Transcript 4-mussolinis-foreign-policy

3. Mussolini’s Foreign Policy (1928-43)
Historian’s interpretation of Mussolini’s
Foreign Policy
 There was no doubt that
Mussolini wanted ‘To make Italy
great, feared and respected’.
 However, historians are divided
over the extent to which
Mussolini’s foreign was a break
from that liberal era and how far
there was continuity
 There was also lots of historical
debate whether Mussolini’s
alliance with Nazi Germany was
from ideology or pragmatism
too.
Historian’s interpretation of Mussolini’s
Foreign Policy (cont-d)
 Anti-Fascist historians like De
Felice and Gentile argue that
Fascist Italy could’ve avoided
the ‘German embrace’ and
entry into WW2.
 However, historians Martin
Blinkhorn and MacGregor Knox
suggests the German alliance
and Italy’s aggression of late
1930s and early 40s were the
logical outcome of Fascist belief
in struggle and violence.
Historian’s interpretation of Mussolini’s
Foreign Policy (cont-d)
 Blinkhorn suggests that Mussolini
needed war to keep Fascism alive
 He believed that Mussolini was
anxious by the early 1930s that ‘his
movement and regime were
growing too comfortable, too
paunchy and middle-aged and
needed new challenges’.
 Macgregor Knox stressed the
interdependence of Fascist foreign
and domestic policy, ‘internal
consolidation was a prerequisite of
foreign conquest and foreign
conquest was the decisive
prerequisite for a revolution at
home’.
Historian’s interpretation of Mussolini’s
Foreign Policy (cont-d)
 Knox, therefore, sees violent
struggle, whether at home or
abroad, at the heart of Fascism.
 During the 1920s, Mussolini’s
foreign policy had much in
common with that of the liberal
govts before and after WW1, as
he aimed to expand Italy’s
influence in the Balkans, Near
East and East Africa.
 Mussolini’s methods were
different from his liberal
predecessors.
Historian’s interpretation of Mussolini’s
Foreign Policy (cont-d)
 Mussolini was hasty and reckless,
prone to make grandiose gestures
and, above all, keen to increase
Italian prestige and his own.
 Mussolini saw an aggressive foreign
policy as essential in order to
transform the Italian people – to
make them into a dynamic,
aggressive and united nation.
 This aim certainly seems increasingly
evident in the mid to late 1930s
when the Fascist regime, both at
home and abroad, became more
radical.
Historian’s interpretation of Mussolini’s
Foreign Policy (cont-d)
 By and large, in the 1920s
Mussolini appeared prepared to
play by the rules of western
diplomacy and Italy had an
important role in the League of
Nations.
 Mussolini was for the most part
content to cooperate with
Britain and France, the strongest
European powers in the 1920s,
who dominated the areas
Mussolini was keen to expand in,
namely the Mediterranean and
North Africa.
Examples of Italy cooperating with
the rest of the inti’l community
 Mussolini signed the Locarno Pacts
(1925), which involved Germany
accepting its western frontiers and
being admitted to the League of
Nations.
 He acquired Fiume from
Yugoslavia by diplomacy in 1924
and, in the same year, received
small bits of French and British
territory in East Africa.
 Mussolini signed the Kellogg-Briand
Pact (1928) along with over sixty
other countries, whereby they
pledged to renounce war.
Mussolini did not take this
agreement seriously.
Examples of Italy cooperating with
the rest of the inti’l community (contd)
 The explanation for the relatively
peaceful and restrained policy
conducted by Mussolini during
the 1920s lies in the fact that
much of his attention was
focused on extending and the
consolidating his political
position within Italy.
 Furthermore, much of the Italian
army was tied up in suppressing
rebellion in Libya.
Mussolini demonstrated a preference
for confrontation and aggression
 The Corfu Crisis (1923)-Italian
troops occupied Corfu after the
murder of an Italian general by
Greek bandits.
 Mussolini sought to bully Greece
into paying compensation to
Italy.
 It is possible that Mussolini had
planned to take Corfu
permanently but he withdrew
after the League of Nations
ordered Greece to pay Italy
compensation.
Mussolini demonstrated a preference
for confrontation and aggression
(cont-d)
 Relations with France and
Yugoslavia- Superficially
Mussolini appeared to want
good Franco-Italian relations,
but he demonstrated a hostile
attitude to France in several
ways in the 1920s.
