Transcript The Migration Imperative - Department of Social Policy and

COMPAS Seminar Series Trinity Term 2013
Thursday 23 May 2013
The Migration Imperative: rational
economics, public benefit, private passion?
David Coleman, University of Oxford
[email protected]
http://www.spi.ox.ac.uk/oxpop
The Migration Imperative
‘(immigration is)…a vital part of our economic strategy’
‘Migration is essential for the UK economy’
‘Our migrant communities are a fundamental part of who we are and Britain is a
far richer and stronger society because of them. whether it’s great scientists,
doctors, medical practitioners, artists, musicians, sports stars or business’
‘This is our island story: open, diverse and welcoming, and I am immensely proud
of it.’
‘But while I’ve always believed in the benefits of migration and immigration……’
David Cameron’s speech on immigration, University Campus Suffolk, Ipswich 25 March 2013 .
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/david-camerons-immigration-speech
‘We are country of migrants’
Mrs Barbara Roche MP , 2000, and numerous other politicians
‘There are half a million vacancies in our job market, and our strong and growing
economy needs migration to fill these vacancies’
‘the movement of people and labour into and out of the UK is, and always has
been, absolutely essential to our economy.’
Tony Blair’s speech to the CBI 27 April 2004
Strongly supported by ‘The Economist’, ‘The Financial Times’ and other periodicals.
Basic proposition of this talk
Some migration normal, desirable in open society.
Specific skills migration clearly advantageous, sometimes
essential.
But overall, net economic benefits net marginal, possibly
negative; asymmetrical – some costs tend to be ignored.
In UK demographic benefits moderate, demographic effects
substantial.
Liberal immigration policy not compatible with welfare state.
Ethnic consequences radical, permanent.
Exacerbates social divisions, popular discontent and
unhappiness.
If so, why is support for it, and critiques of its critics, so
strong?
Background to the migration imperative –
some possibilities
Elite / popular divide in opinion and sentiment. Rational
response to elite advantages: economic, personal services,
professional. But problems for others.
Desire to occupy moral high ground – a charitable
universalism. Support for migration = internationalism
personified.
ideals of world citizenship, inclusiveness, open mindedness, Christian charity
for poor and weak. Support from churches.
Keeping at arm’s length the repulsive critics of migration: lower
class, narrow minded, xenophobic, closet (and non-closet) racists, swivel-eyed fruitcakes and loons
etc. OR sinister Powellite eugenists etc (works on the other side of the spectrum, too)
Self-hatred - British society boring, stuffy, inward-looking, obsolete, needs
changing; active support for diversity / multiculturalism.
The population connection – Malthus must be proved wrong.
Political self-interest – equivalent of 30 Parly. constituencies of potential
voters imported since 2001. Mr Teather’s comments.
Opinions on the effect of immigration upon the UK economy, respondents
of different educational level. Source: BSAS 2011
Opinions on effect of immigration on economy by educational level. Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 2011.
http://www.britsocat.com/Body.aspx?AddMap=MiEcono&control=BritsocatMarginals&AddSeries=12&JumpCrossMarginals=yes
35%
(0) 0 - Extremely bad for economy
percdnt agreeing with stated effect
30%
25%
(5) 5 - Neither
(7) 7
(10) 10 - Extremely good for economy
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Degree
Higher education A-level or equivalent O-level/GCSE A-C
below degree or prof.
or equivalent
qual.
CSE/GCSE D-G or
equivalent
No qualifications
Some surprising broad class similarities?
YouGov opinion polls 25-26th March
http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/3c9vhdqg0k/YG-Archiveimmigration-260313.pdf
Do you support or oppose the following policies?
Doing more to charge foreign governments for the cost of treating overseas
patients
ABC1 Support:
80% Oppose:
8%
CDE Support:
77% Oppose:
9%
Not allowing people to join the council house waiting list until they have
lived in Britain for 2 years
ABC1 Support:
79% Oppose:
12%
CDE Support:
83% Oppose:
8%
Fining landlords who rent homes to illegal immigrants
ABC1 Support:
80% Oppose:
9%
CDE
82% Oppose:
8%
Support:
David Cameron has pledged to reduce net immigration to Britain from the
hundreds of thousands to the tens of thousands. Do you support or oppose
this aim?
ABC1 Support
78% Oppose
10%
Some paradoxes / oddities?
Migration an important issue for social liberals.
But economic growth not usually a social liberal top
priority, despite being the main argument.
Common cause between business and asylum /
migration pressure groups and charities.
