The Problem of Induction
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Transcript The Problem of Induction
Science and induction
Science and we assume causation (cause and
effect relationships)
For empiricists, all the evidence there is for
empirical knowledge, including science,
concerning “matters of fact” is sensory
experience
For some, we move from individual
experiences/singular statements to
generalizations/universal statements using
induction (and we certainly often do).
The Problem of Induction
David Hume
Empirical generalizations
1. Millions of ravens have been observed and all are
black.
2. A non-black raven has never been observed.
--------------------------------------------------------3. All ravens are black
Are, like other forms of inductive arguments,
ampliative
Reasoning moves from the past and present to the
future
From what has been experienced to what has not
Hume’s question
What justifies our use of induction?
There are, he imagines, two possibilities:
Experience, which concerns matters of fact
Reason, which concerns relations of ideas
And he proposes that we explore each to see
if the justification lies there
The inference
What does my past or present knowledge about
some kind of object (e.g., that bread has always
been nourishing) suggest about my next
encounter with that kind of object?
Put another way, propositions of the form:
What we have all experienced that X causes Y, and
X will always cause Y
Are very different
What justifies such the inference from the first to
the second?
Reason (aka Demonstrative
Knowledge)
There is no necessary connection between
I’ve always experienced that X causes Y.
I foresee that the next X I encounter will cause Y.
It is logically possible that however many my
experiences of X causing Y, it won’t next time,
or next week, or next July…
Inductive arguments are not deductively valid.
Experience
Can we appeal to our past experience using
induction to justify our use of it?
After all, while not deductively valid, many
inductive arguments seem strong and have
proven helpful.
1. Induction has worked in the past.
So, our use of induction is justified.
Appealing to an inductive argument (that
induction has worked in the past) to justify
induction is circular.
The “nature” of Nature:
an added premise
1.
Induction has worked in
Induction will the past.
2. Nature is uniform.
----------------------------------work in the future.
1. The sun rose today.
2. The sun rose yesterday.
n. The rose on n.
3. Nature is uniform
----------------------------------The sun will rise tomorrow.
The “nature” of nature
What justifies the premise:
Nature is uniform
It was uniform in the past and it is uniform
in the present.
That is, it is also the conclusion of an
inductive argument.
Is this all about “secret powers”?
Is the problem just lack of knowledge?
Say, on Hume’s part, about why bread
nourishes?
Say, about why the law of the conservation
of energy holds?
The argument: No matter how much we
learn, the problem will apply to that
knowledge as well.
Can evolutionary theory help?
Induction assumes that the universe contains
“kinds” and causation
It also assumes the uniformity of nature
Reasoning this way is useful because it
underlies predictions.
Other species also use induction.
Is it possible that the capacity and/or
disposition is the product of natural selection?
Can evolutionary theory help?
Is it possible that the capacity and/or
disposition is the product of natural selection?
Yes and cognitive scientists maintain it likely
is.
If this is the case, does it justify induction?
No: the problem remains.
And the past success of induction does not
guarantee its success in the future.