Event Analysis and Protection
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Transcript Event Analysis and Protection
NERC Event Analysis
Update
Member Representatives Committee Meeting
October 28, 2008
Robert W. Cummings
NERC Director of Event Analysis
& Information Exchange
Active Event Analysis Teams
MRO System Separation – Sept. 18, 2007
Writing final report
FRCC South Florida Disturbance – Feb. 26, 2008
Writing final report
RFC PEPCO Disturbance – June 13, 2008
RFC Event Analysis Team – collecting data
SPP Southwestern Public Service Company
Separation – June 17, 2008
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Ongoing & Emerging Trends
Emerging & Ongoing Trends
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Unexpected Generator Turbine Control Action (31)
Voltage sensitivity of generation auxiliary power systems (13)
Transmission equipment failures (11)
Human Error (8)
Protection system misoperation (8)
Near-term load forecasting error (6)
Wiring errors (6)
Inter-area oscillations (5)
Protection equipment failures (4)
System Integrity Protection Scheme Misoperations (SPS & RAS) (4)
Generation vs transmission protection miscoordination (3)
Lack of Redundancy (3)
Emerging & Ongoing Trends
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Loss of station observability (SCADA) (3)
Relay loadability (3) – 1 of these was in Europe
Relay settings (drifting) (3)
Relays / controls out-of-date with manufacturers’ tech. bulletins (3)
Uncoordinated load restoration (3)
Handling of missing/bad data by EMS systems (2)
Failed or run-away operation of substation automation (2)
Gas supply / gen. dispatch coordination (2)
Line hardware / conductor failures (2)
Protection system design errors / misapplications (2)
SCADA system misoperation (1)
EA Trends – Top Two Disturbance
Elements
31 – Unexpected generator turbine control actions
• 28 in 7 events since August 2007 (and counting)
• 2 units CAUSAL in a system separation event
13 – Voltage sensitivity of generation auxiliary power
systems (not included above)
Problem: THESE BEHAVIORS ARE NOT MODELED
OR STUDIED
• Turbine controls (non-governor) are not modeled
• Typically only analyzing t = 0 to t = 20 seconds
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Generator – System Interface Issues
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System
Conditions
Trans
Protection
Gen Protection
PRC-001 Coordination
Gen Controls
Turbine / Boiler
Controls
System
Controls
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System Protection Performance
Improvement Initiative
Protection & Control Performance Issues
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Relay Loadability
• Standard PRC-023 – Relay Loadability passed by NERC Board,
awaiting FERC approval
Protection System Redundancy
• SPCTF White Paper & SAR – December
PRC Standards Technical Support
• Protection misoperation analysis, maintenance, etc.
Protection System Coordination
• Trans & Gen Protection Coordination – IEEE collaboration
• Transmission Protection Coordination
System Performance & Protection Coordination with
Turbine/Boiler Controls
Protection & Control Performance Issues
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Elevate System Protection and Controls
Task Force to Subcommittee status
• Increased emphasis on the importance of system
protection
Collaborative efforts with
• IEEE Power & Energy Society
• IEEE Power System Relay Committee
• Bridge between IEEE standards and NERC system
performance requirements (in NERC standards)
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System Modeling
Improvement Initiative
Modeling Issues
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If something in not modeled, how can you
predict system behavior or interaction????
Dynamics Modeling Issues
Missing models
Data errors
Models may not match field equipment and settings
Issue of “proprietary models”
No models for many wind farms
• No good indication of where wind farms are connected
• Registrations issues
Need for New Modeling
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Turbine / boiler control models needed
• Units may remain stable, but ramp to zero and trip
Far more complex dynamic load models
needed to analyze and predict FIDVR (FaultInduced Delayed Voltage Recovery) behavior
• More load composition data needed to do this
Better governor models
Better SPS/RAS models
Models for new power electronic devices
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