Juniper Networks Customer Presentation
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Transcript Juniper Networks Customer Presentation
Strategies For Managing
Denial Of Service
Ian Quinn
APRICOT 2002
Bangkok, Thailand
Agenda
The Impact Of Denial of Service (DoS)
Issues Complicating DoS Management
Network Architecture
Proactive Measures
Detection & Management
Summary
What Are The
Threats To A Service Provider
Disruption Of Customer Networks
Desirable to be able to assist customer
Consumption Of Bandwidth
Lower bandwidth links susceptible
Often a big problem in Asia Pacific
Network Stability
Frequently a problem for older platforms
Related to additional workload, and
performance headroom
All
Affect Service Delivered
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Popular Points Of
Attack And Pressure
Data Center
Peering Points
Service Providers
&
Regional/National
backbones
Customers On
Access Circuits
Core
Infrastructure
Actual Targets
Customers
Datacenters
ISP servers
Infrastructure (eg routers)
Additional Pressure Points
Access circuits
Peering points
Low bandwidth core links
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Specific Impact
Of DoS In Asia Pacific
Tier 1
Provider
United States
Tier 1
Provider
DoS Attack
Tier 1
Provider
Service
Provider 1
DoS
Attack
Asia Pacific
Service
Provider 2
Service
Provider 3
Asia Pacific
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Impacts Of Security Incidents
Customer service levels
Internet access, web farms, ecommerce
Especially if impact is repeated
Support overhead
Especially in isolating and blocking Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks
Service provider reputation
Service Level Agreement (SLA) breaches
SLA increasingly being offered
Multi-service networks change the game
Operations stress
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Agenda
The Impact Of Denial of Service (DoS)
Issues Complicating DoS Management
Network Architecture
Proactive Measures
Detection & Management
Summary
Forged Source Address
Customer 1
(Victim)
Attacker
Forged Source
Addresses Include:
10.1.1.1
10.2.2.2
192.168.1.1
192.168.2.2
Customer 2
Customer 3
Prefixes Include:
Prefixes Include:
10.1.1.1
10.2.2.2
192.168.1.1
192.168.2.2
More difficult to isolate and trace back attack
Use of randomised source addresses prevents
identification of specific source / destination blocks
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Distributed DoS Attacks
Peer 2
Peer 3
Peer 1
Attacker compromises hosts in multiple networks,
using them to launch a coordinated attack
Attack can’t simply be stopped at one point
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Distinguishing DoS Traffic
Data Center
Service Providers
&
Regional/National
backbones
Attack traffic often looks like valid traffic
Blocking all traffic matching attack profile often
increases the impact
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Asymmetric Routing
Peer 2
Peer 3
Peer 1
Even if the attack packet is not source spoofed, the
network’s path to a particular destination isn’t
necessarily how it came
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Upstream Peers
Data Center
Service Providers
&
Regional/National
backbones
Traceback through peers is generally difficult
Operational interfaces, upstream capabilities
Often necessary to relieve peering bandwidth
congestion
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Agenda
The Impact Of Denial of Service (DoS)
Issues Complicating DoS Management
Network Architecture
Proactive Measures
Detection & Management
Summary
Proactive Measures
Data Center
Peering Points
Service Providers
&
Regional/National
backbones
Customers On
Access Circuits
Core
Infrastructure
Areas requiring attention
Core routers (protect)
Customers access links (protect, and protect from)
Datacenters & ISP servers (protect)
Peering (protect, and protect from)
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Peering Points
Service Providers
Core
Infrastructure
Peering
Connections
&
Regional/National
backbones
Important point for enabling:
Detecting changes in traffic, eg statistics
Sampling of traffic
Tracing back traffic to peers
Blocking or rate limiting traffic
Proactive measures, eg rate limit ICMP
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Securing The Core Routers
Performance
headroom
What happens when the
going gets tough!
