Transcript June 8, 2005 - Jaax

Bioterrorism, Agroterrorism,
and Food Safety
Association of Food and Drug
Officials Annual Conference
Kansas City MO, 8 June 2005
Jerry Jaax
Associate Vice Provost for Research Compliance
and University Veterinarian
Kansas State University
It is a complicated world and it is shrinking every day
Emerging… or Intentional??
Biological Warfare
The intentional use of micro-organisms
or toxins derived from living organisms
to produce death or disease in humans,
animals and plants
Bio-terrorism is
the random use of
these weapons
against the public
With the purpose
of demoralizing a
country, exacting
revenge, and/or
affecting policy
Potential Targets for Biological Weapons
• Humans
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–
•
•
•
•
Pathogenic diseases
Vector-borne diseases
Zoonotic diseases
Toxins
Food
Animals
Plants
Materiel
The Challenge in
Talking about
Bioterrorism
Striking a balance between:
• alerting and informing the public
with a realistic sense of the risk,
without
• exaggerating and arousing
harmful or paralyzing fears
Government,
Scientists, and the
Press
Analysis of “Threat Biology” is complex
• No information
Information
looks different
to different
people
• Misinformation
• Differing Agenda
• Different Perspective
• Interpretation
• Ideology
• Dual-use technologies
Accurate conclusions
are difficult!!
• Technology explosion
• Intent
Biological Agents as Weapons.
• Sythian arrows dipped in blood of decomposing bodies (400 BC)
• Diseased bodies in water supplies
• Saliva from rabid dogs in artillery shells (Poland, 1650)
• Smallpox infected clothing or blankets
• Nomadic Mongols catapult bubonic plague-infested bodies into
the Genoese trading post in the Crimea.
• German Glanders efforts
• Japanese Imperial Units 731 and 100
• Anthrax mailings
• Ricin mailings
Excludes “Biocrimes”
Food and Water Borne Biocrimes
(1932 - Present)
‘96 - Diane Thompson--Dallas hospital….Shigella in pastries (12 ill)
‘95 - Debora Green---Kansas City….Ricin in meals (1 ill)
‘84 - Rajneeshees---Oregon...Salmonella on salad bar (751 ill)
‘70 - Eric Kranz---Montreal… Ascriis suum in food (4-5 ill)
-----‘66 - Dr. Mitsuru Suzuki---Japan…S. typhi in food (ca.412 ill / 12 dead)
‘39 - Kikuko Hirose---Japan…Salmonella in pastries (12 ill)
‘36 - Tei-Sabro Takahashi---Japan…Sal. in pastries (10 ill / 4 dead)
‘32 - Prince Mikasa---Japan…Cholera in fruit (0 ill)
<1200 ill & 16 dead
Implications and Constraints for the Bioweaponeer
• Must be presented as a respirable aerosol
Therefore
Magic
Involved
• Preparation and weaponization may jeopardize viability
• Aerosols are dependant on meteorological conditions
However...
• Contagious agents can be delivered without weaponization
• Some agents can be spread by vectors
Courtesy David Franz
Little or No Magic Involved
Urban Myth: Biologics too sophisticated for terrorist use
Reality: Bloody rag, a blender and a highly contagious virus
• 1997 - New Zealand farmers illegally introduce rabbit
hemorrhagic disease (RHDV) – calicivirus
• Circumvented one of the best bio-security systems in the world
Virus entered 3 ways:
 mailed into the country in a vial
 Carried in a vial placed in an air travelers sock
 Carried in a handkerchief drenched in blood/tissues from infected rabbit
Infected rabbits - lungs, spleen, and liver
 Used kitchen blender to make slurry to mix with rabbit
food
 Not a human pathogen
Possible Indicators of a BW/BT Attack
• Disease entity not naturally-occurring in the area
• Multiple disease entities in same patients (mixed agent attack)
• Large # of military and civilian casualties (inhabit same area)
• Data suggestive of a massive point source outbreak
• Apparent aerosol or cutaneous route of invasion
• High morbidity and mortality relative to # at risk
• Localized or circumspect area for illness
• Low attack rates for personnel working with filtered air or
closed ventilation systems
• Dead sentinel animals of multiple species
• Absence of a competent natural vector in
area of outbreak
• Severe disease in previously healthy
population
Biodefense is the "single most significant
modern challenge to U.S. sovereignty"
• "biological weapons can be delivered by a few
• present a small signature for which the U.S. has illdeveloped intelligence gathering capability
• conventional concepts of deterrence are not
necessarily effective
• the nation has a limited response capability to contain
the consequences."
