Transcript No Slide Title

Objectives
 Comprehend the causes and
actions associated with the
Cuban Missile Crisis as a case
study of American-Soviet
relations at the height of the
Cold War
Material drawn from John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum
http://www.jfklibrary.org/
Cuban Missile Crisis: Background
 In 1962, the Soviet Union was desperately behind
the United States in the arms race. Soviet missiles
were only powerful enough to be launched
against Europe but U.S. missiles were capable of
striking the entire Soviet Union.
 In late April 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev conceived the idea of placing
intermediate-range missiles in Cuba. A
deployment in Cuba would double the Soviet
strategic arsenal and politically counter U.S.
missiles placed in Turkey, thus providing a real
deterrent to a potential U.S. attack against the
Soviet Union.
Cuban Missile Crisis: Background
 Meanwhile, Fidel Castro was looking for a way
to defend his island nation from an attack by
the U.S. Ever since the failed Bay of Pigs
invasion in 1961, Castro felt a second attack was
inevitable. Consequently, he approved of
Khrushchev's plan to place missiles on the
island.
 In the summer of 1962 the Soviet Union worked
quickly and secretly to build its missile
installations in Cuba.
Day 1: October 16
 President Kennedy and principal foreign
policy and national defense officials are
briefed on the U-2 findings.
 Discussions begin on how to respond to the
challenge. Two principal courses are offered:
an air strike and invasion, or a naval
quarantine with the threat of further
military action.
 To avoid arousing public concern, the
president maintained his official schedule,
meeting periodically with advisors to
discuss the status of events in Cuba and
possible strategies.
Day 2 and 3: October 17-18
 Day 2 (17 Oct): American military units begin moving to bases in the
Southeastern U.S. as intelligence photos from another U-2 flight show
additional sites; and 16 to 32 missiles
 Day 3 (18 Oct): President Kennedy is visited by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko, who asserts that Soviet aid to Cuba is purely defensive and does not
represent a threat to the United States. Kennedy, without revealing what he
knows of the existence of the missiles, reads to Gromyko his public warning of
September 4 that the "gravest consequences" would follow if significant Soviet
offensive weapons were introduced into Cuba.
Day 4-6 (October 19-21)
 Day 5 (Oct 20) President Kennedy returns to Washington and after five hours
of discussion with top advisers decides on a naval quarantine of Cuba to block
Soviet ships from completing the missile site construction. Naval units are
deployed and work is begun on a speech to notify the American people.
 Day 6 (Oct 21) Soviet vessels approach the quarantine line. U.S. and Soviet
nuclear forces at full alert.
 Soviet freighters turn and head back to Europe. The Bucharest, carrying only
petroleum products, is allowed through the quarantine line. U.N. Secretary General
calls for a cooling off period, which is rejected by Kennedy because it would leave the
missiles in place.
Day 7 (October 22)
 President Kennedy formally establishes the Executive Committee of the
National Security Council and instructs it to meet daily during the crisis.
 Kennedy briefs the cabinet, U.S. congressional leaders and the British Prime
Minister Macmillan of the situation
 President Kennedy writes to Nikita Khrushchev, Premier of the Soviet Union,
prior to addressing the American public on live television: ... “I have not
assumed that you or any other sane man would In this nuclear age, deliberately
plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win and
which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world,
including the aggressor.”
 President Kennedy speaks on television to the American people, revealing the
evidence of Soviet missiles in Cuba and calling for their removal. He also
announces the establishment of a naval quarantine around the island until the
Soviet Union agrees to dismantle the missile sites and to make certain that no
additional missiles are shipped to Cuba
Day 8 (October 23)
 U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson briefs the U.N.
Security Council.
 The U.S. naval quarantine fleet is now fully in place around Cuba.
 Soviet submarines threaten the quarantine by moving into the Caribbean area.
 Soviet freighters bound for Cuba with military supplies stop dead in the water,
but the oil tanker Bucharest continues towards Cuba.
Day 9 (October 24)
 Chairman Khrushchev replies indignantly to President Kennedy's October 23
letter stating in part:
 "You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quarantine, but rather are setting forth an
ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use
force. Consider what you are saying! And you want to persuade me to agree to this!
What would it mean to agree to these demands? It would mean guiding oneself in
one's relations with other countries not by reason, but by submitting to arbitrariness.
You are no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us."
Day 10 (October 25)
 Knowing that some missiles in Cuba were now operational, President Kennedy
personally drafts a letter to Premier Khrushchev, again urging him to change
the course of events. U.S. military finalizes plans to attack missile sites
 U.N. Secretary General U Thant calls for a cooling off period, which is rejected
by Kennedy because it would leave the missiles in place.
 Heated debate between the United States and the Soviet Union in the halls of
the United Nations. During the debate in the Security Council, the normally
courteous U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson aggressively confronts his Soviet
U.N. counterpart Valerian Zorin with photographic evidence of the missiles in
Cuba.
Day 11 (October 26)
 A Soviet-chartered freighter is stopped at the quarantine line and searched for contraband
military supplies. Photographic evidence shows accelerated construction of the missile sites
and the uncrating of Soviet IL-28 bombers at Cuban airfields.
 In a private letter, Fidel Castro urges Nikita Khrushchev to initiate a nuclear first strike against
the United States in the event of an American invasion of Cuba.
 John Scali, ABC News reporter, is approached by Aleksander Fomin of the Soviet embassy staff
with a proposal for a solution to the crisis.
 Later, a long, rambling letter Khrushchev Kennedy makes an offer: removal of the missiles in
exchange for lifting the quarantine and a pledge that the U.S. will not invade Cuba.
Day 12 (October 27)
 A second letter from Moscow demanding tougher terms, including the
removal of obsolete Jupiter missiles from Turkey, is received in
Washington.
 Over Cuba, An American U-2 plane is shot down by a Soviet-supplied
surface-to-air missile and the pilot, Major Rudolph Anderson, is killed
Day 13 (October 28)
 Radio Moscow announces that the Soviet Union has accepted the
proposed solution and releases the text of a Khrushchev letter affirming
that the missiles will be removed in exchange for a non-invasion pledge
from the United States.
Aftermath
 Impact on future U.S. Foreign Policy:
 Under Secretary of State on October 29, 1962, writing: "If we have learned anything
from this experience, it is that weakness, even only apparent weakness, invites Soviet
transgression. At the same time, firmness in the last analysis will force the Soviets to
back away from rash initiatives.“
 Crisis, even as close as this one, can be effectively managed at the highest levels
(implications of which we will see later in Vietnam)
 Soviet Union:
 Crises must be prevented.
 Hard-liners argued that this could be achieved by building up Soviet military forces,
to discourage U.S. aggressive tendencies.
 Soviet concerns about losing control over their nuclear weapons led them to resolve
never again to place nuclear missiles in a country so far away from their home
territory.
 The primary lesson Cuba drew, then, was that neither superpower could be trusted. It
viewed U.S. guarantees as ploys and Soviet promises as hollow.