Transcript The case of the Spatial Plan of the Republic of Serbia

M. Vujošević, N. Krunić
Institute of architecture&urbanism of Serbia
www.iaus.ac.rs
The role of the Belgrade Metropolitan Area
in improving territorial capital of Serbia:
Great hopes, false promises, and bleak futures?
The case of the
Spatial Plan of the Republic of Serbia (2010)
Presentation at METREX Conference, Sofia,
September 12-14th 2016
Contents
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Always standing motif
The prime theatre of post-socialist (post-communist) reforms in the SEE countries
Planning system and practice and collapse of strategic thinking, research and governance (STRG)
‘’Developmental schizophrenia’’
General development conditions of Serbia: a brief account on past historical sequences
Serbian economy, ‘’failed Balkan tiger’’ : dead cat bounce effect
Serbian spatial banana
Two attempts to resolve the problem of regional-territorial disparities in Serbia (Plan of 1996 and
Plan of 2010)
Key characteristics of the SPRS (2010), otherwise promulgated by a special law/act
Implementation of the Plan (2010)
SPRS (2010): the key vision
SPRS (2010): key insufficiencies regarding the TK of Serbia
Belgrade Metropolitan Area: some facts
Future development prospects for Serbia
Territorial capital of Serbia in the Balkan pentagon
Destructive role of the concept of WB
Concluding
remarks:
Specific
problems
with
Serbian
‘’EU-tifosi’’
Always standing motif
The key motif has been to get better insight into the key open
issues of strategic thinking, research and governance in Serbia,
now in collapse for more than two decades, focusing on the
following key issues:
• Generally, why all strategic development schemes in Serbia failed
in crucial aspects?;
• Specifically, has there been any lesson to draw from that with
regard to the most recent strategic commitments on the strategic
spatial development of Serbia, especially in national plans?; and
• Why overwhelming majority of documents grossly replicate
approaches, methodologies and categories from analogous
European documents, and thereby miss to pay due attention to
concrete, most burning and pressing development problems of
Serbia (‘’acting in a geographical and politico-economic vacuum’’)?
The prime theatre of post-socialist (post-communist) reforms in the SEE countries
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Public scene and the main direction of reforms dominated by the neo-liberal doctrine (the predicaments
of the Washington Consensus), now ‘’refreshed’’ by the Serbian New Right and its current ‘’boostering’’
(a late reflex of Thatcherite’s TINA/There Is No Alternative), followed by no attempt to construe a new
TATA (There Are Thousands of Alternatives)
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Continuous contests, disputes, tensions and conflicts regarding the transition reforms model issues
Domination of the so-called ‘’comprador intelligentsia’’ , submissive and permissive to demands of
hegemonic foreign actors
A grand redistribution of wealth, income, development chances, etc. –to add on ‘’A GRAND ROBBERY OF
THE CENTURY HAS BEEN COMPLETED’’ (Branko Horvat)
Now Serbia – to note, along side with the majority of the SEE countries – belongs to a group of
economic, political, diplomatic, ecological etc. (semi)colonies, part of the ‘‘inner peripheries of Europe’’
(‘’third Europe’’, ‘’Fourth Europe’’, and similar), with the endangered territorial capital, otherwise
underutilized
Extremely negative impact of the 2008 crisis, putting additional burden onto national economies, and
picturing future development prospects in bleak tones: public finances on the verge of collapse, a lack of
exit strategies, and a lack of institutional and organizational arrangements for new development cycle
A slow departure from ‘’government’’ to ’’governance’’, in parallel to a slow democratization of society
In sum Serbia has a hybrid social, political and economic system, generating
economic retrogression, vast social anomy, differentiation and polarization
(especially after 2008), and constant political conflicts, paralleled by a bleak
development prospects
Planning system and practice and collapse of strategic thinking, research and governance (STRG)
As result of applying a number of post-socialist ideological and political
mantras of dominant neoliberal doctrine, the systemic and practical
status of strategic planning has been constantly deteriorating, now
planning playing the role of ‘’junior partner of market” (otherwise
equally undeveloped, still being in the phase of the so-called ‘’postsocialist early-capitalist proto-market”. Planning cluster is composed of a
number of elements from disparate planning modes, where three modes
are dominant, viz.:
• Planning as the crisis management;
• Planning supporting and enabling ‘’wild” privatisation and marketisation
of public goods; and
• Various types of quasi/pseudo planning.
