Transcript Nagarj2
Nagarjuna (Part 2) (c. 150-250 AD) The Fundamentals of the Middle Way (Mulamadhyamaka-Karika) (Text, pp. 77-98) The Historical Evolution of Buddhism The Major Buddhist Traditions Theravada (“The Way of the Elders”) - Sri Lanka & Southeast Asia Mahayana (“The Greater Vehicle”) - China, Korea, & Japan (& Tibet & Mongolia) Vajrayana (“The Way of the Diamond Thunderbolt”) Tibet & Mongolia Vajrayana is a development within the Mahayana tradition. The Early Schools & the Rise of Theravada (4th century BC - 1st century AD) Council at Rajagraha (483BC) Council at Vaisali (383 BC) Sthaviravada Mahasamghika Council at Pataliputta (247 BC) Vibhajyavada Sarvastivada (c. 225 BC) Theravada (c. 200 BC) Vatsiputriya Golulika Ekavyavaharika Sammatiya Bhadrayamiya Dharmottariya Sammagurika Mahisasaka (c. 125 BC) Kasyapiya Dharmaguptaka* Vaibheshika (c. 180 BC) (c. 100 BC) * Sautrantika* *Contributed to rise of Mahayana Caitika (c. 50 BC) Uttarashaila* Aparashaila The Rise & Development of Mahayana (& Vajrayana) India Mahayana Buddhism China Japan Madhyamaka* (2d-3d centuries AD) Ashvaghosa Tibet Three Treatise School San-lun Sanron (1st century AD) Yogacara ** (3d-4th centuries AD) Tantrayana Consciousness-Only Mei-shih Hosso Chen-yen (3d century AD) Sukhavati (Pure Land) (1st century AD) *Nagarjuna **Vasubandhu Shingon (True Word) Ching-tu Jodo-shu & Jodo-shin-shu Ch’an Zen Ti’en-Tai (Lotus) Tendai Hua-yen (Flower Graland) Nicheren Shoshu Vajrayana The Spread of Buddhism Buddhism out of India by 1000 AD Theravada Mahayana Vajrayana Spheres of Influence Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamaka-Karika (contains a dedication to the Buddha & 27 chapters) Chapters contained in Readings (pp. 77-98) Causality (Ch 1) What’s Happening? (Ch 2) Arising, Enduring, & Dissolving (Ch 7) The Agent & the Action (Ch 8) Perceiver & Perception (Ch 9) Fire and Fuel (Ch 10) Non-Beginning (Ch 11) Essence & Existence (Ch 15) Self & Reality (Ch 18) Nirvana (Ch 25) The 12-Link Chain of Interdependent Causation (Ch 26) Nagarjuna’s Philosophy of the Middle Way The “middle way” between what? metaphysical essentialism & metaphysical nihilism See footnote 1 on p. 78 of the Text Because the central concept in Nagarjuna’s philosophy of the “middle way” (madhyamaka) is shunyata (“emptiness”), his perspective is often referred to as “Voidism” or “Shunyavada” (“the way of emptiness”). (The world -- and the selves & other entities that constitute the world -- are devoid or empty of essence.) Through the method of “critical dialectic,” Nagarjuna challenges the assumptions of essentialism & nihilism, attempting to demonstrate through rigorous logical analysis that both views are self-contradictory, absurd, & false. If either essentialism or nihilism is true, then (according to Nagarjuna) there can be no causes, no conditions, & no effects (Ch 1); nothing can be happening (Ch 2); nothing can arise, endure, or dissolve (Ch 7); there can be no agents & no actions & thus no phenomenal world (Ch 8); there could be perceivers without perceptions & perceptions without perceivers (Ch 9); either fire & fuel are identical or there could be fuel without fire & fire without fuel (Ch 10); there can be no change; no birth, no aging, no dying; no samsara (Chs 11 & 15); and there can be no release from self & world, no nirvana (Ch 18, vv. 1-6). Nagarjuna’s critical dialectic is also directed against various realistic interpretations of the world that appears in experience.* *Metaphysical realism (in this context) is the view that the phenomenal world is real. Essentialism & Nihilism Essentialism is the view that reality is made up of eternal, unchanging, independent, & substantial essences (self-essences as well as thing-essences). Nihilism is the view that there are no such essences & that therefore nothing exists at all. Essentialism & nihilism agree that only substantial essences can be “really real.” Chapter 1 Causality Does it make any sense to imagine that there are causes without effects or conditions without that which is conditioned? Don’t the ideas of cause & effect go together, i.e., mutually imply each other? Isn’t that also the case with conditions & the conditioned? Chapter 1.1 If either essentialism or nihilism is true, then “nothing