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Unit 2
The China Lobby's Impact on U.S.-China
Relations:
A Case Study of Human Rights Issues
Dr. Pei-Shan Kao, Assistant Professor
National Chiao Tung University, TAIWAN
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I. Introduction
II. Term Explanations: Interest Groups; The China
Lobby; The Taiwan Lobby
III. History of US-China Relations
IV. The Case Study of Human Rights: U.S.-China
Bargaining on Tiananmen Incident
V. The China Lobby Impact on States’
Bargaining
VI. Conclusion
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1. Introduction
As the USA is a democratic and pluralistic society,
lobbying activities are very active and influential.
In U.S.-China relations, many interest groups actively
intervene and participate inside the process.
-By means of “politicisation”(政治化), they express
their opinions to influence states’ bargaining and
policies.
-Not only American interest groups
but also the Chinese teams actively
lobby on matters with regard to trade,
human rights, and national defense, etc.
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-They lobby for Congress support for their claims. →This
complicates states’ decision making process.
-The Chinese community in the USA= much more
complicated; ∵many different groups
-∴This Unit attempts to examine the role the lobby groups
played in U.S.-China relations & their effectiveness.
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Table 1. The Path of Interest Groups’ Influence
Interest Groups → PRESSURE
Congress
→
Administration
Government
↓RESPONSE
Parties/
Politicians
Policies
Public
Opinions
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2. TERM EXPLANATIONS
a. Interest Groups (or Pressure Groups)
private organisations that attempt to affect states’
policies and political decisions according to their own
interests.
~ “any group that, on the basis of one or more shared
attitudes, make certain claims upon other groups in the
society for the establishment of forms of behavior that
implied by the shared attitudes”. (David Truman, 1951)
Many different types: e.g. business groups, professional
bodies and trade unions, etc., who represent their
members’ interests.
In the USA, many business groups such as “Coalition for
a Sound Dollar” and “U.S. Chamber of Commerce”
actively involve in U.S.-China relations. Some of them
show support for engagement with China; some of them 6
criticise and oppose having close relationship with China.
b. The China Lobby
In the USA, the "China lobby“= the special interest group acting
on behalf of the Chinese government to influence America’s
China policy.
*Before the retreat of the regime of Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan in
1949, the term “China lobby” → the interest groups acting on
behalf of the Republic of China (R.O.C.). During the Second
World War, their major work was to persuade U.S. Congress
to provide much more economic aids to Chiang to fight
against the Japanese.
-When the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan, the China
lobby (the R.O.C.) attempted to prevent U.S. recognition of the
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Chinese Communist regime.
∵the
rise of China, the PRC lobby has much more financial
resources to fortify their presence in American politics.
-Meanwhile, the “China lobby” gradually refers to the PRC
lobby.
-Generally speaking, in the USA, the PRC China lobby can
be divided into two groups: one supports the Chinese
government and another is considered anti-government.
-e.g. The Friendship Association of Chinese Students and
Scholars (FACSS) is the pro-Beijing groups in America.
Other groups: Overseas Chinese Democracy Coalition,
Foundation for China in the 21st Century, Support
Democracy in China (SDC), Silicon Valley for Democracy in
China (SVDC), China Democracy Party (CDP), etc., are the
anti-government groups.
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3. The Taiwan Lobby
-The Taiwan Lobby in the USA: many different groups.
i.e. the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office
(TECRO); the Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce of
North America (TCCNA); World United Formosans for
Independence (WUFI); the Formosan Association for
Political Activity (FAPA); and the Kuomintang (KMT)
groups.
-Each group has its appeals.
e.g. the TCCNA, FAPA and the WUFI support Taiwan’s
independence. They hence oppose the KMT groups
who support having good relationship with China. The
TECRO represents official opinions and interests.
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Before 1979, the PRC China lobby
was practically nonexistent; since
1979, the PRC China lobby has
gradually strengthened.