Recommended quadrupling the
DoD biodefense budget
Defense Science Board
July 2002
The Dark Side of Biotechnology
"Biology is about to lose its innocence
in a profound way. While physics
dominated weapons in the 20th
century, biology will dominate
weapons in the 21st"
George Poste
Defense Science Board
•
“Constructed” polio virus (3 years)
•
Virus (Phi X174) built from scratch in 2 weeks (DOE funded project)
•
Mouse Pox “super virus”
Prudence or Paranoia???
• Camelpoxvirus is the causative agent of Camelpox
• Causes Pox disease in dromedary camels - Africa and Asia
• Iraqi BW lab with genetic engineering capability admittedly
worked with the agent
WHY???
• Primary human pathogen in non-endemic area?
• Genetic modification as BW agent?
• Lab surrogate for Variola?
• Worried about Camels??
Biowarfare in the Former Soviet Union
• Dr. Ken Alibeckov - Biopreparat
• Defected from the FSU - wrote “Biohazard”
• Defined the scope of the FSU bio programs
• Tens of thousands scientists and technicians
• Thousands involved in Offensive Agricultural BW
programs
• Strategic as well as Tactical Doctrine
Potential proliferation of
expertise, technology, agents
The Crux of the Proliferation Problem
"If you are not financially independent, it
influences your moral decision-making."
Daan Goosen, former managing director of Roodeplaat
Research Laboratories (RRL) in South Africa
Russian scientists make an average of
$1,644 yearly ($137/mo); the U.S. Labor
Department puts the average annual salary
for an American scientist at $59,200.
Chicago Tribune
2004
''We stockpiled hundreds of tons
of anthrax and dozens of tons of
plague and smallpox near
Moscow and other Russian cities
for use against the United States
and its allies''
Soviet defector Colonel Kanatjan Alibekov, MD
Biopreparat's deputy chief (1992)
Alibek predicts in “Biohazard” that the threat of
biological attack has actually increased as techniques
developed in the USSR have ''spread to rogue regimes
and terrorist groups . . . they are cheap, easy to make ,
and easy to use
One gram, or one twenty-eighth of an ounce, highgrade anthrax can hold up to 100 billion spores.
Estimated conservatively, at 10,000 spores to a
lethal dose, one gram in theory could cause about
10 million deaths
Ken Alibek
Anthrax
Spores
Pulmonary
(aerosol) 80%
• Spore form is extremely stable
• Inhalational disease highly lethal
• Starter cultures widely available
•
Weaponized by all major
offensive BW programs
• Susceptible population
Anthrax
Cutaneous (contact) 20%
**Not contagious
from one individual
to the other
Gastro-intestinal (oral)
Plague
ATLANTA, Mar 20, 2002 (BW HealthWire) –
“Pneumonic plague.. has the dubious
distinction of placing high on the CDC list of
agents that could be deployed as a bioterror
weapon, according to a report in the March 20
Bioterror Medical Alert.”
“While experts note that an aerosolized release of plague would not cause a massive
epidemic akin the 14th century "Black Death" scourge that killed tens of millions, a 50-
kilogram release of pneumonic plague over a large city could
infect 150,000, causing 36,000 fatalities.
Ricin is a stable toxin easily made from the mash that remains after processing Castor
beans for oil. Castor beans are grown agriculturally worldwide and the plants grow wildly in arid
parts of the United States. Castor beans are slightly larger than pinto beans and have been
described as looking like blood-engorged ticks. The beans are not normally used as food.
Poisoning can occur following
inhalation, ingestion, or injection
of ricin toxin from castor beans.
Deadly in less than milligram amounts
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Moderately toxic by inhalation
Relatively not toxic orally
Somewhat difficult to formulate as powder
Quite stable
Dose-dependant morbidity
Castor beans widely available and popular
Weaponization attempted by US, USSR and Iraq
No Known Treatment Available – Supportive Care only
Smallpox (Variola major)
• More historical deaths than plague and all
wars combined
• In some ancient cultures, naming infants
forbidden prior to smallpox survival
• 18th century, smallpox killed every 10th
child born in Sweden and France, every
7th child in Russia
• 1949 - Last U.S. case
• 1977 - Last natural case
• Highly contagious
(not
‘extremely’)
•
•
•
•
•
•
Quite stable
ca. 30% mortality
Virus not widely available
Weaponized by the USSR
Susceptible population
No animal reservoir
What About Engineered Pathogens
“My most successful research was the finding that a
bacteria called Legionella could be modified in such a way
that it could induce severe nervous system disease. And
the symptoms of nervous disorders [similar to those of
multiple sclerosis] would appear several days after the
bacterial disease was completely "cured." So there would
be no bacterial agent, but symptoms -- new and unusual
symptoms -- would appear several days later”.
