Transcript Monopoly
MONOPOLY
MBA NCCU
Managerial Economics
Jack Wu
CASE: ATORVASTATIN(降膽固醇藥)BY
PFIZER
Pfizer markets atorvastatin under the brand
name “Lipitor”.
In 2010, Lipitor was Pfizer’s best-selling drug.
Even while protected by patent, Lipitor faced
competition from other statins- particularly
simvastatin.
The US patent on simvastatin, owned by Merck,
expired in 2006, and Merck cut the price of Zocor,
its branded simvastatin.
Pfizer’s US patent on atorvastatin expired in
June 2011.
GENERIC DRUG
In 2003, Ranbaxy Lab (Indian generic drug manufacturer)
filed for a generic version of atorvastatin.
To encourage the manufacture of generic drugs, the H-W
Act provides six months of exclusivity to the first generic
manufacturer approved by the FDA. The six-month period
of generic exclusivity begins immediately after the expiry of
the patent of the original drug.
Typically, the exclusive generic manufacturer would price
its drug at 70-80% of the price of the original patented
drug.
Once the generic exclusivity expires and open competition
ensues, the price may fall to 5% of the price of the patented
drug.
MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS QUESTIONS
Pfizer must decide how to manage the
competition.
How much should it spend on advertising?
At what scale should Pfizer produce the branded
drug?
How would generic production of atorvastatin
affect the market for the ingredients in the
production of the drug?
MARKET
Pure
(Perfect) competition – least freedom in
pricing
Monopolistic competition
Medical clinic
Oligopoly
Hospital
anti-virus software, microcomputer operating
system
Monopoly
– single supplier of good or a
service with no close substitute: most freedom
in pricing
MARKET POWER
Definition: ability to influence price
monopoly -- single supplier of good or a service
with no close substitute
oligopoly -- few suppliers
monopsony -- single buyer
oligopsony – few buyers
SOURCES OF MARKET POWER
unique resources
human
natural
intellectual property
patent
Copyright
economies of scale / scope
product differentiation
government regulation
MONOPOLY: MARGINAL REVENUE AND
PRICE
250
infra-marginal
units
150
130
demand (marginal benefit)
70
marginal revenue
50
0.4
-50
0.8
1.2
1.4
1.6
Quantity (Million units a year)
2
REVENUE, COST, AND PROFIT
Price
($)
200
190
180
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
Sales
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
Total
Revenue
($)
0
38
72
102
128
150
168
182
192
198
200
198
Marginal
Revenue
($)
190
170
150
130
110
90
70
50
30
10
-10
Total
Cost ($)
50
52
56
62
70
80
92
106
122
140
160
182
Marginal
Cost
($)
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
Profit
($)
-50
-40
16
40
58
70
76
76
70
58
40
16
MONOPOLY: PROFIT MAXIMUM, I
Operate at scale where
marginal revenue = marginal cost
Justification:
If marginal revenue > marginal cost, sell more and increase
profit.
If marginal revenue < marginal cost, sell less and increase
profit.
OPERATING SCALE:
PROFIT MAXIMUM
MONOPOLY: PROFIT MAXIMUM, III
contribution margin = total revenue less variable
cost
profit-maximizing scale: selling additional unit
does not change the contribution margin
DEMAND CHANGE
Find new scale where marginal revenue = marginal
cost
should change price
new scale and price depend on both new demand
and costs
COST CHANGE
Find new scale where
marginal revenue = marginal cost
change in MC --> should change price (but less
than change in MC)
change in fixed cost --> should not change price or
scale
3G LICENSING
“There’s good and bad in auctioning off spectrum …
it may raise costs for telecoms providers” Anthony
Wong, Director-General, OFTA, Hong Kong
•
How does one-time license fee affect price and scale of
operations?
ADVERTISING
benefit of advertising -- increment in contribution
margin
advertising elasticity = % increase in demand
from 1% increase in advertising
ADVERTISING: PROFIT MAXIMUM
Profit-maximizing advertising/sales = incremental
margin x advertising elasticity
•
incremental margin = (price - MC)
PROZAC: ADVERTISING
Competition from generics would
reduce incremental margin
raise advertising elasticity
COKE VS PEPSI, NOV. 1999
Coke
raised prices by 7%
increased advertising and other marketing
Pepsi
raised price by 6.9%
what about advertising?
ANSWER
Pepsi should increase advertising expenditure for
two reasons:
price increase --> increase in incremental
margin;
Pepsi’s increase in advertising will attract some
marginal consumers -- those who are brandswitchers, relatively less loyal to Pepsi/Coke; so
Coke’s demand will be more sensitive to
advertising (higher advertising elasticity)
DOLLAR GENERAL
“Our customer lives within three to five miles of
the store, knows we’re there”
cut advertising from 3.8% to 0.2% of revenue
sales dropped but profit rose
ADVERTISING
Industry/Company Curr.
Sales
Advertg
Ratio
IBM
USD
89,131
1,406
1.6%
Anheuser Busch
USD
15,036
850
5.7%
Fosters
AUD
3,972
380
9.6%
Microsoft
USD
32,187
1,060
3.3%
General Mills
USD
11,244
477.0
4.2%
Kellogg
USD
10,177
858.0
8.4%
SAP
EUR
7,025
162
2.3%
Unilever
EUR
39,672
4,999
12.6%
Units: millions
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The profit maximizing R&D/sales ratio is the
incremental margin percentage x the R&D
elasticity of demand
R&D/sales should be raised if price is higher,
marginal cost is lower, or if the R&D elasticity is
higher
R&D SALES RATIOS (2005)
Company Units
Sales Rev R&D exp
R&D/sales
(million)
USD
11,244
168
1.5%
USD
10,177
181
1.8%
Unilever
EUR
39,672
953
2.4%
IBM
USD
91,134
5,842
6.4%
Microsoft
USD
39,788
6,184
15.5%
SAP
EUR
8,512
1,089
12.8%
General
Mills
Kellogg
MARKET STRUCTURE, I
(a) Perfect
Competition
(b) Monopoly
demand
30
Price (Cents per unit)
Price (Cents per unit)
demand
supply
0
300
Quantity (Million units a year)
60
marginal
cost
30
marginal revenue
0
150
Quantity (Million units a year)
MARKET STRUCTURE, II
Relative to competitive market, monopoly
sets higher price
produces less
earns higher profit
COMPETITIVENESS
entry and exit barriers
perfectly contestable market -- sellers can enter
and exit at no cost
Lerner Index (incremental margin percentage) -measures the degree of actual and potential
competition
MONOPSONY
buyer with market power restricts purchases to
depress price
trades off
marginal expenditure
marginal benefit
MONOPSONY SCALE
marginal expenditure
400
supply
350
273
0
marginal benefit
6
8
Quantity (Thousand tons a year)