Operation DENY FLIGHT

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Transcript Operation DENY FLIGHT

Airpower in the
Post Cold War
1
Overview I
 Gulf War Background
 The Enemy
 The Plan of Attack
 Objectives
 Concept of Operations
 Five Strategic Rings
 Targets
 Phases of the Campaign
 Operations PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH
 The Conflict and Lessons Learned
2
Overview II
 Operation SOUTHERN WATCH
The Conflict and Lessons Learned
 Operations PROVIDE RELIEF/RESTORE HOPE
The Conflict and Lessons Learned
 History of the Balkans
Background
Ethnic Groups
3
Overview III
 Operation DENY FLIGHT
The Conflict and Lessons Learned
 Operation ALLIED FORCE
Background
NATO Actions
Operation ALLIED FORCE Begins
Lessons learned by US Military
Political Lessons Learned
Impact of Lessons Learned on Future DOD Budget
 CFD Review
4
Gulf War Background
 Conflict began 2 August 1990
 Iraq and Kuwait could not settle grievances over oil
 Saddam Hussein sent armies to invade Kuwait
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US Objectives
 Immediate, complete, and unconditional
withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait
 Restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government
 Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the
Persian Gulf
 Protection of American citizens abroad
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Operation DESERT SHIELD
 CENTCOM CINC—Army Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf
 CENTAF Lt Gen Charles A. Horner
 Became JFACC during the war
 In first five days:
 Five fighter squadrons, contingent of AWACS, and part of 82d Airborne
Division
 Equaled Iraqi force in first 35 days
 Air Reserves/Air National Guard called to active duty
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DESERT STORM Begins
 16 Jan—An 11th-hour appeal for Iraqi
withdrawal from Kuwait drew silence
 17 Jan—Operation DESERT STORM began
as allied forces answered Iraq’s silence
 Within 10 days, air sorties reached the
10,000 mark
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Iraqi Threat
 4th largest armed force in world
 Well over 1 million troops
 750 combat and 200 support aircraft
 Nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities
 SCUD Missiles
9
Air Defense Threat
 Iraq’s air defense system thought to be the best
outside of the Soviet Union
 United States was probably the only nation in the
world with the airpower to “disintegrate” an
integrated system of this type
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Objectives
 Isolate and incapacitate Iraqi command structure
 Win air superiority
 Destroy nuclear, biological, and chemical
capabilities
 Eliminate Iraqi offensive military capability
 Eject Iraqi Army from Kuwait
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Boyd 2 Video
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Concept Of Operations
 Powerful and focused air attacks
on strategic centers of gravity
over a short period of time
 Target Hussein Regime, not Iraqi
people
 Minimize civilian casualties and
collateral damage
 Minimize Coalition losses
 Pit US and Coalition strengths
against Iraqi weaknesses
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Instant Thunder
 Developed by Colonel John Warden and his
Checkmate staff in Washington
Named in direct response to Vietnam’s unsuccessful
Rolling Thunder campaign
 Based on a unique five-ring model of the modern
nation-state
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The Five Strategic Rings
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Target Systems
Leadership
System
Essentials
Infrastructure
Population Fielded
Forces
Hussein Regime
Electricity
Railroads
Oil
Bridges
Strategic
Psyops
- Iraqis
Incapacitate
Telecommunications
- Civil
- Military
Damage
Internal
Control Org.
