Transcript military as a political actor

Venezuelan Military as a
POLITICAL ACTOR
Independence & Post Independence
 Simon Bolivar as liberator of Northern South
America
 Criollo elite
 Boves the brutal and primitive royalist
commander
 Military forces of 19th century
 Armies of regional caudillos
 Liberals begin to establish a professional army
(1870-1899)
Andean Militarism (1899-1958)
 From small towns of Tachira
 Little professional training
 Married into Caracas upper class
 Generational divide leads to revolution of October
1945
 Military at the heart of General Perez Jimenez’s
“New National Ideal”
Military & Consolidation of
Punto Fijo Democracy
 President Betancourt
reorganizes the armed
forces
 Abolition of the joint
staff
 Institutionalized
competition for
resources
 Military role as
defender of the 1961
constitution
Military Support for Punto Fijo
 Increased budgets
 Sophisticated
military equipment
 Social services
 Professional training
in the North Atlantic
 Positions in public
administration for
retired officers
Strong Ties with the United States
Military
 Cooperation to
neutralize leftist
guerrillas in
1960’s
 Military groups
residing “in
country”
 Joint maneuvers
 1980’s – purchase
of F 16 aircraft
The Unsuccessful Coups of 1992
 February 4, 1992 (4F)
 Junior officer “Bolivarians” come close to
capturing President Perez
 Lt. Col Hugo Chavez gains notoriety
 Government purges Army Officer Corps
 November 27, 1992
 Navy and Air Force
 More violence
 Military leaders frighten the populace
Military in Post-Coup Era
 Son in law of President Caldera (General Pérez
Rojas) involved in corruption
 Tripartite division of military
 Strongly supportive of Punto Fijo
 Professional, non-political
 Clandestine supporters of Hugo Chavez
Military as a Factor in the Transition
to the Fifth Republic
 Military insures the integrity of the 1998
electoral process
 1961 Constitution commits military to uphold
democracy
 Extent of Chavez support in officer corps unclear
 Caldera urges the military to respect the
electoral outcome
 AD refuses to support military efforts to block
Chavez’s assumption of power
External Actors, Venezuela’s Military &
Chavez’s Assumption of Power
 Much of Venezuela’s officer corps trained by the
United States military
 United States government upholds sanctity of
elections
 Latin American neighbors uphold the sanctity of
elections
Armed Forces emerge as backers of the Fifth
Republic
 Purges of senior, anti-Chávez military
 Promotion of sympathetic junior officers
 Staffing of senior positions in the police and
intelligence forces with confidants of President
Chávez
Armed Forces and the Paro of December
2001- February 2002
 Armed Forces disarm police forces controlled by
politicians opposed to President Chávez
 In general – maintain order during anti-Chávez
marches
 Evidence mounts of violence being used against
dissident military personnel.
Heightened Tensions
February – March 2002
- Chavez fired the head of
the state-owned oil company,
Petroleos de Venezuela
(PDVSA), and appointed a
new board of directors.
- Ousted PDVSA executives ally with the Catholic
Church, media, and anti-Chavez military officers
- Anti-government also included the business elite
and middle class.
Golpe
April 11 , 2002
 March on the Presidential Palace (Miraflores)
 protests politicization of PDVSA and National
Assembly
 grant of additional powers to the executive
 Violence at end of march leads to death of at
least 20
 Chavez detained and incarcerated on a
Caribbean island
Golpe and Counter-Golpe
April 12 – 13, 2002
 Security forces raid the residences of government
supporters
 Chávez supporters arrested
 Military and civilian supporters quarrel over the
shape of the new government
More Golpe
April 12, 2002
 Military installs the
president of
FEDECAMARAS as the
president of the
Republic
 Constitution suspended
 Institutions closed
 United States
government supportive
of new government
Golpe and Counter-Golpe
April 12 – 13, 2002
 Security forces raid the residences of government
supporters
 Chávez supporters arrested
 Military and civilian supporters quarrel over the
shape of the new government
Counter-Golpe
April 12 – 13, 2002
 Chávez loyalists take to the streets
 Carmona & supporters retreat to military
headquarters of Fuerte Tiuna
 Army returns President Chávez to Miraflores
AFTERMATH OF THE GOLPE
 Officers of questionable loyalty removed from
positions of command
 loyalists promoted
 Intelligence services purged
MORE AFTERMATH OF THE GOLPE
 President Chávez cuts most remaining ties with
the United States military
 Asymetric warfare to resist possible seizure of
Venezuelan oil fields by President George W.
Bush
 2005 increased control by Bolivarian elite over
promotions
 Strengthening of reserve forces ties with
Communal Councils
Encouragement of Afro-Caribbean
religion within the Armed Forces –
SANTERIA
Unexpected Defection of General Raúl
Isaías Baduel (November 2007)
 Helped to reinstall
Chávez’s in office
during a brief coup in
2002
 Minister of Defense
 Described the proposed
changes to 1999
Constitution “in effect a
coup d’état”
Venezuelan Military: A Bolivarian
Armed force (2012)
 Regulars
 Militias
 Commanded by Bolivarian
loyalists
 $ 5 billion in Arms
purchases from Russia
 Personally responsible
 Some Iranian influence
to El Comandante
 Recruitment from
Community Councils
 Training
 Insurgency
 Maintenance of order