Transcript HIS 28 – Part 22

THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE LATE 60S BC
1. i) After the majority vote in the Senate on 5th December
63 BC which recommended the death penalty for the
conspirators who had been arrested in Rome, CICERO
arranged for them to be conveyed immediately to Rome’s
prison where they were strangled.
ii) He would pay dearly later for not allowing them to appeal
to “the People”.
2. CATILINE who, along with MANLIUS, had already been
declared a “public enemy”, was killed in battle in early
January 62 BC at the “Battle of Pistoria” (north-west of Florence).
3. The crisis was over, Cicero was a hero, but the modern
scholarly community remains divided over
i) whether CATILINE really was “the mastermind” behind a
grand conspiracy or
ii) whether CICERO, for political ends, linked at least two
separate but dangerous pockets of discontent and accused
CATILINE of co-ordinating joint action by the leaders of
the two.
4. And not long after all of this, a victorious POMPEY
returned to Italy from his huge successes in the eastern
Mediterranean only to be shunned by the Senate which
refused to recognize his achievements or to make land
available in Italy for his veteran troops.
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE, THE RISE OF JULIUS CAESAR,
HIS CONSULSHIP IN 59 BC and THE 50s BC
1. During the 60s CICERO (b. 106) had, through observation
and through participation in an active senatorial career
(culminating in his consulships in 63 BC), developed a particular
political outlook or ‘political philosophy’ referred to as “the
Harmony of the Orders” (CONCORDIA ORDINUM).
2. i) During his consulship, in the face of crisis, all “rightthinking men” had rallied around him to protect the state
from “revolution”.
ii) He believed that continuing co-operation between
senators, ‘equestrians’ and other “solid” citizens would
guarantee political stability for the foreseeable future.
iii) In particular the “optimates” in the Senate must work at
all times with the ‘equestrian’ leadership.
iv) If they did so, radical “tribunes of the Plebs” and
radical proposals would always fail to command a
majority in the Popular Assemblies – because of the
powerful ‘patron-client’ system – and “populists”
would make no headway.
v) CO-OPERATION (“Harmony”) would be the key.
5. a) The 60s had seen POMPEY racing ahead in his career
but now unable to get his acjievements recognized.
b) The 60s had seen CRASSUS, despite his wealth,
frustrated at every turn in his desire to gain a second
“special military command”.
6. a) During the 60s too a slightly younger Gaius IULIUS
CAESAR (b. 100 BC) had made headway in his career,
but, being in considerable debt, had been able to satisfy
his creditors (who could block his advancement) only
by reaching an agreement with CRASSUS who had
offered financial support.
b) He was probably only too aware also that political
conservatives (including Cicero) viewed him with a
certain degree of suspicion over where he stood
politically.
GNAEUS POMPEIUS
(b. 106 BC)
MARCUS LICINIUS
CRASSUS
(b. ca 115 BC)
MARCUS TULLIUS
CICERO
(b. 106 BC)
GAIUS IULIUS CAESAR
(b 100 BC)
SOME DEVELOPMENTS at the END of the 60s
1. By late 61 BC the short-lived co-operation between the
conservative majority in the Senate (“the optimates”) and
the leaders of the ‘Equestrian Order’ was severely threatened.
2. We find Cicero writing to his friend Atticus on 5th December
61 BC: “I assume that you have heard that our friends the
equestrians have virtually broken with the Senate!”
3. Two specific issues were caused tension:
a) jury bribery; and
b) the tax-collecting contract for the province of ASIA.
BRIBERY OF JURORS
1. a) There had been unquestionable examples of jurors
being bribed.
b) The most notorious case had been the acquittal of a
guilty Publius CLODIUS PULCHER in ‘the “Bona
Dea” Affair’ [“the Affair of ‘the Good Goddess”].
c) Publius CLODIUS Pulcher, of noble patrician
background [b. 93 BC], had committed sacrilege by
attending the exclusively female rites of BONA DEA
(“the GOOD GODDESS”) dressed as a woman and was
charged accordingly.
2. CICERO in court disproved his alibi but he was still found
‘not guilty’ because equestrian jurors had been bribed.
3. The SENATE soon proposed a judicial enquiry into
jury-bribery generally, something CICERO resisted because
he realized that it would alienate “the Equestrians” from the
“optimate” cause.
4. More and more the SENATE failed to listen to Cicero’s
arguments and more and more followed the leadership of the
extremely conservative and very moral CATO THE
YOUNGER (Marcus Porcius CATO) [b. 95 BC], (a greatgrandson of CATO THE ELDER).