Core
Infrastructure
Protect the route
processing capability
Performance
Authenticated protocols
Services
Secure mgmt access
Authentication
Private access
Multi-level access
authorisation
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Protecting Data Center And Hosts
Core
Core
Permit only relevant traffic
Prevent traffic overwhelming server capacity
For example, http, https, icmp echo request
Drop traffic before it hits the server
Reactive filtering to limit impact of DoS
Detect, isolate and drop
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Securing Customer Access Links
ATM/FR
T1
E1
DS1
OC-3
STM-1c
OC-3/12 ATM
DS1
OC-3
E1
ChDS3
ChOC-12
Optical Core
TDM Backhaul
Infrastructure
IP Core
Access Layer
Limit traffic coming into the network from
customers
Legitimate IP source addresses
Legitimate route announcements
Maybe rate limit ICMP
Reactive filtering to limit impact of DoS
Detect, isolate and drop
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Operational
Establish procedures for detecting security
events
Pre-plan response
Techniques for isolating problem, tracking it through
the network to a source
Standard responses to alleviate impact to service
Train staff and practice
Document and update a security policy
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Agenda
The Impact Of Denial of Service (DoS)
Issues Complicating DoS Management
Network Architecture
Proactive Measures
Detection & Management
Summary
Generic Approach To DoS Attacks
Use statistics to detect attack in progress
Use sampling or logging to capture traffic for
analysis
Isolate attack
Attack type
Source (often difficult or impractical)
Destination
Minimise the impact of the attack
Filter on destination and protocols
Drop traffic or rate limit
Carry traffic with a lower class of service
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Detecting Attacks
Customer logging fault call
Historically most often detected this way
Sudden changes in traffic profiles
Average packet size changes
Link utilisation increases
Traffic by destination address
Source address normally forged or distributed
Packet inspection
Generate alarms in response to changes
Alarm for closer human inspection
Overview easily available for NOC staff
Migrate to some level of automated response
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Isolating Attack
Filters allow
Concentrate on packets of interest
Destination address useful
Incoming interface allows traceback through network
Automate isolation from sampled traffic
Sampled traffic files
Cflow/Netflow
Mirror to interface connected to analyser / probe
scapshaw@ballpark> file show /var/tmp/sampled-pkts
Time
Dest
Src
Dest
Src Proto
addr
addr
port
port
flags
Sept 27 5:48:54 192.168.9.194 192.168.9.195 1075
999
1
Sept 27 15:48:55 192.168.9.194 192.168.9.195 1075
999
1
Sept 27 15:48:56 192.168.9.194 192.168.9.195 1075
999
1
Sept 27 15:48:57 192.168.9.194 192.168.9.195 1075
999
1
Sept 27 15:48:58 192.168.9.194 192.168.9.195 1075
999
1
TOS
Pkt
len
Intf
num
IP
frag
TCP
0x0
0x0
0x0
0x0
0x0
84
84
84
84
84
8
8
8
8
8
0x0
0x0
0x0
0x0
0x0
0x2
0x2
0x2
0x2
0x2
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Dropping Attack Traffic
Peer 2
Peer 3
Peer 1
Blocking
traffic often increases the
impact on target
Reduces
damage to other customers
Blocking closer to the source minimises impact
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Rate Limiting
Peer 2
Peer 3
Peer 1
Rate limit traffic matching attack profile
Reduces congestion
Still affects some valid traffic
Best implemented as close to source as possible
Ensures some level of service is still provided (some
packets get through)
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Class Of Service
Peer 2
Peer 3
Peer 1
Lower the Class of Service for traffic matching
attack profile
Manages service levels during congestion
Still affects some valid traffic
Best implemented as close to source as possible
Delivers as much matching traffic as possible, while
minimising impact on others
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Infrastructure Requirements
Filtering, Rate Limiting, Sampling, Class of
Service
Enable without compromising throughput
Consistent capability across all interfaces
Wide range of filter match options
No inherent limitations (eg terms per filter)
Easy access to statistics and configuration
Be able to implement throughout network
Peering, customer access, datacenter, core
Router itself must be hardened from attack
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Additional Steps
Detection
Probe
Specialised
Management
Service Providers
&
Regional/National
backbones
Probes potentially allow higher level of traffic
inspection
Specialised management tools can correlate statistics
from multiple sources and highlight single event
Both reduce overhead managing attacks
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Agenda
The Impact Of Denial of Service (DoS)
Issues Complicating DoS Management
Network Architecture
Proactive Measures
Detection & Management
Summary
Summary - The Benefits
Improved customer service levels
Alarms for notification
Ability to respond
Reduced support overhead
Lower costs, easier staff retention
Improved reputation
Ability to offer Service Level Agreement (SLA)
with confidence
Competitive position, esp. against those that can’t
Multi-service core networks
Less stress (mgmt, NOC staff)
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Further References
Juniper
Networks Whitepapers
Rate-limiting
and Traffic-policing Features
Fortifying the Core
Visibility into Network Operations
Minimizing the Effects of DoS Attacks
Available
from
http://www.juniper.net/techcenter
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Thank You
[email protected]
http://www.juniper.net