NOVA interview with
former Soviet biowarrior
Sergei Popov
The Biological Threat has Evolved
Cold
War
Gulf War
Dissolution of USSR
Tactical use on
battlefield
….and strategic use
against mainland U.S.
Today… and Tomorrow??
“Terrorist” use against
military, population
centers, and
economic/agricultural
infrastructure
Geopolitical “Asymmetry has changed the face of the game. The
U.S. has few or no “near-peers” for conventional forces
Courtesy David Franz
Diseases often mentioned in the context of Biological Warfare
Human Diseases
Animal Diseases
Zoonoses
• Smallpox
• Anthrax
• Melioidosis
• Cholera
• Brucellosis
• Glanders
• Shigellosis
• Coccioidomycosis • Plague
• VEE/EEE/WEE
• Psittacosis
• ** Foot &
Mouth
• Marburg/Ebola
• Q fever
• Fowl plague
• Histoplasmosis
• Tularemia
• Newcastle
• Rift Valley fever
• Lassa fever
• Rinderpest
Toxins
• Wheat Stem Rust
• Botulism
• SEB
• African Swine
Fever
Plant Diseases
• Ricin
• Rice Blast
• Pathogenic Plant Fungi
• Karnal Bunt
Courtesy David Franz
“CDC List”
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist.asp
Category A
Category B
Category C
• Anthrax
• Brucellosis
• Emerging diseases
• Plague
• Epsilon Toxin (C. Perfringens)
• Nipah
• Smallpox
• Food and water safety threats
• Hantavirus
• Tularemia
• Viral Hemorrhagic
Fevers
• Marburg
•
Salmonella, E. coli O157:H7, Shigella, Vibrio,
Cryptosporidium
• Yellow Fever
• Glanders
• Drug resist TB
• Meliodosis
• etc
• Ebola
• Psittacosis
• Lassa
• Q Fever
• Machupo
• Ricin
• SEB
Categorizations based on
various factors that affect
potential as weapons
• Typhus
• Viral encephalitities (VEE/EEE/WEE)
High Priority
Lower Priority
“OIE List A” Animal Diseases
Transmissible diseases with potential for serious and rapid
spread that are of serious
socio-economic or public
health consequence and major importance in international
trade of animals and animal products.
• Foot and Mouth Disease
• African Horse Sickness
• Rinderpest
• Exotic Newcastles
• Pest des petis ruminants
• Avian Influenza (HPIA)
• Hog Cholera
• Sheep and Goat Pox
• African Swine Fever
• Lumpy Skin Disease
• Swine Vesicular Disease
• Rift Valley Fever
• Vesicular Exanthema
• Vesicular Stomatitis
“Category A” agents
• Pose a significant
security because:
risk to national
• easily transmitted from person to person
• high mortality
• require special efforts to ensure preparedness
80% of “Category A”
agents are zoonotic
The Risk is Agent,
Target, and Delivery
Dependent
Prevention
The Silent Enemy
The longer a BW
attack goes
undetected or
unrecognized, the
more serious it
becomes.
BW Attack
Incubation Period
Clinical Signs
Impact
Mass Casualties
Early detection
and effective
intervention is
critical
Emerging or Intentional Disease Event
Dick and Jane from Kansas City
just returned from travel in the
UK and introduced Foot and
Mouth Disease into the massive
food animal economy of the
United States.
Was this an innocent mistake?
Or were they Terrorists intent on damaging
the U.S?
Why Agricultural Targets ??
Its not about
killing cows!!
An economic assault on our national
security and infrastructure
The Great Engine of Our Prosperity
…Our ability to produce safe,
plentiful, and inexpensive food
creates the discretionary spending
that drives the American standard
of living….
Dr. Jon Wefald
President KSU
Homeland Security
Presidential Directive #9
30 Jan 04
…..a successful attack on the United States
agriculture and food system could have
catastrophic health and economic effects.
• The U.S. will protect the agriculture and food
attack, major disasters, and other emergencies by:
system from terrorist
• Identifying and prioritizing sector-critical infrastructure and key resources
for establishing protection requirements
• Developing awareness and early warning capabilities to recognize threats
• Mitigating vulnerabilities at critical production and processing nodes
• Enhancing screening procedures for domestic and imported products
• Enhancing response and recovery procedures
NRC Report to the USDA on
Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture,
20 Sept 2002
"Biological agents that could be used to harm
crops or livestock are widely available and
pose a major threat to U.S. agriculture."