Little left opposition to inflow of low-wage labour –
traditionally opposed by unions (controlling
inflation = wage restraint).
But low-wage migration a source of inequality.
No apparent contradiction between ‘migration
imperative’ and environmental concern.
Need to re-write history – ‘nation of immigrants’ etc.
The economic case for migration
Moderates, solves population ageing, decline.
Increases GDP.
Curbs inflation.
Fills vacancies; both low-wage and highly skilled – helps us
to ‘win the world race’.
Increases skilled labour and productivity.
Supplies essential low-wage labour –provides essential work
that natives refuse to do.
Britain needs more diversity.
Counter-arguments
Demographic arguments weak; ‘Ponzi’ logic.
Costs of population growth, with no discernible advantage.
(No relation in Western world between GDP, population size/growth, and welfare, income, happiness.)
Vacancies relatively constant, in part created by migration.
Fiscal calculations yield minor, sometimes negative results.
Uncosted problems of health, crime, security, integration.
Employment effects asymmetrical: benefits for elite,
competition for low-skilled and poor.
Open doors incompatible with welfare state.
Low immigrant workforce participation, importation of
poverty. No ‘cheap’ labour in a welfare state.
Social divisions in culturally, religiously separated societies.
European comparisons – effect of projected migration levels on projected
population size, 2010 compared with 2060. Western and Southern Europe.
Source: Eurostat.
Effect of migration on projected population growth 2010-2060, percent, selected Western and Southern
European countries, by descending order of growth without migration.
Source: data from Eurostat 2008 convergence scenario
40
35.6
30
27.3
24.1
20
14.7
10
13.7
8.9
7.7
7.2
2.8
3.0
0
France
Norway
UK
-5.2
-10
-20
-30
-40
Netherlands
percent population change to 2060 with
migration
percent population change to 2060
without migration
Belgium
Spain
Italy
Germany
-5.3
-18.3
-18.8
-25.3
-28.9
UK population size required to maintain given PSRs by immigration, 2000
- 2100 (millions)
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
PSR 3.0
PSR 3.5
PSR 4.22
2100
2080
2060
2050
2030
2025
2020
2010
2000
0
All the world must go to live in Korea
7000
6000
4000
3000
2000
1000
UN Medium variant population
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
0
1995
millions
5000
Population from PSR replacement migration
Demographic consequences to the UK of
projected levels of migration, 2011 - 2061
UK population 2011 - 2061. 2010-based Principal projection and high and low migration variants
90
OXPOP TFR=1.95, net migration = 240k
ONS High Migration 260k
ONS Principal Projection, TFR = 1.84, migration = 200k
85
ONS Low migration 140k
ONS natural change only
80
75
70
65
60
2011
2016
2021
2026
2031
2036
2041
2046
2051
2056
2061
Proving Malthus wrong – you can always squeeze in
an extra one (but no more ‘oysters and champagne’).
Age-structure at different levels of net migration, UK 2011 2086, with constant TFR = 1.84 and falling mortality. Source:
ONS and OXPOP
4.5
183 thousand
90 thousand
Aged Potential Support Ratio
4.0
40 thousand
25 thousand
zero migration
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
2086
2081
2076
2071
2066
2061
2056
2051
2046
2041
2036
2031
2026
2021
2016
2011
Retirement age and the PSR, UK 2011 - 2086
6.0
Aged Potential Support Ratio
5.5
APSR 20-75 (graduated)
5.0
APSR 20-69
4.5
APSR 15-64
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
2086
2081
2076
2071
2066
2061
2056
2051
2046
2041
2036
2031
2026
2021
2016
2011
pr
A Jun
ug 2
0
D Oct 01
ec 2
-F 0
A eb 01
pr 2
- 0
A Jun 02
ug 2
0
D Oct 02
ec 2
-F 0
A eb 02
pr 2
- 0
A Jun 03
ug 2
0
D Oct 03
ec 2
-F 0
A eb 03
pr 2
- 0
A Jun 04
ug 2
0
D Oct 04
ec 2
-F 0
A eb 04
pr 2
- 0
A Jun 05
ug 2
0
D Oct 05
ec 2
-F 0
A eb 05
pr 2
- 0
A Jun 06
ug 2
0
D Oct 06
ec 2
-F 0
A eb 06
pr 2
- 0
A Jun 07
ug 2
0
D Oct 07
ec 2
-F 00
A eb 2 7
pr
0
A -Jun 08
ug 2
0
D Oct 08
ec 2
-F 0
A eb 08
pr 2
- 0
A Jun 09
ug 2
0
D Oct 09
ec 2
-F 0
A eb 09
pr 2
- 0
A Jun 10
ug 2
0
D Oct 10
ec 2
-F 0
A eb 10
pr 2
- 0
A Jun 11
ug 2
0
D Oct 11
ec 2
-F 0
A eb 11
pr 2
- 0
A Jun 12
ug 2
0
D Oct 12
ec 2
-F 01
eb 2
20
13
A
job vacancies (1000s)
Employment vacancies UK 2001 – 2013.
