Transcript Présentation PowerPoint - experience the spirit of europe!

How to protect against new
threats: NATO and the European
Security and Defence Policy.
Madeleine Hubin
([email protected])
A. NATO
1. Origin
2. NATO after the collapse of communism
2.1. Evolution of NATO
2.2. Enlargement
2.3. War in Kosovo
2.4. NATO after 9/11: Afghanistan
2.5. NATO and the war in Iraq
2.6. Over the past years
3. NATO today: a new strategic concept
1. Origin of NATO
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Beginning of the Cold War : « We are scared »
Signature of the Treaty 4 April 1949 :
– Basis : article 5
– Importance of article 4: The Parties will consult
together whenever, in the opinion of any of them,
the territorial integrity, political independence or
security of any of the Parties is threatened.
•
Warsaw Pact: 1955.
Menace Rouge
Art 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty
The Parties agree that an armed attack against
one or more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all
and consequently they agree that, if such an
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise
of the right of individual or collective selfdefence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations, will assist the Party or
Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually, and in concert with the other
Parties, such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Art. 5 (cont.)
Any such armed attack and all measures taken
as a result thereof shall immediately be reported
to the Security Council. Such measures shall be
terminated when the Security Council has taken
the measures necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security.
A Divided Europe
2. NATO after the collapse of
Communism
2.1. Evolution of NATO
Reasons for the persistence of NATO
• Basic mission of NATO still true : « Keep the
Americans in, the Germans down and the
Russians out ».
• Willingness to keep an institutional framework for
transatlantic relations.
• Habit of cooperating within NATO and difficulty in
creating new institutions.
• NATO’s appeal to new democracies.
• Unexpected adaptability of the organisation.
• Regional tensions in Europe.
The armies of NATO in the 90s.
• Budgetary cuts.
• Professionalisation of the army in some States.
• Downsizing of armies.
• Deeper technological gap with the USA.
Missions of NATO in the 90s.
• Peacemaking and peacekeeping operations:
– Deliberate Force
Non-article 5 missions
Out-of-zone missions
Peace-keeping/ making missions
– I(mplementation)FOR then S(tabilization)FOR
– New threats:
Weapons of mass destruction
International terrorism
A new strategy: Co-operative security
• Definition : « All the common means thanks to which
potential enemies prevent, settle, reduce, contain or
face threats which could lead to a war among
themselves »
• Extension : Principle of co-operation between the
member States and international organisations to
promote peacekeeping or peacemaking.
• Example: Bosnia : Dialogue between the parties in
conflict and
– NATO : Peacekeeping
– OSCE : Organisation of elections
– Council of Europe : State
– European Union : Economic development
Framework for co-operation with
the European States
• North Atlantic Co-operation Council (1991): Forum
for consultation and cooperation between NATO and
non-member-countries in the Euro-Atlantic area.
• Partnership for Peace (1994): assists participating
countries in restructuring their armed forces to enable
them to play their role at home and in NATO-led
peace-keeping operations.
• Mediterranean Dialogue (1995)
• Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council (1997)
2.2. Enlargement
• At first, wait and see (1991 – 1997)
• Then, limited enlargement (July1997 – March
1999) with the admission of Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic on 16 March 1999
• 23 March: start of « Allied force » operation in
Kosovo. (air campaign: 78 days)
• Afterwards, greater enlargement (negotiations
Dec. 2002 until April 2004…): Slovenia,
Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia
and Estonia.
• April 2009: Croatia and Albania.
Questions raised by the enlargement
• Why enlarge ?
• What added value do the new member states
bring NATO ?
• What new problems or dangers do new member
States bring NATO?
• What are the terms for new admissions ?
• What will be the reaction of third parties (mainly
Russia) ?
• At what cost for NATO ?
Questions (cont.)
• At what cost for new member States ?
• How to make the present Alliance members agree
with enlargement?
• How to enlarge ?
– Who ?
– When ?
– Consequences on the military plans ?
Enlargement principles
• The new members are willing and able to
assume the responsibilities and obligations of
membership and accept the policies and
processes implemented at the time of
admission.
• No State will be admitted if it aims to close the
door behind itself, by using its vote to veto other
admissions.
• The states must settle their ethnic problems as
well as their border disputes before joining
NATO.
Principles (cont.)
• The candidates must be able to contribute to the
missions of the Alliance
(No « profiteers »).
