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Case Study: Somalia
Bianca Chan
Ji Hyun Rhim
Matilda Ronning
Chenyu Yao
Outline
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Historical background
Action taken by the international community
Tipping points and important decisions
Failures of the international community
Nicholas Wheeler’s Theory of Human
Intervention and Somalia
• Somalia today
• Conclusion
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
About Somalia(‫)الصومال‬
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Location: Horn of Africa
Capital: Mogadishu
Population:700 thousand
Resources: poor in profitable natural
resources, poorly developed economic
infrastructure after independence
• Clan system
History
Late nineteenth century:
the British and Italians
established British
Somaliland and Italian
Somaliland
1941:Northern
Somalia remain a
protectorate, while
southern Somalia
became a
trusteeship
1960: the union
of the two
regions into the
independent
Somali Republic
under a civilian
government
History 2
1969: Mohamed Siad Barre
seized power in 1969 and
established the Somali
Democratic Republic, and
ruled Somalia in a brutal and
discriminatory way
1991: Somalia
Civil War;
Barre's
government
collapsed
Since1991:
No central
and
internationall
y recognized
government
exists
Siad Barre and Somalia Civil War
• Supreme Revolutionary Council
(SRC)-Somali Revolutionary
Socialist Party (SRSP)
• renamed the country the Somali
Democratic Republic
• Brutal communist, totalitarian
rule
• 1986: attacked clan-based
dissident groups opposed to his
rule
-> used special forces, the "Red
Berets“
• Eventually ousted by combined
northern and southern clanbased forces, all of whom were
backed and armed by Ethiopia.
Those against Siad Barre
• Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)
• United Somali Congress (USC)
• Somali National Movement (SNM)
• Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
• together with non-violent political oppositions:
• Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)
• Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)
• Somali Manifesto Group (SMG)
After Siad Barre
President
Ali Mahdi Muhammad
• selected by the
manifesto group as an
interim state president
Opposition
• United Somali Congress
military leader General
Mohamed Farrah Aidid
• Somali National Movement
leader Abdirahman Ahmed
Ali Tuur
• Somali Patriotic Movement
leader Colonel Ahmed Omar
Jess
• refused to recognize Mahdi
as president
Propaganda leaflet depicting a white dove of
peace being crushed by a fist labeled "USC/SNA"
("United Somali Congress/Somali National
Alliance").
UN situation
• Growing criticism of the UN role
• Too preoccupied with the Iraq crisis and the
developing war in the former Yugoslavia to
busy itself with civil war
American situation
• Ceased to have any strategic significance at the
end of the cold war
• Too preoccupied with the situation in Iraq, the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the
collapse of the former Yugoslavia to give much
attention to the plight of Somalis
• Bush vs. Clinton
• American people were sympathetic towards the
suffering Somalis vs. After soldiers faced fire from
armed clans and 19 soldiers were killed in 1993 in
the Battle of Mogadishu
ACTION TAKEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
Action taken by the international
community
• November 1991 - March 1992: UN’s
humanitarian agencies withdrew from Somalia
out of fear for the security of UN personnel
• UN Security Council authorized sending of 50
unarmed observers to monitor ceasefire as
well as 500 peacekeepers to assist with
delivery of humanitarian aid
Action taken by the international
community
• 1992 US’s first course of action to help
Somalia crisis: airlifts food to Somalia
Operation Provide Relief
• April 1992-March 1993
• Led by United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I)
• The Air Force C-130s delivered 48,000 tons of food and
medical supplies in six months to international
humanitarian organizations in Somalia
• 50 UN military observers to make sure food wasn’t
stolen
• UN oversaw ceasefire
• Unsuccessful
• 100,000 lives were saved as a result of outside
assistance, about 10,000 after the United States join
Operation Restore Hope
• December 1992 - May 1993
• Led by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF)
• To make environment safe to deliver assistance
• UNITAF was followed by the United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II)
• Raid in Mogadishu to make area safe for aid
• Military supervised aid process
• Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia
• Addis Ababa Agreement
• Worst of starvation over by March 1993
• Humanitarian success!!