whatever arises.” Suppose that nihilism is true. Nothing can arise from nothing. (Ex nihilo nihil fit.) Suppose that essentialism is true. Only eternal & unchanging essences are “really real.” Essences neither come into being nor pass out of being. Nothing can arise. Now, whatever arises must be caused to arise. But if “nothing whatever arises,” then nothing is caused. Chapter 1.2 & 1.5 The same argument applies to the conditions from which things arise. If things do not arise, then there can be no conditions of arising. If nothing arises, then the idea of conditions from which things arise has no application; conditions are not conditions. The argument of 1.6-1.8 1.6 Since neither being nor non-being can arise, neither can be caused or conditioned. 1.7 If absolutely nothing exists (nihilism), then there can be no causes (or conditions) since causes would be something rather than nothing. 1.8 Can there be uncaused & unconditioned events? If so, why do we need the ideas of cause & condition at all? What does “effect” mean? Doesn’t “effect” logically imply cause & condition? So that if there are effects, there must be causes & conditions, which makes both essentialism & nihilism (which imply no causes or conditions) false. Chapter 1.9 1.9, line 1 If nothing comes into being (essentialism & nihilism), then nothing goes out of being. 1.9, lines 2-3 If nothing begins (essentialism & nihilism), then nothing is preceded by a precipitating (immediately preceding) condition. 1.9, lines 4-5 That which has ceased to exist cannot be a cause or condition of anything else. Is that true? If domino I causes domino II to fall & then ceases to exist, it is still the cause of domino II’s falling, isn’t it? Chapter 1.10 Both essentialism & nihilism agree that if there are no substantial essences, then nothing really exists. Essentialism holds that there are substantial essences; nihilism holds that there are none. Either way, the ideas of cause & condition are rendered meaningless. If nothing really exists (nihilism), then causes & conditions do not really exist. If only substantial (i.e., unchanging) essences really exist (essentialism), then, again, causes & conditions, which are part of the process of change (becoming) do not really exist. So if either essentialism or nihilism is true, then the changing world we experience (the phenomenal world of causes, conditions, effects, & events) is ontologically unreal, an ILLUSION. (Does N. really disagree with this? If so, what is his position in contrast to essentialism & nihilism?) How about metaphysical realism? Does it fare any better than essentialism or nihilism, according to Nagarjuna? According to the realist perspective, the changing, pluralistic, & particularistic phenomenal world of causes, conditions, effect, events, and entities is real. That world really exists, but it is neither Being (unchanging essence) nor Non-Being (nothing). It is a world in which entities change as a result of causes & conditions (cause & effect relations). It is a world of Becoming. Nagarjuna does not accept realism either. In 1.1, he denies that – – – – an event can be caused by itself, or by something other than itself, or by both itself & something other than itself, or by nothing at all (i.e., neither by itself nor by something other than itself). In 1.11, lines 1-2, he states that an effect cannot pre-exist in its causes & conditions. Why not? Is it because the preexistence of effect in cause/condition obliterates the distinction between cause/condition & effect? Is it because such pre-existence makes the effect the cause/condition of itself, requiring it to exist before it exists (which seems absurd)? in 1.11, lines 3-4, N. asks how an effect that does not pre-exist in its causes or conditions can arise from them. That is, if the effect exists outside of its causes or conditions, then why should a particular effect arise from any particular cause or condition? Why should we think that it is caused or conditioned at all? If the cause/condition is one thing and the effect is another thing, then why should THIS effect arise from THIS cause/condition? Perhaps there are neither causes/conditions nor effects, but just EVENTS that come and go without being caused or conditioned. So . . . . (as N. states