Transcript So Where Are We (The World) on This Climate Change Problem?

Global Climate Change as a “Wicked” Problem:
Shifting Energy Systems and Managing Changing
Rates and Magnitudes of EnvironmentalChange
By
Edward L. Miles
Bloedel Professor of Marine Studies and Public
Affairs, School of Marine Affairs, and Team Leader
Climate Impacts Group
Center for Science in the Earth System (CSES)
University of Washington
Background
Framing the Policy Problem
Theme : Energy & Environment: Crisis, Opportunities,
and Challenges
On the performance of the global regulatory system
& the states within it:
• How appropriate are the actions proposed or
taken?
• How effective are they likely to be?
• What can we expect?
SCALE I: GLOBAL
• What kind of problem is climate
change?
• Why is the global warming problem
so difficult for the world, the U.S.
and China, inter alia, to deal with?
Characteristics of Long Time Scale Problems [Decades to
Centuries] (Brooks 1977 )
• Intergenerational trade-offs intrinsic.
• Predicted effects highly uncertain; uncertainty erodes
consensus re action.
• Uncertainties cascade and increase from physical and
chemical effects (lowest), to biological/ecological, to
social.
• When effects long term & cumulative, costs of delay
appear small compared to potential immediate econ. costs
and social dislocations (see point 1).
• Long term envir. probs. require sustained effort; this in
conflict with short term crisis orientation of politics.
Typical Human Response to “Long Wave”
Threats, (Dyson 2005)
• Rapid advance in scientific understanding
(cf. HIV/AIDS).
• But overall societal response characterized
by avoidance, denial, & reproach.
•  little behavioral change until….
• Evidence of damage plain.
Defining “Wicked” Problems (Rittel &
Webber, 1973)
No definitive solution.
No stopping rule. Solutions not true/false but
better/worse.
No ultimate test of solution. Every solution a “oneshot operation”; no learning by trial & error.
Every solution essentially unique.
Every wicked problem a symptom of another
problem….
Critical Limiting Conditions for Societal Response
Table 1
Residence Times of Greenhouse Gases in the Atmosph ere
GHG
Carbon Dioxide (CO2)
Methane (CH4)
Nitrous Oxides (N2O)
Chlorofluorocarbons
CFC-11
HCFC-22
Perfluorocarbon (CF4)
Residence Times
50-200 Years
(The range varies with sources and
sinks and depends on the
equilibration times between
atmospheric CO2 and terrestrial
and oceanic reserves.)
12 years
120 years
50 years
12 years
50,000 years
Source: IPCC. 1990. Climate Change: The Scientific Assessment, Working Group 1.
Critical Limiting Conditions for Societal Response
Table 2
Timescales of the Global Carbon Cycle as Determined by Exchange
Between the Atmosphere and the Ocean
Mechanism
Time Required
Troposphere (lower atmosphere) mixing alone
1 year
Atmosphere to surface ocean layer
4 years
Surface ocean layer to intermediate
50-200 years
layer below the thermocline
Venting from ocean above thermocline to atmosphere
100 years
Turnover time of deep ocean basins
1000 years
Source: IPCC. 1990. Climate Change: The Scientific Assessment.
Why are these two sets of physical characteristics
important for policy development?
• They demonstrate that:
1. global climate change is a problem of long time scale;
2. all policy measures will be indeterminate in their
ultimate impacts;
3. indeterminacy, when linked to issues of costs, changing
lifestyles, and distributive inequities, creates large
obstacles to significant short-run policy action;
4. benefit-cost analytics tend to discount the future heavily
beyond 2 decades.
Uncertainty & International
Regime Building
• Uncertainty about seriousness & causes of a problem
& malign configuration of actor interests are
separately major hurdles in international regime
building. In combination, results often lethal.
• Global climate change the ultimate collective action
problem (large disparities between private & social
costs) but often the decision rules of int’l. law-making
conferences stack the deck in favor of the least
enthusiastic parties  the “Law of the Least
Ambitious Program”. (Miles et al. 2006.
Environmental Regime Effectiveness….).