 He encouraged opposition
movements in France’s
Moroccan and Tunisian colonies.
 He was hostile to Yugoslavia, an
ally of France, because it had
gained territory Italy had
wanted at the end of the WW1
Mussolini demonstrated a preference
for confrontation and aggression
(cont-d)
 Mussolini funded Croat
separatists who sought
independence from Yugoslavia.
 He also helped King Zog seize
power in Albania (1926) and
turned Albania into a satellite
state, to extend Italy’s influence
to the south of Yugoslavia.
Opportunities for Expanision in the
1930s
 ‘Intentionalist’ historians, for
example, MacGregor Knox, who
believe that Mussolini had long-term
aims in foreign policy,
 They argue that in the 1930s
Mussolini was at last able to discard
cautious approach of the 1920s in
order to realise those aims.
 ‘Structuralist’ historians, like De
Felice, contend that Mussolini was
merely an opportunist, with no fixed
plans, and that ideology played no
role in his foreign policy.
Opportunities for Expansion in the
1930s (cont-d)
 Structuralists view Mussolini’s more
expansive foreign policy in the 1930s
simply in terms of a response to
changing int’l circumstances.
 Opportunities for Italian expansion:
 The League of Nations was undermined
by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria
(1931) and Germany’s withdrawal from
League membership (1933).
 Hitler came to power in Germany
(1933) intent on revising the Versailles
Treaty.
 The Wall St Crash (1929) and the Great
Depression undermined int’l relations as
tariffs were increased and countries
became more inward-looking.
Initial suspicion of Hitler
 At first Mussolini was decidely
cool towards Hitler when he
came to power in 1933.
 Mussolini’s first meeting with
Hitler in Venice in June 1934, was
a tense affair.
 He wanted Austria as a satellite
state of Italy and feared that
Hitler would seek to take it over
and that he wold also demand
German-speaking South Tyrol,
which Italy got from AustriaHungary in 1919.
Initial suspicion of Hitler (cont-d)
 In July 1934, Austrian Nazis
murdered the Austrian
chancellor, Dollfuss, who had
close links with Mussolini, but the
Austrian Nazis failed to seize
power.
 Mussolini moved Italian troops to
the Brenner Pass (the ItalianAustrian border) in order to warn
Hitler off intervening in Austria.
 It is not clear whether Hitler had
been planning an invasion.
Questions #1
1. What were De Felice and Gentile’s view on
Mussolini’s foreign policy?
2. What were Martin Blinkhorn and
MacGregor Knox’s viewpoints on Mussolini’s
policies?
3. What examples were there of Mussolini
cooperating with the international
community in the 1920s?
4. Draw a timeline to show Mussolini’s
preference for confrontation and
aggression.
5. How do intentionalist and structuralist
viewpoints differ regarding Mussolini’s
policies of expansion in the 1930s?
6. How was Mussolini intially suspicious of
Hitler?
The Stresa Front - 1935
 Mussolini signed the Stresa Front
with Britain and France in April
1935.
 This happened when Hitler
broke the Versailles in March
1935, by announcing his
beginning of conscription and
his intention to build up an army
of 550,000 soldiers.
 The 3 powers agreed to take
collective action in the even of
any further German breach of
Versailles.
The Stresa Front – 1935 (cont-d)
 This pact fell very quickly
because:
1)Britain did not consult either Italy
or France before signing the
Anglo-German Naval Agreement
with Hitler in June 1935.
 This allowed Germany to
expand its navy beyond the
level laid down at Versailles.
2) Mussolini invaded Abyssinia in
Oct 1935 and Britain and France
condemned this aggression.
Invasion of Abyssinia (1935)
 The Abyssinian War of 1935-36
was bigger and more brutal than
any of the imperialist policies of
the liberal Italian govt’s.
 As a result of this invasion,
Mussolini drew closer to Hitler’s
Germany while his relations with
France and Britain deteriorated.
 Historians disagree about what
led Mussolini to invade Abyssinia.
Invasion of Abyssinia (1935) cont-d
 ‘Structuralists’ argue that
Mussolini invaded in an attempt
to divert the Italian people’s
attention away from domestic
economic problems.
 Intentionalists such as Martin
Blinkhorn see it in terms of ‘an
outgrowth of Fascism itself, its
need to fight and win battles.