What is most lacking, especially vis-à-vis bleak future development
prospects, are two following modes:
• Planning as a means of political pluralisation and democratization; and
• Planning supporting complex societal transformation and modernization;
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• Effective strategic thinking, research and governance (STRG)
‘’Developmental schizophrenia’’
As from 2000 onwards, at least 1,000 various
strategic documents (plans, programs,
strategies, strategic projects, and so on) have
been adopted at all governance levels, but
the country is still missing effective ‘’exit
strategies’’ .
General development conditions of Serbia: a brief account on past historical sequences
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Now the country has found itself in a prolonger period of suspended development, resulting
from:
Development stagnation in 1980s;Miss-event in 1990s: disintegration of SFRY, wars, UN sanctions and isolation, excessive damage
to infrastructure and industry by NATO bombing in 1999 (30 -100 billion USD), when at least 300
key industrial compounds were destroyed (mostly those in the public sector), with a subsequent
collapse of a major part of economy and extreme hyperinflation
Miss-directed post-socialist transition reforms as from 2000 onwards, under dominant neoliberal
agenda, governed by predilections of the Washington consensus, comprising:
Economic transformation from socialist self-management economy into market (etatization,
privatization, marketization, liberalization, deregulation)
Post-Fordist development (shift from industrialisation to services) , paralleled by curtailing of a
large part of real economy;
Nominally dynamic economic growth, fast GDP growth (5% per year), with selective and slow
recovery and restructuring of real economy (“growth without development”) in the period
2000-2008, based on imports and supporting services (banking, transport, insurance, etc.)
Austerity and deprivation measures after the outburst of the crisis in 2007/2008, orchestrated
and directed by WB, MMF, EC, and so on, unable to develop prosperous economy and to reindustrialise the country
An obsession with ‘’ developing a market economy’’, despite the fact that Serbia had already in
the second half of 1990s been exchanging some 60% of its exports and imports in the OECD
countries, that is, in the most competitive markets.
General development conditions of Serbia: some facts
Serbia, as one of the least developed European countries, has found itself at the very
bottom or close to bottom of almost all European lists of economic, social, health-medical,
ecological, demographic etc. development, few details:
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GDP per capita is only 2/3 (65%) of that from the end of 1980s, not exceeding 3,500 € (nominally),
among the lowest in Europe;
Enormous total unemployment (estimated at 25-30%), social differentiation and polarization and ever
larger share of precariat;
Enormous brain-drain;
Basically unsustainable pattern of development: among the most polluted countries in relative terms,
that is, if compared to the economic development level reached, with lowest sustainability rates, energy
efficiency , etc.;
Poor HDI;
Second to lowest month income in Europe, some 350 € per month;
The highest rate of deindustrialization among all ESCs: the industrial production in Serbia is 70% less
than at the end of the 1980s;
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Enormous domestic and foreign debt;
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Among European countries with the largest number of refugees (in relative terms), following the missevents of 1990s and afterward;
Almost 100 industrial centres, growth poles and growth axes ‘’disappeared’’, paralleled by technological
retrogression: the share of LT in total industrial sector is ca 50%, and the share of LM is ca. 27%;
Extremely unbalanced regional (spatial, territorial, etc.) development, among all European countries;
Extremely polarized s atial pattern of FDI (otherwise heavily subsidized), the overwhelming majority
newly located in the ‘’Serbian spatial banana’’, i.e., in the Belgrade – Novi Sad Metropolitan Area;
Out of some 3,500 SMEB (Business Register, Summer 2016), only one (1) out of eighteen (18) operates in
some productive activity, other seventeen (17) occupying some service activity;
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Serbian economy, ‘’failed Balkan tiger’’ : dead cat bounce effect
(Maričić, Zeković, 2016, after Yanis Varoufakis, 2014)
Serbia belongs to the group of European countries with largest
regional/spatial differences: at less than 10% of total surface of ‘’Serbian
spatial banana’’ (SSB) ca. 2/3 of the GDP has been produced (2015), ever
increasing from 40% at the end of 1990s, to ca. 50% in the 1990s, and ca.
