Transcript US Foreign Policy Between the Wars

US Foreign Policy Between the Wars
Kevin J. Benoy
As the Great War Ended
• Of all combatants, the USA
emerged from the war in
the strongest position.
• Militarily and economically,
she had strengthened her
position enormously during
the war.
• At Paris, Wilson looked as if
he would bring America into
prominence in a new world
order.
• Yet within just a few short
years, the USA would
retreat into isolationism.
No League of Nations Membership
• The USA didn’t
even join the
League of Nations –
Wilson’s pet
project.
• It was a product of
the post-war treaty
process that
America’s Congress
ultimately rejected.
Isolationism?
• This isolationism was not
complete.
• US economic penetration of
Latin America, which took
off during the wartime
period, continued.
• American diplomats still
pressed for an “open door”
trade policy, allowing free
markets for US
manufacturers – though
America also put up tariff
walls to inhibit imports.
Isolationism?
• Americans were not
above threatening strong
action against those who
stood in the way of US
business interests – as
when Mexico considered
nationalizing American
owned oil wells within
the country. Like the UK
in the 19th century, US
rhetoric was Classical
Liberal, but policies were
strongly nationalist.
War Debts
• America insisted on full
repayment -- $12 billion at 5%
interest.
• Europeans hoped for cancellation
– as Britain had cancelled its
allies’ debts at the end of the
Napoleonic Wars. The US was
less generous.
• Eventually a lower interest rate
was allowed, but that was all.
• It was not until the German
financial crisis of 1923 that the US
came to accept that war debts
and reparation payments were
linked.
• High American tariffs also
impeded European efforts to earn
the dollars needed to pay their
debts.
Washington Conference
• Relations were strained in the immediate
post-war years.
• The large US navy was a potential threat to
Britain – paralleling the Anglo German naval
rivalry before WW1.
• A Solution was arrived at in Washington, in
1921-1922.
• Suspicious of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,
the US got a deal whereby the pre-war
alliance was widened into a 4 Power Pact,
joining Britain, the Japan, France and the
USA in a deal to consult over Pacific
problems.
• They also agreed to limit naval sizes to
specific ratios: 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 for Britain,
the US: Japan, France and Italy respectively.
• The agreement ended Anglo-American
hostility, but wrecked Britain’s special
relationship with Japan. France too was
suspicious of Britain and America.
Isolationism
• America’s lack of involvement in
most the bigger international
discussions was oddly out of
step with her financial
involvement.
• Her industrial strength dwarfed
that of other nations –
equivalent to the next 6
countries combined.
• The size of her domestic
economy gave Americans a
sense of self-sufficiency and
they saw little reason to concern
themselves with many global
issues.
• Besides, what direct threats
existed to America anyway?
Isolationism
• A strong US navy was
maintained after the Great
War and a modern air force
was created. The army was
largely wound down
• This allowed sufficient power
to intervene in the so-called
“banana republics” on behalf
of US business interests, but
military expenditures were
minimized.
• Even the US code-breaking
service was eliminated when
Secretary Stimson ended
funding to it, feeling it was no
longer of value.
The Kellogg-Briand Pact
• In 1928 the US made a small foray
into world affairs.
• American and French diplomats
suggested a treaty renouncing war
as a means of settling disputes
between the two powers.
• The idea was wildly popular and
had great traction in an election
year.
• Amid great fanfare, the treaty was
enlarged to include other nations.
• Signed in Paris on August 27, 1928,
the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawed
war except in cases of self
defense.
• Then America again withdrew into
self-satisfied isolation.
Threats to Peace - Asia
• In the 1930s. America’s old
Pacific nemesis, Japan,
flagrantly violated
international law when it
invaded Manchuria.
• President Roosevelt
condemned the action, but
refused to join in economic
sanctions or to do anything
that might lead to military
confrontation with Japan.
• Domestic trouble
strengthened isolationism.
America First
• Isolationism was enshrined
in legislation:
– In 1934 Congress banned
loans to any foreign
government defaulting on
war debts.
– In 1935 the US resolved not
to sell arms to any nation
involved in a war.
– Later legislation forbade loans
to combatant nations.
• Such neutralist legislation
made matters worse.
Britain and France were
weakened in their resolve to
stand up to fascist
aggression
America First
• When Italy
invaded
Ethiopia,
Roosevelt
condemned the
action, but US
oil shipments
to Italy actually
increased.
America First
• It was not until 1937
that American policy
makers began to shift
positions – and only
gradually, as Charles
Lindbergh and his
America First
movements still had
considerable traction.
Shifting Policy
• Roosevelt and others came
to understand that threats
were evolving in Europe and
Asia.
• Secret naval talks began
with Britain about the
German and Japanese
threats.
• The cynical Japanese attack
on an American patrol
vessel, the Panay, in China,
made the Japanese menace
real to many.
Shifting Policy
• Military aircraft
production doubled.
• By 1940 there was a
further commitment to
double naval strength
and to increase the
army from an
insignificant force to
over 1 million men.
On the Eve of War
• US tardiness in preparing for
war was noted in both Berlin
and Tokyo.
• Hitler calculated that growing
American power would not
prove a hinderance until the mid
1940s.
• Japan was more precise in its
estimation. They felt:
– By 1941 Japanese navel strength
would be 70% that of the US.
– By 1942 it would be 65%.
– By 1943 it would be 50%.
– By 1944 it would be 30%.
• Both Germany and Japan had a
powerful incentive to act before
the “sleeping giant,” as Admiral
Yamamoto called it, awoke.
finis