Mussolini’s aims in invading Abyssinia
 To link up Italy’s existing colonies in
North-East Africa (Eritrea and Italian
Somaliland)
 To gain revenge for the Italian
defeat at Adowa (1896)
 To satisfy the many Italian
nationalists who had been angry at
Italy’s failure to acquire any
colonies as a result of the 1919-20
Peace Settlement.
 To be able to claim to be
recreating the glories of the
ancient Roman Empire in North
Africa.
Mussolini’s aims in invading Abyssinia
(cont-d)
 Mussolini was thought to have
considered an attack on
Abyssinia from 1932 onwards,
and even before.
 He picked a quarrel with
Abysinnia after a small military
clash at Wal-Wal in Dec 1934.
 Mussolini believed that France
and Britain would not take any
action against Italy if it invaded
Abyssinia as Pierre Laval, the
French Foreign Minister, had, in
Jan 1935, agreed that there
were no major French interests
at stake in Abyssinia.
Mussolini’s aims in invading Abyssinia
(cont-d)
 In June 1935, Anthony Eden,
the British Foreign secretary,
visited Rome and proposed a
deal between Abyssinia and
Italy
 This would have given Italy the
Ogaden region and
compensated Abyssinia with a
piece of British Somaliland,
allowing Abyssinia access to
the sea.
Mussolini’s aims in invading Abyssinia
(cont-d)
 However, the League of Nations
imposed economic sanctions on Italy
following its Abyssinia invasion in Oct
1935.
 This was largely because the British
gov’t felt under pressure from public
opinion, which was pro-League, to
take a stand against Italy.
 The sanctions did not include oil or
steel. Britain and France’s attempts to
prevent Mussolini from gaining all of
Abyssinia angered Mussolini (eg: by
planning to offer him two-thirds of it in
the Hoare-Laval Pact Dec 1935)
 Mussolini completed the conquest in
May 1936.
Results of the Abyssinian War
 Mussolini now turned his back on
good relations with Britain and
France, which he could’ve restored.
 Mussolini drew closer to Hitler, whose
own aggression was encouraged by
Mussolini’s flouting of the League.
 Mussolini undermined the League of
Nations and withdrew Italy from
membership.
 The successful conquest of Abyssinia
also made Musolini more open to
take risks and use force but it had
paid off in this instance.
Results of the Abyssinian War (cont-d)
 It was very popular in Italy.
 Abyssinia did not prove of
significant commercial value to
Italy; in 1939 only 2% of Italy’s
trade was with Abyssinia.
 Sanctions hurt the Italian
economy.
 The war was very expensive,
costing 40 million lire, and Italian
troops were engaged in fighting
Abyssinian guerrillas until 1939.
Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil
War
 Both Mussolini and Hitler
intervened in the Spanish Civil
War, in support of General
Franco’s Nationalists against the
Republican gov’t.
 This war broke out in July 1936
and Mussolini sent 70,000 troops
to Spain but they performed
poorly, suffering a humiliating
defeat at Guadalajara in March
1937, where Italian anti-Fascists
formed part of the opposing
force.
Reasons for intervening in Spain
 Mussolini wanted to weaken France
as it had a left-wing Popular Front
gov’t similar to the Spanish gov’t.
 It tried to weaken it by installing a
right-wing regime in Spain, which
Mussolini hoped would become a
satellite state of Italy.
 He also did this to acquire naval
bases in the Balearic Islands, which
would help promote Italian power
in the Mediterranean.
 However, Mussolini gained very little
from intervention in Spain, which
proved very costly – costing approx
14 million lire.
Closer ties with Nazi Germany
 Italy and Germany signed the
Rome-Berlin Axis in Oct 1936, a
commercial and friendship
treaty.
 In Nov 1937, Italy also signed the
Anti-Comintern Pact (originally
signed by Germany and Japan
in 1936).
 In Dec 1937, Italy followed
Germany by walking out of the
League of Nations.
Closer ties with Nazi Germany (contd)
 Mussolini also introduced a series
of anti-semitic laws in 1938,
possibly an attempt to cement
his friendship with Hitler.
 Many radical fascists saw the
German alliance as a way of
radicalising the Fascist regime in
Italy.
 Mussolini himself also came to
fall under Hitler’s spell.
