Transcript The Cosmological Argument

The Cosmological Proof (I)
Metaphysical Principles and Definitions
• Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR):
For every positive fact, whatsoever, there is a
sufficient reason, known or unknown,
explaining why it is.
• Ex Nihilo, Nihil Fit (ENNF): “From
nothing, nothing comes,” a corollary of PSR. If
every positive fact has a sufficient reason
explaining why it is, then something cannot
come from nothing because nothing has no
explanatory power.
• The World: Everything existing in
space and time, i. e. the spaciotemporal universe.
• Dependent Being: A being that
depends upon something(s) outside
itself for its existence and explanation.
• Independent Being: A being that
depends upon nothing outside itself for
its existence and explanation.
THE PROOF
1.) At every moment of its existence,
everything in the world is dependent.
(Premise)
2.) If, at every moment of its existence,
everything in the world is dependent,
then, at every moment of its existence,
the world as a whole is dependent.
(Premise)
3.) At every moment of its existence, the
world is dependent. (from 1 & 2)
4.) At every moment of its existence, the
world depends on something, call it I,
other than itself, for its existence.
(from 3 & and the Definition of
Dependent Being)
5.) I is either an infinite and eternal
regress of dependent beings or an
eternal, independent being. (from 4,
the Definition of the World, and the
Definitions of Dependent and
Independent Beings)
Note on Step (5.)
Since it is dependent, the world must depend
on something outside itself. The world, by
definition, contains everything existing in
space and time. Thus, what the world
depends upon must be outside space and
time, i. e. eternal. Since, by definition,
dependent beings cannot depend upon
themselves, if the explanation for the world is
to be provided by dependent beings, there
must be an infinite regress of them. Since an
independent being depends on nothing
outside itself, only one is needed to account
for the world.
Dn+1
î
Dn
•
•
•
î
D4
î
D3
î
D2
î
D1 (The World)
I
î
D(The World)
6.) An infinite regress of dependent
beings is not possible. (from the
Definition of Dependent Being and
ENNF)
Note on Step (6.)
Dependent beings, as it were, “borrow”
their being or existence. Thus, an
infinite regress of them is not possible.
Think of this analogy. George needs to
borrow $20 to buy food to live on. Mary
says she’ll lend it to him but first has to
borrow it from Harry.
Harry says he’ll lend it to Mary but first
has to borrow it from Judy. Judy says
she’ll lend it to Harry but first has to
borrow it from Fred. Fred says he’ll
lend it to Judy but first has to borrow it
from Susan. If George is to get the
money he needs to buy food to live on,
can this borrowing process go on
forever? Clearly not. If George is going
to get the money he needs, eventually,
you have to arrive at someone who
actually owns $20.
Similarly, if a dependent being is going to
get the being it needs to exist,
eventually, you have to arrive at a being
that “owns” being in itself, namely an
independent being. Otherwise,
something would have to come from
nothing, thus violating ENNF.
7.) I is an eternal, independent being.
(from 5 & 6)
8.) Therefore, an eternal, independent
Creator of the world, namely I, exists.
(from 4 & 7) QED.
Criticisms of the Proof
• The Alleged Hasty Generalization of (1.)
– The fallacy of Hasty Generalization is
drawing a conclusion about every
member of a group based only upon
what one knows about a nonrepresentative sample of the group.
– For example, “Every philosopher I
happen to know is jerk; therefore, all
philosophers are jerks.”
– In this case, a critic might say we
have experienced very little of the
spacio-temporal universe. Thus,
it’s not appropriate to conclude
that everything in the spaciotemporal universe is dependent
just because everything in the
part of it we’ve experienced is
dependent.
– In response, a defender of the Proof can
appeal to the Principle of Uniformity. This
scientific principle basically says that what
is true in one part of the spacio-temporal
universe is true in all parts of it.
– For example, gravity operates in every
other part of the spacio-temporal universe
in the same way that it operates in our part
of it.
– Thus, if there is pervasive dependency in
our part of the spacio-temporal universe,
there is pervasive dependency in all other
parts of the spacio-temporal universe.
