Transcript Andre Ulied, Mcrit Ltd., Spain and Philippe Doucet, Free

Scenarios and Vision for the European Territory in 2050
Andreu Ulied, Phillipe Doucet, Roberta Capello,
Klaus Speakermann, Jacek Szlachta, Oriol Biosca
www.et2050.eu
ESPON MC Meeting, Aalborg, June, 2012
ET2050 Consortium
ESPON CU
Sara Ferrara
Marjan van Herwijnen
Sounding Board
Patrick Salez
Karl Peter Schon
MCRIT, LP
Andreu Ulied
Oriol Biosca
Rafael Rodrigo
POLIMI
Roberto Camagni
Roberta Capello
Ugo Fratesi
TERSYN
Jacques Robert
IOM
Marek Kupiszewski
Dorota Kupiszewska
IGEAT
Phillipe Doucet
Moritz Lennert
Valérie Biot
Jean-Michel Decroly
RIKS
Jaspers de Vliet
Hedwig van Delden
RKK
Ivan Illes
Katalin Süle
S&W
Michael Wegener
Klaus Speakermann
Nordregio
Alexandre Dubois
University of Thessaly (UTH)
Harry Coccosis
WSE
Jacek Szlachta
ISIS
Carlo Sessa
ERSILIA
Jaume Jorba
ET2050 Objective
Supporting policy makers in
formulating a VISION
long-term integrated and
coherent, for the development
of the EU territory from 2010
up to 2050.
ET2050 Methodology
Scientifically-driven (what may happen in the future?)
Politically-driven (what we would like to happen?)
ET2050 Methodology
Scientifically-driven (what may happen in the future?)
Politically-driven (what we would like to happen?)


ET2050 Methodology
Scientifically-driven (what may happen in the future?)
Politically-driven (what we would like to happen?)
e.g.
tow s
e.g.
borders
Works carried out towards Baseline (First Interim Report)
1. Analysis of Present State (16 reports)
•
•
•
By Sectors (demography, economy, energy, transport, land-uses, environment, governance)
By Territories (9 macro-zones covering EU+NC)
By European Policies (Cohesion, Agricultural, Transport, Environment…)
2. Critical Bifurcations ahead
(aprox. 25)
3. Definition of Key Directions (aprox. 15 Trends + 15 Policies)
4. Comparison of Baseline Scenarios (aprox. 100 future-oriented studies)
5. Foresight exercise (indicators at World/EU scale (1950-2050, 10+50 indicators)
6. Forecast exercise (indicators at NUTS3)
•
Sectoral models (MULTPOLES, MASST, MOSAIC-TT, METRONAMICA)
and Integrated model (SASI)
7. Analysis of results and adjustment of Baseline Scenario
Critical Bifurcations
“Europe in a cross-roads”
Critical Bifurcation
Federalisme (Superstate)
Structural Reforms / Voluntarist Scenario
Limited Federalisme
Wellfare (in average)
Limited Reforms / Likely Scenario (Most Win)
Euro-crisis
Break-up
Worse-case Scenario for ST (All Lost)
1992
2012
2020
2050
Critical Bifurcation
Federalisme (Superstate)
Structural Reforms / Voluntarist Scenario
Limited Federalisme
Wellfare (in average)
Limited Reforms / Likely Scenario (Most Win)
Baseline
BAU (no Reforms) / Consensus Scenario
Euro-crisis
Break-up
Worse-case Scenario (All Lost)
1992
2012
2020
2050
5 Critical Bifurcations
Overall level of agreement and disagreement
Towards multiple-speed
Europe
Increasing Urbanisation
Growing disparities
Decarbonisation only in
the very long term
No economic structural
transformations
0%
20%
40%
Agree
60%
Disagree
80%
100%
Building Blocks for the Baseline Scenario
A metamodel to foresight
indicators aggregated at European level 2030-2050
Baseline Reference World Indicators
• Population: 9.200 M (Europe from 15% in 1950 to 7% today and 6% in 2050)
• Urban population: 69% (Europe 89% in 2050)
• GDP: € 135.000 billion (Europe from 39% in 1950 to 30% today and 18% in 2050)
• Trade: € 154.000 billion (Europe from 17% in 1950 to 15% today and 9% in 2050)
• Maritime transport: € 145.000 billion ton·km (average 3,7% annual growth, EU 2%)
• Air transport: € 32.000 billion RPK (average 5,0% annual growth, EU 3,5%)
• Tourism: 3.250 million visitors (Europe from 90% in 1950, 45% today and 27% 2050)
• Energy Consumption: 24.300 MTOE (Europe 28% in 1950, 17% today, 9% in 2050)
• CO2 emissions: 64.000 Mton (Europe from 18% in 1950, 15% today, and 5% in 2050)
