Transcript Cosmological Argument for Existence of God

The Cosmological Proof
Necessary Terms
• Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): For
every positive fact, whatsoever, there is a sufficient
reason, known or unknown, explaining why it is.
• Ex Nihilo, Nihil Fit (ENNF): “From nothing,
nothing comes,” a corollary of PSR. If every positive
fact has a sufficient reason explaining why it is, then
something cannot come from nothing because
nothing has no explanatory power.
Terms, Cont.
• The World: Everything existing in space and time, i.
e. the spacio-temporal universe.
• Dependent Being: A being that depends upon
something(s) outside itself for its existence and
explanation.
• Independent Being: A being that depends upon
nothing outside itself for its existence and explanation.
THE PROOF
1. At every moment
of its existence,
everything in the
world is dependent.
2. If, at every moment of its
existence, everything in the
world is dependent, then, at
every moment of its
existence, the world as a
whole is dependent.
So, at every moment of
its existence, the world
is dependent.
Continuing the proof:
At every moment
of its existence, the
world is dependent.
According to the definition,
a dependent being depends
upon something(s) outside
itself for its existence and
explanation.
At every moment of its existence, the world depends on
something, call it I, other than itself, for its existence.
Based on definitions of dependent and independent,
then, I is either an infinite and eternal regress of
dependent beings or an eternal, independent being.
Further Explanation:
Because it is dependent, the world must
depend on something outside itself. The
world, by definition, contains everything
existing in space and time. Thus, what the
world depends upon must be outside space
and time, i. e., eternal.
Dn+1
Dn
D4
î
Since, by definition, dependent
beings cannot depend upon
themselves, if the explanation for the
world is to be provided by dependent
beings, there must be an infinite
regress of them.
D3
î
D2
î
D1
(The World)
An infinite regress of dependent
beings is not possible.
(Reason from: the Definition of Dependent
Being and ENNF)
Analogy on Impossibility of Infinite
Regress
Dependent beings, as it were, “borrow” their
being or existence. Thus, an infinite regress of
them is not possible. Think of this analogy.
George needs to borrow $20 to buy food to live on.
Mary says she’ll lend it to him but first has to
borrow it from Harry. Next, Harry says he’ll lend it
to Mary but first has to borrow it from Judy. Judy
says she’ll lend it to Harry but first has to borrow it
from Fred. Fred says he’ll lend it to Judy but first
has to borrow it from Susan.
If George is to get the money he needs to buy food
to live on, can this borrowing process go on
forever? Clearly not. If George is going to get the
money he needs, eventually, you have to arrive at
someone who actually owns $20.
Similarly, if a dependent being is going to
get the being it needs to exist, eventually,
you have to arrive at a being that “owns”
being in itself, namely an independent
being. Otherwise, something would have
to come from nothing, thus violating
ENNF.
Since an independent being
depends on nothing outside
itself, only one is needed to
account for the world.
I
î
D
(The World)
I is an eternal, independent being.
Therefore, an eternal, independent
Creator of the world, namely I, exists.
Criticisms of the Proof
• The Alleged Hasty Generalization
– The fallacy of Hasty Generalization is
drawing a conclusion about every
member of a group based only upon
what one knows about a nonrepresentative sample of the group.
– For example, “Every philosopher I
happen to know is jerk; therefore, all
philosophers are jerks.”
– In this case, a critic might say we
have experienced very little of the
spacio-temporal universe. Thus,
it’s not appropriate to conclude
that everything in the spaciotemporal universe is dependent
just because everything in the
part of it we’ve experienced is
dependent.
– In response, a defender of the Proof can
appeal to the Principle of Uniformity. This
scientific principle basically says that what
is true in one part of the spacio-temporal
universe is true in all parts of it.
– For example, gravity operates in every
other part of the spacio-temporal universe
in the same way that it operates in our part
of it.
– Thus, if there is pervasive dependency in
our part of the spacio-temporal universe,
there is pervasive dependency in all other
parts of the spacio-temporal universe.
