Transcript Strength in Unity or in Division? Two logics of

Private Interests versus
Public Debate:
Two logics of collective action in the international
climate change negotiations, 1991-2003
Simone Pulver
Brown University
2008 International Studies Association
Collective action:
Power through organization
“Superior power also means superior ability to defend and reproduce
power. The powerful are fewer in number, are less likely to be
divided among themselves, have a clearer view of what they want
to defend, and have larger resources for organized action, all of
which imply that they are likely to succeed in recreating the initial
situation” (Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980:78)
Extend literature on collective action
1. Transnational collective action
2. Comparative assessment of collective
action by capital and civil society
Research question
• Are capital and civil society groups governed by different
logics of collective action?
• Comparative case study of the oil industry and climate
change advocacy communities, over the course of the
UN climate change negotiations, 1991-2003
•
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Oil industry versus Environmental Community
Associational practices
Shifting institutional terrain
Winners and losers
• Data: Interviews with over 70 oil industry executives,
environmental activists, and climate experts;
participation in 4 rounds of the international climate
change negotiations
Facing climate change
•
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•
Oil Industry
130 companies
15 leading players
6 companies active in
climate debates
Structural/material power
• Utilitarian: profit
• Non-utilitarian: business
versus national identity
Enviro. Community
• 200+ ENGO participants
in UN climate negs.
• 15 active ENGOs in
climate debates
• Discursive power
• Utilitarian: fundraising,
membership, political
access
• Non-utilitarian: shared
goal of climate protection
Associational practices (I)
Split in the oil industry (1997)
Kyoto
protocol
Climate
science
Renewable
energy
Emissions
trading
ENGO
partners
ExxonMobil
CON
BP
PRO
Uncertainties
Precautionary action
NO
NO
NONE
Business line
& Projects
10% by 2010
NO
YES
BLOCKING
SUPPORTING
Associational practices (II)
Climate Action Network (CAN)
(1991-2003)
• 300+ member organizations
• 81 countries
• 20 million members
• US ENGO Environmental
Defense breaks with CAN
over policy differences
• Climate Justice NGOs
organize alternative
Climate Justice Summits
in 2000 and 2002
Shifting institutional terrain
Year
Business
community
Enviro
community
Institutional terrain
1991
United
United
Wait & See vs. Target & Timetables
1992
United
United
Wait & See vs. Target & Timetables
1993
United
United
Wait & See vs. Target & Timetables
1994
Weakly divided
United
Wait & See vs. Target & Timetables
1995
Weakly divided
United
Wait & See vs. Target & Timetables
1996
Weakly divided
United
Wait & See vs. Target & Timetables
1997
Divided
United
Wait & See vs. Target & Timetables
1998
Divided
United
Kyoto implementation
1999
Divided
United
Kyoto implementation
2000
Divided
Weakly divided
Kyoto implementation
2001
Divided
Weakly divided
Kyoto implementation
2002
Divided
Weakly divided
Kyoto implementation
2003
Divided
Weakly divided
Kyoto implementation
Winners and losers
Phase I: 1991-1997
Targets & Timetables
Wait & See
AOSIS
OPEC
European Union
JUSSCANNZ
Oil industry
Global Climate Coalition
Climate Action
Network
Phase II: 1997-2003
KP “out of touch
with reality”
OPEC
ExxonMobil
Climate Justice NGOs
Building carbon
markets
US, Japan, EU
BP, Shell
Environmental Defense
“Plugging
loopholes in KP”
AOSIS
Climate Action
Network
Conclusions
• Business and environmental communities faced
similar challenges in organizing and mobilizing
transnationally
• Fractures were motivated by utilitarian interests
• Discursive power of ENGOs depends on
collective action. Material/structural power of oil
industry persists without collective action