60% in the first decade of the new millennium
Two attempts to resolve the problem of regional-territorial disparities in Serbia, by means of
which clearly demonstrated two kinds of political wills (out of three), first, to place key
problems
on
the
main
political
agenda;
and
second,
to produce, in a competent and democratic way, implementable strategic documents
The Spatial Plan of the Republic of Serbia (1996): ambitious, not
implemented for missing implementation programme, lack of
political will and the impact of some exogenous factors.
The Spatial Plan of the Republic of Serbia (2010), followed by a
programme for its implementation: equally ambitious,
implementation questioned if not abandoned, both for a lack of
political will of the most recent Serbian New Right, lack of
financial resources, shrinking public sector, and pending problems
with the servicing of ever larger foreign debt in a prolonged global
and national crisis.
Two attempts to redirect and control spatial development of Serbia by means of national
spatial plans (1996 and 2010), cont’d
• The Plan from 1996: to act as ‘’more than a plan’’, that is,
to introduce necessary changes in the legislative
framework of planning and other governance
instruments, in order to depart from the system of
socialist ideological and political monopoly towards postsocialist market-oriented system (although not always
explicated in this way), Serbia being at that time the only
PSC having such strategic documents.
• The Plan from 2010: to integrate various sector
approaches into a common strategic framework, in accord
with the current discourse on sustainable spatial
development and new European ‘’spatial planning’’ (also
not always explicated in this way).
Implementation of the Plan (2010)
Plan was followed by a very ambitious implementation program,
accepted in 2011, now effectively abandoned, for: first, a lack of
political will of the current Serbian government, a New Right
political cluster in a Serbian version, supported by MMF, WB, EC
and so on, which (government) only insists on conjuncture
,,boosterism’’, thereby neglected putting any strategic issue and
scheme on the agenda; and second, very complex IP, too complex,
enthusiastic, optimistic and so forth vis-à-vis miserable
development reality of Serbia, as it contains more than 500
various stipulations, propositions, provisions etc., viz.: visions,
general and specific aims, goals and targets (operative goals),
general and specific (sector) principles, concepts-and-conceptions,
scenarios, guidelines, implementation policy measures and
instruments, strategic priorities, programs, etc., not supported
(propped-up)
by
appropriate
supports
(institutional,
organizational, logistic, financial, etc.).
To note, analogous warnings and lessons from the
implementation of the Plan from 1996 have been ignored.
Key characteristics of the SPRS (2010), otherwise promulgated by a special law/act
Plan is imbued with general categories/notions from the ESDP and subsequent
strategic pan-European and pan-EU papers: missions-and-visions; compact, smart
and similar cities; urban-and-regional hubs and nods; FUAs ; unavoidable SWOTs,
general and sector-wise; balanced territorial, economic and social cohesion;
strategic planning of local development; social coherence and inclusiveness;
economic-and-regional
interactivity;
institutional
and
organizational
responsibility; optimal utilization and management of TK; functionally economic
regions and areas; territorially and regionally balanced development; renewable
energy sources management; climate change control and management;
polycentric urban (spatial, regional, territorial etc.) development and systems;
urban-rural cooperation; strengthening of urban identity; inclusive management
of informal/illegal construction; regional/urban/spatial accessibility; sustainable
technical infrastructure; spatial integration (of Serbia) into its regional
surroundings; etc.
Prognostic part has been elaborated without any prior rigorous and systematic
analysis of the past, and especially with regard to the ex post evaluation of the
correlation between multi-decennial urban, spatial and demographic trends,
current situation and the implementation of policy measures from a number of
previous (earlier) documents of the kind.
Also, no specific implementation provisions have been explicated regarding
either the role of Belgrade as a Gateway City of SEE, or regarding resilient
(adaptable, stabile, resistant, and so on) urban development.
