Transcript Slide 1

DEMIFER: DEmographic and MIgratory Flows
affecting European Regions and cities
Johanna Roto
on behalf of the DEMIFER team
ESPON
Liege, 18 November 2010
Demographic State
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At present more than one quarter
of the NUTS2 regions in the
ESPON area experiences
population decline
Main demographic changes
across Europe:
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slowing of population growth
Ageing of the population
Migration
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Not sufficient to compensate
decline
May lead to an increase in
regional disparities
Affects also age structures of
populations & labour force
resources
Increasing importance of intraand extra-Europe migration
Demographic State
• The size of the working age
population declined in 25% of
all NUTS2 regions in 20002007; at the same time there
are more than 50 regions
where the working age
population has increased by
more than one per cent per
year
• decline in the growth rate of
the working age population
• Main cause of change: cohort
turnove
• Big cities attract labour
migrants
Regional differentiation
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Therefore there is not one unambiguous effect of migration and
demography on the competitiveness of European regions and thus
Policy strategies
• Different types of regions face different challenges -> Policies stimulating i.e. mobility
may have different impacts on different types of regions
• Different challenges ask for different mix of policies
• Bundles of policies -> need for cross-sectoral thinking
TYPOLOGY OF REGIONS
Case studies
• More spatial detail (NUTS 3 – NUTS5)
• Focus on internal and international migration and the linkages with regional socioeconomic dynamics
Typology of the Demographic Status in 2005
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Based on: share of both young
adults and elder population,
natural population change and net
migration rate.
Retaining favourable trends:
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Dealing with population decline:
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'Challenge of Labour Force'
'Challenge of Decline'
Challenging disparities:
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'Euro Standard'
'Family Potentials types'
'Challenge of Ageing'
'Young Potentials‘
Overseas
Type 1 & 3  favourable demographic & socio-economic trends
• Above average: GDP level, share of migrants, share of highly
educated, labour force participation
• Below average:
GDP growth, unemployment
Type 2 & 5  population decline & “lagging behind”
• Below average: GDP level, share of migrants, share of highly
educated, labour force participation
• Above average: GDP growth, unemployment
Type 4 & 6  demographic growth & socio-economic disparities
• Above average: GDP level, share of migrants
• Around average: Labour force participation
• Type 4 (-), Type 6 (+): GDP growth, share of highly educated,
unemployment
Policy Options
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Retaining favourable trends:
Euro Standard (Type 1) and Family Potentials (Type 3)
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Retain the favourable trends -> Continued pursuance of the Lisbon agenda goals
and “smart growth”
Need for greater social inclusion (immigrants, youth, women in labour markets)
Dealing with population decline:
Challenge of Labour Force (Type 2) and Challenge of Decline (Type 5)
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Making this regions attractive places to live and work
Boost natural population growth, attract immigrants and increase opportunities
for the labour force.
Challenged by population growth:
Challenge of Ageing (Type 4) and Young Potentials (Type 6)
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Not only more, but better jobs for growing/changing population
Integration of migrants & family-friendly policies
The impact of migration on population change
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75% of NUTS2 regions gain population due
to migration
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Migration, both intra-Europe and especially
extra-Europe, have and will have a
significant impact on demographic and
labour force development of regions.
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It will benefit affluent regions, whereas poor
regions will loose population due to
migration. Similarly, migration will reduce
ageing in affluent regions and increase in
poor ones.
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Most regions experiencing population
decrease do so mainly due to natural
change. Most regions gaining populations
do so mainly due to extra-Europe migration.
The impact of migration on population change
• Under the Status Quo scenario
the population declines by 40
million over the 45 years.
• Over 75% of the regions are
gainers of migration, and in 1/4
of the regions the 2050
population size will be 30%
higher.
• Without changes in
demographic and migratory
flows, 1/3 of the regions will
face considerable population
decline (> 20% by 2050).
Future trends in the labour force
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The age pattern of female labour
force participation differs
considerably across types of
regions
Regional disparities in activity
rates depend on economic
developments
If the rates would not change, the
size of the labour force in the
ESPON area will decline by 17%
until 2050
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In 23 regions the labour force
would shrink by > 50%.
Only in 1/4 of the regions the
labour force would increase.
In 90 percent of the European
regions the labour force would be
smaller without extra- European
migration.
Policy scenarios
Policy scenarios
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Population scenarios are important devices for thinking about alternative
futures, taking into account both the mutual relationship between
demography & economy and the linkages between economic & social
policies and demographic & migratory developments
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Policy scenario implications for:
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Mortality: expected to decline but not in all regions to the same degree
Fertility: expected to increase or to be maintained at the current level -> vital to
pursue family-friendly social welfare policies
Migration: constant internal migration; international migration is assumed to
increase
Population ageing remains the most important demographic challenge in all
scenarios
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Both the old-age dependency ratios and the very old-age dependency ratios rise
steadily, but slightly more in the social scenarios than in the market scenarios.