• No third party is entitled to interfere in the
enlargement process. (Russia)
2.3. War in Kosovo : consequences
• Intervention out of the UN framework (new).
• Obvious technological gap between the European and
American armies.
• Objective of the operation: « zero casualty ».
• New member States take part just after joining NATO.
• Differences among the allies on the way to operate :
 The Americans do not want to go to war collectively.
 The Europeans want to develop their own capabilities.
At first, 43,000 troops were sent. In October 2004, there
were 18,000 soldiers from most NATO members, 9 partner
countries and 2 non-NATO countries (Argentina and
Morocco). Russia took part in SFOR and KFOR until
summer 2003.
Washington Summit (1999)
• Celebration of the Alliance’s 50th anniversary in
the middle of the war in Kosovo.
• Adoption of a new strategic concept which emphasises
the new missions of NATO against new threats
(multidirectional and often hard to predict):
– Balkans
– Focus on weapons of mass destruction
– Terrorism, organized crime, sabotage, threat to flow
of vital resources.
• Launch of the Membership Action Plan (advice, aid, support in
political, economic and legal fields + security)
• Establishment of a WMD Center
Adoption of the Defence
Capabilities Initiatives (DCI)
• Enhanced mobility and deployability beyond NATO
territory.
• Sustainability: the forces must be able to carry out long
operations.
• Survivability: ability to protect forces and infrastructure
against present and future threats.
• DCI Domains: Command – Control – Communications –
Intelligence – Surveillance- Target Acquisition –
Reconnaissance - Strategic transport - Suppression of
enemy air defence
Cuts in defence budgets
Priorities have evolved :
• Staff cuts.
• Resources are transferred to the
modernization of the equipment.
• Co-operation on a multinational basis
whenever possible.
• Resources are put in common.
• Specialization.
2.4. NATO after 9/11: Afghanistan
• Article 5 enforced : Europe assists the US.
 Luxembourg radar aircraft sent.
Refusal to use NATO structures for the operations in
Afghanistan
 US preference for an ad hoc coalition.
• Use of NATO in the war against terrorism ? National
reaction first.
• NATO leads the operations of ISAF (international security
assistance force) in Kabul in 2003.
 NATO can operate outside Europe.
• ISAF today = coalition of 48 countries deployed under UN
authority (see ISAF doc.)
Prague Summit (2002)
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« Prague Capabilities Commitment » - PCC
Streamlined command structure.
Stronger commitment to combating terrorism.
Set-up of a Response Force of up to 21,000
soldiers for crisis-management operations until
2006. Technologically advanced, flexible,
deployable, interoperable and sustainable force
(land, sea, air elements).
Objectives of PCC
• Defending against chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear attacks.
• Ensuring secure command, communications
and information superiority.
• Improving interoperability of deployed forces
and key aspects of combat effectiveness.
• Need for global partners.
• Providing comprehensive political, economic
and military solutions with NGOs, the UN and
the EU, the OSCE etc.
2.5. NATO and the war in Iraq
• Divisions among Alliance members.
• Decision-making process stopped, no
consensus.
• NATO supports the multinational division under
Polish command.
• No NATO-banner troops occupying Iraq
• NATO training mission since 2004: training
security forces, developing security institutions,
reform of defence in Iraq.
Istanbul Summit (28-29 June 2004)
• NATO will widen its mission of International
Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) with the
establishment of several additional Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT). It will also
strengthen its support for elections.
• NATO will end its mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
where it will be replaced by an EU force.
However, the latter will be supported by NATO.
(cont.)
• Enhancing measures against terrorism :
– Improving intelligence sharing
– Quicker response to CBRN attacks
– Providing assistance to protect major events (Euro 2004,
Olympic games)
– Enhancing co-operation among partners
• Enhancing the Mediterranean Partnership.
• Istanbul Co-operation Initiative with the Middle East
designed to promote bilateral co-operation between NATO
and interested parties in the region, the Gulf countries, for
instance. Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE: crisis management,
civil emergency planning and border control.
2.6. Over the past years
Riga Summit 2006
• Differing strategic interests between US and Europe.
(315,000 > 40,000 US soldiers in Poland, Bulgaria and
Romania)
• 2005 – 2006: 8 simultaneous military out-of-zone
operations (EUCOM covers 91 States).
• Modernisation of the Alliance’s forces.
• Afghanistan: no increase in troops.
