Transcript Slide 1

DEMIFER: DEmographic and MIgratory Flows
affecting European Regions and cities
Johanna Roto
on behalf of the DEMIFER team
Romanian ESPON Conference,
Bucharest, 25th November 2010
Demographic State
• At present > 1/4 of the NUTS2
regions in the ESPON area
experiences population decline
• Main demographic changes across
Europe:
• slowing of population growth
• Ageing of the population
• Migration: intra- and extra-Europe
migration
Demographic State
• The size of the working age
population declined in 25% of
all NUTS2 regions in 20002007
• in 50 regions the working age
population has increased by >
1% / year
• Big cities attract labour
migrants
Regional differentiation
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Therefore there is not one unambiguous effect of migration and
demography on the competitiveness of European regions and thus
Policy strategies
• Different types of regions face different challenges -> Policies stimulating i.e. mobility
may have different impacts on different types of regions
• Different challenges ask for different mix of policies
• Bundles of policies -> need for cross-sectoral thinking
TYPOLOGY OF REGIONS
Case studies
• Case: i.e. ROMANIAN MACROREGION - North-East and South-East Regions
Typology of the Demographic Status in 2005
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Based on: share of both young
adults and elder population,
natural population change and net
migration rate.
Retaining favourable trends:
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Dealing with population decline:
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'Challenge of Labour Force'
'Challenge of Decline'
Challenging disparities:
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'Euro Standard'
'Family Potentials types'
'Challenge of Ageing'
'Young Potentials‘
Overseas
Type 2 & 5  population decline & “lagging behind”
Characteristics:
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Below average: GDP level, share of migrants, share of highly educated, labour force
participation
• Above average: GDP growth, unemployment
Policy options for regions dealing with population decline:
• Making this regions attractive places to live and work
• Boost natural population growth, attract immigrants and increase opportunities for the labour
force.
Projections
Impact of migration on population change and to labour force
 Three reference scenarios:
1. Status quo projection - the base period rates and flows
are held constant until 2050
2. No migration projection - the base period rates and flows
are held constant until 2050 but all migration rates and
flows are set to zero (This gives a natural increase only
projection)
3. Free movement within Europe but no extra-Europe
migration - the base period rates and flows are held
constant until 2050 but all extra-Europe migration rates
and flows are set to zero
The impact of migration on population change
• Under the Status Quo scenario
the population declines by 40
million over the 45 years.
• Over 75% of the regions are
gainers of migration, and in 1/4
of the regions the 2050
population size will be 30%
higher.
• Without changes in
demographic and migratory
flows, 1/3 of the regions will
face considerable population
decline (> 20% by 2050).
Future trends in the labour force
• The age pattern of female
labour force participation
differs considerably
• Regional disparities in activity
rates depend on economic
developments
• If the rates would not change,
the size of the labour force in
the ESPON area will decline
by 17% until 2050
Policy scenarios
• Population scenarios are important devices for thinking
about alternative futures, taking into account both the
mutual relationship between demography & economy
and the linkages between economic & social policies and
demographic & migratory developments
• Policy scenario implications for:
• Mortality
• Fertility
• Migration
• Population ageing remains the most important
demographic challenge in all scenarios
Policy scenarios
The bottom of the European league: Romania
GSE
Population
LSE
EME
CME
STQ
25,000,000
Natural Increase
GSE
LSE
EME
CME
STQ
Net Migration
10,000,000
GSE
LSE
EME
CME
2045/50
2040/45
2035/40
2030/35
2025/30
2020/25
15,000,000
2015/20
2005/10
20,000,000
2010/15
0
-100,000
-200,000
-300,000
-400,000
-500,000
-600,000
-700,000
-800,000
-900,000
-1,000,000
STQ
0
-200,000
-400,000
-600,000
-800,000
5,000,000
-1,000,000
-1,200,000
-1,400,000
2045/50
2040/45
2035/40
2030/35
2025/30
2020/25
2015/20
2010/15
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2005/10
-1,600,000
0
Population Change in 2005-2050 - Scenarios
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GSE: Large decreases in
mortality, large increases in
fertility. Migration levels and
regional inequalities increase
significantly.