in 1.1) events cannot arise from themselves, nor can they arise from something other than themselves; and they cannot arise from both themselves & something other than themselves since the mere combination of two non-causes does not produce a cause. But, also, events cannot arise “without a cause,” i.e., from nothing, since nothing can arise from nothing; “nothing” cannot cause or give rise to anything. it seems that “nothing whatever arises” (1.1, line 1) N. points out another problem with the idea of causality in 1.13: If the conditions that give rise to an effect are not self-created, but rather are created by something other than themselves, which is in turn created by something other than itself, & so on to infinity, then the effect can never arise. E cannot arise until C1 has arisen, but C1 cannot arise until C2 has arisen, but C2 cannot arise until C3 has arisen, but C3 cannot arise until C4 has arisen, & so on to infinity. it seems that (contrary to metaphysical realism & common sense) “nothing whatever arises” (1.1, line 1) (See also 1.14) Isn’t this conclusion also contrary to the Buddhist doctrine of the interdependent origination of all things? Chapter 2 What’s Happening? 2.1 & 2.2 Past, present, & future. Neither past nor future is Now; neither exists. Does the Now exist? 2.3 & 2.7-9 Both essentialism & nihilism deny that anything can really happen. So if either essentialism or nihilism is true, then there are no happeners at all, & the now-happening cannot happen. 2.4 Realism holds that something is happening now (although what is happening might not happen, i.e., its happening is not necessary but contingent). Realism is closer to ordinary, common sense experience on this matter. Should we, then, accept the realist perspective instead of either essentialism or nihilism? Nagarjuna rejects essentialism & nihilism, but he also rejects realism. If realism is true, i.e., if something is really happening now, then we can distinguish between (1) what is happening now and (2) the happening of what is happening now (2.5). That is, in any happening, there are two happeners -- the happening & the happener (e.g., writing & writer) (2.6). If we think of the happener and the happening as two distinct realities, then, it seems, there could be a happener without a happening (e.g., a writer but no writing) (2.10). And doesn’t the happener as well as the happening happen (the writer as well as the writing) (2.11)? Doesn’t this analysis also imply an infinite regress? Take the distinction between (1) what is happening now and (2) the happening of what is happening now (2.5). What is happening now cannot happen without the happening of what is happening now. But the happening of what is happening now cannot happen without the happening of the happening of what is happening now. And the happening of the happening of what is happening now cannot happen without the happening of the happening of the happening of what is happening now. And so on, ad infinitum. Nothing can begin to happen. (2.6, 2.10, 2.11) Consider also the distinction between happener & happening (e.g., writer & writing). For the writing to happen, there must be a writer. But the writer must also happen in order to write. In the happening of the writer, there must be a happening of the happening of the writer, and there must also be a happening of the happening of the happening of the writer, and so on to infinity. No writing is possible. In 2.12-14 & 2.17, Nagarjuna considers the beginning and the end (cessation) of what is happening now. 2.12-2.14 Where is the beginning of what is happening now? It cannot be in the past or in the future since they do not exist. Also, if the beginning of the present is in the past (common sense & realist view), then the present began before it existed (which makes no sense). And the beginning of the present cannot be in the present since in that case the beginning of the present would follow its existence (i.e., the present would first exist & then begin to exist). 