Operation Continue Hope
• March 1993-March 1995
• Led by UNOSOM II
• An estimated quarter of a million lives were
saved
• Revived the Somali police: some 8,000 were
deployed in 82 district stations
• By March 1995, there were 46 district courts,
11 regional courts and 11 appeals courts
TIPPING POINTS AND IMPORTANT
DECISIONS
Important decisions
• Resolution 733: enabled the council to authorize
an arms embargo under chapter 7 of the charter
• Resolution 733, 746: led to the creation of
UNOSOM I to provide humanitarian relief and
help restore order in Somalia after the dissolution
of its central government
• Resolution 794: unanimously passed on
December 3, 1992 to form UNITAF, to ensure
distribution of humanitarian aid and
establishment of Somalia.
Negotiations
Addis Ababa Agreement
• Some difficult negotiations
in Somalia between UN
Special Envoy, Aidid, and Ali
Mahdi
• The principles of a ceasefire
were agreed
• Overly optimistic as
Mogadishu collapsed into a
state of general lawlessness
Mohamed Sahnoun
• Sahnoun did a lot to see the
clan system and secured
the support of the clan
elders
• Strengthened his bargaining
leverage with the warlords
• But the secretary general
pushed a more forcible way
to solve the problem quickly
The Bush Administration and
‘Operation Restore Hope’
• Telegram from US Ambassador in Kenya
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Bill Clinton’s criticism towards Bush for his foreign – policy
failures over Somalia and Bosnia
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Bush’s personal reaction to the stories of the suffering of
the Somalis
• Sustained media coverage on Somalia
• Support from US public
FAILURES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
Failures of International Society
United States:
• The intervention was too late
• Worst part of the famine already over
• Biggest threat was diseases, not starvation
• More lives could have been saved
• Too much force put into finding Aidid
• Many civilians killed in the search
• No previous warning given before the raid against Abdi house
(which was thought to been Aidid’s command and control center)
– The Somalias killed was estimated to 10.000 by US intelligence, while Adid
says it was 13.000
• Resulted in a distrust of US and UN, and a growing support of Adid
Was the use of military force really
necessary?
• Sahnoun’s approach to solve the situation
– Make the clan-leaders cooperate and weaken the power of the
warlords
– Some argue that the attempt was stopped at the time when it had just
started to show results
• The promise of disarmament, March 27
– Even though 14 warlords signed the agreement of a disarmament
within 90 days, it actually never took place
– Instead they were told that they could keep their heavy weapons if
they moved them into UN monitored containment areas or
Mogadishu.
– The disarmament didn’t happen mainly because it would have taken
too much time and US wasn’t ready to comit and stay in Somalia for
the time period needed.
Operation Gothic Serpent
aka. “Black Hawk Down,” Battle of Mogadishu
• October 3-4, 1993
• Part of Operation Continue Hope
• 18 U.S. soldiers were killed (1 more killed two
days later in a separate incident)
• The United States continued operations until
March 25, 1994, when U.S. forces withdrew
and was replaced by forces from India,
Pakistan, Malaysia and Egypt
The early withdrawal by US and UN
• US withdrawal
• Operational Gothic Serpent
• Withdrew in early 1994
• Eager to hand over everything to UN
• Did not stay long enough to be able to help in
creating institutions such as idenpendent police
and judicary
• UN withdrawal
• Tried to rebuild Somalia and restore legitimate
authority – but failed
• Finally withdrew from Somalia by February 1995
Somalia Today
• The situation in Somalia is still unstable
• No central government have had control over
the whole country since 1991
• Considered a failed state
Problems
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No central government
Civil war
Informal economy
Religious extremists
Drought
Piracy
The Government
• Transitional Federal Government
• Internationally recognized
• Only have control over parts of the capital and some territories int
the center of Somalia
• Have reestablished National Insistutions
– Militairy of Somalia etc.
