Transcript history of international relations, 1945-1991

HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, 1945-1991
THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE
COLD WAR IN THE 1960s
NIXON, DÉTENTE, CHINA, STRATEGY AND
DOCTRINE, THE FOREIGN POLICY REVOLUTION OF
KISSINGER, LESSONS OF VIETNAM
ANDRÁS JOÓ PhD
CORVINUS 2015
COVERT ACTION AND INTELLIGENCE
• SECRET ATTEMPTS TO MANIPULATE THE
COURSE OF EVENTS
• WALTER ULBRICHT, ANNOUNCED TO
HIS INNER CIRCLE AFTER RETURNING TO
BERLIN FROM EXILE IN MOSCOW ON 30
APRIL 1945:
• ‘It’s got to look democratic, but we
must have everything under our
control.’
• STASI
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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COVERT ACTION - A MAJOR ARM OF US FOREIGN POLICY
• THE ARRIVAL OF EISENHOWER IN THE OVAL OffiCE HAD TURNED
COVERT ACTION INTO A MAJOR ARM OF US FOREIGN POLICY
– BETWEEN 1951 AND 1975, THERE WERE ABOUT 900 MAJOR COVERT
ACTIONS
– ASSASSINATION PLOTS
• CIA DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE (DDI), RAY CLINE,
WROTE:
The weak point in covert paramilitary action is that a single misfortune that reveals CIA’s
connection makes it necessary for the United States either to abandon the cause
completely or convert to a policy of overt military intervention.
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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MAKE THEM ‘SCREAM’
• NIXON TOLD THE CIA IN 1970 TO TRY
TO PREVENT THE ELECTION OF CHILE’S
MARXIST PRESIDENT, SALVADOR
ALLENDE, AND TO MAKE THE CHILEAN
ECONOMY ‘SCREAM’
• CLAIMS THAT THE CIA ORCHESTRATED
ALLENDE’S OVERTHROW IN 1973,
LARGELY MISTAKEN
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/chile/
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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HARMEL REPORT
• IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1960S, NATO FACED NEW
CHALLENGES
• IN 1966 FRANCE WITHDREW FROM THE ORGANIZATION’S
INTEGRATED MILITARY COMMAND
• EAST-WEST RAPPROCHEMENT SEEMED IN THE OFFING
• THE USSR BECAME MORE PLIABLE IN ITS FOREIGN POLICIES
• NEW ATMOSPHERE CAST DOUBTS ON THE NECESSITY OF
NATO’S COSTLY DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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COLD, BUT STILL A WAR
•
•
•
•
•
DISTORTED VIEWS
US EXPERIENCE
LESS ATTENTION PAID TO KGB OPERATIONS
MITROKHIN ARCHIVE
KGB USUALLY SUPPORTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE
– HAD GREATER INflUENCE THAN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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SOVIET FP GOALS, INTELLIGENCE, COVERT ACTIONS
• IN ASIA, AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, THE MAIN INITIATIVES
IN SOVIET POLICY DURING THE 1960S AND 1970S WERE ALSO
MORE FREQUENTLY TAKEN BY THE KGB THAN BY THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY
• INDIA WAS DESCRIBED BY GENERAL OLEG KALUGIN, WHO IN
THE MID-1970S WAS THE YOUNGEST GENERAL IN SOVIET
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, AS ‘A MODEL OF KGB INFILTRATION
OF A THIRD WORLD GOVERNMENT’
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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THIRD WORLD KGB OPERATIONS
• VLADIMIR KRIUCHKOV, HEAD OF THE KGB
FIRST CHIEF (FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE)
DIRECTORATE (FCD) FROM 1974 TO 1988,
DESCRIBED THE NON-ALIGNED
MOVEMENT (NAM) AS ‘OUR NATURAL
ALLIES’
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
• SOVIET BLOC HAD AN
INBUILT ADVANTAGE OVER
THE WEST IN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION
• THE AUTHORITARIAN AND
SECRETIVE POLITICAL
SYSTEMS OF ONE-PARTY
STATES ARE HARDER TO
PENETRATE THAN THOSE OF
DEMOCRACIES
