The Politics of Global Climate Change

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Transcript The Politics of Global Climate Change

The Politics of Global Climate
Change
Urs Luterbacher
Graduate Institute of International
Studies
Climate Change can be defined
as a Global Common Problem: A
Rival Non-Exclusive Collective
Good
• The Atmosphere is a global common
• Greenhouse gas accumulation demonstrates
the overuse of this global common
Problems due to Greenhouse gas
accumulation
•
•
•
•
Rise in temperatures (not uniform)
Rise in precipitations
Sea level rise
Enhancement of the water cycle: more
extreme events
Theory of Collective Goods and
Theory of the Commons
Commons are non exclusive
collective goods where rivalry is
present
• The importance of jointness: Behavior
driven by average product: F(Nx)/N(x)
• Common as opposed to private marginal
product
Possible Solution to Tragedy
• Privatize the resource to make owner responsible
for costs
Problems with private ownership
• Need institutional structure (usually
legal system) to protect and enforce
individual rights
• Costly
• Some resources difficult to allocate to
individuals or even to groups
• The Atmosphere is such a Resource
• Problem of “Anticommons”
How to overcome tragedy?
• Define a common pool resource but
apply strict regulation
• membership criteria
• rules of use
• define new property rights
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
• The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change signed in Rio in 1992
establishes broad guidelines for climate change
policies but no legal obligations, the only
obligation is an obligation to report emissions
by country
• The Kyoto protocol establishes mandatory
emission reduction targets below 1990 levels
but only for industrialized (Annex I) countries
The Kyoto Targets:
• 5.2 % reduction of emission levels below
1990 levels by 2008-2012 for all
industrialized countries
• specific targets for various countries: US
-7%, EU -8%, Japan -6%, Switzerland -8%
but Australia + 8%, Norway +1%, Iceland
+10%!
• 6 greenhouse gases are considered: CO2,
CH4, N2 O, HFC(hexafluorocarbon),
PFC(perfluocarbon), SF6(sulphur hexaflouride)
Which Instruments to use to
achieve reductions?
• At first, a generalized carbon tax was
envisaged.
• Such a tax raises many problems:
• Who will collect it?
• How can one avoid distortions between countries?
• How can one make sure that goals are achieved:
When property rights are not well defined tax
mechanisms might make things worse
• Such taxes are regressive between and within
countries
The Kyoto Flexible Mechanisms:
an alternative instrument
• Emission reductions can be achieved in a
variety of ways, country specific or through
the use of the so-called Kyoto flexible
mechanisms which are:
• Emissions trading between industrialized
countries
• Joint implementation between industrialized
countries
• The clean development mechanism between
industrialized and developing countries
Several Issues About the Mechanisms
Remain Unresolved
• Will a country be able to achieve all
reductions through the mechanisms?
• How will the mechanisms be implemented?
• Which compliance rules shall be used?
• How will emission rights be allocated?
• How will one account for carbon sinks?
The Kyoto decisions reflect the
interests of major players
• Major rapidly developing countries such as
India, China, and Brazil are not subject to
any obligations
• These countries might benefit from the
mechanisms without having to reduce
emissions via the CDM
• Emissions trading and joint implementation
are there to keep the US involved
• The targets reflect a compromise between
the US and the EU
Can Formal Analysis help us to
understand the climate change
negotiation process?
• Yes, common good analysis tells us that
often players don not have dominant
strategies: there is thus a competition for
first move (players do not want to cooperate
and compete with each other not to be the
first)
• This is why the Kyoto ratification process is
so difficult
A simple illustration of first
move competition and the
absence of equilibrium
Prisoner’sDilemma
Row
C
Chicken
Row
C
C
C
Column
C
C
C
(3,3)
Column
C
C
(3,3)
(1,4)
Row
(4,1)
(2,2)
(2,2)
(4,2)
C
(1,1)
How can one catch the dynamic
evolution of a country’s interests?
• The Nordhaus method:
• Describe the global economic evolution of several
countries involved in transactions with each other
via an integrated model that considers both
economic evolution and climate change
• Define a “Utility” (Interest function) for each
country (for instance in terms of maximizing
consumption)
• Calculate optimal strategies to achieve this
• Do the calculations show whether a country has an
interest or not to collaborate with others on climate
change ?
Calculation of Optimal Strategies
Evolution of Water Consumption
Simulated Values 1960 to 2030
35
Water Consumption
30
25
20
15
10
5
Calculation of Optimal Strategies:
Evolution of Water Consumption of Industria
Sim ulated Values 1960 to 2030
60
Water Consumption
50
40
30
20
W ith Coope
10
W ithout Coo
0
The Role of Non State Actors
• Non State Actors influence negotiations
mostly through their influence on public
opinion within countries
• NGO’s might help to coordinate
information
The Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms
Also Raise Equity Questions
• What is the appropriate distribution of
emission rights?
• What are the criteria?
• What are the equity considerations within
countries?
The Kyoto Protocol is largely
compatible with other global
environmental agreements except
for minor details
• It is largely compatible with the
Biodiversity convention, with the possible
problem of carbon sinks.
• Refrigerant gases are recommended by the
Montreal Protocol on the protection of the
ozone layer and listed as greenhouse gases
by the Kyoto Protocol.
Trade issues could pose problems
• The WTO order is built on the principle of
non-discrimination for like products
• In principle the WTO does not distinguish
between different PPM’s
• Some dispositions of the Kyoto protocol
could be in contradiction with these WTO
principles
• Problem of leakage and gray energy
For small countries it makes
sense to promote international
cooperation
• Make use of the articles of the protocol and do
not attempt to use idiosyncratic methods
• Try to reduce as many emissions abroad as
possible
• Encourage the construction of international
networks
• On these points, Switzerland does not compare
favorably with Norway for instance