Questions #2
1. What were the main factors leading
to fall of the Stresa Front?
2. What were the main aims of
Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia?
What were the main impacts and
results of this invasion?
3. What were the structuralist and
intentionalist views of the Abyssinia
invasion?
4. What were the reasons for Italy’s
involvement in the Spanish Civil War?
5. Explain the Rome-Berlin Axis and the
Anti-Comintern Pact and how these
strengthened ties between Italy and
Germany.
The Anschluss (Mar 1938)
 Once Mussolini drew closer to Hitler, he
changed his policy towards Austria
and decided to allow Hitler to
increase German influence over
Austria.
 In Jan 1936, Mussolini told Hitler he was
happy for Austria to become a client
state of Germany.
 In Mar 1938, Hitler felt compelled to
organise an immediate takeover of
Austria after the Austrian chancellor,
Schuschnigg, announced he would
call a referendum on Austria’s
independence.
 When Hitler invaded Austria – having
been invited to send troops in by the
newly appointed Austrian chancellor,
Seyss-Inquart (an Austrian Nazi),
Mussolini agreed.
The Sudeten Crisis and the Munich
Conference (1938)
 In 1938, a crisis broke out over
Hitler’s demand that the Czech
gov’t allow the Germanspeaking area of
Czechoslovakia-the
Sudetenland-to unite with
Germany.
 By Sept 1938, an invasion of
Czechoslovakia by Germany
seemed very likely.
 Also looked possible that Britain
and France might intervene on
the Czech’s side.
The Sudeten Crisis and the Munich
Conference (1938) cont-d
 War was averted when Mussolini
helped set up the Munich
Conference in Sept 1938.
 This conference was attended
by Germany, Italy, France and
Britain.
 Mussolini was keen to avoid war
breaking out and was able to
pose as a mediator between
Hitler and the British and French.
 However, it was Hitler dictating
the pace and direction of int’l
affairs, not Mussolini.
The Sudeten Crisis and the Munich
Conference (1938) cont-d
 Hitler did not inform Mussolini
before he occupied the rest of
Czechoslovakia in March 1939.
 Mussolini was encouraged by
Britain and France’s
appeasement of Hitler over the
Sudentenland (and the Anschluss)
to believe that neither country
would stand up to aggression.
 This in part explains Mussolini’s
increasingly belligerent foreign
policy from the late 1930s
onwards.
1939-43: Growing Italian aggression
 Mussolini was well aware that Italy
was the junior partner in the ItalianGerman relationship.
 This was one of the reasons for his
determination to increase Italy’s
influence by force.
 In Feb 1939, he announced to the
Fascist Grand Council his intention
that Italy should break out of the
‘prison’ of the Mediterranean.
 He said the ‘bars’ of the prison
were ‘Corsica, Tunisia, Malta and
Cyprus; its sentinels Gibraltar and
Suez’.
The Invasion of Albania (April 1939)
 Was a publicity stunt by Mussolini
as Albania was already virtually
under Italian control.
 Mussolini wanted to show he had
made some gains following on
Germany’s expansion in 1938-39.
The Pact of Steel (May 1939)
 Italy and Nazi Germany were
obligated to support each other
in the event of a war.
 This was because they were
fatally tied by signing a military
alliance.
 This worked to Germany’s
advantage because it was
much more likely that Germany
would go to war.
The Pact of Steel (May 1939)cont-d
 Mussolini likely hoped to acquire
German support for Italian
expansion in the Balkans,
Mediterranean and North Africa.
 However, Mussolini had no
intention of going to war in 1939.
 He knew how unprepared the
Italian armed forces were and
would thus be at a huge
disadvantage.
Outbreak of WW2 (Sept 1939)
 Mussolini was alarmed when he
heard in August of Hitler’s plans
to invade Poland.
 Mussolini announced that Italy
was a ‘non-belligerent power’
when Hitler invaded Poland in
Sept and Britain and France
declared war.
 Mussolini told Hitler that he could
only enter the war if he received
17,000 trains full of munitions
from Germany.
State of Italy’s Armed Forces in 1940
 Mussolini’s dependence on
Germany in WW2 was a result of
Italy’s continuing economic
weakness and lack of raw
materials.
 During WW2, this was worsened by
Italian imports being disrupted
(partly by British attacks)
 Between 1935 and 1938, Italy spent
11.8% of its national income on
rearmament compared to 6.9% in
France and 5.5% in Britain.