Harley Moon, co-author
Both primary authors of the report said a
biological attack on U.S. agriculture was a
matter of “when
- not if.”
Agroterrorism Threats / Agents?
Foot and Mouth
Disease (FMD)
Mad Cow Disease
(BSE)
Highly contagious virus (days)
Slow-acting prion (years)
Aerosol transmission & fomites
Not zoonotic
Infected tissues in food
Zoonotic (vCJD)
Widely available
Rare – hard to find
Cause epidemic
Isolated cases or clusters
Mass depopulations
Limited depopulations
Significant economic impact
Significant economic impact
Require no delivery system
Require thoughtful delivery
#1 Agroterrorism threat
Improbable terrorism threat
Regional concentration magnifies
vulnerabilities and potential consequences.
Dairy
Beef
Swine
Poultry
Corn
Wheat
http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/census97/atlas97/
Potential Impacts of Foreign Animal Disease on Industry
• Productivity losses
• Decreases in market prices
Direct Impacts
• Value of animals destroyed
• Vaccination costs
• Carcass disposal costs
• Cleanup and disinfection
costs
• Profit losses
Council for Agricultural Science and Technology,
Number 28, Feb 2005
Potential Impacts of Foreign Animal Disease on Industry
• Loss of exports and foreign demand
• Loss of domestic sales / demand
• Loss of competitive position
domestic/export markets
Indirect Impacts
• Costs to rebuild production capabilities
• Decreased demand for services
(processing / marketing / etc.
• Emotional / psychological trauma
Council for Agricultural Science and Technology,
Number 28, Feb 2005
“Prior to September 11, 2001, all known
victims of criminal use of biological agents in
the U.S. were exposed by the oral route - with
food as the vehicle”
David Huxsoll, DVM, Ph.D.
KVMA, Jan 02
In the 1980’s, the Rajneeshee cult
contaminated salad bars with
Salmonella typhimurium in an effort to
influence a local election in Oregon
• 751 known cases of GI disease
• a more virulent strain (S. typhi
could have caused many deaths
Informant cracked the case!!
"If that hideousness (FMD)
came here, it wouldn't be any
more hideous for the animals
— they are all bound for a
ghastly death anyway. But it
would wake up consumers. I
openly hope that it
comes here. It will bring
Ingrid Newkirk, PETA
President and Co-founder
economic harm only for those
who profit from giving people
heart attacks and giving
animals a concentration camplike existence. It would be
good for animals, good for
human health and good
for the environment.“
ABCnews.com 4/2/2001
“If vivisectors were routinely being
killed, I think it would give other
vivisectors pause in what they were
doing in their lives… Call it political
assassination or what have you…”
“I don't think you'd have to kill too
many [researchers]. I think for five lives,
10 lives, 15 human lives, we could save a
million, 2 million, 10 million non-human
lives.”
Jerry Vlasak, MD, Physicians Committee for
Responsible Medicine (PCRM) spokesman at an
animal rights convention
The Observer, July 25, 2004 (UK)
“Would I advocate taking 5 guilty
vivisector’s lives to save 100’s of
millions of innocent animal lives? Yes
I would.”
Development and testing of
biodefense and emerging disease
countermeasures rely heavily on
animal-based research
Texas Tech professor found not guilty of
smuggling plague samples, but guilty of
fraud and improper shipping John Dudley Miller
Physician
Respected researcher
Family man
Convicted felon
Terrorist?
Scapegoat?
• Lost his job and his medical license.
60 FBI agents
on campus
• 24 months in prison.
• Fined $15K & $38K restitution.
Oh waiter, there seems to be a
rock (python) in my soup!
At least 11,600 tons of illegal bush meat, including monkey, rat, bat,
gorilla, camel and elephant, were smuggled into Britain during 2003, exposing
cattle to a range of infectious diseases, including foot and mouth. The extent of
the illegal trade in meat from Africa, Asia and the Middle East is revealed in an
internal government report (Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs UK),
which says that the problem is far worse than had been thought. Almost all of
the meat, which is bound for street markets and ethnic restaurants, is hidden
in passengers' suitcases and goes undetected by airport
security. The food includes snake and antelope meat, frogs' legs, snails, and
cows‘ nostrils, as well as meat from endangered species such as chimpanzees,
antelopes and elephants.