- Only internal
distribution and
storage, not
production
export
capability
Nuclear
Biological
Chemical
Research
Facility
- Foreign
workers
Destroy
Strategic Air
Defense
Destroy
Strategic
Offense
- Bombers
- Missiles
Tactical
Republican
Psyops
Guard
- Soldiers in
Kuwait
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Horner 2 Video
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Campaign Overview
 Four Part Campaign:
 Phase I: Strategic Air Campaign
 Phase II: Suppression of enemy
 Air Defenses over Kuwait vicinity
 Phase III: Air Attacks on ground forces in Kuwait and vicinity
 Phase IV: Ground Operations as directed
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And in the end…
 On 27 Feb 1991, the Iraqi military
was scattered and defeated
 Iraq lost 90 aircraft to coalition forces
 122 Iraqi aircraft fled to Iran
 Stealth provided the needed edge
 The Persian Gulf War officially
ended on 11 Apr 1991
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Post-Desert Storm Video
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The Crisis in Iraq—ONW
 UN Security Council established a no-fly zone over
northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish people from attacks
by Saddam Hussein
 Operation Provide Comfort began on 5 Apr 1991 as a
humanitarian relief effort to deliver food, clothing, and
supplies to Iraq’s Kurdish refugees
 C-130s began airdropping supplies on 7 Apr 1991
 Lasted approximately 8 years and was then replaced by
Operation NORTHERN WATCH
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The Crisis in Iraq:
Lessons Learned—ONW
 The need to avoid fratricide
 The limitations of airdrops
 Host-country tensions
 The need for alternate bases
 Lack of an exit strategy
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The Crisis in Iraq—OSW
 OSW was a Combined Task Force enforcing the “no-fly zone” below the
32nd parallel (extended to 33rd in 1996) in southern Iraq
 Not an aggression against Iraq—executed as a self-defense measure
 Coalition partners included the US, UK, France, Saudi Arabia, and
Kuwait
 Fire from more than 850 Iraqi SAMs and AAAs directed at coalition
aircraft
 Iraq violated the no-fly zone more than
160 times
 More than 150,000 USAF sorties by 1998
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“What we’ve effectively done since 1992 is
conduct an air occupation of a country…”
 General Ronald R. Fogleman
Jul 1995
24
The Crisis in Iraq:
Lessons Learned—OSW
 Became a test for USAF AEF concept in Oct 1995
 Quality-of-life changes needed due to high Ops-Tempo
 Reorganized Security Forces
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The Crisis in Somalia
 In mid-1992, drought and civil war devastated Somalia
 Food supplies became a weapon of war
 Operation PROVIDE RELIEF began by the United States on
22 Aug 1992 to deliver food to Somali refugees
 Military and civilian aircraft used
 Over 2,000 sorties, carrying 48,162 metric tons of food
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The Crisis in Somalia
 Although a humanitarian effort:
 44 American soldiers lost their lives
 175 were injured or wounded
 Danger of failure due to warlord interference
 Operation Restore Hope
 Coalition peacekeeping operation from 9 Dec 1992 to 4 May 1993
 First test of Rapid Global Mobility
from the CONUS
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The Crisis in Somalia:
Lessons Learned
 First large scale test of newly formed AMC and the
Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC)
 Difficulties evolved in the planning, coordinating,
and managing the operation
 Austere infrastructure of Somalia added to lack of
adequate bases for strategic airlift aircraft
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The Balkans:
A Brief History
 After World War II, monarchy abolished;
Communist Party leader Tito proclaimed the
country the Federal People's Republic of
Yugoslavia, with himself as prime Minister
 Eliminating opposition, the Tito gov’t executed
Mihajlovic in 1946
 Tito died in 1980, and the fragility of the
federation he ruled quickly became apparent
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The Balkans:
A Brief History
 After World War II, monarchy abolished;
Communist Party leader Tito proclaimed the
country the Federal People's Republic of
Yugoslavia, with himself as prime Minister
 Eliminating opposition, the Tito gov’t executed
Mihajlovic in 1946
 Tito died in 1980, and the fragility of the
federation he ruled quickly became apparent
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Three Ethnic Groups In Conflict
 Serbs—Dominant in Yugoslavia's politics and
army, orthodox Christianity makes them natural
allies of Russia
 Croats—Roman Catholics, closer to the West than
Serbs and exposed to Western Influences
 Muslims—Living mainly in ethnically mixed towns
and cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina
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32
Operation DENY FLIGHT
 Oct 1992, UN Security Council Resolution 781 established a no-fly zone
over Bosnia-Herzegovina
 Operation DENY FLIGHT
 Enforced the no-fly zone
 Provided close air support to UN troops
 Conducted approved air strikes under a dual-key command arrangement
with the UN
 28 Feb 1994, NATO aircraft shot down four warplanes violating the nofly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina
 This was the first military engagement ever undertaken by the Alliance
33
Operation DENY FLIGHT
 NATO objectives
 Bosnian Serb compliance to cease attacks on Sarajevo and other
safe areas
 Withdrawal of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from the total
exclusion zone around Sarajevo
 Complete freedom of movement for UN Forces and personnel, and
nongovernment officials
 Unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport
34
Operation DENY FLIGHT
 NATO missions of Operation DENY FLIGHT
To conduct aerial monitoring and enforce compliance
with UN Security Council Resolution 816
To provide close air support for UN troops on the
ground at the request of, and controlled by, UN forces
To conduct approved air strikes
against designated targets
threatening the security of the
UN-declared safe areas
35
Operation DENY FLIGHT
 Operation DENY FLIGHT lasted from 12 Apr 93 – 20 Dec 95
 Almost 100,000 sorties flown
 A formal closure ceremony was held in Vicenza, Italy on
21 Dec 95
 Forces associated with Operation DENY FLIGHT were then
transferred to Operation DECISIVE ENDEAVOR as part of the
overall NATO operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.
