Transcript Pearl Harbor and Modern Mythmaking.

Pearl Harbor and Modern
Mythmaking.
The usefulness of disasters in furthering
political agendas by conspiracy
theorists.
MYTH : The US carriers were hustled out of port
just before the attack, to "save" them for a war
that FDR already knew would be dominated by
the flattop.
FACT: The two carriers then operating from Pearl
Harbor, Enterprise and Lexington, were on
missions to deliver additional fighters to Wake
and Midway. See the document. These
assignments sent the carriers west, toward
Japan and the IJN, widely separated and lightly
escorted.
MYTH : Pearl Harbor was not sent an urgent
message on the morning of Dec. 7th so as to
prevent the fleet from being alerted. Variations
include using commercial telegraph instead of
military radio to transmit the message so as to
delay arrival of the message.
FACT: Atmospheric conditions prevented radio
communications between D.C. and Pearl Harbor.
The choice of commercial telegram, while
possibly not the best means of communication,
was chosen for reasons given to the
investigations.
MYTH : The U.S.N. thought that the
harbor at Pearl Harbor was too
shallow to allow a torpedo attack.
FACT: The document shown is a message from the Chief
Of Naval Operations which states that no harbor is to
be considered safe from torpedo attack. The
consideration at Pearl Harbor, however, was that the
fleet should be ready to sortie on short notice and
removing anti-torpedo netting would slow the units'
exit from the harbor
MYTH : The "Fourteen-part message", which the Japanese
ambassador was supposed to deliver to the U.S. Secretary of
State 1/2 hour before the attack on Pearl Harbor began, was a
declaration of war, or at least a breaking off of diplomatic
relations which would have signaled war.
FACT: The message is not a declaration of war, and did
not even break off diplomatic relations. Beyond a
recapitulation of Japanese grievances against the U.S.,
and the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, there
doesn't seem to be any real point to the message at all.
MYTH : The Captain of USS WARD, on anti-submarine
patrol outside the entrance to Pearl Harbor, sent a
message that he had sunk a submarine over an hour
before the aerial attack began.
FACT: See the file for WARD's actual report to the
ComFOURTEENTH message center. Captain Outerbridge
reports attacking a sub, but not sinking it.
MYTH : The Opana Point Radar reported the Japanese
attack 1 hour before the planes arrived over the harbor,
but Adm. Kimmel refused to do anything about it.
FACT: Pvts. Eliot and Lockard were manning the radar at
Opana Point. They noticed a large blip on the scope and
call in to the as-yet not fully functional Fighter
Information Center. Pvt. McDonald took the call and
located the sole officer at the Center and asked him to
call the operators back. Lt. Kermit Tyler.
“We have wakened a sleeping giant and filled him with
a terrible resolve.”
Toshiro Mifune, NOT Yamamoto Isoruku.
Finally, we enter the realm of
“Magic”.
• From: Washington
• To: Tokyo 1 December 1941
• (Purple) #1227
• Indications are that the United States desires to continue the
negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the
so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the
critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have
been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further
developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint,
to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible
to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have
complete confidence, (for example, Vice President Wallace or
Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye,
who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the
Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for
some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers
should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final
effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their
discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.
• We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to
war or peace.