 However, there was not much to
show for this investment as much of
the spending went for inferior
weapons.
Italy’s military weakness in 1940
 Italy was short of oil, coal and
iron ore. This resulted in a 20%
reduction in steel output in 194042.
 Mussolini boasted of an army of 8
million but in 1939 only 0.8 million
troops were available. By 1940,
this had risen to 3 million.
 The Italian Navy had no aircraft
carriers and only 8 battleships.
Italy’s military weakness in 1940 (contd)
 Italy did have a large submarine
fleet but a third of its submarines
were destroyed by the British in the
first 3 weeks of the war.
 The Army had only 1500 tanks and
most of them were light.
 The Italian airforce lacked longrange bombers and its fighters were
slow. In 1939, Italy had 1500 aircraft
compared to Germany’s 4200.
 The leadership of Italy’s armed
forces was old and there was
intense rivalry between the army,
navy and airforce.
Italy’s entry into WW2
 Mussolini kept out of the war for the
first 10 months, torn by a desire to
share in any spoils won by Germany
and the realisation that Italy was
not ready for war.
 Mussolini was not comfortable with
his position of ‘non-belligerency’ as
it was similar to Italy’s stance at the
start of WW1.
 After Hitler’s swift conquest of
Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland
and Belgium in Sept 1939-June
1940, and with France on verge of
collapse, Mussolini decided to
declare war..
Italy’s entry into WW2 (cont-d)
 Mussolini was keen not to lose
out on any possible territorial
gains.
 Italy declared war on France just
2 weeks before it surrendered.
Ciano (his son-in-law and foreign
minister), King Victor Emmanuel
and most of the Italian people
were against Mussolini’s decision.
 Italy gained very little French
territory after France surrendered
because Hitler wanted to
preserve good relations with the
new Vichy French gov’t.
Italian campaigns in the Balkans and
North Africa (1940-43)
 Mussolini wanted to conduct his
own campaigns, separate from
Hitler’s.
 So he invaded Greece in Oct
1940, which proved disastrous as
Hitler had to send in German
troops to help Mussolini out in
April 1941.
 In Sept 1940 Italian forces in
Libya invaded Egypt but were
driven out by British forces.
 Again in 1941, the Germans had
to send troops in and take
control of the campaign.
Italian campaigns in the Balkans and
North Africa (1940-43) cont-d
 In Nov 1940, the Royal Air Force
destroyed half of the Italian fleet at
Taranto and in March 1941, British
forces expelled Italian troops from
East Africa.
 In June 1941, Mussolini weakened
his forces in the Balkans and North
Africa by sending 200,000 troops to
the Eastern Front to help Hitler’s
attack on the USSR.
 In Nov 1942, British-American armies
finally defeated the German-Italian
forces in North Africa at El Alamein.
The Fall of Mussolini (July 1943)
 In 1943, the Allies invaded Sicily.
The war was never popular in
Italy and became increasingly
unpopular as defeats grew and
economic conditions worsened.
 Real wages fell by 30% in 194043; food prices rose by 72% in
1940-42 and rationing was
introduced.
 In March 1943, strikes involving
130,000 workers broke out in
several northern cities.
The Fall of Mussolini (July 1943) cont-d
 Victor Emmanuel II, some of the
generals and the majority of the
Fascist Grand Council in the Fascist
Party combined to depose and
arrest Mussolini in July 1943.
 Mussolini was replaced by Marshal
Badoglio, who surrendered to the
Allies in Sept 1943.
 Mussolini was rescued by German
troops and spent the rest of the war
in northern Italy as puppet ruler of
the Salo Republic, which was
effectively under German control.
 In April 1945, he was captured and
executed by communist partisans.
Questions #3
1) Explain the Anschluss, the Sudeten Crisis
and the Munich Conference and how each
of these events increased Nazi influence over
Europe.
2) How did the Pact of Steel work to Hitler’s
advantage?
3) Why did Mussolini refer to Italy as a nonbelligerent power by the outbreak of WW2?
4) To what extent did Italy have military and
economic ‘weaknesses’ during WW2.
5) Why did Mussolini eventually declare war in
1940 against France and Greece?
6) What were the main factors leading to the
fall of Mussolini in 1943?