• The north-west part of Somalia, Somaliland
• Self-declared but unrecognized state
• Relatively stable
• The north-east part, Puntland
• Declared an autonomous state in 1998 and its leaders
• Considering themselves to be independent
• Al-Shabaab
• Controls most part of the South
The Islamic Courts Union (ICU)
• Controlled most part of southern Somalia until the end of
2006, and also the capital Mogadishu
• Lost their territory in December 2006
• After this loss some of the hardline Islamists from ICU formed
other militant groups, such as Al-Shabaab
• By January 2009 a reconciliation and deal was done between
the TFG and Djibouti contingent from former ICU
• Resulted in expansion of parliament
• And the former leader of ICU, Sheik Sharif Ahmed, became President of
TFG in an election in 2009 – still president today
Al-Shabaab
• Islamic militant organization
• Controls large parts of southern
Somalia
• Using force and terrorist tactics
in order to gain control
• In February 2008 they were added to US’s list of foreign
terrorist organizations
Economy
• According to the CIA and the Central Bank of
Somalia:
– Somalia have a quite healthy informal
economy based on mainly livestock
– remittance/money transfer companies
– telecommunications
• GDP per capita: $600 (2010)
GDP
GDP in current U.S. dollars. Only until 1990.
GDP
US: $114.119 trillion, Japan: $5.069 trillion
GDP Growth Rate
Percentage change of real GDP compared to previous year.
Industry
It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water,
and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and
subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for
depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural
resources.
Drought in Somalia
Data from 2006
• Around 1.5 million people in Somalia are in acute
state of food crisis
• Water storage areas have dried up
• Crop production is estimated to be the lowest in over
a decade
• Big problems with cattle deaths
• Displacement of around 400, 000 people
– Everyday up to 2000 Somalia refugees are
migrating into Ethiopia
NICHOLAS WHEELER’S THEORY OF
HUMAN INTERVENTION AND SOMALIA
Solidarism
• States should satisfy certain basic
requirements of decency before
they qualify for the protection
which the principle of nonintervention provides (28)
• committed to upholding
minimum standards of common
humanity (38)
• State leaders have a responsibility
to protect the security and wellbeing of their citizens (49)
• State leaders override their
primary responsibility not to
place their citizens in danger (51)
Solidarist Theory of Legitimate
Humanitarian Intervention
Four Minimum Requirements/
Threshold Criteria
Four Additional Criteria
• Supreme humanitarian
emergency
• Necessity/ Last Resort
• Proportionality
• Positive Humanitarian
Outcome
• Humanitarian Motives
• Humanitarian
Justifications
• Legality
• Selectivity
Supreme Humanitarian Emergency
• “A supreme emergency exists when the danger is
so imminent, the character of the threat so
horrifying, and when there is no other option
available to assure the survival of a particular
moral community than violating the rule against
targeting civilians.” (50)
• Crimes against humanity-genocide, mass murder,
state breakdown, and ethnic cleansing
• Michael Bazyler-“Intervening nation or nations
need not wait for the killings to start if there is
clear evidence of an impending massacre” (34)
Somalia (1991-1992)
• Ongoing civil war:
• More than 20,000 people
killed in battle (Sept. 1991Dec. 1991)
• Outside of battle:
• Starvation; over 3 million
suffering
• Massive death; 500,000 dead
• Displacement; 1.5 million
displaced
• 80% of food aid stolen
Humanitarian Motives and
Justification
• “Governments that justify intervention in
humanitarian terms establish a normative
benchmark against which we can judge their
subsequent actions.” (39)
– Actions following claims are more important than the
claims themselves
• Mona Fixdal & Dan Smith- humanitarian
intervention is “just if it produces a surplus of
good over harm-taking all affected parties into
consideration. (36)
Somalia (1992-1993)
Motives
Justifications
• Somalia operation
perceived as relatively
risk- free and shortterm
• Bush wanted to deflect
attention from his
inaction over Bosnia
• Media and pressure
from US public
• Declared Supreme
Humanitarian
Emergency
• Somalia didn’t have any
resources that was
wanted politically
• Major operations in
Somalia
Legality
• “Promotion of human rights is as important a
purpose in the Charter as is the control of
international conflict.” (Teson, 42)
Somalia (1992-1993)
• After collapse of the Siad Barre government in
1991-> anarchy
• “the unique character of the present situation in
Somalia and mindful of its deteriorating, complex,
and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate
and exceptional response.” (186)
• “not a case of intervention against the will of the
government, but of intervention when there is a
lack of government.” (186)
• No government, no problems with legality
Selectivity
• “Considerations of prudence do not
determine the moral agenda, but they do
condition its treatment.” (48)
• There were elements of self-interest involved,
but it was largely out of humanitarian interest.
