Transcript File

Truman
Foreign Relations and Policy / The USA as a Superpower
Soviet-American relations before Truman
• The USA and the USSR were allies in WWII but enemies soon after. The roots of
Soviet-American antagonism dated to the Russian Revolution of 1917.
• After the Russian Revolution of 1917, Russia became the world’s first Communist
nation. The United States and the Soviet Union had very different ideologies and
aims.
• American antipathy to Communism was so great that it was 1933 before the
United States have the Soviet Union diplomatic recognition.
• However, when Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union and declared war on the
United States during 1941, the two countries became wartime allies. There was
considerable co-operation, but also a great deal of tension.
Opposing ideologies and aims
USA
USSR
Americans supported a capitalist system, with free
trade and minimal government intervention in the
economy.
Communists favoured a state-controlled economy in
which the government promoted economic equality
through the redistribution of national wealth.
Americans considered a multi-party state and free
elections the hallmark of democracy.
Communists argued that other parties were
unnecessary as the Communist Party was the party of
the people, and that economic rather than political
equality characterised democracy.
Americans thought Communist promotion of
revolutions threatened US national security: it might
leave the United States without trading partners and
allies and Communist countries might attempt to
export revolution to the United States.
Many Communists advocated the promotion of
Communist revolutions throughout the world.
Wartime co-operation
• United in their determination to defeat Germany, the Americans and the Soviets managed
frequent and considerable co-operation during the war. Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill held
wartime conferences in Tehran (1943) and Yalta (Feb. 1945), where they planned how to
achieved victory. The decisions at Yalta were particularly important:
- They agreed that defeated Germany would be divided into four zones of occupation: one
American, one Soviet, one British and one French. Although within the Soviet zone, Berlin
would similarly be divided into four zones.
- For the most part, the Soviets and the Americans each kept the other out of the territories
from which they drove the troops of Germany and its allies. Each promoted its own political
and economic system in liberated countries. For example, as they fought their way to Berlin in
1944-5, Soviet forces promoted Communism in East European countries such as Poland. When
Roosevelt and Churchill expressed great concern about this at Yalta, Stalin promised that
Poland’s Communist government would soon hold democratic elections (he lied).
- Roosevelt hoped that a new international organisation, the United Nations (UN), would keep
the peace in the post-war world. Although wary, Stalin seemed in agreement at Yalta.
- As yet unaware of the enormous power of the untested atomic bomb, Roosevelt was desperate
for Soviet aid in the war against Japan. Although Chiang Kai-shek’s China was a US ally,
Roosevelt offered Stalin territorial and economic concessions in China at Yalta. Stalin in turn
promised Soviet entry into the war in the Pacific three months after the defeat of Germany.
Wartime tensions
• Two major causes of wartime tension were the atomic bomb and
Poland. While the Americans (reluctantly) shared knowledge of the
development of the atomic bomb with Britain, they kept it secret
from their Soviet ally. However, Soviet spies kept Stalin informed.
Disagreements over Poland in particular led Roosevelt to waver
between optimism and pessimism over post-war Soviet-American
relations until the day he died.
Soviet-American relations under Truman
• Harry Truman had an inauspicious background for one who had to maintain the
increasingly uneasy alliance with the USSR. He had focused on domestic politics
throughout his political career and Roosevelt had not kept him informed on
foreign and defence policies during his vice-presidency. The Washington Post said
there was a ‘great disparity between Mr Truman’s experience and the
responsibilities that have been thrust upon him.’ Unsurprisingly, the
inexperienced new president followed Roosevelt’s policies and advisers.
• Like Roosevelt, Truman was ambivalent about the Soviet Union. He had long held
a reputation for plain-spoken honesty and subsequently claimed that he gave
Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov a hard time when they talked about Poland in
May 1945. However, he was pleased with the last Big Three wartime conference
at Potsdam, Germany, in the summer of 1945 and said he thought he could work
with Stalin. Subsequently, Truman ruefully recalled that, ‘I liked the little son-of-abitch,’ but Stalin told a colleague that Truman was ‘worthless.’
Soviet-American relations under Truman
Potsdam
• At Potsdam, there was relatively amicable agreement on the ‘5 Ds’: the demilitarisation,
deindustrialisation, decentralisation, denazification and democratisation of Germany.
