Transcript Slide 1

The Future of American
Religion to 2050
Vegard Skirbekk
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA),
Eric Kaufmann
Birkbeck College (U. London) & Harvard KSG Belfer Center
Anne Goujon
IIASA
Context and Data
• US Census Bureau Race Projections to
2050
• No census question
• But can use large surveys (GSS), plus
census and immigration statistics
• Pew 2007, 2008 surveys for small groups
Methodology
• Cohort Component Projections
• Multi-State Projection (PDE) Software
• Inputs (for each group, by 5 yr age bands
and sex):
– Base Population
– Total Fertility Rate (TFR)
– Net conversion/apostasy per year
– Net immigration per year
– Mortality (standard)
Resident
population
Catholic
Hispanic
8.1%
Jewish
1.7%
Hindu/
Buddhist 0.9%
Muslim
0.4%
Other
4.1%
Catholic nonHispanic
19.5%
No Religion
15.0%
Protestant Black
9.7%
Protestant
Liberal
10.4%
Net
Muslim
immigrants 8.4%
Protestant
Fundamentalist
20.6%
Protestant
Moderate
9.5%
Other
12.9%
Protestant
Fundamentalist
5%
Hindu/
Buddhist
9.6%
Protestant
Moderate
0.7%
Jewish
0.01%
Catholic
Hispanic
34.8%
No
Religion
16.8%
Catholic
nonHispanic
10.3%
Protestant
Liberal
0.7%
Protestant
Black
0.8%
• Immigration based on
numbers acquiring
citizenship in 2003-6
(Homeland Security)
• 1.2m per year
• Faith of immigrants
computed from source
countries x religious
composition of source
countries (CIA Fact
Book)
• Catholic and Other
overrepresented,
Protestants
underrepresented
Fertility and
Population Share,
2003-43
Proportion of Jews and Muslims in the American Population
and Electorate (Constant Scenario)
2.5%
2.0%
Jewish, age 20+
1.5%
Jewish
1.0%
Muslim
0.5%
Muslim, age 20+
0.0%
2003
2008
Source: GSS; Author’s calculations
2013
2018
2023
2028
2033
2038
2043
White Voting Age Population
35%
30%
Fundamentalist
Protestants
No Religion
25%
Catholics
20%
Moderate
Protestants
15%
10%
Liberal
Protestants
5%
Jews
0%
2003
2008
2013
2018
2023
2028
2033
2038
2043
Fertility and
Population Share,
2003-43
Conversion
Migration
Fertility Differentials
Constant
Constant
H0
Zero
H3
Constant
H2
Doubles
Half
Zero
H1
H7
H4
Constant
H5
Converging
Zero
H6
No Religion
Fundamentalist Protestants
50
50
45
45
H0 BS
H1 BS
40
40
H2 BS
H3 BS
35
H4 BS
35
H5 BS
30
30
25
25
2003 2008 2013
2018 2023 2028
2033 2038 2043
2003
2008
2013
2018
2023
2028
2033
2038
2043
Ethnoreligious Categories by Religious Attitude (%)
AntiHomosexuality
Anti-Abortion
Jewish
28
7
Hindu/Buddhist
33
13
No Religion
37
12
Other non-Christian
50
21
Muslim
55
33
Liberal Protestant
55
23
Moderate Protestant
59
27
‘White’ Catholic
64
20
Black Protestant
66
30
Hispanic Catholic
72
24
Fundamentalist Protestant
74
33
Total
59
24
Source: GSS 2000-2006
Total Fertility Rate by Religious Attitudes, 2003
Fundamentalist
vs. Liberal
Protestant
Fundamentalist
vs. No Religion
Homosexuality
Always Wrong
(Y/N)
Abortion
Always
Wrong (Y/N)
Traditionalist TFR
2.13
2.13
2.50
2.47
Modernist TFR
1.84
1.66
1.98
1.83
Difference in percent
16
28
52
64
Source: GSS 2000-2006
Traditionalist-Modernist Fertility Gap,
Children Ever Born (CEB), for Women 40-59
Homosexuality Always Wrong (Y/N)
Abortion Always Wrong (Y/N)
pre-1985
1.22
1.11
1986-95
1.28
1.16
1996-2006
1.38
1.21
Source: GSS 1972-2006
Projected Trends in Opinion Under Various Scenarios
Constant
Fertility gap
80%
70%
Fertility
convergence
60%
Oppose abortion
50%
40%
Constant
Fertility gap
Oppose
homosexuality
30%
Fertility
convergence
20%
10%
1983
2003
2023
2043
2063
2083
2103
Constant (H0)
Migration doubles
(H1)
Fertility converges
(H2)
No migration (H4)
No migration, fertility
converges (H6)
Migration half (H7)
Constant (H0)
Migration doubles
(H1)
Fertility converges
(H2)
No migration (H4)
No migration, fertility
converges (H6)
Migration half (H7)
Conclusions: Market Share
• Main drivers to 2043 are immigration and
secularization, fertility matters more long term
• Conversion favours Fundamentalist Protestants but is
not large enough to compensate for immigration of
Hispanic Catholics and rise of No Religion
• Fundamentalist Protestants will decrease in total,
among whites, and among voters
• Muslims will outnumber Jews by approximately 2020
• Jews, white Catholics and liberal Protestants will
decline
• Protestants decline from a majority in 2003 to 40
percent by 2043; Catholics may outnumber
Protestants by mid-century
Conclusions: Religiosity
• Seculars will increase their share of the white
population but not of the total population
• Secularization will plateau by 2043 and will
reverse thereafter.
• Secular-Religious Fertility differences between
partisans on opposite sides of 'culture war' issues
are substantial and growing
• Opinion on abortion is likely to become more prolife
• Attitudes regarding homosexuality will be stable,
reflecting more liberal attitudes among younger
cohorts but more conservative attitudes among
demographically-growing groups
The Future of American
Religion to 2050
Vegard Skirbekk
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA),
Eric Kaufmann
Birkbeck College (U. London) & Harvard KSG Belfer Center
Anne Goujon
IIASA