By the 1990s, "China lobby"
began usually referring to special
interest groups acting on behalf
of the PRC
The China Lobby (1940s-1979)
→The ROC China Lobby (1979-1990)
→The Taiwan Lobby (1990s-)
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a. China-U.S. Interdependent Economic and
Trade Relations
*China-US two-way trade accounted for 17.7%
of China’s total trade amount.
*NOW the USA= China’s 1st trading partner
*The USA= the 1st export market for China
*The USA=China’s 4th-largest import supplier
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*China= America’s third-largest export
market
*China= America’s fastest growing
export market
*China (has passed Canada)= America’s
biggest import supplier
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*US-China trade reached a particularly high level
of growth:
(1)the years after 1979, when they established
formal diplomatic relations ;
(2) in the post-Cold War era (1989-present).
*On Foreign Direct
Investment:
The USA is China’s major investor
country since 1979.
The cumulative realised amount of
US investment in China was $57.13
billion since 1979 till January 2008,
ranking the second biggest investor
of China after Japan.
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China’s “Go Global” policy in 2000
*More and more Chinese companies were
permitted by the Chinese government to do
business in the USA.
*Chinese-invested companies mainly have been
concentrated in New York, followed by Los
Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Houston and
Seattle.
*The majority of Chinese
enterprises focus on selling
manufactured products.
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*According to American statistics, in 1990
there were only 624,000 journeys by
Americans to China. However, this level grew
nearly two times to 1,181,000 in 1995, and
totalled 1,476,000 in 2000.
*The percentage increase over ten years,
namely from 1990-2000, is 136%, and the
annual growth rate is 9.0%.
*In 2000, China ranked seventh amongst
foreign countries visited by Americans.
*In 2006, there were 1,327,000 U.S. residents
travelling to China; China rank as the tenth
destination for U.S. travelers.
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*In 1990 there were 229,000 trips made by Chinese to
the United States. This increased to 387,000 five years
later, and totalled 453,000 in 2000.
*China ranked, in 2002, fifteenth amongst countries
travelling to the United States.
*The numbers of Chinese tourists nearly grew two times
within ten years. The annual growth rate is 7.0%.
*In 2008, there were 493,000 Chinese visitors to the
United States.
-Transportation Links:
-American Airlines (AA); Hainan Airlines (HU); Air China (CA);
China Eastern (MU); China Southern (CZ) airlines; Northwest
Airlines (NW); and United Airlines (UA)
-Kungpeng Airlines (joint venture between China’s Shenzhen
Airlines and Mesa Air Group of the United States)
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Bilateral Educational Exchanges
*From 1978 to 1991, there were no more than
80,000 Chinese students studying in the United
States.
*In 2002, there were 64,757 Chinese students
studying in the USA; until 2005, there are
640,000 Chinese students in total studying in
America.
*On the other side, in 2006
there were 11,064 Americans
studied in China; however, in
1995 there were only 1,396
Americans studying there.
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c. Governmental and Congressional Exchange Mechanism
*Establishment of a strategic dialogue regime between
American and Chinese senior level officials (twice a year in
Beijing and Washington, alternatively; dialogue content
was not limited to any specific economic, political and
security issues. ) (2005)
*Establish a “military hotline” (2007)
*Establishment of an exchange mechanism between their
legislative bodies. (The NPC and the Senate ) (2004)
*The “China Caucus” set up by the US Senate and the House of
Representatives for a better understanding of China and for the
purpose of promoting the bilateral exchanges. (2005)
*The “US-China Working Group” in the House of Representatives
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(2005); “the Senate China Working Group” (2006)
Chinese Community in the USA
*The Friendship Association of Chinese
Students and Scholars (FACSS), one of
the biggest Chinese groups in America.
*Asian American Business Development
Centre.
*The Chinese Finance Association.
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IV. The Case Study of Human Rights: U.S.-China Bargaining
on Tiananmen Incident
<Background>
The June 4 incident seriously damaged U.S.-China
relationship, making it fall to the lowest point since they
established diplomatic relations in 1979. Not only
President Bush but also Congress expressed their regret
and anger.