Stalin ignored Truman’s and Churchill’s protests about the imposition of Communism on
Poland, but confirmed that he would join the war against Japan three months after the
defeat of Germany. Unaware of Soviet spying talents, Truman triumphantly informed
Stalin that the United States had successfully tested an amazing new weapon.
Japan and the bomb
• As promised, Stalin declared war on Japan on 8 August 1945, three months to the day
after the German surrender. However, it was the two atomic bombs that Truman
ordered dropped upon Japan on 6 and 8 August 1945 that forced the Japanese
surrender. Naturally, the United States worked to exclude the Soviets from the peace
settlement with Japan. Stalin’s successor, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, recalled
Stalin saying that the bomb had revolutionised the world balance of power. Stalin
viewed Truman’s America as a frightening economic, military and technological giant
that was far more powerful than the Soviet Union, a nation devastated during WWII.
Soviet-American relations under Truman
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Post-war Soviet American hostility
Post-war Soviet-American hostility was surely inevitable because of:
Their opposing ideologies
Long-term tensions
Disagreements during WWII, especially over Poland
American secrecy over, and possession of, the atomic bomb
The imbalance of power
The personalities of Stalin and Truman
The personalities of Stalin and Truman
The prospects for a good working relationship between Stalin and Truman were poor. Stalin
was exceptionally suspicious and Truman lacked Roosevelt’s emollient charm and patience. As
Truman freely admitted, Roosevelt was a hard act to follow. As a result, the new president was
keen to prove himself and determined to appear competent, tough and decisive. Regardless of
personalities, it is unlikely that conflict between the two most powerful nations in the world
could ever have been avoided, particularly given their opposing ideologies and the disparity in
their power.
Post-war peace-making
• In 1945, post-war peace treaties proved problematic due to Soviet-American tensions:
- Sept. 1945: the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (of the USA, the USSR,
Britain, China and France), held in London to draft peace treaties with defeated enemy
states, broke down after nearly one month of unproductive discussions dominated by
disagreements between the Soviets and the three Western nations.
- Dec. 1945: the American, Soviet and British foreign ministers met in Moscow but the
prospect of a peace treaty with Germany was increasingly poor because of
disagreements over Iran, which both the Soviet Union and the United States sought to
dominate. Truman was exasperated: ‘I’m tired of babying the Soviets.’
- Feb. 1945: the Truman administration was shocked by a speech in which Stalin declared
the incompatibility of Communism with capitalism, and the inevitability of another war.
Supreme Court Justice William Douglas described that speech as a ‘Declaration of
WWIII.’ Within days, American diplomat George Kennan sent his highly influential ‘Long
Telegram’ from Moscow. Kennan argued that the Soviet Union was irredeemably
expansionist and that the United States should resist it. This would become known as
the doctrine of ‘containment’. Truman’s Secretary of State James Byrnes called Kennan’s
analysis ‘splendid’ and began a series of speeches that demonstrated the hardening of
the Truman administration’s opposition to the Soviet Union.
Post-war peace-making
- March 1946: the prospects for peace-making worsened because of the continuing
disagreements over Iran and former British Prime Minister Churchill’s speech at Fulton,
Missouri. Churchill declared that the Soviets had brought down an ‘Iron Curtain’ that
separated Sovietised Eastern Europe from democratic and pro-American Western
Europe and that they wanted ‘the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrine’.
Truman was taken aback when much of the American press reaction to the speech was
hostile, and dishonestly denied that he had known and approved the speech in
advance. US foreign policy under Truman was never made in a vacuum: during 1946 his
policies towards the Soviets were criticised by liberal Democrats such as Henry Wallace
as too harsh and by Republicans as too soft.
- June 1946: the Council of Foreign Ministers met in Paris and finalised draft treaties with
Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland and Italy. There would be no peace treaty with
Germany because Soviet-American relations had deteriorated further after March 1946,
due to disagreements over Greece, Turkey and Germany, which signalled that what
became known as the Cold War was underway.