• Enhanced cooperation with non-member states.
• Adoption of the Global Policy Directive (recognition of
the role of the EU in terms of international security).
Riga Summit (2)
• NATO remains an essential place for political
consultation as well as a forum to help standardize the
tools and processes of joint military action.
• Consensus in question.
• Main threats: terrorism and WMD proliferation.
• Main risks and challenges: instability of failed states,
regional crises and conflicts, increased availability of
conventional weapons, diversion of emerging
technologies, distortion in supplies of vital resources.
Riga Summit (3)
• To combat those threats, NATO must be able to deploy
troops everywhere in the world for long periods of time
and lead several operations simultaneously, by using a
combination of conventional and nuclear forces.
• Differing views: US (NATO = world security organisation)
>< most European countries (NATO = strictly military
organisation, want to rely on the UN and the EU to face
crises in the world)
Bucharest Summit 2008
• Croatia and Albania allowed to join the alliance in 2009.
• Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: accession
vetoed by Greece (name dispute).
• Ukraine and Georgia: accession postponed indefinitely
(by France and Germany, against the will of the USA).
• NATO will back the construction of the US missile
defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic.
• Gap between western and eastern Europe: distance vs
guarantee.
• France: returning to Integrated Command in 2009.
• Afghanistan: need for more troops, debate about more
involvement.
Strasbourg Summit (April 2009)
• 60th anniversary of NATO
• Two new member States: Albania and Croatia.
• New Secretary General as of 1st Aug. (A.F. Rasmussen
replaces J. de Hoop Scheffer).
• France is back in Allied Command (which de Gaulle had
left in 1966 to protest against US domination). France
wants European headquarters in Brussels.
• Afghanistan: strategic support of the US, 5,000
additional troops (compared with 17,000 extra troops,
and 4,000 instructors for the US alone).
• Russia: the NATO-Russia Council is back at work
(suspended in August 2008 bec. of crisis in Georgia).
Common issues: security, stabilisation in Afghanistan,
fight against terrorism, drugs and piracy, nonproliferation and disarmament.
• Russia: love-hate relationship … Two Russians spies
expelled from NATO, two Canadian diplomats expelled
from Russia … Need for reinforcing cooperation and
relations, for new trust.
• Russia wants to contribute to the US anti-missile
defence system.
Burden sharing in NATO
• Contribution < national sovereignty.
• Burden-sharing mechanism: 2% of GDP to pay
for the NATO operations. ( would represent $ 67
bn). Not met (5/28).
• Fragmentation of the defence sector in Europe >
unnecessary duplication, unhelpful competition,
gaps or incompatibilities.
• In Afghanistan: other actors should share the
burden: G8 States, UN, Afghan government.
• Capabilities, money and political will.
3. NATO today : a new strategic concept
• Active engagement, modern defence
• 3 essential core tasks:
A. Collective defence
- Deterrence: appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional
capabilities.
- Threats: proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear
weapons, terrorism, cyber attacks, fundamental
environmental problems, resource constraints
B. Crisis management
Political and military tools: prevent, manage, stabilise
and support.
C. Cooperative security
Partnerships with other States or international
organisations.
Reinforcement of arms control, disarmament, nonproliferation efforts.
• Emphasis on Alliance solidarity, importance of
transatlantic consultation and need to engage in a
continuous process of reform.
• Open-door policy.
• Maximising efficiency, improving working methods and
spending its resources more wisely.
B. The European Security and
Defence Policy
Plan
1. Historical background up to 1998.
2. The golden age of the ESDP: principles, actors,
a few missions, European difficulties.
3. Civilian crisis management.
4. The Solidarity clause.
5. New challenges:
- lessons learnt from the Iraq crisis
- evolution of the approaches
- technology and finance
- the European Security Strategy : a failure?
1. Historical background up to 1998
The Western European Union
• Specific European initiative on defence: Brussels Pact
1948 (Benelux, France and the UK).
• Forerunner of NATO.
• Objective: to deter German revanchism.
• Article 5: if one of the members is attacked in Europe,
the other members will bring aid and assistance with all
possible means, military and others (// art 51 of the UN
Charter).
• 1949: the WEU’s defence functions subsumed into
NATO.
• Considered as the European pillar of NATO then as the
security wing of the EU.
Other defence initiatives
• European Defence Community (1952-1954): Pleven
Plan. Benelux, France, Italy, Germany. The French failed
to ratify.