Baseline Reference World Indicators
Overall EU role in the World 1950-2050 (Europe's share in the World)
100%
Population
Tourism
GDP
Energy consumption
Trade
CO2
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
Baseline Key Directions to 2050
• Ageing Population: 540 Minh (>65 from 16% to 27%, stable migration 1,5 M/year)
• Relative Economic Decline: €24.000billion (from 2,3% growth 1970-2010 to 1,4%)
• Growing inequities: 10% with higher GDP/capita captures more GDP growth
• Insufficient Technologic Innovation: R&D budget around 2% of GDP
• More diversified energy sources: 26% RES (Oil price from € 67 / barrel to € 138)
• Climate Change: 35% GHG reduction since 1990 (80% reduction target in force)
• Subverted proximities: 8.600 Bpaxkm within EU (0,7%), 7.000 Btnkm (1,6%) Gateways
• Increasing Urbanisation: 90% urban pop. (50 cities>1 Minh), periurbanisation
• Towards a Multiple-Speed Europe: limited territorial governance structures, EU 1%
• Limited public expenditure (50% 2010, 40% 2050), Public Debt (70% to 50%)
• Not significant progress in relation to the Territorial Agenda main goals
Baseline Key Directions to 2050 (population)
European Population (m illions of people)
600,0
Europe population
500,0
400,0
300,0
200,0
100,0
0,0
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
% aged 65 or more
Population Ageing (People Older than 65 years (%))
30,0%
25,0%
20,0%
15,0%
10,0%
5,0%
0,0%
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
Baseline Key Directions to 2050 (economy)
Retirem ent age
Retirement age
64,5
64,0
63,5
63,0
62,5
62,0
61,5
61,0
60,5
60,0
59,5
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
EU27 GDP (1000 m ilions of 2010 €)
25.000,00
2030
2040
2050
European GDP
20.000,00
15.000,00
10.000,00
5.000,00
0,00
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
Baseline Key Directions to 2050 (energy&environment)
Energy Consumption
Prim ary energy consum ption (MTOE)
2.000,0
1.800,0
1.600,0
1.400,0
1.200,0
1.000,0
800,0
600,0
400,0
200,0
0,0
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
% aged
or more
CO2 65
Emissions
Total CO2 em issions (1990=100)
120,0
100,0
80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0
0,0
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
Baseline Key Directions to 2050 (transport)
Total passenger·km (1000Mpax·km )
9.000,0
Passenger transport
8.000,0
7.000,0
6.000,0
5.000,0
4.000,0
3.000,0
2.000,0
1.000,0
0,0
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
Total freight tonne·km (1000Mt·km )
8.000,0
2030
2040
2050
Freight transport
7.000,0
6.000,0
5.000,0
4.000,0
3.000,0
2.000,0
1.000,0
0,0
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
Baseline Key Directions to 2050 (urbanisation)
% Urban Population
EU27 Urban Population (% over total population)
100,0%
90,0%
80,0%
70,0%
60,0%
50,0%
40,0%
30,0%
20,0%
10,0%
0,0%
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
EU27 Num ber of cities > 1 m illion inhabitants
6000,0%
2020
2030
2040
2050
Num. Cities > 1 million
5000,0%
4000,0%
3000,0%
2000,0%
1000,0%
0,0%
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
Baseline Key Directions to 2050 (public finances)
Government expenditure
Governm ent expenditure (as % of GDP)
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
European Public Debt (% of GDP)
0,8
2030
2040
2050
European Debt
0,7
0,6
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
0,0
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
Europe 2030 Reflexion Group
“The challenges we face
today are different to those
of the past and call for
different responses. Whether
we look at relative
demographic and economic
decline, climate change or
energy shortages the
challenges can only be
properly understood and
tackled when situated in a
regional and global
context… …the choice for
the EU is clear: reform or
decline”.