800
Source: ONS
Labour Market Statistics May 2013.
UK employment vacancies 2001-2013 (1000s). Source: ONS. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/lms/labour-marketstatistics/may-2013/dataset--claimant-count-and-vacancies.html
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
More strategic considerations
Immigration driven by broad processes, including national deficiencies in
education, training, welfare.
Risks economic distortion and dependency: NHS, low-productivity
enterprises. ‘migration junkie’ employers and some universities.
Distracts attention from marginalised domestic labour reserves, need to
reform education and welfare. (15% NEET in 16-24 age-group 2012 Q4,
9 million economically inactive aged 16-64 Q1 2013).
Western countries cannot compete in low skill, low productivity
enterprises. Risk of ‘new mercantilism’ in international pursuit of skills?
Need to maximise human capital for a high income, high productivity,
high skill, more equal society. (Migration can help here).
Labour needs to be scarce, educated, highly paid.
Dull, repetitious or unattractive work must be replaced or well rewarded.
Current supply of migrants arises from asymmetries in demographic
transition and economic development – which all policy aims to eliminate.
Beyond next (?) 50 years this asymmetrical migration will dry up.
NEET percentage of 16-18 year olds only, England 1984 –
2012 – remains high. Source: Dept of Education NEET Statistics Q4 2012
Dependency in graduate higher education?
HESA SFR 183
HIGHER EDUCATION STUDENT ENROLMENTS AND QUALIFICATIONS OBTAINED AT HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR THE ACADEMIC YEAR 2011/12
http://www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2667&Itemid=161
Oxford University – short-term trends in domicile of graduate
research students
The other end of the scale - fruit picking etc.
A good example of path dependency?
MAC Migrant Seasonal Workers Report 14 May 2013.
Ukrainians possibly needed to replace Bulgarian and Romanian fruit
pickers may depart for better jobs in 2014. If not replaced, threat of
15% rise in prices, imports increase, domestic fruit-growers fail.
British workers unlikely to fill the void : “cannot or will not work at
the intensity required” and “have little incentive to come off social
security benefits”.
“The Government may wish to consider a replacement scheme that
targets workers from non-EU countries. Ukraine is the obvious one.”
Some possibilities for (partly) replacing manual labour.
USA – the world’s third-biggest grape producer.
64% produced for wine. Of that , 75% mechanically picked by 1995
5 hand harvesters:
1.25 acres / day. Cost $35-$50 per ton.
1 mechanical ; crew of 5: 10- 20 acres / day. Cost $ 15-$25 per ton.
Fruit-picking machinery
The next step - caring robots
Cody – Georgia Tech – bathes patients http://www.coe.gatech.edu/content/robotic-cody-learns-bathe
HERB fetches, carries, cleans http://www.ri.cmu.edu/pub_files/2010/1/HERB09.pdf
Hector ‘assistive companion’ http://www.companionable.net/
Rewriting history – ‘a nation of immigrants’?
Yes – in the very long run!
Emigration predominant from 16th – later 20th century.
Most ‘White British’ genetic ancestry appears to be ancient.
Uncertain magnitude and effects of Saxon invasions 5th – 6th
centuries, Danes 8th – 10th. Former possibly up to 50%.
Relatively small contributions from Romans, Normans and
others.
Later arrivals episodic, much more impact on culture and
economy than on population.
But may become ‘nation of immigrants’ in future.
Percent of population of England and Wales born
outside UK, 1841 – 2011.
England and Wales 1841 - 2011, percent born outside UK. Source: Census 1841 - 2011
(n.b. there was no census in 1941).
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
2011
2001
1991
1981
1971
1961
1951
1941
1931
1921
1911
1901
1891
1881
1871
1861
1851
1841
0
A summary of genetic variation in Europe: first principal component
Barbujani G., Bertorelle G. PNAS 2001;98:22-25
©2001 by The National Academy of Sciences
Genetic relics of ancient migration to Europe. A map created
by the principal components of genetic data.
Source: Novembre et al, 2008 Nature 456, 7218
More correlations between genetic and geographical
structure.
