Transcript Lecture 8: Ukraine and Moldova

LG232: Russia and the former
Soviet space
8. Ukraine and Moldova:
transition to where?
Dr. Ecaterina McDonagh
[email protected]
1991: Ukraine becomes
independent
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Leonid Kravchuk: responsible for ideology in the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine
Also involved in the processes leading to the
dissolution of the USSR in 1991
Popular Movement for the Independence of Ukraine
(Rukh)
Stronger than in Russia and Belarus, but not enough
power as in the Baltics
1991: Kravchuk elected as the first president
1991: independence referendum (overwhelming
majority: 90%)
Political institutions
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Semi-presidential constitutional model: the
president is directly elected and possesses
considerable executive powers; but PM
and the government are approved by the
legislature (‘dual executive’)
President-parliamentary regime: PM
follows the preferences of the president
rather than the parliament
‘Troubled semi-presidentialism’: intraexecutive conflict, cabinet instability and
executive-legislative confrontation (Protsyk
2003)
Troubled semi-presidentialism in
Ukraine
Often prime-ministers challenged the president
Cabinets in Ukraine, 1991-2002: 11
6 PMs ran or planned to run for the presidency after
dismissal
 Poor legislative activity of cabinets in Ukraine
Success rate of turning drafts into laws as low as 36% in
2001-02 (58% in 1994-95)
 Frequent cabinet turnover:
Average length of cabinet stay in office, 1991-2002: 15.3
months
NB: both the president and the legislature could dismiss
the cabinet unilaterally
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Troubled semi-presidentialism in
Ukraine: the power of the president
Less powerful than in Russia
 Kravchuk: limited presidency
 Kuchma: persistent attempts to
increase presidential powers
 Paradox: fragmented
parliament but united in its
hostility towards the president
Kuchma’s economic reform
legislation: repeatedly blocked
by the parliament
2000-2001: Kuchma’s attempts to
call a referendum to reduce the
powers of the parliament
(blocked)
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Institutional reforms after the
Orange revolution I
Kuchma’s term: parliament
prevented consolidation of full
authoritarianism
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Post-Kuchma Ukraine: a stronger
legislature brought more instability
rather than more democracy
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2004-2006: constitutional
changes
Ukraine as a parliamentary-presidential
republic
Cabinet is installed and answerable to
the legislature
But the president still has a right to
veto, and dismiss the parliament
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Institutional reforms after the
Orange revolution II
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In 2010 the Constitutional
Court ruled: the 2004
amendments to the
constitution as
unconstitutional
Ukraine becomes a full
presidential republic
Yanukovych: ‘the end to
instability’
Tymoshenko: ‘end of
democracy in Ukraine’
Historical, cultural and societal
factors in Ukrainian transition
No experience of democracy or independence
Short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic (1917-1921)
The Cossack state – the Hetmanate (1654-1776)
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Ukraine: pro-European or pro-Russian identity?
Regional divide: East and West
Although sometimes exaggerated!
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Historical, cultural and societal
factors in Ukrainian transition
Political culture and path-dependency
Where did Ukraine come from?
 Views in the West: Ukraine through Russian lenses
 Modern Ukraine as a state is a new entity (so is
Russia)
 Both are related to the medieval state of Kyivan
Rus
 Collapse of the Kyivan Rus in the 13 c.: eastern
part -> the Moscow Tsardom
western part -> absorbed by Poland (Ukraine) and
Lithuania (Belarus)
 Regional differences: the longer a region was
exposed to non-Russian and Western influences,
the more pro-Western and anti-Russian it is today
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Orange Revolution
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2004 presidential elections:
results falsified
Mass protests in 2004
Re-run of elections:
Yushchenko as new president
Great hopes for the future of
Ukrainian democracy
Mostly shattered by 2006-2007
Unstable reformist coalition,
corruption scandals, etc.
The Yulia Tymoshenko case
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One of the leaders of the
Orange Revolution
Former prime-minister of
Ukraine 2007-2010
In jail since 2011
Convicted for exceeding her
powers as PM when
negotiating gas deal with
Russia
New accusations: tax
evasion charges;
involvement in murder of
MP
Politically motivated?
The political economy of
transition in Ukraine
Economic reforms in the 1990s but not sufficient
to ensure development of democracy
 Privatization and liberalization increased pluralism
but also led to rampant corruption
 Crucial economic sector: energy transportation
system
 A source of large scale corruption
Almost all Ukrainian oligarchs (and some politicians!)
made their fortunes in the energy trade
 Some economic improvement in the late 1990searly 2000s but now badly hit by the global
economic crisis
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Economy: mixed record
Resources and the economic
growth
Post-Orange Ukraine: more continuity
than democratic change?
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A stalemate between the president and the
legislature: resolved only when Yushchenko agreed
to weaken the presidency
Collapse of the ‘Orange coalition’ in 2005 and
Tymoshenko-Yanukovich co-operation against the
president
The 2006 Elections: bitterly contested (Yanukovich’s
party came first; Tymoshenko’s - second)
Stalemate again: negotiations on division of powers
The most successful post-Soviet coloured revolution:
the end of patronal presidential power (Hale 2006)
In retrospect, hardly any success of the revolution!