Somalia
• No country had an agenda that would
undermine the humanitarian purposes of
intervention
• No resources
• No political imposition
• Too much media coverage and public
sympathy to allow another agenda
Proportionality
• Nigel Rodley- “Gravity and extent of the
violations be on a level commensurate with
the reasonably calculable loss of life,
destruction of property [and] expenditure of
resources.” (35)
• Are civilian losses avoided as much as possible?
Casualties
United Nations
• UNOSOM I: 8 deaths out of 54
military observers and 893
military personnel
• UNITAF: 46 deaths (43 US
forces), 156 wounded (153 US)
out of 37,000 personnel
• UNOSOM II: 147 deaths (143
military personnel, 3
international civilian staff and
1 local staff) out of 28,000
personnel, including 22,000
troops and 8,000 logistic and
civilian staff
Somalis
• September 1991: over 20,000
killed or injured by the end of the
year
• 1991-1992: 300,000 deaths, 1.5
million people starving
• UNOSOM I: 500,000 deaths
• UNOSOM II:
Attack on Aidid safehouse-60
civilian deaths, 4 journalists dead
Battle of Mogadishu-number
unknown (estimations range from
several hundreds to over a
thousand killed), 3,000-4,000
wounded, estimated 200 civilian
deaths
Expenditure
• UNOSOM I: $42,931,700 net, 48,000 tons of
food and medical supplies
• UNITAF/ UNOSOM II: $1,643,485,500 net
Positive Humanitarian Outcome
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RESCUE
Success of intervention in
ending the supreme
humanitarian emergency
(37)
Fairly successful
Operation Provide Relief
Operation Restore Hope
Millions saved from
starvation
Revival of police and courts
Partial revival of
infrastructure
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PROTECT/RESTORATION
How far humanitarian
addresses the underlying
political causes that
produced human right
abuses (37)
Failed to address the root of
the problems in Somalia
Failed to disarm or capture
Aidid
Made no progress in
restructuring the
government
Could not end civil war
Nicholas Wheeler’s Conclusions (52)
• There is a responsibility to protect
• Justifications, legality, and selectivity have
progressively better humanitarian
qualifications BUT, all three don’t have to be
met.
• Governments should be prepared to risk and
lose soldiers’ lives for primarily humanitarian
reasons
CONCLUSION
Solidarist Theory of Legitimate
Humanitarian Intervention
Four Minimum Requirements/
Threshold Criteria
• Supreme humanitarian
emergency
• Necessity/ Last Resort
• Proportionality
• Positive Humanitarian
Outcome
Four Additional Criteria
• Humanitarian Motives
• Humanitarian
Justifications
• Legality
• Selectivity
Significance of Somalia
• The case study of Somalia was significant because it was
the turning point of humanitarian intervention, validating
the responsibility to protect as a customary law
– Customary law. “If over a period of time, states begin to act in a
certain way and come to regard that behavior as being required
by law, a norm of customary international law has developed.”
(44)
• Also demonstrated what is needed in a humanitarian
intervention
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Cultural sensitivity
Commitment
Time
Balance
Links
• CNN Coverage 2010:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hHTKyAEl
6b8
• Black Hawk Down Trailer:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tnV6wMvd9s
• Drought in Somalia:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8mK_myt
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