Figure?1 SNP-Based PCA of 2,457 European Individuals from 23 Subpopulations (A) Kernel density plot of the first two dimensions
of a SNP-based PCA using those 309,790 SNPs from the GeneChip Human Mapping 500K Array Set (Affymetrix) that passed
quality con...
Oscar Lao , Timothy T. Lu , Michael Nothnagel , Olaf Junge , Sandra Freitag-Wolf , Amke Caliebe , Miroslava Balas...
Correlation between Genetic and Geographic Structure in Europe
Current Biology Volume 18, Issue 16 2008 1241 - 1248
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2008.07.049
Ethnic change
Continued migration from one population, into
another with sub-replacement fertility, must
eventually replace one with the other.
If incoming populations have higher fertility, the
process will be accelerated.
Migration, not differential fertility, is usually the
dominant factor.
Estimates of foreign origin and immigrant
population, selected European countries.
Sources: national statistical offices
Numbers of foreign citizens, and immigrants, enumerated
in selected European countries, around 2009
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
N'lands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
UK
2011
2007
2011
2010
2008
2009
2011
2007
2007
2009
2010
‘Foreign ‘Foreign
Population Origin’
Origin’
Millions (millions) (percent)
8.4
n.a.
n.a
10.6
n.a
n.a
5.6
0.57
10.2
5.4
n.a
n.a
64.0
n.a
n.a
81.9
16.04
19.6
16.7
3.43
20.6
10.6
n.a
n.a
44.9
n.a
n.a
8.0
1.73
21.7
61.4
10.24
16.7
Foreign
ImmigrantsImmigrants citizens as
as percent of
percent of
(millions) total pop. immigrants
1.00
11.9
92.4
1.38
13.0
70.4
0.43
7.7
80.7
0.25
4.6
67.7
5.34
8.4
69.5
10.60
12.9
67.3
1.78
10.7
42.7
0.65
6.1
68.9
6.00
13.4
72.4
1.34
16.7
45.1
7.14
11.6
62.5
A projection of ethnic transformation in the UK 2006 – 2056. TFR = 1.84,
net immigration = 180,000 / year. Source: Coleman 2010.
Very long-term ethnic change in the UK in relation to level of
net immigration (+180k, +81k, ‘balanced’ and natural change).
Coleman 2010 Figure 6.
Source:
UK 2006 – 2061. Projected changes of population size,
Potential Support Ratio (PSR) and percent ‘White British’ on
different migration assumptions.
Net
population
annual
(millions)
migration
2006
from 2006
60.6
(1000s)
2061
zero
62.6
balanced
66.0
81
76.0
180
79.2
% white
PSR
British
2006
2006
4.14
86.9
2061
1.84
2.14
2.15
2.28
2061
78.0
63.3
58.2
53.0
Comparison of results of European
‘foreign-origin’ projections
Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000-2050,
selected countries, as percent of total population.
35
30
Germany medium variant
USA medium variant (excludes black population)
Netherlands base scenario
Denmark 2002- based medium variant
Sweden foreign background 2004 based
Austria 'Compensating' scenario, no naturalisation.
percent
25
20
15
10
5
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
Net migration can go down as well as up.
Germany 1954 – 2011.
Migration to Germany 1954 - 2011, by citizenship.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden. Up to 1990 German Federal Republic only.
+ 800 000
Net migration
Germans including aussiedler
Foreigners
Germans without aussiedler net flow
+ 700 000
+ 600 000
+ 500 000
+ 400 000
+ 300 000
+ 200 000
+ 100 000
- 100 000
- 200 000
2010
2008
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
1964
1962
1960
1958
1956 2)
1954 2)
- 300 000
Outcome
Premise wrong? – not that much support for migration?
Argument wrong? – high levels of migration are essential for
the national life?
But if large-scale migration not essential, has downsides, and
must eventually end, how to explain its support?
Inevitable population ageing forces societies to adapt and
change. Migration may be one, small, way of coping with it.
Demand for numerically unbalanced migration may arise
substantially from domestic failures in welfare, education.
Large populations with reasonable birth rates should be able
to be relatively self-sufficient in skills given wise policies
regarding human capital and workforce policy.
A final word
“In a competitive economy the gains from migration
should largely accrue to migrants themselves, leaving little
over for the recipient community. In theory, the latter will
enjoy an economic surplus. But this is likely to be small.”
“one's assessment of the desirability of sizeable
immigration is a matter more of values than of economics.
It is not a choice between wealth and poverty, but of the
sort of country one desires to inhabit.”
Martin Wolf, chief economic commentator of the Financial Times, 13th April
2004.