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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ANALYSIS AND DISTORTION
• SOVIET BLOC HAD AN INBUILT DISADVANTAGE IN INTELLIGENCE
ASSESSMENT
• IN ONE-PARTY STATES, POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS IS
NECESSARILY DISTORTED BY THE INSISTENT DEMANDS OF
POLITICAL CORRECTNESS
– MECHANISM FOR REINFORCING, RATHER THAN CORRECTING, THE
REGIMES’ MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE OUTSIDE WORLD
• AUTOCRATS, BY AND LARGE, ARE TOLD WHAT THEY WANT TO HEAR
• PESSIMISTIC INTELLIGENCE REPORTS WERE KEPT FROM
BREZHNEV FOR FEAR THAT THEY ‘WOULD UPSET LEONID ILYICH’
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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INTELLIGENCE ASYMMETRY IN EAST AND WEST
• MAIN ADVERSARY
• THERE WAS MORE THAN ONE MAIN ADVERSARY FOR THE
USSR
• REPRESS DISSENT – INTERNAL PROBLEM
• HUGE SURVEILLANCE NETWORKS
– THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC WERE SEVEN TIMES MORE
NUMEROUS EVEN THAN IN NAZI GERMANY
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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EXTENT OF THE KGB’S IMPORTANCE
• UNDER GORBACHEV THE FULL EXTENT OF THE KGB’S IMPORTANCE
TO THE SURVIVAL OF THE USSR BECAME CLEAR
• THE MANIFESTO OF THE HARD-LINE LEADERS OF THE AUGUST 1991
COUP, OF WHICH THE KGB CHAIRMAN, VLADIMIR KRIUCHKOV, WAS
THE CHIEF ORGANISER, IMPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE
RELAXATION OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST IDEOLOGICAL
SUBVERSION HAD SHAKEN THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ONE PARTY
STATE:
‘Authority at all levels has lost the confidence of the
population … The country has in effect become ungovernable.’
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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TOPPLING THE STATUE OF FELIX DZERZHINSKY
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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HARMEL REPORT
• UPON THE INITIATIVE OF
HARMEL, NATO’S NORTH
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
UNDERTOOK TO EXAMINE
EAST-WEST RELATIONS,
NATO’S INTERNAL
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE,
AND ITS DEFENSE STRATEGY
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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NIXON
• IN 1952 DWIGHT D.
EISENHOWER SELECTED NIXON
AS HIS RUNNING MATE FOR
THE PRESIDENCY
• SPENT EIGHT YEARS AS VICE
PRESIDENT, DEMONSTRATING
PARTICULAR INTEREST IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
TRAVELING EXTENSIVELY
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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NIXON VS JOHNSON
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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MILITARY AND STRATEGIC PROBLEMS – TET
OFFENSIVE
• MILITARY OFFENSIVE BY THE PEOPLE’S ARMY OF VIETNAM (NORTH
VIETNAMESE ARMY) AND THE VIET CONG
• 30 JANUARY 1968, THE VIETNAMESE NEW YEAR (TET) TRUCE WAS BROKEN
WHEN VIET CONG FORCES ATTACKED 13 CITIES IN THE CENTRAL REGION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
• A VIET CONG PLATOON MANAGED TO PENETRATE THE GROUNDS OF THE U.S.
EMBASSY IN SAIGON
• WIDE PUBLICITY
• THE TET OFFENSIVE FAILED TO ACHIEVE HANOI’S MILITARY OBJECTIVES –
CASUALTIES HIGH
• COMMANDER OF U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM REQUESTED 206,000 ADDITIONAL
TROOPS TO MOUNT A DECISIVE COUNTEROFFENSIVE
• LBJ DENIED THE REQUEST
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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THE TET
OFFENSIVE
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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“I’m going to stop that war. Fast.”