5. i) The judicial enquiry was established.
ii) It did its work.
iii) No one was prosecuted for bribery.
iv) “The Equestrians” were alienated from the optimates by
the whole affair - and unwilling to co-operate as before.
CATO THE YOUNGER
(95 – 46 BC)
great-grandson of CATO THE
ELDER
(CATO THE CENSOR)
(234 – 149 BC)
THE ‘ASIAN’ TAX-COLLECTING CONTRACT
1. In early 60 BC, members of the “Equestrian Order” who had
won the contract to collect taxes in the “province” of ASIA
concluded that their bid had been too high and their profits
would be minimal.
2. They wanted the contract re-negotiated.
3. The SENATE staunchly refused on principle– although we
find Cicero writing, in his purely private correspondence:
“We should have made the sacrifice – to keep the whole
[equestrian] order on our side”.
4. The Senate’s refusal drove the “Equestrians” away
politically.
[The contract was re-negotiated the next year]
5. The “optimates” controlling the Senate had taken a stand
on two issues, under Cato’s influence, on moral grounds
and had been weakened politically as a result.
6. With ‘equestrian’ support “populists” would now have an
easier time in the Popular Assemblies but would not
necessarily always get what they wanted.
7. i) And POMPEY was no closer to getting his work
recognized or (and this was more pressing) getting land
for his troops.
ii) A “Flavian Bill” which had at last been introduced in
early 60 BC and which would have provided the vitally
needed land had failed - frustrating even Cicero who
had tried introducing amendments in order to save the
proposal.
JULIUS CAESAR PLAYS A VITAL ROLE
1. 60 BC also saw Julius CAESAR deciding to stand as a
candidate for one of the consulships of 59 BC.
2. The opposition to him on the part of the “optimates”,
under CATO’s leadership, was massive.
3. Fearing that they might not be able to stop him (because
he had quite wide popular support and had Crassus’ money behind
him), they devised a plan to destroy his career in the year
4.
after his consulship if he managed to get elected.
a) The “provinces” to which the consuls would go as
governors after their year as consuls had to be decided
in advance of the elections.
b) Now “province” (provincia in Latin) technically meant
‘any area of public responsibility’.
c) And so the “optimates” declared that the ‘consular
provinces’ for 58 BC would be silvae callesque
(“the forests and cattle-runs [of Italy]”).
d) CAESAR would hardly be able to gain gloria (an
enhanced military reputation – including military ‘glory’)
overseeing forests and cattle-runs!
5. Fully aware of the opposition to him, CAESAR came up
with a bold, an ‘impossible’ plan.
6. a) The bitter rivals, CRASSUS and POMPEY, were each
totally frustrated in trying to achieve their aims.
b) CAESAR would persuade them to forget their
differences, to pool their private resources, and to work
with him – to achieve the goals of all three.
7. Working on the needs and ambitions of both Pompey and
Crassus and using his natural charm and considerable
powers of persuasion, he somehow succeeded in convincing
them to join his ‘plan’ and work together.
8. i) The three formed a purely PRIVATE agreement which
we call “the FIRST TRIUMVIRATE” – a political
coalition powerful enough to give them dominance in
the state.
ii) No other combination of forces at that point appears to
have had the ability to resist them successfully – and
for quite some time their agreement remained secret
anyway.
9. Once the news leaked, the “optimates” rushed to organize a
fund to bribe electors to vote against Caesar in the elections.
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE
1. The year of CAESAR’s consulship, 59 BC, (and he had been
easily elected despite the fund) saw important legislation.
2. He proposed to take to the Popular Assembly, as consul,
a bill which:
a) would make land available to Pompey’s veterans (at last);
b) would recognize and ratify Pompey’s work in the East
(at last);
c) would renegotiate the tax-collecting contract in ASIA
entered into by members of the “equestrian order”.
3. He gave the SENATE ample chance to support these
measures first – all to no avail.
5. He then went to the Popular Assembly, where his “optimate”
colleague in the consulship, Marcus Calpurnius BIBULUS,
vetoed the bill’s introduction.
6. CAESAR accepted the temporary set-back and opted for a
different approach.
