Transcript Measuring the Success of International Sanctions The case of the

COERCING, CONSTRAINING AND SIGNALING
EXPLORING THE PURPOSES OF TARGETED SANCTIONS
Francesco Giumelli
Senior Lecturer
Metropolitan University Prague
email: [email protected]
Presentation Prepared for
WORKSHOP: How are Targeted Sanctions Supposed to Work (both in theory and in practice)?
Geneva, Switzerland, 1-3 October 2009
Measuring the Success of Sanctions – Geneva, 2 October 2009
The Problem
 The focus of the study:
 Do sanctions work?
 The answer…
 It depends!!
 The argument
1.
2.
Mono Vs. Multiple-Purpose Approach

Coercion, Constraint and Signal

Sanctions as only one tool among many
Causal Complexity Approach
 A definition of success

Sanctions can only contribute to a policy goal through
the achievement of their purpose
Measuring the Success of Sanctions – Geneva, 2 October 2009
A synoptic table for statecraft
Table 1 – A Synoptic Table of Statecraft in Foreign Policy
Domains
(Baldwin,
1985)
Methods,
Mode,
Techniques
(Haas, 1974;
Art, 1980)
Propaganda
Peaceful
Diplomacy
Incentives
Tools, means,
instruments,
levers
Purpose (Art, 1980)
Scope (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950)
Cooperative
Noncooperative
Ends, aims,
objectives,
goals
Statements
Diplomatic
advantages
Economic aids
Etc
STATECRAFT
Economic
statecraft
Sanctions
Financial
Restrictions
Travel Bans
Arms Embargo
Commodity
Boycotts
Military statecraft
Violence
Strategic bombing
Invasion
Etc
To signal
To support
To cooperate
To signal
To constrain
To coerce
Milieu
Possession
Survival
(Wolfer,
1962)
Targets
(primary and
secondary)
(Baldwin,
1999/2000)
Individuals
Entities
Domestic
Audience
States
International
organizations
International
Audiences
Measuring the Success of Sanctions – Geneva, 2 October 2009
A Taxonomy of Sanctions
 What is a sanction?
 Politically motivated penalty
 Success?
 Degree of achievement of its purpose
 What are the purposes of sanctions?
 To coerce: Make the target do something
 To constrain: Prevent the target from
doing something
 To signal: Signal an audience
Measuring the Success of Sanctions – Geneva, 2 October 2009
A Taxonomy of Sanctions (2)
Classificatory Typology of Sanctions
Feasibility
Enforcement
High
Low
High
Low
Coercion
Constrain
Signal
Measuring the Success of Sanctions – Geneva, 2 October 2009
What defines the purpose?
 Feasibility: the acceptability of the
senders’ demand by the target
 Practicality: can the demand be met?
 Preciseness: does the target know what to
do?
 Enforcement: the attempt to make a
target obey certain decisions
 Implementation: is the sanction
implemented?
 Monitoring: is the sanction monitored?
Measuring the Success of Sanctions – Geneva, 2 October 2009
Talking about success
 Coercion
 To change the behavior of the target
 To make one policy option more appealing
to the target
 Constrain
 To prevent the target from doing smthg
 To weaken the target’s abilities
 To attach a cost to political misconducts
 Signal
 The message is sent and delivered
Measuring the Success of Sanctions – Geneva, 2 October 2009
The Conclusions
 Do sanctions work?
 It depends!
 Sanctions can only contribute to
strategies by
 Coercing, constraining and signaling
 The taxonomy of sanctions establishes
that
 Sanctions are not all alike
 Success assessed according to purpose
 Comparisons are to be done for similar
cases
Measuring the Success of Sanctions – Geneva, 2 October 2009
Thank you for your attention!
For comments and suggestions, please write to
[email protected]