2.17 where is the end (cessation) of what is happening now? It cannot be in the present, for in that case the nowhappening would end before it ends. It cannot be in the past since then the nowhappening would have ended before it began. If the cessation of what is happening now is in the future (common sense & realist view), then what is happening now will never cease because the future never arrives. whatever is happening now can neither begin nor end. But what does N. mean by the following statement? “Happening is the same as beginning to happen, and having already happened is the same as ceasing to happen.” (2.17, lines 5-6) (Extra Credit Essay) 2.15-16 According to Nagarjuna, Neither happeners nor non-happeners are unchanging (“standing still”). The idea of an unchanging happener (a happener that does not happen) is nonsensical (i.e., selfcontradictory). Non-happeners are not unchanging (permanent) because they do not exist. [What about a Being (e.g., God) that neither happens nor changes - a non-happener that exists?] The argument of 2.18-2.21 Either (A) the happener is identical with the happening, or (B) the happener is [ontologically] different from the happening (2.18). If (A), then actor & action, deed & doer, are identical (which seems false) (2.19). If (B), then there could be happeners without happenings and happenings without happeners (which also seems false) (2.20). The idea that happener & happening are neither identical nor different is incomprehensible (2.21). [What about both identical and different?] That which is now happening is not caused by its own happening (i.e., by itself) (2.22), nor by a happening other than itself (2.23), nor does its happening happen in the past, or in the future, or in the present (since it never begins) (2.24). The same is true of non-existent happeners (2.24). neither an existent nor a non-existent happener’s happening happens -neither in the past, nor in the present, nor in the future. The happening, the happener, and the happened are all non-existent. 2.25 Chapter 7 Arising, Enduring, & Dissolving 7.1-7.3 Can anything arise? 7.1 Arising either arises or not. If not, then it cannot give rise to other, further arisings (nothing can arise from that which itself does not arise). If arising arises, then it must have the “three characteristics” of anything that arises, i.e., it itself must arise, endure for a time, and then dissolve. 7.2 The “three characteristics” must occur either separately or simultaneously. If they occur separately, then there is an infinite regress, & nothing can ever begin to arise (see next slide & fn 2 on p. 83 in the Text). If they occur simultaneously, then arising would arise, endure, & dissolve all at the same time, instantaneously, & thus nothing could exist. The infinite regress problem implied in 7.2 If arising must arise, endure, Dissolving, too, must & dissolve, then the arising, arise, endure, & dissolve, enduring, & dissolving of & the arising, enduring, & arising must each also arise, dissolving of dissolving endure, & dissolve, & so on, must each arise, endure, & ad infinitum. dissolve, & so on, ad If enduring must also arise, infinitum. endure, & dissolve, then the arising, enduring, & Thus, nothing could ever dissolving of enduring must arise in the first place. each arise, endure, & dissolve, & so on, ad (Other infinite regress passages in Chapter 7: infinitum. See Text, 7.3 & fn 4 [p. 83], 7.14, 7.18, & 7.19, lines 1-2, & fns 2 & 4 [p. 83].) The infinite regress problem can be avoided IF there is . . . “a non-arising arising of arising,” i.e., an ontologically foundational arising (“first cause”) that does not arise from anything else, that just IS & ENDURES but neither arises nor dissolves, and which is the original, primary Source of all arising, enduring, & dissolving (7.4-5). 7.19, lines 3-4: “But if that which gives rise to all arising is non-arising, then the now-arising could arise.” But Nagarjuna does not accept this (“first cause”) solution. Why not? See Text, 7.4-8, 7.13, & 7.17. (Are his reasons for rejecting this approach good ones?) (Extra credit essay) Nagarjuna himself recognizes that the thrust of his arguments, i.e., that nothing arises, endures, or dissolves (7.14, 7.20), seems to be inconsistent with the Buddhist doctrine of interdependent origination (which he accepts [see Ch 26]). After focusing on arising, N. directs his attention to enduring & dissolving: Passages on enduring: 7.22, 7.25, 7.27, & 7.28 Passages on dissolving: 7.21, 7.23, 7.24, 7.26, 7.29, 7.30, 7.31, & 7.32 He uses arguments similar to the ones we have been discussing to arrive at his radical conclusion in 7.33-34: 33. Since arising, enduring, and dissolving cannot happen, there are no [real] things that arise, endure, or dissolve. If there are no such things, how can the ordinary phenomenal world exist? 