7. Soon a friendly ‘tribune of the plebs’, Publius VATINIUS,
was found to introduce to the Plebeian Assembly a measure
a) to assign to CAESAR for 58 BC not the “forests and cattleruns [of Italy]” but CISALPINE GAUL and for five years
(not one);
b) to allow him four legions to undertake whatever tasks
were necessary in his “province”; and
c) to have him begin his governorship immediately, not
when his consulship ended.
8. No “optimate” tribune applied his veto (perhaps out of fear
that violence might erupt) BUT Caesar’s co-consul
BIBULUS announced that he had observed adverse omens
and that no public business could, therefore, take place that
day.
9. Vatinius (the tribune) simply ignored this and pressed
ahead with his bill – which quickly passed into law (although
its validity would be challenged at a later date).
10. Since CAESAR was already enlisting the legions assigned
to him, the SENATE chose not to intervene further.
11. CAESAR then re-introduced the part of his earlier bill to
provide Pompey’s veterans with land.
12. BIBULUS threatened to use his veto again but withdrew
the threat when rioting broke out - and the bill passed.
13. a) POMPEY should have been delighted!
b) He wasn’t!
c) It seems that he was beginning to have doubts about his
relationship with CAESAR if it meant that advantages
could be gained only by means of questionable
legitimacy.
14. CAESAR could not afford to lose POMPEY.
15. He applied a centuries-old Roman solution: he offered
POMPEY (aged 47) his daughter JULIA (aged about 24) in
marriage.
16. a) The marriage re-cemented the political bond between
Caesar and Pompey.
b) And the marriage appears to have proved an unusually
happy one.
17. CAESAR now pushed through the other parts of his original
bill:
a) ratification of Pompey’s arrangements in the East; and
b) a re-negotiated tax-collecting contract for CRASSUS’
equestrian friends.
18. a) POMPEY even persuaded the SENATE to add
‘Transalpine Gaul’ to Caesar’s governorship – for one
year.
b) The Senate’s reluctant agreement probably resulted from
fear that, otherwise, a bill might be taken to “the People”
to give Caesar ‘Transalpine Gaul’ for five years.
19. CAESAR would be away in ‘the Gauls’ until the late 50s BC.
CAESAR’S MOVEMENTS BETWEEN 58 AND 52 BC
THE SURRENDER
OF
VERCINGETORIX
52 BC
AT THE END OF
CAESAR’S
CAMPAIGNS
“Vercingetorix Throws Down His Arms at the
Feet of Julius Caesar” Lionel Noel Royer, 1899
THE HEAD OF
A GAUL ON A
ROMAN
denarius
of 48 BC
58 BC
1. One problem for CRASSUS, POMPEY, and CAESAR was
to see that Caesar’s legislation of 59 BC was not overturned
once he ceased to be consul and was away in “Gaul”.
2. To this end, they put all their efforts into
a) getting consuls sympathetic to their cause elected for 58 BC
b) ensuring an aggressive ‘tribune of the Plebs’, also
sympathetic to them, would be elected for 58 BC and would
protect the achievements of 59 BC even if other ‘tribunes’
opposed him.
3. a) The sympathetic consuls elected were Aulus Gabinius, a
protégé of POMPEY, and Lucius Calpurnius Piso
Caesoninus, an adherent of CAESAR.
b) The ‘tribune of the Plebs’ who would protect their interests
was Publius CLODIUS PULCHER (he who had favoured female
attire) – but he was a “patrician” and CAESAR, as Pontifex
Maximus, and POMPEY, as one of the nine augurs, had
had to use their religious offices (amid much debate) to have him
adopted into a plebeian family to solve the problem.
4. To weaken the opposition further, the “TRIUMVIRS”
planned to have CATO and CICERO, their most vocal
opponents, “leave town”.
5. a) CATO was sent on formal public business to Cyprus.
b) CICERO, who refused to accept a position on Caesar’s
staff in GAUL, had to be forced into exile – although
this did not happen until early in 58 BC.
6. CAESAR, already on his way to GAUL with his legions,
could only hope that enough mechanisms were in place
to protect his interests while he was away.
7. He would be fighting Gallic tribes, visiting Britain, and
adding the territories of the Gallic tribes to Rome’s
empire between 58 and 50 BC – for eight years (as we noted).
8. The climax would come in 52 BC at the Battle of ALESIA
and the total surrender of the Gallic chieftain
VERCINGETORIX (illustrated by Lionel Noel Royer, as we noted before).
THE SURRENDER
OF
VERCINGETORIX
52 BC
“Vercingetorix Throws Down His Arms at the
Feet of Julius Caesar” Lionel Noel Royer, 1899