US Secretary of State James Baker:
The Chinese government’s action a
most unfortunate event, and that the
American people were extremely
concerned about it.
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<US Reactions and Policies>
*US Congress: strong reactions and criticism
e.g.-Stephen Solarz, urged the recall of the US ambassador
to Beijing, and called for the cessation of military
cooperation and commercial exchange with China
-Senator Jesse Helms demanded the introduction of
economic sanctions
-considered granting sanctuary to Chinese students staying
in the USA. (The Pelosi Bill)
-suggested and introduced dozens of sanctions bills to
punish China
-required President Bush to adopt more extensive and
stronger measures
-The renewal of China’s MFN status?
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*Public Opinions: more than 75 percent of Americans were following the
story closely; called for harsh sanctions
*Interest Groups: International Labour Organisation; Robert J. Kennedy
Memorial Foundation for Human Rights; Human Rights Watch; Asia
Watch (testified 9 times); Amnesty International, the International Human
Rights Law Group, and the anti-PRC China lobby, i.e., the Independent
Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS), etc. → called for
tougher measures
*Bush Administration: Sanctions + Secret Visits to China Deputy
Secretary of State
National Security Advisor
Lawrence Eagleburger
Brent Scowcroft
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<China’s Attitudes and Reactions>
*Serious attitudes and criticism
*Used the serious discrepancy between the executive and
congressional branches of the USA
*conveyed a ‘partially conciliatory’ message to the USA
↓
*Lifted ‘restrictions on cultural and academic exchanges and
promised not to sell medium-range missiles to the Middle East.
*Agreed to resume discussions on the Fulbright programme; allowed
US diplomats to travel to Tibet; and the return of Peace Corps
volunteers.
*Announced the release of 573 detainees
*Purchased $4 billion of Boeing aircraft as well as US wheat to
appease the US Congress and to please American enterprises
*Lifted the Martial Law
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→President Bush then relaxed many economic sanctions
he had imposed on China
→Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was invited by
Baker to visit the United States for talks on the Persian
Gulf in November, 1990.
→Baker accepted Qian’s invitation to visit China in 1991.
→In January 1992, President Bush met Li Peng in New
York, during a visit to the United Nations headquarters.
↓
U.S.-China Relations were recovered
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Conclusion
~To conclude, Chinese bargaining strategies were multidimensional during this crisis bargaining. Although it
encouraged US allies to impose pressure on the United
States, to prevent the imposition of more sanctions, China
also knew how to make some concessions at the best
moment. In addition, it smartly utilised and united with the
pro-PRC groups, namely American interest groups and the
PRC lobby to influence the US government.
~Compared with China’s flexible strategies and policies, the
plural social and governmental system of the United States
obstructed its bargaining tactics. Congressional
requirements, NGO vigilance and the separation of powers in
the United States make it more difficult to produce a
coordinated policy.
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Conclusions:
1. Since the United States is a pluralistic and democratic
country, any one can express their opinions and voices;
this encourages the involvement and participation of
lobbies in politics.
-In this crisis bargaining, the lobbies (American interest groups +
the China lobby ) actively involved in the process to
influence the US government’s decision making.
2. China’s successful utilisation of American interest
groups ( knew how to unite with American business
group to seek Congress support against the anti-PRC
lobby.)
e.g. Viewing the renewal of its MFN trade status in June
1990, and the serious pressure President Bush
confronted from Congress, and many interest groups,26
China decided to make more compromises.
3. However, compared with the performance and activities
of the ROC lobby in the early time or the anti-PRC lobbies,
the PRC China lobby is not so active. They are used to
cooperating with the government and play a secondary
role in U.S.-China relations.
4. The anti-PRC lobbies, particularly the human rights
groups, greatly and actively involve in American politics
attempting to influence its decision-making.
5. Although the US government made some decisions
under the pressure of the lobbies and Congress, the
Administration has its own thoughts and considerations.
→even though the lobbies can influence states’ bargaining
and decision-making, the efficiency of their works
depends.
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