The Cold War and ‘containment’ in Europe
• The Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union lasted from about 1946 to 1989. Although
there was no direct Soviet-American military conflict, both countries used covert warfare and
war by proxy as each sought to gain and maintain its own allies and to destabilise those of the
other. The Cold War remained ‘cold’ because after 1949 both countries possessed nuclear
weapons, so that resort to war would most likely have been suicidal. Nevertheless, both
maintained readiness for war: they stockpiled nuclear weapons and prepared land, air and sea
forces for a clash.
The origins and start of the Cold War
• Despite ideological tensions that dated from the Russian revolutionary era, there was no real
preparation for any possible Soviet-American conflict until after WWII. This suggests that it was
events during WWII that triggered the Cold War. The most important of these were:
- The Sovietisation of Eastern Europe that began when its troops marched across the region en
route to Berlin in 1944-5
- US secrecy over the atomic bomb, which signalled American mistrust of, and superiority over,
its Soviet ally.
• Both sides believed the other to be the aggressor in the Cold War, but the historian Martin
McCauley was surely right in saying that both were expansionist powers, determined to
encourage or force others to accept their domination and/or political system. This led to postwar conflict over particular areas, such as Iran, Greece, Turkey and Germany.
The Cold War and ‘containment’ in Europe
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Greece and Turkey
The Truman administration wrongly believed that Stalin was behind the Greek Communist Party’s opposition to the
conservative Greek government and this, combined with disagreements over Turkey, caused acute problems in SovietAmerican relations.
During the war, Churchill and Roosevelt had sympathised with Stalin over Soviet access from the Black Sea to the
Mediterranean through the Straits, but Stalin’s post-war pressure on Turkey over this led Truman to send an American fleet to
the Straits in Aug. 1946.
Germany
During the war, the Soviets agreed to send raw materials from their German zone in exchange for reparations from the other
zones. However, during 1945-6, the Soviets plundered their zone, received the reparations from the Western zones, but sent
nothing in return. In May 1946, America suspended the dispatch of reparations from the American zone to the Soviet zone and
blamed the Soviets (and the French) for the lack of Allied agreement on Germany.
The Allied Control Council (ACC) comprised the four military governors of the occupied zones of Germany. ACC meetings
became increasingly bitter during 1946. This prompted Byrnes to say at a Sept. 1946 speech in Stuttgart that American troops
would remain in Europe for the foreseeable future, and that the West’s German zones should be economically and politically
independent. When the British and American zones were combined in 1947 (the French joined in 1949), it was clear that the
economic and political divisions of Germany and indeed of Europe were hardening.
Developments in the different German zones demonstrated how each power sought to create and/or support countries in
their own image. Within the Soviet zone, the Communist Party was dominant, while in the Western zones there were free
elections in which multiple parties participated.
The Council of Foreign Ministers again failed to reach agreement on German and Austrian peace treaties in their Moscow
meeting in March 1947. When President Truman made his ‘Truman Doctrine’ speech in March 1947, it constituted a final and
unequivocal American declaration of what was to become the Cold War.
The Cold War and ‘containment’ in Europe
The Truman Doctrine
• Using the pseudonym ‘Mr X’, US diplomat George Kennan expanded
on his idea of containment in his article in Foreign Affairs magazine, in
July 1947. Kennan said the US should oppose the Soviets ‘with
unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of
encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.’
President Truman elucidated and advocated Kennan’s containment
doctrine in a speech to Congress on 12 March 1947. Truman said
Greece and Turkey were threatened by Communist aggression and
asked for $400 m. to help them. Congress granted him the money.
The Cold War and ‘containment’ in Europe
The significance of the Truman Doctrine
• The Truman Doctrine was highly significant. It affected and dominated US foreign policy
for nearly half a century. It was one of the declarations of Cold War, the point at which
the Truman administration and Congress made public the decision that Communism
was a great threat that must be opposed. It did not represent a sudden departure in US
foreign policy, but the culmination of much anxiety about and discussion of crises such
as Iran, Greece, Turkey and Germany. Some contemporaries expressed doubts.
Republican Senator Taft criticised the simplistic division of the world into two. Kennan
himself said it was too sweeping because it failed to ask whether a threatened state
was worth supporting and whether it was within US capabilities to support it.