Conditions Under which International System
Responds Effectively to Global Environmental
Problems
• Available evidence suggests two conditions:
a). Disaster; b). Consensus that disaster on
significant scale highly probable in short
run.
• So system propensity to respond is
hyperdependent on rate of envir. change &
immediacy of perceived effects.
Policy Dynamics, cont’d.
• Policy dynamics constitute a “prism”. Actions must be
taken initially by gov’ts.  all global intergovernmental
efforts re mitigation must be refracted through:
– 1. dynamics of bureaucracy at nat’l. level;
– 2. rates & magnitudes of envir. change;
– 3. perceptions of winners & losers;
– 4. differing discount rates;
– 5. societal capacity to learn over timescales required.
– 6. perceptions about national security.
Those policy dynamics slow down rates of policy
change.
Standards: The Framework Convention on Climate
Change (FCCC), Art. 2
• The ultimate objective of this Convention …is to
achieve…stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. Such a level should be
achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to
adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is
not threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed in
a sustainable manner.
• [Severe problems with this formulation: 1. Stabilization not the
most appropriate objective; 2. No single measure of “dangerous
interference” exists above 300ppm; 3. Assumptions about time to
significant impacts false because ignoring internal feedbacks,
nonlinearities, and thresholds in earth’s climate system].
Standards, cont’d.
• Initial informal settling on x2 pre-industrial ambient
concentration as standard = 560ppmv. [Impacts presumed
manageable and effect on world GNP calculated on order
of 1%]. EU later (2006) changing level to 2°C.
• IPCC rev. BAU projections of >x2 CO2 world [575ppmv]
by 2050 & >900ppmv by 2100,i.e., >x3 CO2 world. 2006
emissions already at 2GT/yr above worst case projections.
• Current (2009) levels at >387ppmv. Note that between
1860 & 2009 anthropogenic inputs of CO2 now at max.
level at onset of ice ages over last 650k yrs ( & maybe over
last 20-22 million yrs.)
Atmospheric CO2 Concentration
Year 2008
Atmospheric CO2 concentration:
385 ppm
38% above pre-industrial
Data Source: Pieter Tans and Thomas Conway, NOAA/ESRL
year
ppm
y
1
1970 – 1979: 1.3 ppm y-1
1980 – 1989: 1.6 ppm y1
1990 – 1999: 1.5 ppm y-1
2000 - 2008: 2.0 ppm y-1
2008: 2.3 ppm y-1
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
1.24
1.85
2.39
2.21
1.61
2.41
1.79
2.17
2.28
Fossil Fuel Emissions: Top Emitters (>4% of Total)
2000
Carbon (tons x 1000)
China
1600
USA
1200
800
Russian Fed.
Japan
400
0
India
1990 03
95
07
99
01
03
Time
Gregg Marland et al., CDIAC; Global Carbon Project 2009
05 2007
Fossil Fuel Emissions: Profile Examples (1-4% of Total)
Carbon (tons x 1000)
160
UK
Canada
120
80
Australia
South Africa
Brazil
Spain
40
Denmark
0
1990 03
95
07
99
01
03
Time
Gregg Marland et al., CDIAC; Global Carbon Project 2009
05 2007
Corell. 2006
Corell. 2006
Percentage of Global Annual Emissions
Regional Shift in Emissions Share
Kyoto Protocol
62%
57%
49.7%
43%
38%
FCCC
Kyoto
Protocol
Adopted
J. Gregg and G. Marland 2008, CDIAC
50.3%
53%
47%
Current
Kyoto
Protocol
Enter into
Force
5
Recent
emissions
Fossil Fuel Emissions:
Actual
vs. IPCC Scenarios
0
1850
1900
1950
2000
CO2 Emissions (GtC y-1)
10
9
8
7
Actual emissions: CDIAC
Actual emissions: EIA
450ppm stabilisation
650ppm stabilisation
A1FI (Avgs.)
A1B
A1T
A2
B1
B2
2050
SRES
(2000)
2008
aver.