• Fouchet plan in the 1961: draft treaty for a political
community. Failed in 1962, lack of supra-nationalism.
• 1970: Davignon Plan on European Political Cooperation. External policy Co-operation meetings of
foreign ministers.
• Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe:
(1994) active in the early warning conflict prevention, in
crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.
- 56 Member States from 3 continents.
- Created in the early 1970s as a multilateral forum for
dialogue and negotiation between the two blocks.
- Three-fold dimension to security: political and military;
economic and environmental; human.
- Areas of activity: preventive diplomacy, conflict
prevention, democratization, human rights, arms control,
economic and environmental security …
Treaty of Maastricht (1992)
•Creation of a Common Foreign and
Security Policy.
•No proper military capacities >
Western European Union.
•CFSP decisions are still subject to
unanimous votes.
June 1992: Petersberg Declaration:
Missions
• Humanitarian and rescue tasks (of nationals).
• Peacekeeping tasks.
• Tasks of combat forces in crisis management,
including peacemaking or peace-enforcement.
• Military and civilian crisis management.
• Collaboration with NATO: avoid duplication and
target specific gaps.
Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)
• Incorporated the Petersberg missions.
• High Representative + Policy Planning and Early
Warning Unit.
• Development of the European Security and
Defence Policy.
• No European army. National armies remain
under the command of national authorities
except for the duration of the mission.
Evolution
• Evolution of the attitude of the so-called "neutral"
States (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden), which
now accept to engage militarily in crisis
management.
• Evolution of Germany which starts using an army
again in its foreign policy.
• Evolution of France which at the time focuses less
on building a powerful EU independent from the
US.
• General awareness in Europe, following the crises
in Bosnia and Kosovo, of the collective inability to
act without the USA, which led either to the
absence of any action, or to the US command of
operations.
2. The golden age of the ESDP
• Saint Malo (1998): Blair (UK) and Chirac (F)
emphasis on an autonomous action capability
supported by credible armed forces (Bosnia,
Kosovo).
• Cologne Summit (1999): Definition of a Common
Defence Strategy. Official launching of ESDP.
Global Helsinki Objective (1999)
“Co-operating voluntarily in the framework of
EU-led operations, the member States will have
to be able by 2003, to deploy within 60 days,
and sustain for at least one year, up to 60,000
people able to achieve the Petersberg
missions".
• Set up of a common crisis management tool:
ESDP.
Main idea behind the ESDP
• The Union wants to assert its identity on the
international scene, in particular through the
implementation of a Common Foreign and
Security Policy, including the progressive
framing of a Common Defence Policy, which
might lead to a common defence …
Principles
• Intervention of the European Union for crisis
management, not collective defence.
• Intervention of the Union when NATO is not
present as such.
• Action within the EU’ s institutional framework.
• Creation of appropriate structures within the
European Union.
• Collaboration with the WEU for capacity of crisis
assessment, intelligence gathering and strategic
planning capacity.
Principles
• Possibility to resort to NATO means.
• Strengthening of the armed forces of the
member States.
• Capacities supplied by each member State
individually and on a voluntary basis.
• Possible participation of non-EU member States
in EU crisis management (promotion of
international co-operation).
Actors
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European Council,
Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers,
High Representative of the CFSP,
Political and Security Committee,
CFSP Working Group and CFSP
Counsellors
• Influence of the Commission and the
European Parliament.
• Treaty of Nice (2000) : formalised the Union’s capacity
to manage crises outside its territory + its engagement
in peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
• Transfer of competences from the WEU to the EU.
• New military structures :
– The political and Security Committee (PSC)
– The Military Committee (EUMC)
– The Military Staff (EUMS)
– The Committee for Civilian aspects and Crisis
Management
– Agencies :
• Satellite Centre of Torrejon
• Institute for Strategic Studies (Paris)
A few missions of ESDP
• EU police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (20032007)
• Operation "Concordia" in the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia. (2003) Military operation, 350
troops.
• Operation « Proxima » : police in FYRM. (2003-2004)
• Operation "Artemis" in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. (2003) Military crisis mgt.