• Journalist Walter Lippmann, who never thought much of Truman, approved aid to
Greece but disliked Truman’s tone: ‘A vague global policy, which sounds like the tocsin
(alarm bell) of an ideological crusade, has no limits. It cannot be controlled. Its effects
cannot be predicted.’ It certainly demonstrated the drawbacks of conducting foreign
policy in a democracy, in that Truman knew that winning over the public necessitated
that issues be painted in black and white, as good versus evil: a characterisation that
left little room for manoeuvre in US foreign policy.
The Cold War and ‘containment’ in Europe
The Marshal Plan
• Truman’s Secretary of State, George Marshall, feared that the post-war
devastation might make Western Europe vulnerable to Communist insurgency
and the Red Army, especially as there were strong Communist parties in France
and Italy in particular. West European countries were important trading
partners and potential allies for the United States, so Truman decided to pump
$13 b. into the restoration of their economies. When Marshall announced his
plan in June 1947, he did not specify that the aid would be confined to Western
Europe. The Soviets and the Eastern European states considered accepting
Marshall Aid. However, the Soviets did not want to give full details of their
economic devastation to the Americans, so they rejected the offer of aid and
ensured that the East Europeans did so too (had the Soviets accepted the offer,
it is doubtful that Congress would have financed Marshall Aid)
The Cold War and ‘containment’ in Europe
The significance of the Marshall Plan
• The Marshall Plan helped to seal the division of Europe into two antagonistic blocs. In
response to American aid in Western Europe, the USSR tightened its hold over Eastern
Europe, establishing full Communist Party domination in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania
and Poland, then last of all, in Czechoslovakia in spring 1948. From autumn 1947, the
Soviets ordered the West European Communist parties to do all they could to bring
down their national governments.
• Within the US itself, Marshall Aid demonstrated the bipartisan approach to the Cold
War. In March 1948, Truman asked Congress to finance the Marshall Plan and to
introduce universal military training and the draft. He said these measures were
necessary because Soviet domination of Eastern Europe might be followed by a Soviet
takeover of Western Europe too. In April 1948, the Republican-controlled Congress
granted the Democrat Truman the money he requested even as the presidential
election approached. However, they rejected his proposals for universal military
training and the draft.
The Cold War and ‘containment’ in Europe
The Berlin Blockade
• Amidst all this tension in and over Europe, it was not surprising that a great crisis
arose, and that it occurred in the place where the Soviets and Americans came
into closest contact – Germany. When Stalin blocked Western access to the
Western zones of Berlin in June 1948, there could be no doubt that the Cold War
was well and truly underway.
• Truman had three options. He could surrender and get out of Berlin, but that
would be humiliating and make the US appear an unreliable ally. He could send
military convoys down the autobahns to West Berlin, but even the feisty Truman
considered that too aggressive and likely to lead to war. Truman chose a third
option: millions of tons of supplies were airlifted by the Americans and the British
into West Berlin until Stalin ended the blockade a year later in May 1949.
The Cold War and ‘containment’ in Europe
The significance of the Berlin Blockade
• The Berlin Blockade was highly significant in two ways. First, it demonstrated how far
each side was willing to go in the Cold War. Truman’s choice of the third option and
Stalin’s passivity in face of the airlift suggested that neither wanted to risk war. Second,
whatever Stalin’s motives, the blockade was a failure. Whether he aimed to get the
Western allies out of Berlin, or to halt the development of a West German state closely
tied both politically and militarily to the Western bloc, or to test Western determination
and unity, he failed spectacularly. The Western powers remained in West Berlin and
demonstrated great unity, and the blockade precipitated the development of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and a strongly pro-American West German state.
The development of two German states
• The Truman administration had already been considering the establishment of a West
German state and the blockade seemed to confirm the wisdom of the idea. In May
1949, a constitution was drawn up for the new West German state. In Oct. 1949, the
Soviets set up an East German state. The East Germans began to fence, mine and patrol
their 850-mile frontier with West Germany.
The Cold War and ‘containment’ in Europe
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NATO
The deterioration in relations with the Soviets confirmed the belief of Truman and the
West Europeans that they needed to organise themselves into a defensive association
lest the Red Army pour into Western Europe. A Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in
spring 1948 represented the completion of the Iron Curtain and, combined with the
Berlin Blockade, convinced Congress to agree to a massive increase in defence
expenditure and to US membership of NATO.