34. It is all a dream, an illusion, like a city of the gods floating in the heavens. So much for arising, enduring, and dissolving. Chapter 8 The Agent & the Action 8.1-6 If either essentialism or nihilism is true, then there are neither agents nor actions. If there are neither agents nor actions, then nothing arises. If nothing arises, then there is no phenomenal world. If there is no phenomenal world, then there is no liberation from it & Buddhism is false. 8.7-11 “It cannot be” verses based on the law of noncontradiction (which N. accepts & uses). 8.12-13 The principle of correlativity: no independently existing agents or actions; correlativity the key to understanding “all things.” Chapter 9 Perceiver & Perception 9.1-2 The idea that perceiver & perception have separate existences (perceiver prior to perception) 9.4, 9.8, & 9.9 Absurd implications of that idea 9.3 & 9.6, 9.5, 9.7, 9.10, 9.11, & 9.12 The true view: Correlativity of perceiver & perception Chapter 9 is not in our text reading. Chapter 10 Fire & Fuel 10.1 Fire & fuel are either identical or different (distinct realities) 10.2-3 & 10.5 Criticism of the idea that they are different 10.4 Criticism of the idea that they are identical 10.6-7 Criticism of the interactionist theory 10.8-11 Criticism of the common sense view that fuel is more fundamental than fire 10.12-14 The true view: the relationality & interdependence of fire and fuel (correlativity again) 10.15-16 Implications of the fire-fuel relationship with regard to the nature of the phenomenal world (including the self) Chapter 10 is not in our text reading. Chapter 11 Non-Beginning (Samsara) Chapter 11 is not in our text reading. 11.1-2 The nature of samsara 11.3-6 Is birth prior [i.e., ontologically prior] to, subsequent to, or simultaneous with aging & dying? [None of the above.] Is there, in reality, any birth, aging, or dying? 11.7 “If samsara has no beginning . . . . ” [then nada?] 11.8 Whatever is [IS], is without beginning. (If either essentialism or nihilism is true, then there is no samsara, & that would negate the message of the Buddha. See fn on p. 91 in the Text.) Chapter 15 Essence & Existence 15.1-3 & 15.8-9 Implications of essentialism 15.4-5 Entities without (devoid of) essence? Shunyata vs essentialism 15.6-7, 15.10-11 The Buddha vs essentialism & nihilism Chapter 18 Self & Reality 18.1-5 The emptiness (shunyata) of the self & the consequences of realizing that 18.6 The true Buddhist position on the self (neither self nor no-self)? 18.7 Criticism of language & thought 18.8 A tetralemma: the ontological status of the [phenomenal] world 18.9 The nature of reality 18.10 The ontological status of interdependent entities Chapter 25 Nirvana 25.1-2 N’s problem: How can nirvana arise? 25.3 & 25.9 What nirvana is not 25.4-6 Nirvana not an existing phenomenon. 25.7-8 Nirvana not nonexistent (non-being). 25.11-14 Nirvana does not both exist & not-exist. 25.10 & 15-16 The true view: Nirvana is neither an existing phenomenon nor a non-being 25.17-18 Tetralemmas on the ontological status of the Buddha The Buddha in nirvana – does not exist – does not not-exist – does not both exist & not-exist – does not neither exist nor not-exist The Buddha during his lifetime – did not exist – did not not-exist – did not both exist & not-exist – did not neither exist nor not-exist The equivalence of samsara & nirvana 25.19-20 The argument for the equivalence of samsara & nirvana (they are both equivalent to emptiness) (see fn 2 on p. 96 in the Text). 25.21-23 If Shunyavada is true, it is pointless to speculate about nirvana, the finite & the infinite, identity & difference, permanence & impermanence, etc. (If all things are empty [shunya] of essence, then there are no real predicates because there are no real subjects.) Nagarjuna’s conclusion (25.24) 24. Liberation is the cessation of all thought, the dissolution of all plurality. The Buddha taught nothing at any time, in any place, to any person.