• NIXON WAS WELL AWARE OF THE
DESTRUCTIVE NATURE OF THE WAR
• BEFORE FINISHING THE WAR HE WANTED
TO WIN IT
• FACED THE RELATIVE DECLINE OF US
POWER
• NIXON WORKED CLOSELY WITH HIS
ENERGETIC NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR, HENRY A. KISSINGER
• THE PROGRAM OF
VIETNAMIZATION BEGUN UNDER
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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KISSINGER
• U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR (1969–1975)
AND SECRETARY OF STATE
(1973–1977)
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1999/06/kissin
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
ger-metternich-and-realism/377625/
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HOW COULD OLD DIPLOMACY APPLY TO THE AGE
OF THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS?
• KISSINGER'S DOCTORAL THESIS RAISED EYEBROWS AT HARVARD
• TASK OF STATESMEN REMAINED THE SAME: TO CONSTRUCT A
BALANCE OF FEAR AMONG GREAT POWERS
• MAINTENANCE OF AN ORDERLY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
– A SYSTEM THAT, WHILE NOT NECESSARILY JUST OR FAIR, WAS ACCEPTED BY
THE PRINCIPAL PLAYERS AS LEGITIMATE
– NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD ALTERED STATESMANSHIP LESS THAN PEOPLE
THOUGHT
– REAL TASK OF STATESMEN IS TO FORESTALL REVOLUTIONS, THE REAL HEROES
OF HISTORY ARE ENLIGHTENED CONSERVATIVES
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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REALPOLITIK
• AS LONG AS THE SYSTEM
WAS MAINTAINED, NO ONE
WOULD CHALLENGE IT
THROUGH REVOLUTION
• ORDER THROUGH A
BALANCE OF FEAR,
COOPERATION
• DEFENSIVE MECHANISMS
• DIPLOMATIC,
• MILITARY,
• SCIENTIFIC
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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ENLIGHTENED CONSERVATISM WITHIN ONE’S OWN
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL LIMITS
’Every statesman must attempt to
reconcile what is considered just with
what is considered possible. What is
considered just depends on the
domestic structure of his state; what
is possible depends on its resources,
geographic position and
determination, and on the resources,
determination and domestic structure
of other states.’
• ACCORDING TO KISSINGER DENG
XIAOPING REPRESENTED
ENLIGHTENED CONSERVATISM
• MODERATE DOSES OF CHANGE
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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THE CREDIBILITY OF DIPLOMACY IN THE COLD WAR
• KISSINGER REGULARLY MIXED VIOLENCE AND THE THREAT OF
IT WITH DIPLOMACY, SO THAT HIS DIPLOMACY HAD
CREDIBILITY
– OPENING TO CHINA IN ORDER TO UNDERMINE THE SOVIET UNION
WHILE THEY SOUGHT DÉTENTE WITH MOSCOW
– UNWILLINGNESS TO QUIT VIETNAM WITHOUT FIRST SPILLING BLOOD
– SUPPORT OF ODIOUS YET PRO-AMERICAN REGIMES IN GREECE AND
CHILE
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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CREDIBILITY, WITHDRAWAL, STRATEGIC
REALIGNMENT
• WITHDRAWING AMERICAN TROOPS WHILE PROVIDING REPUBLIC
OF VIETNAM (SOUTH VIETNAM) FORCES WITH MASSIVE AMOUNTS
OF WAR SUPPLIES TO ENABLE THEM TO DEFEND THEMSELVES
• AUGUST 1969 KISSINGER EMBARKED ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
• PROVED TO BE VERY LONG
• NIXON ORDERED THE SECRET BOMBING OF CAMBODIA AS WELL AS
A GROUND INVASION
• AT CHRISTMAS 1972 NIXON ORDERED A MASSIVE BOMBING
CAMPAIGN AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM TO PRESSURE ITS LEADERS
TO ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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THE SO-CALLED VIETNAMIZATION OF THE WAR
• PRESIDENT BEGAN TO WITHDRAW
AMERICAN TROOPS FROM VIETNAM,
DECREASING THEIR NUMBER FROM 543,000
IN THE SPRING OF 1969 TO 156,800 BY THE
END OF 1971
• ONLY 60,000 US TROOPS THERE BY LATE 1972
• VIETNAMIZATION HELPED TO LIMIT
DOMESTIC DISSENT
• INTENSIFICATION OF BOMBINGS
• TO PUT PRESSURE ON HANOI
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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“LIKE A PITIFUL, HELPLESS GIANT”
• NIXON ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY
THAT HE WOULD NOT ALLOW
“THE WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL
NATION” TO ACT “LIKE A PITIFUL,
HELPLESS GIANT.”