SPRS (2010): the key vision for one of the least developed European
countries
“In the future Serbia should be territorially
defined and regionally well balanced,
competitive, socially coherent and stable
with sustainable economic growth, proper
infrastructure
and
good
transport
accessibility, preservation and protection of
natural and cultural heritage, enhanced
environment and functionally integrated with
neighbouring countries and regions’’.
Spatial Plan of the Republic of Serbia until 2020 (2010)
SPRS (2010): key insufficiencies
regarding the TK of Serbia
• The Plan is lacking explicit substantive and
implementation provisions on the role of the
BMA and the SSB in improving TK of Serbia.
• The Plan is lacking substantive provisions
regarding how to counter the concept of
Western Balkan and its destructive role for
Serbia.
• No provisions have been defined regarding the
institutional and organizational arrangements
for strategic governance of BMA and SSB.
Belgrade Metropolitan Area: some facts
• Dynamic demographic, urban and economic development after the WW
II
• In the period 1948-2011, the number of inhabitants in the Belgrade
metropolitan region has grown over 2.5 times, from 634,000 to
1,639,121. In the analysed period, the administrative area of the City of
Belgrade has enlarged several times, i.e. from 52 settlements of the City
of Belgrade and Belgrade County (beogradski srez) back in 1948 to the
present 166 settlements, out of which there are 27 urban and 139 socalled ‘‘other’’ settlements.
• Considerably uncontrolled growth and urban sprawl: almost 400,000
illegally constructed buildings (out of some 1.500,000 in Serbia), out of
which some 250,000 are eligible for legalization
• Demographic forecast for BMA:
1.675.000
(PESIMSCEN)
1.709.415 (OPTIMSCEN)
• Estimation for the end of 2015 = 1679895
Development of
build-up land
• UMZ increase
from 173 km2 to
252,6 km2
• Build up land
from 373 km2 to
459 km2
Summary of facts
• A small increase of population (index 103,6),
most intensively in peripheral municipalities.
• Increase of build-up areas CLC-urban area
(index 123), extremely in periphery.
• Decrease of population density in 13 of 17
municipalities.
• Small increase of migrants in total population
(index 106,6)
• A considerable increase of commuting in all
municipalities (index 117,8).
Future development prospects for Serbia
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Serbia is a part of ‘’inner peripheries of Europe’’ with a
“Europeanization of Serbia outside the EU and with its limited support”,
under prolonged overall crisis
General development prospects for Serbia are bleak, with ever
narrowing manoeuvring space to introduce more redistributive policies.
Former government’s slogan „Europe & Kosovo“ now is „Europe &
Russia &China & etc’’.
Ambivalences predominate although the opening of negotiation with EU
should be “a point of no return” in Serbia commitment, with dilemma
about its geo-strategic future has not been solved yet
The “new Jasons” of the post-socialist Argonautics (a “long voyage of
Serbia to Europe”), should solve more complex problems than 1990s
(during the “transitional Argonautics”)
Where is new Colchida to be found now and where to search for a new
Golden fleece - in the West or East, or somewhere in the ex-Third World,
or elsewhere? – still unanswered!
Destructive role of the concept of WB
Extremely destructive concept of Western Balkan, a POLITICO-DIPLOMATIC CHARADE (by
applying the formula ’’former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia plus Albania’’), imposed by Washington
and Brussels, its main role being to represent the key instrument for further political
fragmentation of space in the Balkans. This concept contradicts mere
physical/geographical facts: Serbia occupies the central part of Balkan, along its
north-south axis, stretching from Budapest, via Belgrade and Macedonia, to
Salonika Bay. By means of WB Serbia is disconnected to its immediate
neighborhoods in the East, South and North.
Also, it contradicts a chance offered by Chinese Drang nach Europa.
It contributes to a further fragmentation of economic, political and ecological space, orchestrated
by Washington and the Brussels.
