Transcript Turkish Accession

Turkish EU Accession.
Short-term Threats vs. Long-term Opportunities
Presented by:
Emil Iliev
Kiril Kostov
Lyubomir Vankov
Background
1987 – Turkey applied for accession to the
EU
 1999 – Turkey became a candidate
country
 2005 – Start of official negotiations for
Turkish entry
 Negotiations expected to take 10-15 years

Europe is far too short-sighted
GDP Per Capita
Lowest GDP
Per Capita
 Mass
immigration
into Europe
 Flood of
labor
markets
 Lower real
wages in
Europe

Demographics



72.6 Million
Almost
equal to
2004
Enlargement
99% Muslim
– will
change
religious
balance
within the
EU from 3%
to 20%
Muslim
Unemployment



10.2%
Unemploym
ent
Highest
after Poland
and Slovakia
Coupled
with large
population –
will flood EU
with poor
labor
Geopolitics



Only 3% of
Turkey is
geographica
lly in Europe
Does not
include
Ankara
Will extend
EU border
to Syria,
Iraq, Iran,
Armenia,
Georgia
YES to Turkish Accession
Turkey Reforms
1999 – National Programme for the Adoption of
the EU Acquis
 Abolition of death penalty
 Expanded freedom of expression
 Curtailment of power of military
 Release of political prisoners
 More freedom for the use and study of Kurdish
 Looking for solution to Cyprus
Turkey is an important ally
NATO member since 1952
 Pro-Western and increasingly democratic
 Full support for the “war on terror”
 Contributed to military and peacekeeping
actions on the Balkans and Afghanistan
 EU should use its leverage to export its
values to Turkey

The EU Needs Turkey
To increase its leverage as a normative
power
 To further its value-driven policies
 To obtain a critical strategic partner

“ to modernize an Islamic country based on the
shared values of Europe would almost be a DDay
for Europe in the war against terror,
[because it] would provide real proof that Islam
and modernity, Islam and the rule of law . . .
[and] this great cultural tradition and human
rights are after all compatible”
Joschka Fischer – German Foreign Minister until 2005
“the accession of Turkey would be proof that
Europe is committed not just in word but in deed
to a Europe of diverse races, cultures, and
religions all bound together by common rules and
a sense of human solidarity and mutual respect.”
Tony Blair – UK Prime Minister
Turkey as a Strategic Partner




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Large Army – 400000 standing troops
Physical Presence in Middle-Eastern and
Caucasus-Caspian Region
Geopolitical Significance to the Balkans, eastern
Mediterranean, Middle East, Russian Region
Turkey Membership – more confident and
expansive EU policy in the region
Turkey will provide capacity, local knowledge and
foreign policy experience in dealing with the
Middle East
Major Growth Market





Rapidly modernizing
economy
7 % growth >
average EU growth
$17.1 billion FDI in
2006
$86 billion exports
Less textile, more
electronic exports
Turkish Foreign Trade
EU
Countries
$87.1
46,3%
53,7%
BILLION
$101.3
BILLION
Total $188.4 BILLION
Other
Countries
Energy Crossroad
Crucial for
EU future
energy
security
 Positioned
near all
major
oil & gas
areas

Solution to
EU demographic Crisis
Young, educated Turkish
labor force
 EU showing future deficit
parallel to aging population
 High future EU demand for
Turkish workers

Other Economic Benefits
Already highly integrated economy shared
Customs Union with EU
 Potential logistics centre in trade between
EU and the Caucasus, Middle Asia and the
Middle East
 High consumption behavior

“Absorption Capacity”
If EU could take 10 new states at a
single time, with overall population of
110 million, than Turkey with its 75
million should NOT be a problem as
continuously stated.
 Nothing about Size or
Relative Wealth in
the Copenhagen Criteria

Thank You
for the
Attention