NATO was significant in that:
It completed the division of Western Europe and Eastern Europe. At first the division
had been primarily political and economic. Now it was military.
In 1955, West Germany’s admission to NATO encouraged the Soviets to respond with
the Warsaw Pact, the military alliance for the Soviet bloc.
It could be argued that the establishment of NATO stabilised Europe. Both sides now
knew where they stood. After the establishment of NATO and the fall of China to
Communism, Asia became the great Cold War arena.
The Cold War and ‘containment’ in Asia
• After WWII ended, the US had given $2b. aid to Chiang Kai-shek, but American observers soon
concluded that he was a hopeless case. In late 1949, Mao Zedong’s Communist forces defeated
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces and the Chinese Civil War came to an end. Chiang and his
followers fled to Taiwan. Truman now became a victim to his own doctrine. Many Americans
thought that if Communism were such a threat, Truman should not have allowed China to
become Communist.
• The Republicans blamed the Democrats for the ‘loss’ of China. It was soon commonly believed
that China had been ‘lost’ because of Roosevelt’s ‘betrayal’ of Chiang Kai-shek at Yalta,
insufficient US aid to Chiang, and treachery within Truman’s State Department, which
contained Communist sympathisers. However, as Truman and his State Department recognised,
America could have done nothing short of total war to ensure the defeat of Mao Zedong and
his Communist forces.
• The Chinese Nationalist representative at the UN (Chiang Kai-shek’s Taiwan, rather than Mao’s
People’s Republic of China, held the China seat at the UN until 1971) warned that events in
China could cause revolts and successes by Communist parties throughout Asia. Events in
Korea in the summer of 1950 caused Truman and many Americans to believe that he was right.
The response to the rise of Communism in Asia
• Truman responded to the rise of Communism in Asia by attempting to contain what he
perceived to be Communist aggression in French Indochina (he offered the French financial aid
in their struggle against Communist insurgents in Vietnam in spring 1950) and in Korea.
The Cold War and ‘containment’ in Asia
The course of events in the Korean War
• On 25 June 1950, Communist North Korea attacked non-Communist and pro-American South Korea.
With near-unanimous backing from Congress, the press and the public, Truman sent air and naval
assistance to South Korea and the US 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Straits. The US-dominated UN agreed that
UN forces should be sent to Korea. Truman told reporters that this was not a US war but a UN ‘police
action’. However, although other members of the Western alliance (notably Canada and Britain) sent
forces, the UN force that fought alongside the South Koreans was primarily American. Truman’s initial
war aim was to drive the North Korean Communist forces out of South Korea.
• With the advantage of preparation and surprise, the North Koreans made great advances. A US
infantryman recalled how, ‘Guys, sweat soaked, shitting in their pants, not even dropping them, moved
like zombies’ in retreat, while the casualty rate hit 30%. However, US General Douglas MacArthur, the
UN commander in Korea, turned the war around with a brilliant amphibious assault on Inchon in Sept.
1950. This forced a North Korean retreat and at this point, Truman’s war aims changed. The US now
sought the destruction of destruction of North Korea’s forces and the reunification of Korea. This was
no longer containment. This was what the Republicans called the ‘rollback’ of Communism. Most
Americans supported the change of the aim. They believed that North Korean aggression should be
punished and that South Korean morale would suffer if nothing were done. MacArthur, long an
enthusiastic supporter of Chaing, wanted to invade China.
• In Oct. 1950, the Chinese warned that if American troops crossed into North Korea, China would enter
the Korean War. MacArthur had assured Truman the Chinese would never intervene, but they did. US,
UN and South Korean troops were driven back below the 38th parallel. However, the situation was
stabilised by April 1951 thanks to US General Matt Ridgway. In June 1951, China proposed an armistice
which was finally agreed in July 1953 (Truman contributed to the prolongation of the war by insisting
that Chinese prisoners of war should not be returned to China). The pre-war status quo was restored.
The Cold War and ‘containment’ in Asia
Why did the US fight in the Korean War?