36
The Crisis in Bosnia:
Lessons Learned
 Lack of doctrine
 Tactical air and space power problems
 Bases weren’t large enough to accept the
contingency surges
 Coalition/Joint problems
 Technological problems
37
KOSOVO
38
Kosovo Crisis
 Kosovo lies in southern Serbia and has a mixed population,
the majority of which are ethnic Albanians (Muslims)
 Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic altered the status of the
region, removing its autonomy and bringing it under the
direct control of Belgrade, the Serbian capital
 The Kosovar Albanians strenuously opposed the move
39
United States & NATO
Interests at Stake
 Serb aggression threatened peace throughout the
Balkans and the stability of NATO’s SE region
 Belgrade’s repression in Kosovo created a
humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions
 President Milosevic’s conduct directly challenged
the credibility of NATO
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United States & NATO
Interests at Stake
 Serb aggression threatened peace throughout the
Balkans and the stability of NATO’s SE region
 Belgrade’s repression in Kosovo created a
humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions
 President Milosevic’s conduct directly challenged
the credibility of NATO
41
NATO Action
 After the failure of repeated international diplomatic
efforts since the spring of 1998 to peacefully resolve the
conflict in Kosovo
 North Atlantic Council decided on 23 March 1999 to
authorize NATO air strikes
 Aimed at strategic targets in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to end the repression of Kosovar Albanians by
the Yugoslav government
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NATO’s Objectives
 A stop to all military action and the immediate
ending of violence and repression
 The withdrawal from Kosovo of the military,
police, and paramilitary forces
 The stationing in Kosovo of an international
military presence
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NATO’s Objectives (cont’d)
 The unconditional and safe return of all refugees
and displaced persons
 Establish political framework agreement for
Kosovo in conformity with international law
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NATO’s Objectives (cont’d)
 The unconditional and safe return of all refugees
and displaced persons
 Establish political framework agreement for
Kosovo in conformity with international law
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NATO’s Strategic Objectives
 Demonstrate the seriousness of their opposition to
Belgrade’s aggression in the Balkans
 Deter Milosevic’s attacks on helpless civilians, and
reverse ethnic cleansing
 Damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against
Kosovo
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Military Objective
“Degrade and damage the military and security
structure President Milosevic has used to depopulate
and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo.”
William Cohen, SECDEF
15 April 1999
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Lessons Learned on
Kosovo War Objectives
US Grand Strategy
 Maintain a peaceful,
prosperous US-led
Europe
 Convince NATO to
transition from old Cold
War common defense
against external threats
to new Continental
security coalition
 Persuade NATO to
acquire means and will
to conduct out of area
military ops
European Strategy
Kosovo War Aims
•
Stop the Serbian
slaughter and
expulsion of ethnic
Albanians
•
Remove Milosevic
from power
•
Accomplish the
above with minimal
collateral damage
and NATO casualties
 Maintain a peaceful,
prosperous, and
independent Europe
 Prevent spillover into
Albania and Macedonia,
then to Greece and
Turkey
 Maintain NATO
relationship with Russia
and give it a role in
helping end the crisis
 Demonstrate European
unity
Common Effort Concealed Widely Differing Objectives
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Lessons Learned
by US Military
 United States air refuelers were stretched thin during operation
 Force structure numbers and resources were inadequate for current
level of commitments (all services); support and training as important
to victory as strike
 Older platforms with smart weapons may be seen as good enough;
smart weapons may be better than smart platforms
 Need the right force structure for the future
 C4ISR is currently the weakest link in joint and coalition ops
 On the brink of another “hollow force”
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Political Lessons Learned
by Europeans
 Militarily, Europe remains dependent on Americans
 Best technology, weapons, and platforms “Made in USA.”