Baseline ESPON 3.2
Demography
Population Ageing
Stable total European population
Increasing, globally controlled external migration  ET2050: slight decrease
Economy
Moderate GDP increase  ET2050: low at 1’4%
Slowly increasing total activity rate
Slowly growing R&D expenditure  ET2050: stable at 2%
Decreasing public expenditure
Energy
Steady increase of energy prices
Stable or decreasing European consumption
Increasing use of renewables
Transport
Continued growth of traffic  ET2050: urban decoupling, higher trade
Increase of infrastructure, below needs  ET2050: PPP, better management
Baseline ESPON 3.2
Climate Change
Moderate overall climate change
Increase in extreme local events
Moderate emission levels due to new technologies  ET2050: steep decrease
but 80% targets not met
Spatial development
Further diversification of functions of rural areas; stronger dependence
upon the residential economy and new forms of tourism
 ET2050 Increasing urbanisation and periurbanisation
 ET2050 IIncreasing polarisation
Governance
Increasing co-operation in cross-border regions  ET2050: low cooperation
Increase in multi-level cross-sectoral approaches  ET2050: corporate governance
Enlargements: Western Balkans (2020), Turkey (2030)  ET2050: only Balkans
 ET2050 Multiple-speed Europe (variable geometry, very limited federalism)
 ET2050 high impact of EU policies –Structural and Cohesion Funds
Technology
 ET2050 No technologic radical shift (gradual improvement)
1) European national economies will not be able to adjust to structural
transformations in the short term
The current economic crisis will still last for a number of years, increasing the gap
between more and less developed regions in Europe, and reducing the level of trade
between European countries while increasing the trade of each Member State with the
rest of the World.
Fully agree
Mostly
agree
Rather
disagree
Absolutely
disagree
Public
Administrations
Universities
Consultants
Average
2) Europe will become decarbonised only in the very long term
Decarbonisation will be a slow process lasting for a number of decades. Renewable sources and
more efficiency on the distribution and use of energy will reduce the energy-intensity and carbonintensity of the economy, but fossil fuels will still be the most important energy source in the coming
decades and the energetic dependency of European countries will still increase. Continuous
increases of energy prices are expected.
Fully agree
Mostly
agree
Rather
disagree
Absolutely
disagree
Public
Administrations
Universities
Consultants
Average
3) Growing disparities in Europe
Disparities will grow in Europe. Social inequalities at local or regional level will become
larger. Public support to less developed regions and neighbourhoods will become
scarcer and will produce limited, sometimes even contradictory, effects.
Fully agree
Mostly
agree
Rather
disagree
Absolutely
disagree
Public
Administrations
Universities
Consultants
Average
4) Increasing urbanization in Europe
Territorial patterns will be heterogeneous and diverse in a general tendency
towards more relaxed land regulations, especially in less developed regions.
Increasing land occupation and increasingly mixed urban and rural uses.
Fully agree
Mostly
agree
Rather
disagree
Absolutely
disagree
Public
Administrations
Universities
Consultants
Average
5) Towards a multiple speed Europe
There will not be a deep reform of European governance structures towards federalism,
but limited adjustments. There will be a general move towards different levels of political
integration between countries in a multiple speed Europe.
Fully agree
Mostly
agree
Rather
disagree
Absolutely
disagree
Public
Administrations
Universities
Consultants
Average
Overall level of agreement and disagreement
Towards multiple-speed
Europe
Increasing Urbanisation
Growing disparities
Decarbonisation only in
the very long term
No economic structural
transformations
0%
20%
40%
Agree
60%
Disagree
80%
100%
“Too seek Europe, is to make it!