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF NIXON
• NIXON’S POLICY WAS TO LIMIT OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE TO HANOI
AND PRESSURE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TO END
THE WAR
• MARCH 1970 A COUP IN CAMBODIA OUSTED PRINCE NORODOM
SIHANOUK – WAR SPREAD IN INDOCHINA
• BOTH SOVIET AND CHINESE LEADERS ANXIOUS FOR BETTER
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
• DECEMBER1972,AFTER AN APPARENT PEACE AGREEMENT
COLLAPSED WHEN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE REFUSED TO
MODERATE THEIR POSITION, THE UNITED STATES AGAIN
LAUNCHED A FURIOUS AIR ASSAULT
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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THE CHRISTMAS BOMBINGS
• OPERATION CONDUCTED
FROM 18–29 DECEMBER
1972
• SEVERAL INFORMAL NAMES
SUCH AS "THE DECEMBER
RAIDS" AND "THE CHRISTMAS
BOMBINGS„
• A POLITICAL AIR OFFENSIVE
TO ’NAIL’ THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE TO THE
NEGOCIATING TABLE
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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PARIS PEACE ACCORDS
• NIXON INSTRUCTED KISSINGER TO
MAKE CONCESSIONS
• THE PRESIDENT WAS EAGER TO IMPROVE
RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND
CHINA
– KISSINGER AGREED THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE
TROOPS COULD REMAIN IN THE SOUTH AFTER
THE SETTLEMENT
– THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ABANDONED HANOI’S
INSISTENCE THAT THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT
OF NGUYEN VAN THIEU BE REMOVED
• ON JANUARY 27, 1973, KISSINGER AND LE
DUC THO SIGNED A CEASEFIRE
AGREEMENT IN PARIS
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991
- A.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kC0ecgm0mAM
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GRAND DESIGN OF NIXON AND KISSINGER
• GROWING ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES MANDATED CUTS IN DEFENSE
BUDGETS
• NEGOTIATE ARMS LIMITATIONS AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET
UNION
• A NEW DOCTRINE GREW OUT OF A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL
STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
• NIXON SAW THE WORLD OF THE LATE 1960s AS MULTIPOLAR
• A PENTAGONAL WORLD IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES, WESTERN EUROPE,
JAPAN, THE SOVIET BLOC, AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) ALL
EXERTED POWERFUL MILITARY AND GEOPOLITICAL INFLUENCE
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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AFTERMATH AND COLLAPSE OF SOUTH VIETNAM
• US PULLED ITS TROOPS OUT OF
VIETNAM, LEAVING BEHIND SOME
MILITARY ADVISERS
– BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH VIOLATED THE
CEASEFIRE, AND FIGHTING RESUMED
• ON APRIL 29, 1975, THE SOUTH
VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
COLLAPSED, AND VIETNAM WAS
REUNIFIED UNDER A COMMUNIST
GOVERNMENT IN HANOI
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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THE NIXON DOCTRINE
• THE DOCTRINE BACKED AWAY FROM THE OPEN-ENDED
COMMITMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD MADE TO
CONTAIN COMMUNISM VIA THE 1947 TRUMAN DOCTRINE
• PROMISED ONLY ECONOMIC AID AND MILITARY WEAPONRY
TO DEVELOPING-WORLD ALLIES THREATENED
• THE NIXON DOCTRINE WARNED THAT THE UNITED STATES
WOULD NO LONGER BEAR THE BURDEN OF DIRECTLY
CONFRONTING COMMUNIST THREATS IN THE DEVELOPING
WORLD
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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THE NIXON DOCTRINE
• NIXON AND KISSINGER ATTEMPTED
TO MANAGE THE U.S. RETREAT AS
COST-EFFECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE,
WITHOUT UNDUE LOSS OF U.S.
