Transcript Section 4.2 Golden Memories

Section 4.2
Golden Memories
Self as Psyche
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Memory Theory
• According to the memory theory, identical
persons are those who share at least one
experience memory.
• Consequences:
– Persons can switch bodies as long as they retain
their memories.
– Two persons can inhabit the same body as long as
they have different memories.
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The Inconsistency Objection
• Most people forget a good deal of what has
happened to them.
• If you lose all memory of some part of your
life, does that mean that you are no longer
identical to the person who was in your body
at that time?
• Locke would seem to think so.
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Thought Experiment: Reid’s Tale of the
Brave Officer and the Senile General
• Suppose a brave officer who stole a flag from
an enemy also stole an apple from an
orchard when he was a boy.
• A senile general remembers stealing the flag
but not stealing the apple.
• According to Locke, the senile general is
identical to the brave officer but not the boy.
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The Transitivity of Identity
• If A is identical to B, and if B is identical to C,
then A is identical to C.
• For example, if Mark Twain is identical to
Samuel Clemens and Samuel Clemens is
identical to the author of Huckleberry Finn,
the Mark Twain is identical to the author of
Huckleberry Finn.
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The Inconsistency Objection
• Locke’s theory is inconsistent because it
violates the transitivity of identity.
• The senile general is identical to the brave
officer and the brave officer is identical to the
boy but the senile general is not identical to
the boy.
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Direct Memory vs. Indirect
Memories
• A direct memory is a
memory that a
person can
consciously recall.
• An indirect memory
is a memory that an
earlier stage of a
person can recall.
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Real Memories vs. Apparent
Memories
• A real memory is a memory of an event that
was experienced by the person remembering
it and was caused by the event it records.
• An apparent memory is a memory of an event
that either didn’t happen or wasn’t caused by
the event it records.
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The Circularity Objection
• Only real memories can serve as the basis
of personal identity.
• But real memories can’t be used to explain
personal identity because the explanation
would be circular.
• Real memories are defined in terms of
personal identity so they can’t be used to
define personal identity.
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Quasi-Memories
• Someone quasi-remembers an experience if
and only if they have an apparent memory
that was caused in the right way by an actual
experience.
• To quasi remember something, you don’t have
to be identical to the person who had the
experience.
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Quasi-Memories and Personal
Identity
• Quasi-memories are not defined in terms of
personal identity.
• Thus they can be used to provide a noncircular definition of personal identity.
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The Insufficiency Objection
• Who we are seems to be determined not only
by our memories, but also by our desires and
intentions.
• If our desires and intentions changed radically
enough, there would be reason to think that
we had ceased to exist.
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Quasi-Desires
• A person quasi-desires something if and only if
they have a desire that is caused in the right
way by an actual desire.
• To quasi desire something you don’t have to
be identical to the person who originally had
the desire.
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Psychological Connectedness vs.
Psychological Continuity
• Two people are psychologically connected if
they can consciously quasi-remember and
quasi-desire the same things.
• Two people are psychologically continuous if
they form part of an overlapping series of
persons who are psychologically connected
with one another.
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Psychological Continuity Theory
• According to the psychological continuity
theory, identical persons are those who are
psychologically continuous with one another.
• To survive the death of your body, you only
have to be psychologically continuous with
someone who lived before.
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The Reduplication Problem
• Those who believe in reincarnation believe
that people born at different times can be
psychologically continuous with one another.
• The question is whether psychological
continuity is enough to make people living at
different times identical.
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Thought Experiment—Williams’
Reincarnation of Guy Fawkes
• Suppose Charles undergoes a sudden and
violent change of character.
• Suppose further that he now has Guy Fawkes
memory and character.
• So Charles is psychologically continuous with
Guy Fawkes.
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Thought Experiment: Williams’s
Reduplication Argument
• If it’s possible for Charles to undergo those
sorts of psychological changes, it’s possible for
his brother Robert to undergo them as well.
• But it’s not possible for two different people
to be numerically identical.
• So psychological continuity is not sufficient for
identity.
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Thought Experiment: Parfit’s
Transporter Tale
• Suppose it was possible
to teletransport people
from one location to
another.
• Suppose further that a
replica of oneself was
transported while the
original was kept intact.
• Would the replica be
you?
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Thought Probe: Transporter Travel
• Suppose that it became technically possible to
teletransport a human from one place to
another.
• Would you use the teletransporter? Why or
why not?
• What theory of personal identity lies behind
your decision?
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Thought Experiment: Bodily
Torture
• Suppose someone tells you that the
person in your body is going to be
tortured tomorrow.
• That person, however, will have none of
your memories and you will have no
memory of being tortured.
• Should you fear being tortured? Will you
ever be conscious of being tortured?
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