Transcript Religion and Politics

Religion and Politics
The Demographic Imperative
Source: ‘The Moment of Truth’, Ha’aretz, 8 February 2007
Religious Fertility vs. Religious
Decline
"One of the most central injunctions of virtually
all traditional religions is to strengthen the family,
to encourage people to have children, to
encourage women to stay home and raise
children, and to forbid abortion, divorce, or
anything that interferes with high rates of
reproduction. As a result of these two
interlocking trends, rich nations are becoming
more secular, but the world as a whole is
becoming more religious." (Norris and
Inglehart 2004: 22-23, emphasis added)
Hypothesis: a combination of higher
religious fertility and immigration will lead
to a growth in the religious population
(defined in terms of belief) that exceeds
the net loss of communicants through
religious apostasy.
Methods
• Source: EVS / WVS & ESS + ethnic
minority surveys
• Cohort Component Projection Parameters:
Fertility & Switching (i.e. religious decline
or revival) by age and sex, plus current
Age/Sex Structure of Religious and
Secular 'Populations'
• Mortality Rates assumed as standard
Fig. 5 Projected Religious Population, 6 Early
Secularising Societies, 2004-2104
50%
Proportion Religious
49%
48%
47%
46%
45%
44%
43%
42%
41%
40%
2004
2014
2024
2034
2044
2054
2064
2074
2084
2094
2104
Fig. 7 Age Structure of Major Religious Groups in UK,
2001 Census
0 - 15
16 - 34
45
40
% in Age Band
35
30
25
39
37
34
41
35 - 64
65 and over
32
25
25
20
22
19
18
15
10
5
4
4
0
Muslim
No religion
Christian
What About the Muslim World?
• The religious cleavage between Islamists and
Secular Nationalists/Socialists/Liberals is
Paramount
• Q: Will higher fertility endow Islamists (or
even the wider 'religious' population) with
political leverage into the future?
• Berman & Stepanyan (2003) find a significant
but modest link between Madrassa attendance
and fertility in four countries
• This study uses WVS 1999-2000 dataset on 715 countries (depends on question)
• Aim is to determine parameters for population
projections
Religiosity and Fertility in Muslim Countries, 2000
Egypt
Bangladesh
.98574
Iran
Morocco
Nigeria
Tanzania
Uganda
Pakistan
Azerbaijan
'95-97
Jordan
country relig
Indonesia
Turkey
Bosnia
Albania
2000
.592294
Albania
'95-97
Algeria
1.4048
7.1
tot fertility rate
Source: 2000 WVS and World Bank.
Attitudes to Shari'a and Fertility, Islamic Countries, by
Urban and Rural, 2000 WVS (Muslims Only)
3.5
Children Ever Born
3.3
3.1
city > 100k
2.9
town < 10k
2.7
2.5
2.3
2.1
1.9
1.7
1.5
Str. Agree
Agree
Neither
Disagree
Str. Disagree
Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 2796 respondents in towns under 10,000 and 1561
respondents in cities over 100,000. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.
'A Religious Person'
Religious or Not, by Age Category, Muslims in Islamic
Countries, 2000 WVS
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
Source WVS 1999-2000. N=15197 cases. Question asked in Algeria, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Iran, Morocco,
Turkey, Uganda and Tanzania.
65-98
Weekly Attendance
Attendance at Religious Services, by Religion and Age,
2004 ESS
RC
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Prot
Eastern
Muslims
18-24
Source: ESS 2004
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
Agree with Shari'a Law, by Age, 2000 WVS, Muslims in
Islamic Countries
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 7436 respondents. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.
65-98
rs
U
ni
ve
er
s
e
U
ni
v
ity
ity
)
So
m
Se
c
on
da
ry
(U
ni
vp
pr
e
ni
v
(u
ar
y
nd
ec
o
>S
re
p
p)
.
Te
ch
da
ry
on
Se
c
>S
ec
o
nd
ar
y
Pr
im
Pr
im
>
ar
y
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
ar
y
% Agreeing
Agree with Shari'a Law, by Education, Islamic Countries,
WVS 2000, Muslims Only
Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 7412 respondents. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.
Married/Children:
weak Age:
indeterminate
Education: +
Town Size: -
National Pride: GDP per Capita: Country Ed.: +
Country
Fertility: -
Conclusions: Fertility
• In Muslim developing countries, unlike other
developing countries, higher national religiosity
is associated with lower fertility and National
GDP per head has no impact on fertility
• Islamists in Muslim countries are more fertile;
some evidence for sharpened fertility effect in
more 'modern' contexts, i.e. cities, the educated
• But effect modest: Muslim Religious Fertility
Dynamics more like USA and Europe than Israel
• The growth of the religious population through
fertility is a long-term process, unlike Israel
Conclusions: Religiosity
• Younger, Educated are less religious and/or
Islamist, but effect is complex and there are
exceptions (18-24, university students)
• Urbanites more Islamist than rural population
• Higher education levels may modestly lower
Islamism, but urbanization may raise it.
Generational change will have little effect
• GDP per head unlikely to affect religiosity
• Nationalism and Islamism seem compatible
• All told, we should expect a distinct Muslim
trajectory of modernization and development
rather than secularism
• Future Research: projections of religious
and Islamist populations for Muslim world,
Europe, North America
• Own project:
http://www.sneps.net/RD/religdem.html
• IIASA projections project:
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/~terama/Relig.html