 Politicians unwilling to pay the cost of matching unique US
capabilities
 United States cannot always be counted on to serve the
Alliance’s interests
 US focus shifted with opinion polls
 Fear US commitment could falter if US forces take heavy casualties
50
Political Lessons Learned
by Europeans
 European Union can provide diplomatic muscle (Martti
Ahtisaari saves the day); many foreign policy interests are
similar among EU Nations
 Threat of rising Islamic
 fundamentalism
 Humanitarian (ethnic cleansing)
 Need to build external identity
 Europe can overcome internal diversity to maintain
cohesion
 German Luftwaffe conducted first combat missions since 1945
 Greece provided logistical support despite popular opposition
 Italy and France (which have Communist ministers) offered air
bases
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Impact of Kosovo Lessons Learned
on Future DOD Budget Trends
 No DOD/Allied spending surge like post-Desert Storm
 International defense market continues to shrink
 Readiness and retention will increasingly consume $$$$ for
modernization
 Inevitable tax cut legislation will further erode DOD budgets
 Services must eventually deal with the bow wave
 Old platforms with smart weapons were good enough
 Congress may balk at big bills for new platforms (JSF, F-22, CVX, DD-21)
“We have to make a trade between
 Support forces will need big $$$$ too
smart weapons and platforms...We
need to encourage the services to
concentrate more on smart
weapons.”
Jacques Gansler
Former Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics
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Review of CFD Model
 Distinctive Capabilities—Air and space expertise,
capabilities, and technological know-how
 Functions—Broad, fundamental, and continuing activities
of air and space power
 Doctrine—Fundamental principles that guide the actions
of military forces in support of national objectives
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CFD Model
Time Period
Distinctive
Capabilities
Functions
(missions)
Doctrinal Emphasis
DESERT
STORM
 Air Superiority
 Precision
Engagement
 Global Attack
 Information
Superiority
 Agile Combat
Support
 Rapid Global
Mobility





Strategic Attack
Air Refueling
Command and Control (C2)
Counterair
Surveillance and
Reconnaissance
 Strategic air attack
(precision
weapons/stealth)
 Suppress enemy air
defenses
PROVIDE
COMFORT/
NORTHERN
WATCH
 Rapid Global
Mobility
 Air Superiority




Airlift
Counter Air
Strategic Attack
Surveillance and
Reconnaissance
 Protect northern Iraqi
no-fly zone
 Humanitarian
airdrops for refugees
SOUTHERN
WATCH
 Precision
Engagement
 Air Superiority
 Counter Air
 Strategic Attack
 Surveillance and
Reconnaissance
 Theater attack of
military targets
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CFD Model
Time Period
Distinctive
Capabilities
Functions
(missions)
Doctrinal Emphasis
PROVIDE
RELIEF/
RESTORE
HOPE
 Rapid Global
Mobility
 Global Attack
 Air Superiority
 Agile Combat
Support
 Surveillance and
Reconnaissance
 Counter Air/Land
 Strategic Attack
 Airlift/Special Operations
 AEF concept
 Humanitarian airdrops
for refugees
 Strategic Attack
DENY
FLIGHT
 Air Superiority
 Information
Superiority
 Agile Combat
Support
 Counterair
 Surveillance and
Reconnaissance
 Counterland
 No defined doctrine
ALLIED
FORCE
 Air Superiority
 Precision
Engagement
 Strategic Attack
 Counterland
 Intelligence
 Strategic attacks on
ethnic cleansing Serbs
and military
capabilities
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Summary I
 Gulf War Background
 The Enemy
 The Plan of Attack
 Objectives
 Concept of Operations
 Five Strategic Rings
 Targets
 Phases of the Campaign
 Operations PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH
 The Conflict and Lessons Learned
56
Summary II
 Operation SOUTHERN WATCH
 The Conflict and Lessons Learned
 Operations PROVIDE RELIEF/RESTORE HOPE
 The Conflict and Lessons Learned
 History of the Balkans
 Background
 Ethnic Groups
57
Summary III
 Operation DENY FLIGHT
 The Conflict and Lessons Learned
 Operation ALLIED FORCE
 Background
 NATO Actions
 Operation ALLIED FORCE Begins
 Lessons learned by US Military
 Political Lessons Learned
 Impact of Lessons Learned on Future DOD Budget
 CFD Review
58