Also, it contributes to a petrifying of the current situation of the European periphery in its role of
a colony, and it play a key role against assuming an authentic role in defining and promoting its
genuine interests and common development policy, and thereby counter its constant
instrumentalization on the part of Washington and Brussels in servicing their strategic interests.
It is also about the ultimate handicap: a lack of the elites carrying modernizing and emancipatory
potential of Balkan elites.
Territorial capital of Serbia in the Balkan pentagon
• After almost three decades of ‘’transitional societal experiments”
in vivo, the country found itself in a development impasse, facing
extremely unfavourable future development prospects. Here of
particular importance is endangered territorial capital of the
country, constantly loosing its strategic relevance in the pentagon:
Constança – Budapest – South Adriatic Coast (Bar, Durres, Valona)
– Thessaloniki Bay – Istanbul, which has been of vital relevance for
the utilization of territorial capital of Serbia. via Belgrade
assuming the role of a Gateway City in the South-eastern Europe,
and assuming the key role in improving the utilization of the
territorial capital of Serbia (Corridors VII, X – and XI?).
• The country has been facing weakening of its ‘’territorial capital’’,
especially ‘’institutional capital’’, in parallel with ‘’planning
culture’’ which poorly support the co-called ‘’strategic thinking in
alternative frameworks’’, now in a deep crisis for more almost 30
years, in a prolonged period of SUSPENDED DEVELOPMENT.
More findings on the geo-political concept of WB
The most destructive impact of the concept of ‘’Western Balkans’’, a politic and diplomatic
charade, which was imposed to a number of Balkan countries by few most powerful and
influential European countries, has brought forth a number of negative impacts on the
current development and future development prospects of Serbia. This political and
diplomatic ‘’charade”, construed by applying the formula ‘’Former Yugoslavia minus
Slovenia plus Albania’’), has effectively been serving four key aims: first, to blur the
memories of the former Yugoslavia and its acquis communautaire (a respectable member
of the Third World Movement; industrial and territorial participation and selfmanagement, within a specific model of “titoist” Bolshevik socialism/communism,
medium-developed country, exchanging ca. 60% of its goods and services in the most
competitive markets of OECD countries; high social, educational, health/medical and other
standard, etc.); second, to make easier imposition of the EU acquis communautaire (The
Community acquis) to this group of countries, even to those that will never become
members of EU (upon the chimerical “Union as constantly moving target”); third, to
implement some other dictates from the Brussels and Washington, in the first place that
regarding ‘’Kosovo” (nominally, following the Constitution of Serbia, Kosovo i Metohija);
and fourth, to ease further political fragmentation of Balkan space, fuelled and directed by
Washington and Brussels.
Contrary to its nominal declarations, the concept of WB, at least debatable not entirely
absurd notion (the absurdity of the charade of WB is manifold, starting from that it
contradicts some basic knowledge, e.g., that Serbia, Macedonia and a large part of Greece
occupy the central part of the Balkan Peninsula along its north-south axis, thereby implying
that Serbia cannot be a part of the phantom ‘’Western Balkans” whatsoever), so far has
neither productively contributed to the regional integration and cooperation of this group
of countries nor to its development recovery. A more veritable concept is that of SouthEastern Europe, but it seems that this concept introduces a dissonance into the currently
‘’boosterish” orchestration of the most powerful European actors, focused on the political
narrative of the Western Balkans.
Concluding remarks: Specific problems with Serbian ‘’EU-tifosi’’
The country has been facing a number of specific problems
with its “EU-tifosi” , who until recently had been
aggressively using their hortatory language in persuading
the public at large that “There is no alternative to EuroAtlantic integration” – vis-à-vis an apathy if not rejection of
the majority of population of that cause – and now ever
faster retreating from it.
In that respect, perhaps, a reminder seems to be in place
here, following Albert Einstein words (at least three versions
on the net):
“We can not solve our problems with the same level of
thinking that created them.”
“We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking
we used when we created them.”
‘’We can not solve our problems with the same people who
created them.’’
Thank you!
Questions and comments…
Miodrag Vujošević, PhD, Scientific Advisor
[email protected]
Nikola Krunić, PhD, Research fellow
[email protected]