Transcript Semantic Hacking and Information Infrastructure Protection

Semantic Hacking and
Information Infrastructure
Protection
Paul Thompson
27 August 2009
Outline
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ISTS and the I3P
Cognitive or Semantic Hacking
Intelligence and Security Informatics
Detecting Deception in Language
Socio-Cultural Content in Language
Security and Critical Infrastructure
Protection at Dartmouth
• Institute for Security Technology Studies,
Dartmouth College (ISTS), January 2000
– Funded by National Infrastructure Protection
Center (FBI) and National Institute of Justice
– Computer Security Focus
• Institute for Information Infrastructure
Protection (I3P), January 2002
– Consortium of about 28 non-profit
organizations based at Dartmouth
Semantic Hacking Project
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ISTS project
Funded from 2001 through 2003
Cybenko, Giani, and Thompson
DoD Critical Infrastructure Protection
Fellowship
Types of Attacks on
Computer Systems
• Physical
• Syntactic
• Semantic (Cognitive)
- Martin Libicki: The mesh and the net:
Speculations on armed conflict in an
age of free silicon. 1994.
Background
• Perception Management
• Computer Security Taxonomies
• Definitions of Semantic and Cognitive
Hacking
Perception Management
• “. . . Information operations that aim to
affect the perceptions of others in order to
influence their emotions, reasoning,
decisions, and ultimately actions.”
– Denning, p. 101
• Continuum
– Propaganda -> Psychological Operations ->
-> Advertising -> Education
• Has existed long before computers
Related concepts
PKI
MITNICK
ATTACK
POLICY
Email exchange
asking for a password
Fire
• Propaganda
Virus
authentication
VULNERABILITY protocols
SCANNERS
FIREWALLS AUDITING
TCP
Social
WRAPPERS
Cognitive
• Advertising
• Social Engineering
Engineering
Hacking
Warm
• Semantic Hacking
PHYSICAL ATTACKS
• Computer Security
• Information Warfare
SYNTACTIC
Telephone call
ATTACKS
to ask for a SSN
SEMANTIC ATTACKS
Web page
hacking
Disinformation
Spoofing
Computer Security Taxonomies
“Information contained in an automated
system must be protected from three
kinds of threats: (1) the unauthorized
disclosure of information, (2) the
unauthorized modification of information,
and (3) the unauthorized withholding of
information (usually called denial of
service).”
- Landwehr, 1981
COGNITIVE HACKING
Definition
A networked information system
attack that relies on changing
human users' perceptions and
corresponding behaviors in order to
be successful.
 Requires the use of an information system
- not true for
all social engineering
 Requires a user to change some behaviornot true for all hacking
Exploits our growing reliance on
networked information sources
DISINFORMATION – Lebed case
Jonathan Lebed.
He spread fake rumors about stocks.
Investors driven to buy shares of
that stock inflating its price
The SEC wanted to prosecute him for stock fraud.
Was allowed to keep $500,000 from his
“illegal” stock proceeds.
"Subj: THE MOST UNDERVALUED STOCK EVER
"Date: 2/03/00 3:43pm Pacific Standard Time
"From: LebedTG1
"FTEC is starting to break out! Next week, this thing will EXPLODE. . . .
"Currently FTEC is trading for just $2 1/2! I am expecting to see FTEC at $20 VERY SOON.
"Let me explain why. . . .
"The FTEC offices are extremely busy. . . . I am hearing that a number of HUGE deals are
being worked on. Once we get some news from FTEC and the word gets out about the
company . . . it will take-off to MUCH HIGHER LEVELS!
"I see little risk when purchasing FTEC at these DIRT-CHEAP PRICES. FTEC is making
TREMENDOUS PROFITS and is trading UNDER BOOK VALUE!!!"
Emulex Exploit
• Mark Jakob, shorted 3,000 shares of Emulex
stock for $72 and $92
• Price rose to $100
• Jakob lost almost $100,000
• Sent false press release to Internet Wire Inc.
• Claimed Emulex Corporation being
investigated by the SEC
• Claimed company forced to restate 1998 1999 earnings.
• Jakob earned $236,000
Economic Perspective
• Software Agents / Theory of the Firm
• Value of Information
– Pump-and-Dump Schemes on the Internet
– Denial and Deception in Intelligence
– BattleSpace, e.g., value of information, and
disinformation to a physical, or software,
autonomous agents
• LIVEWIRE exercise – cyber warfare
Theory of the Firm
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Market analysis and assumption of perfect,
costless information inadequate to describe
firms
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More efficient, automated information flow
lowers both transaction and organization
costs
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Information
systems
susceptible
cognitive, or semantic hacking
to
Possible Countermeasures
 Single
source
 Authentication of source
 Information "trajectory" modeling
 Ulam games
 Byzantine Generals Models
Information Trajectory Modeling
• Source model based on statistical
historical data, e.g., weather data, or low
cap stock price movement
• Model would run as background filter
• If strong deviation from model, alert issued
• Could have been used in Jonathan Lebed
case
Possible Countermeasures
• Multiple Sources
– Source Reliability via Collaborative
Filtering and Reliability reporting
– Detection of Collusion by Information
Sources
– Linguistic Analysis , e.g. Determination of
common authorship
Linguistic Analysis
• Determination of common authorship
– Jonathan Lebed case
– Mosteller and Wallace – Federalist papers
– IBM researchers
– Recent NSF KDD program – Madigan et al.