EME: sustainable economic
growth and strong competitive
goals. Less favorable
developments in mortality and
fertility, large increases in
migration
LSE: relatively small decreases in
mortality, constant fertility patterns
and declining migration levels.
CME: low economic growth,
environmental challenges are not
met, and strong competitive goals.
Decreasing mortality & fertility,
constant migration levels
Labour Force Change in 2005-2050 - Scenarios
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The growth of the labour force does
not just depend on the size of the
working age population but also on the
level of labour force participation rates
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GSE and EME: high economic growth
will lead to an increasing trend in
labour force participation rates.
LSE: the poor economic and
environmental developments lead to
falling activity rates everywhere
CME: activity rates are falling due to a
sustained economic downturn.
Disparities are growing
In the future a lot of regions will be
struck by a shrinking labour force. The
LSE scenario sketches the most
dramatic setback. Least dramatic is
the setback in the EME.
Some conclusion
• We believe policy and demography are linked.
• Different policy bundles will influence the direction of change in
future population of Europe, its countries and regions.
• If the status quo holds for the next forty years, Europe’s population
will decline and age .
• If successful policies, Europe’s population could grow by ~20%.
• If policies are not so successful, Europe’s population will hover around
500 million.
• No matter what scenario comes to fruition, life expectancies will
increase substantially and the populations of European regions will
age dramatically.
• Many regions will lose population through out-migration but the net
welfare of today’s population will be improved
Policy Bundles/Combinations - Migration
• Immigration
• May be an answer in many regions and help narrow the gap between
Eastern/Southern regions and Northern /Central Europe. But these
policies must be complemented by policies to help the integration of
newcomers (language, skills).
• Inter-regional migration
• Policies aimed at increasing mobility between European regions may
reduce cohesion, not increase it. Thus policies aimed to stimulate
migration are only effective as part of policy bundles to improve living
condition in poor regions (jobs, housing, schools).
• Extra-European migration
• Immigration policies to facilitate economic migration must be coupled
with successful integration policies to attract higher skilled migrants
Policy Bundles/Combinations - Labour Markets and economy
• Increasing number of persons and years on labour
market
• Policies aimed at increasing the age of retirement should be
combined with policies stimulating healthy behaviour
• Raising labour force participation results in decreasing
disparities only if the labour market performs well. Thus policies
to reduce gender equalities and improve work/child care balance
and integration of immigrants are needed for this.
• Economic growth/labour supply
• Growth in labour productivity can be raised by technology,
capacity building and investments in education and training, but
to be effective these measures need to be complemented by
measures to compensate the effects of ageing
In conclusion…
• Policies aimed at affecting demographic and migratory
flows should not be considered in isolation from other
policies, such as housing, labour market, integration of
migrants, education, innovation and environmental quality
Thank You!
The DEMIFER project team
• NIDI (The Hague, Netherlands) – Lead Partner, state of the art
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UNIVIE (Vienna, Austria) – Demographical typology
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Phil Rees, Peter Boden, Adam Dennett, John Stillwell
PBL (The Hague, Netherlands) – Scenarios & labour force change
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Daniel Rauhut, Johanna Roto, Lisa van Well
University of Leeds (Leeds, United Kingdom) – Scenarios & population change
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Marek Kupiszewski, Dorota Kupiszewska
Nordregio (Stockholm, Sweden) – Policy & Dissemination
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Heinz Fassmann, Ramon Bauer
IOM/CEFMR (Warsaw, Poland) – Multipoles Projection
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Joop de Beer, Nicole van der Gaag, Rob van der Erf, Peter Ekamper
Andries de Jong, Mark ter Veer
CNR (Rome, Italy) – Case studies
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Frank Heins, Corrado Bonafazi, Giuseppe Gesano