Transcript slides - Courses

Computer-Mediated
Communication
Collective Action and Public Goods
Coye Cheshire & Andrew Fiore
// March 28, 2016
Public Good
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The Tragedy of
the “Commons”
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Cornucopia of the
Commons?
(Bricklin 2001)
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Private versus Public Good
 The Free-Rider Problem
Individual interests tend to make
non-contribution tempting,
especially if other people will do
the work.
In collective action, we can view
this as an n-person prisoner’s
dilemma (more on that in a
moment…)
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Free-Riding and the Logic of Collective Action
“If all individuals refrained from doing A,
every individual as a member of the
community would derive a certain
advantage. But now if all individuals less
one continue refraining from doing A, the
community loss is very slight, whereas the
one individual doing A makes a personal
gain far greater than the loss that he incurs
as a member of the community.”
(Pareto 1935, vol. 3, sect. 1496, pp. 946-7)
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Public Goods
(1) Non-Rival Goods
(Jointness of Supply)
(2) Non-Excludability
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Fallacy of Individuals and Collectives
See: Mancur Olson (1965) “The Logic of Collective Action”
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N-person Prisoner’s
Dilemma
The situation:
Coop
1) Each person has 2 options:
cooperate or defect.
Coop
3,3
(R)
0,5
(S)
Defect
5,0
(T)
1,1
(P)
2) defection is the dominant
strategy.
3) The dominant strategies
(defection) intersect at a deficient
equilibrium point.
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Defect
T>R>P>S
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Explaining Collective Action
 Selective Incentives
 Self-Interest
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Self-Interest in Small versus Large
Groups
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Repeated Interactions in Public
Goods and Collective Action
 Under what conditions
will cooperation emerge
in a world of egoists
without central
authority?
Respect my authoritaah!
Life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and
short” (Hobbes 1651)
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The Emergence of Cooperation

Consider two individuals who interact
repeatedly over time
1) No mechanisms for enforceable commitments.
2) No way to be sure what the other will do on each
‘turn’.
3) No way to eliminate the other player or leave the
interaction.
4) No way to change the other player’s payoffs.
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Strategizing 101
Always defect!
Always cooperate!
Randomly cooperate!
Do whatever your partner just did!
Mostly cooperate, randomly defect!
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Can cooperation emerge in a world
of egoists without central authority?
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For Thursday…
 No reading, but please try to show up on
time so that we can get started ~ 12:40
 Problem Statements and Advising
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