Europe exists through its search for the infinit
-and this is what I call adventure”
Zygmunt Bauman, “An Adventure called Europe”
Explorative Scenarios
ESPON3.2 (mid 2000s)
e.g.
region s
e.g.
flows
ESPON 3.2
e.g.
region s
Europe 2030 (CPRM 2002)
Europe 2030 (CPRM 2002)
e.g.
flows
France 2020
(DATAR 2002)
e.g.
flows
e.g.
tow s
e.g.
cities
e.g.
region s
Territoires 2040
(DATAR 2011)
e.g.
flows
e.g.
region s
e.g.
cities
Netherlands 2040 (SPB 2010)
e.g.
tow s
e.g.
region s
e.g.
cities
e.g.
flows
Urban development scenarios 2025 (PLUREL 2008)
e.g.
cities
e.g.
flows
e.g.
tow s
e.g.
region s
e.g.
borders
Example of strategic scenarios
Global Scenarios 2050 (PASHMINA, 2010)
e.g.
flows
e.g.
flows
e.g.
cities
e.g.
cities
e.g.
tow s
e.g.
borders
e.g.
region s
e.g.
tow s
e.g.
region s
Review of Scenarios
Triumphant Markets
Shared Responsibilities
Turbulent Neighbourhoods
Urban Colonies
Good Intentions
Policy First
Sustainability First
The World Wakes Up
Backlash
I'm in love w ith my car
Moonlight ride in a Diesel
Cohesion-oriented (Danubean Europe)
Know ledge is King
Convulsive Change
Transatlantic Market
Global Economy
Enhancing the European potential
Energy-efficient Europe
Business as usual?
The Pro-active scenario ("Green Economy")
Gradual response to climate change + high levels of State
Rapid response to climate change + low levels of State
Cybertopia
A Passive mean World
Trend Scenario by NEAA
Planned-opolis
Renew -abad
Pear World
Orange World
Nobody cares: standstill in European integration
EU renaissance: further European integration
Cosmopolitan Centres
Metropolitan Markets
Fast Forw ard
Slow Motion
Leviathan Governance
Self-Governance Governance
European Innovation Fatigue
Innovations for Innovation’s Sake
Scramble
Moving together
Moving less
Customized lifestyles
Global resilience – local adaptation
Evolved Society
Lettuce surprice U
Sustainability
Fragmentation
Hyperpolisation
Postpolisation
L’Archipel éclaté (un scénario néolibéral)
Le centralisme rénové (un scénario néo-jacobin)
The Hundred Flow ers
Creative Societies
Perpetual Motion
Tribal Trading
Market Forces
Security First
S&T develops a Mind of its Ow n
Please, turn off the Spigot
Take the A-Train
Riding the rainbow
Pro-active Europe
Competitiveness-oriented (Rhine-Rhone Europe)
Big is beautiful
Strong Europe
Regional Communities
Geen economy
Green High-Tech
Nuclear Energy for Big Regions
The Reference scenario
The Defensive scenario
BAU
Rapid response to climate change + high levels of State
The Rich Get Richer
Trading places
Challenge Scenario by NEAA
Spraw l-ville
Communi-city
Apple World
Potato World
EU under threats: a fragmented Europe
Talent Tow ns
Egalitarian Ecologies
Clever and Caring
Breaking Point
Open Governance
Privatised Governance
Europe’s Innovative Societies
Cities Go Ahead
Blueprints
Moving alone
Stop moving
Mega-efficiency in Megacities
Paralysing protectionism
Great Escape
Clustered Netw orks
Europe of Cohesion
Hyper-Tech
Extreme w ater
Regiopolisation
Dépolisation
Le local différencié (un scénario néo-communautaire)
Le polycentrisme maillé (un scénario de l'équité)
Smart
Scenarios classified according to Smart and Inclusive aims
Inclusive
Scenarios classified according to Smart and Sustainable aims
e.g.
flows
e.g.
cities
e.g.
borders
e.g.
region s
e.g.
tow s
www.et2050.eu
Thanks for your attention!
ESPON MC Meeting, Aalborg, June, 2012