2007
2006
growth
2005
rates in %
y -1 for
20002010:
Observed 2000-2007
3.5%
6
5
1990
1995
2100
2000
Raupach et al 2007, PNAS; Global Carbon Project 2009, update
2005
A1B: 2.42
A1FI: 2.71
A1T: 1.63
2010
A2: 2.13
B1: 1.79
B2: 1.61
Summary of IPCC AR4 Conclusions
• Global atmos concentrations of CO2 , methane, & nitrous oxide
have increased markedly as result of human activities since 1750;
far surpassing pre-industrial levels. CO2 drivers principally fossil
fuel use & land use change. Level highest in 650K years.
• Very high confidence [=9/10 chance] that GHG increase resulting
in warming, with radiative forcing of 1.6 [+0.6 - +2.4] W m-2.
Warming now “unequivocal”.
• Warmth in last half of 20th century unusual in at least the previous
1300 years.
• For next 2 decades, warming of 0.2° C per decade projected.
• Sea level projections do not include full effects of changes in ice
sheet flow because basis in published literature lacking.
• Very likely that hot extremes, heat waves, & heavy precipitation
events becoming more frequent.
Implications of Standards
• To achieve stabilization level of 550ppmv by 2100, IPCC
WGI (1994) calculating need to cut aggregate world
emissions of CO2 by 30% by 2050 and another 30% by
2100. [Required cuts 2008 at 50% levels].
• Enormous economic pain and personal suffering would
ensue.  not doable.
• Amended Kyoto-Marrakesh Protocol requiring < 5% cut
by 2012, followed by progressive re-negotiations.
• At current rate of action, impossible to stabilize CO2 level
at doubling pre-industrial ambient concentration by 2100.
Real question is whether we can avoid tripling or beyond.
So Where Are We at the Global
Level?
• Gridlock--global negotiations unlikely to produce effective
remedies on timescale required. Emissions likely to double
by 2050 at present rate.
• Global climate very sensitive to small changes in mean
global T--1-2.5C.
• Considerable uncertainty re magnitude, timing, type, and
scale of impacts as result of warming.
• Long time delays between action and consequences.
• Need for collective action on global scale.
• Severe distributive inequities, both present &
intergenerational.
Some Major Policy Questions
• How to de-carbonize global economies?
• How fast is it possible to de-carbonize global economies?
• What is the risk of irreversible changes in the planetary
climate system?
• How manage the intense conflict between short-term,
medium term, and long term interests and values?
• How to avoid being locked in to short term interests as
prisoners of vested interests?
• How to prepare to respond to low probability/high
consequence events? (Cont’d.)
Sarachik, 2009
Major Policy Questions, cont’d.
• Is there either a rate or a magnitude of change that X
society at Y scale could not effectively adapt to?
• If societal collapse is a real possibility, how will
governments perceive the connections to national security
and what are they likely to do?
Some Policy Implications of Changed
Environmental Conditions
• Going > BAU  faster rates & larger magnitudes of change. Raises
questions about feedbacks, nonlinearities, & thresholds in planetary
climate system.
• Links to other external conditions—growth in world pop. UN
projected stabilization at ~9b people by 2050. Increasing mega-cities
(>8m people from 19 to 31, most on Asian Pacific Rim). Imps. Re
urbanization & demands on energy.
• Severe questions re environmental security—food, water, public
health. Pressures on poorest states. Migrations & societal instabilities.
Implications of a Carbon Constrained
Future (Cicerone. 2008)
• World Energy Usage
• US Energy Usage
• 2005 = 463 Quads [Quadrillion
British Thermal Units (BTU)]
• 87% fossil fuels
• Projections to 2030 = 702
Quads
• Non-OECD growth rate =
~3%/yr-_1 = additional input of
10 billion tons of carbon per
year into atmosphere.
• 2005 = 101 Quads
• 85% from fossil fuels (23% nat
gas; 23% coal; 40% petroleum)
• Projections to 2030 =
1%/yr-1 growth rate
IV. So Why Now Major Cause
for Concern?
Growing Evidence 2006-2009 of “Slippery
Slopes” and “Tipping Points”: Cumulative,
Multiple Stresses and Changes Irreversible
on Human Timescales
CONSIDER
• At 380ppmv enormous increase in surface & sub-surface heat in
ocean [14.5 x 1022J. Levitus et al., 2000,2005] & significant decreases
in pH (Sabine et al., 2004, Feely et al. 2004)..