at DIMACS
• Automatic genre detection
– Information v. disinformation
– Schuetze and Nunberg
Countering Disinforming News :
Information Trajectory Modeling
• AEnalyst
– An Electronic Analyst of Financial Markets
– Used for market prediction
– Dataset of news stories, stock prices, and
automatically generated trends for 121
publicly traded stocks
– Center for Intelligent Information Retrieval, U.
of Massachusetts, Amherst
http://ciir.cs.umass.edu/~lavrenko/aenalyst
Disinforming News
Countermeasure
• Mining of concurrent text and time series
– Time stamps of news articles
– Stock prices
• Based on Activity Monitoring
– Fawcett and Provost
– Monitoring behavior of large population for
interesting events requiring action
– Automated adaptive fraud detection, e.g., cell
phone fraud
Countermeasures for
Disinforming News
• User finds possibly disinforming news item
• User wants to act quickly to make huge
profit, but does not want to be victim of
pump-and-dump scheme
• Query automatically generated and
submitted to Google News to create
collection of related news items
Countermeasure 1:
News Verifier
• Stories optimally re-ranked and presented
to user
• User scans top two or three stories and
decides whether or not original news item
is reliable
• Countermeasure fails if user cannot
determine reliability based on top two or
three ranked stories
• News Verifier – prototype implementation
Countermeasure 2
• Collection assembled by search of Google
News is analyzed automatically, e.g., via
information trajectory modeling
• Countermeasure system extracts
monetary amounts or price movement
references from text and compares to
database of stock prices
• If movement is out of range, user is alerted
• Can process 2 work better than 1?
Cognitve Hacking and a New Science
of Intelligence and Security Informatics
• 1st NSF / NIJ Symposium on Intelligence and Security
Informatics, Tucson, Arizona,1-3 June 2003 (annual
IEEE conference)
• Traditional Information Retrieval
– Developed to serve needs of scientific researchers
and attorneys
• Utility-Theoretic Retrieval taking into account
disinformation
– Cognitive hacking, e.g., Internet stock trading pumpand-dump schemes
– Deception and denial in open source intelligence
– Semantic attacks on software agents in warfare
Deception Detection
• Reflections on Intelligence, R.V. Jones
– WW2 electronic deception
• Whaley’s taxonomy
– Bell and Whaley, Cheating and Deception
• Libicki - Semantic Attacks and Information
Warfare
• Rattray - Strategic Information Warfare
Defense
• Kott - Reading the Opponent’s Mind
Whaley’s taxonomy
• Dissimulation (Hiding the Real)
– Masking, concealing one’s characteristics
– Repackaging, add new, subtract old charcs
– Dazzling, obscure old, add alternative charcs
• Simulation (Showing the False)
– Mimicking, copying another’s charcs
– Inventing, creating new charcs
– Decoying, creating alternative charcs
Detecting Deception in Language
• First of Seven NSF OSTP Workshops on
Security Evaluations – summer 2005
• Most participants psychologists
• Funding was anticipated, but did not
materialize, in FY ‘07
WORKSHOP RESEARCH AGENDA
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Language Measurement Development
within a Deception Context
• Corpus Development
• Theoretical Development in Language and
Deception
• Embedded Scholar Project
• Rapid Funding Mechanism
Deception: Methods, Motives,
Contexts & Consequences
• Santa Fe Institute workshop held on 1-3
March 2007
• Earlier related workshop held in 2005
• Organized by Brooke Harrington
• Stanford University Press book based on
workshops published in 2009
Deception Workshop:
Some Participants
• Brooke Harrington - Max Planck Institute
for the Study of Societies, economic
sociologist, workshop organizer, studies
stock brokers
• Mark Frank - social psychology, SUNY
Buffalo, thoughts, feelings, and deception
• Jeffrey Hancock, Cornell,
communication, digital deception
Socio-Cultural Content
in Language
• IARPA program began this year
• Goals
– to use existing social science theories to
identify the social goals of a group and its
members
– to correlate these social goals with the
language used by the members
– to automate this correlation
Conclusions
• Semantic hacking is widespread
• We are only at the beginning stages of
developing effective countermeasures for
semantic hacking
• Semantic hacking countermeasures will
play an important role in cyber security
and in intelligence and security informatics