• During WWII, the Americans and Soviets agreed that when the war ended,
American forces would take the Japanese surrender in the southern part of Korea
and Soviet forces would take it in the north. Not surprisingly, the Soviets
promoted Communism in the north of Korea and Americans promoted antiCommunism in the south. Two Korean states were created. Both the North
Korean leader Kim II Sung and the South Korean leader Syngman Rhee dreamt of
reuniting and ruling the Korean peninsula. Both endorsed cross-border raids, but
in June 1950 North Korea launched a full-scale attack on South Korea. Truman felt
he had to respond because of foreign and domestic considerations. The foreign
policy considerations were:
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The foreign policy considerations were:
An April 1950 National Security Council (NSC) planning paper (NSC 68) warned Truman that the Soviets had a
‘fanatic faith’ and aimed at total domination of Europe and Asia.
The combination of the fall of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Blockade and the North Korean attack convinced Truman
that the Soviets were increasingly and ominously active and Truman considered Kim a Soviet (and Chinese)
puppet.
It seemed as if the world balance of power was tilting in favour of Communism – in 1949 the Soviets had exploded
their first atomic bomb, and China had been ‘lost’ to Communism.
South Korea was an anti-Communist state that the Americans had helped to create.
Truman was concerned about the safety of Japan, which was close to Korea and lay within what Secretary of State
Dean Acheson called the American defence perimeter.
Truman felt that North Korea was testing the UN. He believed that failure to support the UN could encourage
aggressors and lead to a third world war.
American allies such as Britain and France were supportive, because they had problems with Communist
insurgents in their Southeast Asian colonies.
The United States dominated the UN and it was relatively easy to get UN support against the North Koreans.
The domestic considerations were:
Cold War anxieties had grown in early 1950: Klaus Fuchs, who had worked on the atomic bomb, was revealed to
be a Soviet spy; State Department officials Alger Hiss was found guilty of lying about passing secret documents to
the Soviet Union; Senator Joseph McCarthy had declared that Truman’s State Department contained many
Communists.
The Republicans had bitterly attacked Truman over the ‘loss’ of China and he did not want to be accused of losing
South Korea, especially as there were congressional elections in Nov. 1950.
The Cold War and ‘containment’ in Asia
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The significance of the Korean War
Truman’s response to the rise of Communism in Asia had been to take the nation into a bloody war that
dramatically affected US foreign and domestic policies. The Korean War was significant in that:
36,914 Americans had died before President Eisenhower ended the war in 1953.
Truman’s initial war aim was achieved: South Korea was ‘saved’ for the US and the Western alliance. It could be
said that containment worked.
The US attempt to reunify the peninsula failed.
Asia replaced Europe as the central Cold War arena.
It inspired Truman to give further support to French colonialism in Indochina and to the dictatorial regimes of
Syngman Rhee in South Korea and Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan.
The US dramatically increased military expenditure and massively increased its armed forces (as did the Soviet
Union).
It greatly embittered Chinese-American relations.
It exacerbated Cold War tensions and intensified American anti-Communist hysteria.
It suggested that neither the US, the USSR nor China was willing to risk a third world war: Truman rejected
MacArthur’s suggestion that America use atomic bombs, the Chinese only intervened after several warnings and
requested an armistice in spring 1951, and the Soviets left North Korea and China to do the fighting.
The Korean War also demonstrated the difficulties in conducting foreign policy and waging war in a democracy:
Truman entered the war partly because he feared Republican attacks for ‘losing’ Korea and because he was
anxious about the congressional mid-term elections; his change of war aims after Inchon owed much to popular
demand for revenge against North Korean aggression; General MacArthur made many mistakes after Inchon, but
Truman did not replace him until April 1951 because the general was so popular with the American people.
The Korean War and the powers of the
presidency
• As president, Truman was commander-in-chief of the US armed forces and he
decided to deploy them in Korea from the start. He consulted congressional
leaders and they agreed that South Korea must be assisted. The American
Constitution gave Congress alone the power to declare war, but congressional
leaders said there was no need for a congressional declaration of war. However,
when the war became unpopular, it was commonly known as ‘Truman’s War’,
and rendered him virtually powerless to control Congress or to lead the country
effectively.