• Both combine to dislocate marine ecosystems at almost all trophic
levels & combine again with overfishing to deliver a triple whammy of
multiple stresses.
• Recent indications that both the oceanic (Feely et al., 2005) &
terrestrial (Fung et al., 2005) carbon sinks slowing down rate of
uptake.
• If uptake slows, then projections of maximum temperature increases
by 2100 significantly understated.
• Clearly doubling cannot be a sensible standard. Do we then have to
keep ratcheting down over the next 200 years to a level again
<300ppmv??
IN ADDITION
• Re glacier disintegration, Hansen (2005) poses & explores the question
whether anthropogenic GW can cause ice-sheet melting measured in
meters on timescale of centuries. The dynamics seem to be more than
plausible, i.e., increased heat in mixed layer increases summer melt on
the ice sheet  increased ice stream surges & massive iceberg
discharges. Confirmed 2009 (Kerr; Pritchard et al).
• Re increases in hurricane intensity (not frequency), suggestive recent
work by Emmanuel (2005) appears to establish positive correlation
with tropical SST’s. Not immediately a consensus, but similar
findings by team using different approach (Webster et al. 2005). By
2007 consensus established.
• Impacts of both of above combined mean greater hazards for growing
global coastal populations and higher destructive potential. [>30 megacities (>8 million people), most in Asia, projected by 2050].
Problems in Tropical Agriculture (Battisti
& Naylor, 2009
• Coping with challenge of price volatility (short term) combined with
avoiding a perpetual food crisis under conditions of global warming
(long term) a very serious matter.
• Food crisis of 2006-2008 showing that extreme seasonal heat
detrimental to regional agricultural productivity, human welfare, & to
international agricultural markets when policy makers intervene to
secure domestic food needs.
• GCC presenting widespread risks of food insecurity in 21st century.
In the Mean Time, What is Nature Doing??
• Observed increase in GHG concentrations has most likely
committed the world to warming of 2.4°C (1.4 – 4.3°C)
above preindustrial surface T (Ramanathan & Feng, 2008).
• Even most aggressive mitigation steps can only limit
further additions beyond 2.4°C, not reduce that level.
• Reason is in reducing cooling effect of various aerosols
accompanying GW as result of anti-air pollution programs.
• Planet can’t avoid entering into DAI zone. (Ramanathan
& Feng, 2008). [Now facing need to avoid catastrophic
anthropogenic intervention as target.]
More on Irreversible Climate Changes
• Longevity of atmospheric CO2 perturbation as a result of
pattern of atmospheric interaction with large ocean basins.
Atmospheric temperature increases on millennial
timescale. (Solomon et al. 2009).
• Precipitation changes also long term and irreversible as is
sea level rise. Latter may be much greater than estimated if
polar ice sheets do indeed melt rapidly. Cannot yet be very
precise in assessing effects. (Solomon et al. 2009).
Solutions Now (2009) Much Harder to
Achieve
• Growth in demand for electrification in developing
countries, particularly in Asia, led by China & India.
• Coal as primary alternative -- plentiful & cheap.
• Chinese plans for bringing on-line a 1 GW-capacity coalfired power plant per week for decades.
• If growth in supply not accompanied by CCS technologies,
very difficult to get control of the GW problem.
• But energy technology changes slowly & it will take
decades to spin up CCS technology to be fully operational
& for a very large number of sites to be made ready.
So, Quo Vadis?
• We seem to be stuck on the edge of a precipice. It appears to be
impossible to avoid doubling CO2 concentration by 2050. This tips the
odds in favor of extreme events.
• The EU is ready to move, but, so far, neither the U.S. nor China has
been willing to respond in kind.
• There can be no global agreement without both those states.
• Do they prefer the dance of coordinated unilateral movements while
the global negotiation stalls?
• We need rapid change, but what is the optimal path?
• And will we assist poor, weak states to face the instabilities of a
climate fed by such high concentrations of CO2?
• Both China & the US face severe vulnerabilities as well.