The gap between the ODR and VODR is larger in the ‘successful’ scenarios
(GSE and EME) than in the ‘unsuccessful’ scenarios (LSE and CME).
Population Change in 2005-2050 - Scenarios
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GSE: most likely to come true when
economy-environment policies result in
sustainable growth and effective
cohesion policies. Large decreases in
mortality, large increases in fertility.
Migration levels and regional
inequalities increase significantly.
EME: sustainable economic growth
and strong competitive goals. Less
favorable developments in mortality
and fertility, large increases in
migration
LSE: relatively small decreases in
mortality, constant fertility patterns and
declining migration levels.
CME: low economic growth,
environmental challenges are not met,
and strong competitive goals.
Decreasing mortality & fertility,
constant migration levels. Least
favourable scenario
Labour Force Change in 2005-2050 - Scenarios
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The growth of the labour force does
not just depend on the size of the
working age population but also on the
level of labour force participation rates
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GSE and EME: high economic growth
will lead to an increasing trend in
labour force participation rates.
LSE: the poor economic and
environmental developments lead to
falling activity rates everywhere
CME: activity rates are falling due to a
sustained economic downturn.
Disparities are growing
In the future a lot of regions will be
struck by a shrinking labour force. The
LSE scenario sketches the most
dramatic setback. Least dramatic is
the setback in the EME.
Population & Labour Force Change in 2005-2050
• Increased competition of
labour force
Some conclusion
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We believe policy and demography are linked.
Different policy bundles will influence the direction of change in future
population of Europe, its countries and regions.
If the status quo holds for the next forty years, Europe’s population will
decline and age .
If successful policies stimulate economic growth and solve
environmental/resource problems, Europe’s population could grow by
~20%.
If policies are not so successful, then Europe’s population will hover around
its current level of 500 million.
No matter what scenario comes to fruition, life expectancies will increase
substantially and the populations of European regions will age dramatically.
Many regions will lose population through out-migration but the net welfare
of today’s population will be improved because millions will have moved to
new lives in more successful regions.
Policy Bundles/Combinations - Migration
• Immigration
• May be an answer in many regions and help narrow the gap
between Eastern/Southern regions and Northern Central
Europe. But these policies must be complemented by policies to
help the integration of newcomers (language, skills).
• Inter-regional migration
• Policies aimed at increasing mobility between European regions
may reduce cohesion, not increase it. Thus policies aimed to
stimulate migration are only effective as part of policy bundles to
improve living condition in poor regions (jobs, housing, schools).
• Extra-European migration
• Immigration policies to facilitate economic migration must be
coupled with successful integration policies to attract higher
skilled migrants
Policy Bundles/Combinations - Labour Markets and economy
• Increasing number of persons and years on labour
market
• Policies aimed at increasing the age of retirement should be
combined with policies stimulating healthy behaviour
• Raising labour force participation results in decreasing
disparities only if the labour market performs well. Thus policies
to reduce gender equalities and improve work/child care balance
and integration of immigrants are needed for this.
• Economic growth/labour supply
• Growth in labour productivity can be raised by technology,
capacity building and investments in education and training, but
to be effective these measures need to be complemented by
measures to compensate the effects of ageing
In conclusion…
• Policies aimed at affecting demographic and migratory
flows should not be considered in isolation from other
policies, such as housing, labour market, integration of
migrants, education, innovation and environmental quality
Thank You!
The DEMIFER project team
• NIDI (The Hague, Netherlands) – Lead Partner, state of the art
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UNIVIE (Vienna, Austria) – Demographical typology
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Phil Rees, Peter Boden, Adam Dennett, John Stillwell
PBL (The Hague, Netherlands) – Scenarios & labour force change
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Daniel Rauhut, Johanna Roto, Lisa van Well
University of Leeds (Leeds, United Kingdom) – Scenarios & population change
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Marek Kupiszewski, Dorota Kupiszewska
Nordregio (Stockholm, Sweden) – Policy & Dissemination
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Heinz Fassmann, Ramon Bauer
IOM/CEFMR (Warsaw, Poland) – Multipoles Projection
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Joop de Beer, Nicole van der Gaag, Rob van der Erf, Peter Ekamper
Andries de Jong, Mark ter Veer
CNR (Rome, Italy) – Case studies
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Frank Heins, Corrado Bonafazi, Giuseppe Gesano