Transcript GTAP-E

GTAP_E
Presented by
Belay Fekadu, Farzad Taheripour, Patrick
Georges, David Mayer-Foulkes, Marianne
Aasen, Hyun-Sik Chung, Kenatro
Katsumata, Christa Clapp
Presentation Outline
2
Annex 1 without USA
3
Emissions targets
• Present Kyoto vs. Post-Kyoto flexible target
(E.g. Emission/ GDP (i.e. emission intensity) as a
new flexible target variable.)
• We are pessimistic: Kyoto target not reached
• Redistribute reduction target such that
reduction intensity ratio (=total Annex 1
reduction/Annex 1 GDP) be the same for all
Annex 1 regions.
4
Reduction intensity ratio:
sum reductions Annex 1 / sum GDP Annex 1
-837.2 / 22544597.25 = -3.714E-05
- Multiply the ratio with GDP of each Annex
region to get redistribution of Kyoto reduction
Experiment:
- Emission trading among Annex 1 countries
- 2 scenarios: Kyoto and “our” distribution of
Kyoto reduction target
5
Redistribution of Kyoto-reductions
Regions
USA
EU
EEFSU
JPN
ROA1
Kyoto reductions
-533.922
-204.1
99.99728
-107.236
-91.9418
Our reductions
-293.972
-294.444
-32.6872
-157.454
-55.5918
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New shocks in the model
Regions
USA
EU
EEFSU
JPN
ROA1
Kyoto shocks
-35.6
-22.4
12.9
-31.8
-35.7
Our shocks
-19.6
-32.3
-4.2
-46.7
-21.6
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The Results and Analysis
• When emission trading allowed, initial allocation of emission
quotas doesn’t matter. Each region has the same percentage
reduction in emissions in the two scenarios.
Reduction emission (%)
USA
EU
EEFSU
JPN
RoA1
EEx
CHIND
RoW
-27
-14
-27
-16
-21
3
1
4
8
..but it matters to welfare..?
Welfare changes (%) from emission restrictions
Region
USA
EU
EEFSU
JPN
RoA1
EEx
CHIND
RoW
Kyoto scenario
-0.26
-0.23
2.73
-0.23
-0.81
-0.74
0.05
0.14
Our scenario
0.04
-0.34
1.12
-0.36
-0.57
-0.73
0.06
0.13
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USA becomes exporter of permits in our
scenario
Power of emission purchases
Kyoto
Our scenario
1 USA
14.47
-7.99
2 EU
10.5
26.72
3 EEFSU
-34.98
-23.62
4 JPN
23.86
58.55
5 RoA1
22.92
1.03
10
Summing up and conclusion
• USA largely gains from permit trading, and minor gains from
tot improvement
• EU loses more in scenario two, since they have to buy more
permits
• EEFSU gain less in scenario two, due to decrease in revenue
from permit trading
• Japan loses more in scenario two, since buy more permits
• RoA1 lose less in our scenario, buy less permits
• USA will participate in our regime!
11
12
Summing up and conclusion
• With our scenario, US gains from staying in
Annex 1 group
• In Kyoto scenario, they don’t, and left
13
Energy Substitution Possibilities
14
Tax Replacement Implications
15
Concluding Comments
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