• The Alleged Composition
– The fallacy of Composition is
concluding that, because all the parts
of a thing have a property, the thing
as a whole has the property.
– For example, “Every member of this
class is over two years old. Thus, the
class as a whole is over two years
old.”
– To wit: Everything in the spaciotemporal universe is dependent.
Thus, the spacio-temporal universe
as a whole is dependent.
– Response
• As philosopher Stephen T. Davis
points out, Composition is not
always a fallacy.
• For example, “Every part of this
table is made of wood; therefore,
the table as a whole is made of
wood” is a perfectly valid inference.
• It’s hard to set hard and fast rules
as to when Composition is
fallacious and when it’s not.
• In this case, however, the inference
does not seem to be a fallacious
Composition.
• The spacio-temporal universe as a
whole derives its existence from its
parts.
• Thus, it’s not unreasonable to
transfer the ontological status of the
parts to the whole.
Davis remarks: “[I]t . . . make[s] sense to ask:
Why should [the spacio-temporal] universe exist
at all? That is, why is there a reality at all? Why
is there anything and not nothing? There is no
absurdity at all in the idea of there being nothing
at all, no [spacio-temporal] universe at all. (No
one would be there to notice that state of affairs,
of course, but that does nothing to rule out the
possibility.) It follows that there is nothing about
the [spacio-temporal] universe that implies or
even suggests that it is [an independent] being.”
“The Cosmological Argument and the Epistemic Status
of Belief in God”
• The Alleged Composition of PSR.
– Davis remarks: “[A critic might allege]
that, while PSR applies well to . . .
items like animals, automobiles, and
houses (things that have finite life
spans, things that come into and later
pass out of existence), it does not
apply to the mega-thing of the [spaciotemporal] universe itself.”
“The Cosmological Argument and the Epistemic
Status of Belief in God”
– This suggested criticism amounts to the
charge that this application of PSR is
fallacious Composition. To wit: Because
everything in the spacio-temporal universe
has an explanation, the spacio-temporal
universe as a whole has an explanation.
– Response
• While it’s possible that this application of
PSR is fallacious Composition, all things
being equal, shouldn’t one assume
there’s an explanation for the spaciotemporal universe, especially since a not
unreasonable one has been proffered?
• To put it another way, why is the critic
raising the possibility of fallacious
Composition here? Is he raising this
issue because he has serious doubts
about applying PSR to the spaciotemporal universe as a whole, or is
raising the issue simply because he
doesn’t like the theistic implications of the
proffered explanation? If an explanation
without theistic implications were
proffered, would he still raise this issue?
• The critic’s raising his objection to
applying PSR to the spaciotemporal world as a whole could
be taken as rather apologetic
(defensive), i.e he raises the
objection not because he believes
in it for itself but because it’s the
only escape hatch he can find to
avoid the theistic implications he
doesn’t like.
Final Comments
• The Cosmological Proof does not
conclusively prove the God of traditional
theism in all His glory, but it does offer
strong evidence for such a God.
• The eternal, independent creator of the
entire spacio-temporal universe would
clearly have to be very powerful and
knowledgeable.
• Also, the act of creation itself could be
taken as one of significant, disinterested
goodness.
• Davis concedes it’s not
irrational to reject the
Cosmological Proof; so, it
cannot compel theistic belief.
• Nonetheless, he maintains the
Cosmological Proof is still
helpful to theists, since it’s also
rational to accept it.
• “[N]o objection to theism is more common than
the objection that, in believing in God, theists
are being soft-headed, gullible, and credulous .
. . . Thus, Kai Nielsen (I could have quoted
almost a host of others): ‘For someone living in
the Twentieth Century with a good
philosophical and a good scientific education,
who thinks carefully about the matter . . . for
such a person it is irrational to believe in God.’
In the light of the [Cosmological Proof], this
objection to theism collapses.”
“The Cosmological Argument and the Epistemic Status
of Belief in God”