Transcript Section 4.2 Golden Memories

Section 4.2
Golden Memories
Self as Psyche
McGraw-Hill
© 2013 McGraw-Hill Companies. All Rights Reserved.
Memory Theory
 Identical persons are those who share at
least one experience memory.
 Consequences:


Persons can switch bodies as long as they
retain their memories.
Two persons can inhabit the same body as
long as they have different memories.
4.2-2
Thought Probe: Sleepwalking
and Murder
 Locke suggests that Socrates
waking and sleeping could be
two separate persons if they
shared no memories.
 Courts have found persons not
guilty of what their bodies did
while sleepwalking.
 Does this support Locke’s view?
Are courts justified in using
sleepwalking as an excuse?
4.2-3
Thought Probe: Memory
Damping
 The prospect of erasing memories was
explored in the movie The Eternal
Sunshine of the Spotless Mind.
 There are drugs like propranolol that
actually have that effect.
 Would the widespread use of such drugs
be unethical? Why or why not?
4.2-4
The Inconsistency Objection
 Most people forget a good deal of what
has happened to them.
 If you lose all memory of some part of
your life, does that mean that you are no
longer identical to the person who was in
your body at that time?
 Locke would seem to think so.
4.2-5
Thought Experiment: Reid’s Tale of the
Brave Officer and the Senile General
 Suppose a brave officer who stole
a flag from an enemy also stole an
apple from an orchard when he
was a boy.
 A senile general remembers
stealing the flag but not stealing the
apple.
 According to Locke, the senile
general is identical to the brave
officer but not the boy.
4.2-6
The Transitivity of Identity
 If A is identical to B, and if B is identical
to C, then A is identical to C.

For example, if Mark Twain is identical to
Samuel Clemens and Samuel Clemens is
identical to the author of Huckleberry Finn,
then Mark Twain is identical to the author
of Huckleberry Finn.
4.2-7
The Inconsistency Objection
 Locke’s theory is inconsistent because it
violates the transitivity of identity.
 The senile general is identical to the
brave officer and the brave officer is
identical to the boy but the senile general
is not identical to the boy.
4.2-8
Direct Memory vs. Indirect
Memories
 A direct memory is a
memory that a
person can
consciously recall.
 An indirect memory
is a memory that an
earlier stage of a
person can recall.
4.2-9
Thought Probe:
Were You Ever a Fetus?
 According to Locke, your identity extends
only as far back as your memories.
 It seems to follow, then that you were never
a fetus. You came into existence from a
fetus, but you yourself never were a fetus.
 Is this consequence of Locke’s theory
plausible?
4.2-10
Real Memories vs. Apparent
Memories
 A real memory is a memory of an event
that was experienced by the person
remembering it and was caused by the
event it records.
 An apparent memory is a memory of an
event that either didn’t happen or wasn’t
caused by the event it records.
4.2-11
The Circularity Objection
 Only real memories can serve as the
basis of personal identity.
 But real memories can’t be used to
explain personal identity because the
explanation would be circular.
 Real memories are defined in terms of
personal identity so they can’t be used to
define personal identity.
4.2-12
Quasi-Memories
 Someone quasi-remembers an
experience if and only if they have an
apparent memory that was caused in the
right way by an actual experience.
 To quasi remember something, you don’t
have to be identical to the person who
had the experience.
4.2-13
Quasi-Memories and Personal
Identity
 Quasi-memories are not defined in terms
of personal identity.
 Thus they can be used to provide a noncircular definition of personal identity.
4.2-14
Thought Probe: Soul Catcher
 Scientists at British Telecom are
reportedly working on a silicon chip that
can record human thoughts.
 Do you believe that such a chip could be
developed?
 If it were developed, should it be made
available to the general public?
4.2-15
The Insufficiency Objection
 Who we are seems to be determined not
only by our memories, but also by our
desires and intentions.
 If our desires and intentions changed
radically enough, there would be reason
to think that we had ceased to exist.
4.2-16
Quasi-Desires
 A person quasi-desires something if and
only if they have a desire that is caused
in the right way by an actual desire.
 To quasi desire something you don’t
have to be identical to the person who
originally had the desire.
4.2-17
Psychological Connectedness vs.
Psychological Continuity
 Two people are psychologically
connected if they can consciously quasiremember and quasi-desire the same
things.
 Two people are psychologically
continuous if they form part of an
overlapping series of persons who are
psychologically connected with one
another.
4.2-18
Psychological Continuity
Theory
 Identical persons are those who are
psychologically continuous with one
another.
 To survive the death of your body, you
only have to be psychologically
continuous with someone who lived
before.
4.2-19
Thought Probe: Is Darth Vader
Anakin Skywalker?
 In episode 6 of Star Wars, Obi-Wan
Kenobe tells Luke Skywalker:

“Your father was seduced by the dark side
of the force. He ceased to be Anakin
Skywalker and became Darth Vader.
When that happened the good man who
was your father was destroyed.”
 Did Anakin literally become a different
person?
4.2-20
The Reduplication Problem
 Those who believe in reincarnation
believe that people born at different
times can be psychologically continuous
with one another.
 The question is whether psychological
continuity is enough to make people
living at different times identical.
4.2-21
Thought Experiment—Williams’
Reincarnation of Guy Fawkes
 Suppose Charles undergoes
a sudden and violent change
of character.
 Suppose further that he now
has Guy Fawkes memory
and character.
 So Charles is
psychologically continuous
with Guy Fawkes.
4.2-22
Thought Experiment: Williams’s
Reduplication Argument
 If it’s possible for Charles to undergo
those sorts of psychological changes, it’s
possible for his brother Robert to
undergo them as well.
 But it’s not possible for two different
people to be numerically identical.
 So psychological continuity is not
sufficient for identity.
4.2-23
Thought Experiment: Parfit’s
Transporter Tale
 Suppose we could
teletransport people
from one location to
another.
 Suppose further that a
replica of oneself was
transported while the
original was kept intact.
 Would the replica be
you?
4.2-24
Thought Probe: Transporter
Travel
 Suppose it was possible to teletransport
a human from one place to another.
 Would you use the teletransporter? Why
or why not?
 What theory of personal identity lies
behind your decision?
4.2-25
Thought Probe: Can You Go
to Heaven?
 If a reincarnation is, at best, a copy of
you, wouldn’t a person in heaven be, at
best, a copy of you?
 Can someone in heaven who does not
have your physical body be numerically
identical to you?
4.2-26
Thought Experiment: Bodily
Torture
 Suppose someone tells you that the
person in your body is going to be
tortured tomorrow.
 That person, however, will have none of
your memories and you will have no
memory of being tortured.
 Should you fear being tortured? Will you
ever be conscious of being tortured?
4.2-27