• EUJUST “Themis”: Georgia (rule of law).(2004-2005)
• EUFOR “Althea”: Bosnia, replacing NATO. (since
2004)
• Atalanta: off the coasts of Somalia: piracy
European difficulties
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Strategic transport (air and sea)
Air re-supplying
Intelligence
Protection of troops
Military electronics
• Precision ammunitions : distance shooting
3. Civilian crisis management: four
mutually dependent instruments
• Police co-operation: poss. of providing up to
5,000 policemen, restoring order, training
local police (1,000 deployable in 30 days)
• Strengthening the rule of law: up to 200
judges, or prosecutors and experts.
• Civilian administration: team to establish or
guarantee elections, taxation, education,
water provision, …
• Civil protection: assisting humanitarian actors
through emergency operations. Assessment
and intervention teams.
Civilian crisis management:
objectives
• Working to prevent conflicts from emerging or
intensifying.
• Consolidating peace and internal stability in
transition periods.
• Guaranteeing complementarities between the
civilian and military aspects of crisis
management so as to cover the range of the
Petersberg missions.
4. Solidarity Clause (EU Constitution)
1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly
in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the
victim of terrorist attack or natural or man-made
disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the
instruments at its disposal, including military
resources made available by the member States,
to:
- prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the
Member States;
- protect democratic institutions and the civilian
population from any terrorist attack;
- assist a Member State in its territory at the
request of its political authorities in the event of
a terrorist attack;
- assist a Member State in its territory at the
request of its political authorities in the event of
a disaster.
NB: The European Constitution was rejected by France
and the Netherlands…
5. New Challenges:
Lessons from the Iraq crisis
• The success of European Foreign Policy still depends very
much on the extent to which the national foreign policies of
its most influential Member States coincide.
• Need for the Union to think of itself as a global actor in the
international arena. It must become a provider of external
security, but not the world’s policeman.
• Need for an effective military capability.
• Dec. 2003: EU defines itself as an autonomous geopolitical
actor in its European Security Strategy.
Evolution of the approaches to crises
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During the Cold War: nuclear weapons, bipolar
world.
Today: either conflict which may lead to a war,
or crisis after an aggression (non-state actor
as in terrorism).
Act of terrorism: first national reaction.
Preventive action and retaliation.
Technology and finance
• Technological gap but European know-how.
• Role of the defence industry (mergers,
partnerships) but no political decision power.
• Finance: US: 43% of global defence spending,
EU 27: 19.4% (501 m. inhabitants)!
NB: F and UK: 2.32% of GDP, Poland: 1.66%, Italy:
1.44%, Germany: 1.27%, Spain: 1.16%.
• Problems: bureaucracy, rivalry between armies,
national budget pressures…
The European Security Strategy
• Response to: terrorism, proliferation of WMD,
regional conflicts, state failure, organised crime
+ climate change, energy security, financial
stability, cyber-war.
• Make the EU more responsive and timely.
• Increased emphasis on conflict prevention and
resolution.
• Prioritisation: need to clearly set priorities in
terms of place, importance and intensity.
A failure?
• Strategy: lack of originality, no clear threat, little
military view.
• 2004: UK elections (Euroskeptics are back).
• 2005: EU existential crisis following the rejection
of the constitutional treaty by F and NL.
• Unanimity rule = problem.
• No willingness for collective defence.
• Structural equipment deficit.
• No planning and operating power/ structure.
• Difficult ratification of the LisbonTreaty (2010):
EU members will only act in accordance with
their commitments within NATO.
• Permanent Structured Cooperation: for the
willing (// EMU) or BIG-6 Project (F, G, UK, I, Sp,
Pol), a pioneer group of 60,000 troops. Useful?
• Solution: one voice, something to say and the
necessary means to be credible.
C. Conclusion: NATO and the EU
• NATO = security organisation based on a
political alliance between independent States.
Ad hoc coalitions, multi-partnership.
• EU = political, economic, trade, monetary entity
which unites States in their most fundamental
interests.
• Different states of completion and no parallel.
NATO-EU Cooperation
• Manoeuvres, common operations, common
standards.
• Europe needs strategic autonomy + financial
means.
• Problem: law and force, legitimacy.
• Cooperation is recognized.
• Complementarity is necessary.
• Military means must be compatible.
NATO – EU cooperation
• Action zones: geographical proximity is
fundamental. Efficiency area: time to react,
projection capacity and capacity to sustain/ last.
• Various battle zones: diversity > flexibility and
adaptability.
• How may combat operations affect subsequent
reconstruction operations?
• Afghanistan, Libya, …
• Bottom-up approach.
Questions?
Thank you!