The Telegraph
5 Sept 04
How are we going to counter these new and ominous threats to our
national security, our people, or our economic infrastructure
We must Improve and Refine Traditional Countermeasures to potential emerging
Public Health Threats
• Intelligence / Surveillance / Catch the Bad Guys!!
• Vaccines, Prophylaxis, Treatments
• Disease Surveillance
• Genetic enhancement of resistance
• Rapid diagnostic capabilities
• Rapid - Incident Response
• Consequence Management
• Enhance Surge Capacity
• Training
• Increase Bio-security Profile
Virtually all are dependent upon
$$, facilities and personnel
• Innate Immunity Ramp-up
Government
Federal
State
Local
Basic and
Applied R&D
Industry
Academia
A coordinated and collaborative
partnership is critical
Proactive Measures
• Vaccines
• Prophylaxis
• Intelligence
• Coordination / Training
• Treatments
• Risk Assessment
• Biosecurity
•Enhanced resistance
• Surveilance
• Response & Preparation
• Regulatory Safeguards
before
Biological Threat
Countermeasures
Big $$
Attack
after
• Incident
Management
• Containment
• Consequence
Management
• Disposal
• Decontamination
• Indemification
Reactive Measures
Bigger
$$
The overall risk of some kind of
bioterrorist event in the U.S. in
the future is probably high
However…..
Individual Risk is Extremely Low
“When you hear
hoof beats, don’t
look for Zebras”
We need to at least be
thinking about the
“zebras” when it
comes to surveillance,
diagnostics, and
response
Potential Consequences of Agroterrorism are High.
• Agriculture generates 17%
of U.S. GDP & 13% of U.S. jobs
• Livestock and cropping systems are interdependent - e.g., an
attack on either beef or corn affects the other
• Failures would cause widespread international disruption
Foot and mouth disease in the UK cost an estimated
$5B to agriculture alone. Tourism losses wre an
additional $7.2B - $8.5B.
http://www.defra.gov.uk
http://www.whale.to/m/fmd70.html
Doesn’t have to be
intentional to be serious!
• West Nile
• Nipah Disease
• Prion Diseases
• Avian Influenza
• Exotic Newcastles
• SARS
• Marburg / Ebola
• Etc, etc, etc…
The Good News
• Heightened Awareness
• Accelerated / Applied Research
•
New Facilities
•
Rapid Diagnostics
•
First Response capabilities
•
Countermeasures (vaccines, treatments, containment strategies)
• Pre-positioned materials/teams (vaccines, treatments, PPE)
• Better Planning, Coordination, Communication and Training
• Improved Intelligence, Security and Surveillance
• Reinvigorating Public Health Infrastructure
• Government Reorganization (Homeland Defense Dept)
The Bad News
“After successful prevention, the next line of
defense is the development of new vaccines
and antidotes for bioterror”
The Defense Science Board estimates that we have
only a few of the dozens of antidotes or vaccines
needed to counter the top bioterror threats”
Christian Science Monitor
11 Feb 2003
Agriculture Seduced by our Successes
• The U.S. has been highly successful in preventing the natural or accidental
introduction of many dangerous agricultural diseases for generations
• Foot and Mouth Disease
• Rinderpest
• African Swine Fever
• Containment and response strategies for those diseases that do occasionally
occur have been effective - but costly
• Avian Influenza
• Exotic Newcastle disease
• VEE
• Classical Swine Fever (Hog Cholera)
Historical accomplishments can promote complacency and a
sense of invulnerability in the face of new potential threats
Cautious Optimism??
The dual threat of emerging and intentionally inflicted disease is frightening, but
there is “cause for some cautious optimism.” Scientists have an “ever-
growing toolbox of sophisticated technologies and
strategies at their disposal that will help detect, prevent,
treat, and respond to new and old infectious agents as they
emerge, whether by an act of nature or by deliberate design.”
“… powerful
new tools, including ones that
expose the genetic signature of microbes, are
being
used to detect and identify known and novel pathogens and to
develop new drugs and vaccines.”
Anthony Faucci MD, NIAID/NIH
Forensics &
Countermeasures
Emerging Infectious Diseases/
A Clear and Present Danger to
Humanity,
JAMA. 2004;292:1887-1888.
"For the life of me, I cannot understand why
the terrorists have not attacked our food
supply, because it is so easy to do”
Resignation comments - Tommy Thompson,
Secretary of Health and Human Services
December 3, 2004
The Daunting Challenges
• Endemic Infectious Disease
• Emerging Infectious Disease
• Exotic / Foreign Disease
• Prion Disease
• Food Safety
Human
Animal
Plant