POWER AND INFLUENCE
• SUPPORT FOR STRONG PROAMERICAN LEADERS AROUND THE
WORLD (SO-CALLED SHERIFFS)
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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EGYPT
• KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OFFERED EGYPT A THREE-YEAR
$500 MILLION AID PACKAGE
• GRATEFUL AS HE WAS FOR US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, NASSER
WAS NOT ABOUT TO ABANDON PAN-ARABISM
• ASKED THE SOVIET UNION FOR MEDIUM-RANGE BOMBERS
• RELATIONS BETWEEN CAIRO AND WASHINGTON
DETERIORATED RAPIDLY
• NASSER INVITED THE VIETCONG TO OPEN AN EMBASSY IN
EGYPT IN THE SPRING OF 1965
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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“SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP” AND NEAR EAST
CAHALLENGES
• HAFEZ AL-ASSAD AND THE BA’ATH PARTY, A PRO-NASSER
ORGANIZATION THAT PREACHED STATE SOCIALISM AND ARAB
UNITY, SEIZED POWER IN DAMASCUS IN 1966
• DEVELOPING “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP” BETWEEN AMERICA
AND ISRAEL
• A WELL-ARMED ISRAEL A REAL STRATEGIC ASSET FOR THE
UNITED STATES
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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THE SIX DAY WAR
• NASSER MOBILIZED THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN MID-MAY (1967)
• DEMANDED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WITHDRAW THE
OBSERVERS IT HAD STATIONED IN GAZA AND THE SINAI SINCE THE
SUEZ CRISIS
• ISRAELI JETS KNOCKED OUT NASSER’S AIR FORCE ON THE TARMAC
WHILE HUNDREDS OF ISRAELI TANKS SMASHED THROUGH
EGYPTIAN FRONT LINES IN THE SINAI
• KING HUSSEIN SENT HIS ARMY INTO ACTION AGAINST THE JEWISH
STATE, AS AN ACT OF INTER-ARAB SOLIDARITY
• ISRAELI FORCES COUNTERATTACKED,SEIZED EAST JERUSALEM,
OCCUPIED THE REST OF THE WEST BANK
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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SYRIA, GOLAN HEIGHTS, SUPERPOWER TENSION
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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“BLACK SEPTEMBER CRISIS” - JORDAN
• PLO ATTEMPTED TO OVERTHROW KING HUSSEIN IN 1970
• ROYAL TROOPS GAINED THE UPPER HAND AGAINST PALESTINIAN
GUERRILLAS
• SOVIET-BACKED REGIME IN DAMASCUS SENT TANKS TO THE
JORDANIAN BORDER
• NIXON AND KISSINGER SECRETLY AGREED THAT THE ISRAELIS
SHOULD LAUNCH AIRSTRIKES AGAINST THE SYRIANS
• BREZHNEV PERSUADED THE SYRIANS TO REVERSE COURSE, KING
HUSSEIN MANAGED TO EXPEL THE PLO
• DUDDEN DEATH OF NASSER
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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DÉTENTE
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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END OF ISOLATION - OPENING TO CHINA
• CANDIDATE RICHARD NIXON
WROTE IN Foreign Affairs:
"we simply cannot afford to leave
China forever outside the family of
nations… There is no place on this
small planet for a billion of its
potentially most able people to live in
angry isolation."
http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articl
eID=2483&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23927/richard-m-nixon/asia-after-viet-nam
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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CHINA, 1972
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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NIXON AND FORD
• NIXON’S RESIGNATION IN
AUGUST 1974 BROUGHT
GERALD R. FORD TO THE
PRESIDENCY
• FORD EMPHASIZED CONTINUITY
IN FOREIGN POLICY
•
CONTINUED NIXON’S POLICY OF
DÉTENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE STRATEGIC ARMS
LIMITATION TALKS (SALT),
REACHING BROAD AGREEMENT ON
THE SALT II FRAMEWORK
IN
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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VLADIVOSTOK IN NOVEMBER 1974
VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT MEETING
• DURING A WORKING MEETING IN THE AREA OF VLADIVOSTOK
ON NOVEMBER 23-24, 1974, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU BREZHNEV AND FORD
DISCUSSED IN DETAIL THE QUESTION OF FURTHER
LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT MEETING
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
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