Moldova becomes
independent
June 1989: registration of the Popular Front of
Moldova
 Heightened ethnic activism
Highly-charged language issue: status of ‘state
language’ for Romanian
 Ethnic unity undermined
Ukr (13.8%); Rus (13%); Gagauz (5.2%); Bulg (2%)
 A strongly ethnic character of political liberalisation
 The 1990 elections: majority of seats to Popular Front
 The August 1991 coup in Moscow was denounced
 Declaration of independence: 27 August 1991
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Economic transition: slow and
contradictory
One of the poorest countries in Europe
 WB data: throughout the 1990s GDP fell on
average by 10% per year
 1997: poorer than any country in Central Europe
and any former Soviet state (exc. Tajikistan and
Uzb)
 1997: GDP per capita at only $527
 Economic reforms: a fast start
Moldova ‘as one of the leading reformers in the
region’ (Lewis 2004)
 80% of GDP in private sector (services and
agriculture)
 Deep recession in the 1990s; some economic
growth in the early 2000s
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Economic transition: slow and
contradictory
Overall, unfavourable economic structures
 Modernisation theory confirmed
 Economy dependent on external factors:
Trade with Russia and Ukraine
Migrants’ remittances (around 30% of GDP in 2005)
Energy dependency
External debts
 But also failure of economic reforms:
Focus on agriculture
Absence of domestic industrial production
Import-driven growth
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Ethnic divisions and other
unfavourable structures
1991-92: ethnic conflict in
Eastern Moldova – the
Transnistrian conflict
 A ‘frozen’ conflict to date
 Weak civil society, weak rule of
law, no previous democratic
experience or independent
national government (or
statehood)
 Constant search for national
identity
‘Romanization’, ‘Russification’,
‘Moldovanization’
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Elites and institutions
Moldova as a ‘most robust democratic polity in the postSoviet area’? (Way 2002)
 Frequent elite turnover (both in the executive and the
legislature)
The 1994: a new party (ADP), the 1998 elections: ADP lost
and a new coalition government; the 2001 elections: a
new party (PCRM)
Prior to Voronin, no second-term presidents
 More or less free media in the 1990s
Journalists are not killed or kidnapped
But more media restrictions in the 2000s
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Elites and institutions
The Constitutional Court
Influential player
Mediator of the executive-legislature conflicts
 The role of the parliament
Prevented consolidation of power by the executive
Counter-balance to the president
 Pluralism by default (Way 2002)
Competition existed, but what kind of competition?
Prevented excessive consolidation of power by the president
But also led to elite fragmentation and contestation
 Lack of stable and effective government
1990s-2008: 6 PMs
The longest serving PM – Vasile Tarlev – 7 years in office
(2001-2008)
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The regime change: the paradox
of parliamentarism in Moldova
1991-2000: semi-presidential model in Moldova
Premier-presidentialism: not typical for post-Soviet
states (but characteristic for CEE)
 Moldovan president: more legislative powers than
non-legislative
 Throughout the 1990s: several attempts by the
presidents to change to a presidential regime
President Snegur in 1995
President Lucinschi: the 1999 referendum on the
creation of a presidential regime
50% in favour
But not binding referendum results as L. failed to secure
a parliamentary majority
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The regime change: the paradox
of parliamentarism in Moldova
5 July 2000: constitutional amendment on regime
change to parliamentary system
NB: vote in the parliament not a referendum (passed: 92
votes to 4)
 The president would be elected, and if necessary
dismissed, by the parliament
 Precedent: usually changes in the other direction
(towards more powerful presidents)
Only Moldova and Croatia switched from semipresidentialism to parliamentarism
 Paradoxically, the Moldovan president became more
powerful in a parliamentary regime than in the semipresidential one
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The regime change: the paradox
of parliamentarism in Moldova
Early parliamentary elections in February 2001:
The communists won with 50% of the popular vote and
71% of parliamentary seats
 Presidential elections in April 2001:
Voronin: 71 votes
Braghis: 15 votes
 Constitutional change: the fundamental powers of the
president remained intact
 But the strength of the presidency came not from the
constitutional rules, but from the parliamentary
majority faction
 Highly cohesive and organised PCRM party
 ‘Strong presidentialism in Moldova’s parliamentary
regime’ (Roper 2008)
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The paradox of parliamentarism
in Moldova
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Do labels of regime type matter?
Is direct election of the president a good criterion for
regime classification?
Popular election of the president does not necessarily
establish a strong president (Baylis 1996)
The lack of popular election does not necessarily limit
the power of the president (Roper 2008)
Post-communist context: party fragmentation and
elite divisions
Competitiveness in the 1990s -> weak party system
Emergence of a strong and cohesive party (PCRM) ->
change of the entire political system
April 2009: ‘Twitter Revolution’
5 April parliamentary elections:
the communists won: about 49%
(60 seats out of 101)
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Turnout: 60%
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3 opposition parties got in:
Liberal Party -13% (16 seats)
Liberal Democrats – 12% (14 seats)
Our Moldova Alliance – 10% (11
seats)
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Protests on the streets (largely
anti-communist) but lack of united
opposition
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OSCE observers: elections as
generally free and fair
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April 2009: ‘Twitter Revolution’
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A revolution?
Hardly!
Social unrest: more
likely..
Are such events
favourable to
democratisation
efforts? What do
you think?
Moldova at 20: more continuity
than democratic change
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The Communist Party still a strong political player
Opposition disorganised: ‘The Alliance for European
Integration’ (four parties)
The parliament failed to elect the president on a number of
occasions (acting presidents in the meantime)
Early parliamentary elections: 2009, 2010
Low turnout
After three years of political deadlock, the president was
finally elected (Nicolae Timofti)
5 March 2013: the government resigns due to vote of no
confidence in the parliament
More instability to follow…