• The Alleged Composition of (2.)
– The fallacy of Composition is
concluding that, because all the parts
of a thing have a property, the thing
as a whole has the property.
– For example, “Every member of this
class is over two years old. Thus, the
class as a whole is over two years
old.”
– A critic would say this is precisely the
reasoning behind (2.).
– To wit: Everything in the spaciotemporal universe is dependent.
Thus, the spacio-temporal universe
as a whole is dependent.
– Response
• As philosopher Stephen T. Davis
points out, Composition is not
always a fallacy.
• For example, “Every part of this
table is made of wood; therefore,
the table as a whole is made of
wood” is a perfectly valid inference.
• It’s hard to set hard and fast rules
as to when Composition is
fallacious and when it’s not.
• In this case, however, the inference
in back of (2.) does not seem to be
a fallacious Composition.
• The spacio-temporal universe as a
whole derives its existence from its
parts.
• Thus, it’s not unreasonable to
transfer the ontological status of the
parts to the whole.
• Davis remarks: “[I]t . . . make[s] sense to
ask: Why should [the spacio-temporal]
universe exist at all? That is, why is there
a reality at all? Why is there anything and
not nothing? There is no absurdity at all
in the idea of there being nothing at all, no
[spacio-temporal] universe at all. (No one
would be there to notice that state of
affairs, of course, but that does nothing to
rule out the possibility.) It follows that
there is nothing about the [spaciotemporal] universe that implies or even
suggests that it is [an independent] being.”
“The Cosmological Argument and the Epistemic
Status of Belief in God”
• The Alleged Composition of PSR.
– Davis remarks: “[A critic might
allege] that, while PSR applies well
to . . . items like animals,
automobiles, and houses (things
that have finite life spans, things
that come into and later pass out of
existence), it does not apply to the
mega-thing of the [spacio-temporal]
universe itself.”
“The Cosmological Argument and the
Epistemic Status of Belief in God”
– This suggested criticism amounts to the
charge that this application of PSR is
fallacious Composition. To wit: Because
everything in the spacio-temporal universe
has an explanation, the spacio-temporal
universe as a whole has an explanation.
– Response
• While it’s possible that this application of
PSR is fallacious Composition, all things
being equal, shouldn’t one assume
there’s an explanation for the spaciotemporal universe, especially since a not
unreasonable one has been proffered?
• To put it another way, why is the
critic raising the possibility of
fallacious Composition here? Is he
raising this issue because he has
serious doubts about applying PSR
to the spacio-temporal universe as a
whole, or is raising the issue simply
because he doesn’t like the theistic
implications of the proffered
explanation? If an explanation
without theistic implications were
proffered, would he still raise this
issue?
• The critic’s raising his
objection to applying PSR to
the spacio-temporal world as a
whole could be taken as rather
apologetic (defensive), i.e he
raises the objection not
because he believes in it for
itself but because it’s the only
escape hatch he can find to
avoid the theistic implications
he doesn’t like.
Final Comments
• The Cosmological Proof does not
conclusively prove the God of traditional
theism in all His glory, but it does offer
strong evidence for such a God.
• The eternal, independent creator of the
entire spacio-temporal universe would
clearly have to be very powerful and
knowledgeable.
• Also, the act of creation itself could be
taken as one of significant, disinterested
goodness.
• Davis concedes it’s not
irrational to reject the
Cosmological Proof; so, it
cannot compel theistic belief.
• Nonetheless, he maintains the
Cosmological Proof is still
helpful to theists, since it’s also
rational to accept it.
• “[N]o objection to theism is more common
than the objection that, in believing in God,
theists are being soft-headed, gullible, and
credulous . . . . Thus, Kai Nielsen (I could
have quoted almost a host of others): ‘For
someone living in the Twentieth Century
with a good philosophical and a good
scientific education, who thinks carefully
about the matter . . . for such a person it is
irrational to believe in God.’ In the light of
the [Cosmological Proof], this objection to
theism collapses.”
“The Cosmological Argument and the Epistemic
Status of Belief in God”