Transcript Titel - espon

Territorial impacts of globalization on European
Regions (Tiger)
Van Hamme Gilles
IGEAT-ULB
Aalborg
ESPON seminar, 13.06.2012
2/25
The TIGER project
Lead partner : IGEAT-ULB
Partners
Pp2 (UK): School of real estate and planning. University of Reading
Pp3 (France): CNRS (mainly Université de Normandie)
Pp4 (Italy): Dpto Studi Europei e Interculturali, Sapienza Università di
Roma
Pp5 (Sweden): Internationella Handelshögskolan i Jönköping AB
Pp6 (Bulgaria): Institute of Geography BAS
3/25
The scales of globalization
1. Globalization can be defined by unprecedented intensity of flows and
interdepedencies between territories across the world.
But NOT as undirected interconnections of territories across the world
because distance and power relations (core vs periphery) remain
decisive
2. Cities and macro-regions are the scales at which global processes
operate
•
•
Global cities are the places where global firms really operate;
The macro-regions are large areas of intense internal economic
relations.
However, the state remains a major actor and most of all the main
regulatory level at national and international
4/25
I. The macro-regional scale: Europe in the world
5/25
1. The regionalization process : « natural economic regions »
The areas of intense
trade relations (2008)
In Europe, the share of internal
links are very high (ESPON):
- 84% in maritime links
- 86% of air connections;
- 70% of trade;
- 80% of FDI
- 40% of migrations (up to 64%
when neighbourhood is included)
- 32% of cities links within APS
networks
6/25
2. Regionalization vs globalization
•Two simultaneous processes;
•Europe is more and more open but remains a rather closed
economy.
Internal trade as a share of GDP (%)
ASEAN
CIS
EU
GCC
MERCOSUR
NAFTA
Average of all free
trade areas
External trade as a share of GDP (%)
1968
7,7
0,0
11,9
2,9
1,0
2,8
1986
10,3
0,0
27,3
5,9
1,4
5,5
1996
22,3
13,0
30,5
5,7
3,1
10,0
2007
33,5
11,4
42,4
6,0
4,2
11,7
1968
24,4
2,0
8,8
64,7
11,7
4,2
1986
44,6
8,0
14,6
50,6
13,5
9,2
1996
65,9
29,2
14,1
64,4
12,4
11,7
2007
85,8
40,8
20,6
76,2
22,6
14,6
4,4
10,0
14,1
19,7
7,7
15,3
18,8
28,4
7/25
3. Europe as a major yet declining power
1968
1988
1995
2009
29,4
24,2
23,5
21,2
5,3
4,1
4,8
7,7
19,8
19,4
18,1
13,8
Latin America
7,2
4,6
4,4
4,9
China
1,9
4,1
6,3
13,7
Southern Asia
2,3
1,7
1,7
3,2
Japan, Korea, Taïwan
9,0
16,9
17,1
12,1
Western Europe
Central and Eastern Europe
(former USSR included)
Northern America and
Mexico
Share of in
interregional
trade
1. The decline of old core powers
2. The rise of China but no spectacular rise from other
« Bric ».
8/25
 It results in a shrinking geography of influence in the world
9/25
However, Europe keeps a very high position in the international division
of labour
10/25
Europe as a major power
-
26.5% of interregional trade of services, (22% for NAFTA and
4% for China)
- 39% of outwards and 24% of inwards of interregional flows in
FDI (NAFTA is 30% and 34%; China 10% and 1-2%)
- Western Europe concentrates 40% of the headquarters of the
500 biggest world firms, before Northern America and Japan,
with respectively 33 and 15% in 2008
- The most attractive place for human flows
Etc..
11/25
4. Europe’s relations with the rest of the world
12/25
5. Policy implications
Three main facts
1) Functional Europe goes beyond institutional borders but flows
are unbalanced between core and peripheral extra-EU
functional Europe;
2) But territories that matter for Europe are not necessariliy
where Europe’s influence is the highest
3) Europe is increasingly opened but still a rather closed economy.
large developed economies like the EU mainly rely on their own
markets and producers, even in integrated global sectors such
as the automotive industries
13/25
Policy implications
Two major issues:
1. The openess vs protectionist debate
- Despite globalization, Europe is a strong continental and
integrated economy that mainly rely on its own markets
- Openess is not territorially neutral because openness and
vulnerability to global competitive pressures are unequal at
regional level
14/25
Policy implications
2. The neighbourhood policy
- “The Europe 2020 strategy is not only relevant inside the EU, it
can also offer considerable potential to candidate countries and
our neighbourhood and better help anchor their own reform
efforts. Expanding the area where EU rules are applied, will
create new opportunities for both the EU and its neighbours”
-
in its relations with the neighbourhood, the EU focuses on
strategic issues such as energy, security and immigration
-
However, this is not part of a full development strategy for the
neighbourhood though neighbouring countries do receive large
shares of EU development aid
15/25
II. European territories in the global economy
16/25
1. European regions in the global economy
Openess rate of European
regions/nations to global trade (share
of extra-EU trade to GDP) :
 Regions are unequally open to
global economy
 It varies from 0.1% (Corsica) to
31% in Flanders
17/25
European regions in the global economy
• The geography of the relations
of European regions
European regions have
differentiated relations with the
rest of the world (hence different
interests for the different parts of
the world):
- West-European profile (Blue)
- Global profiles (pink; green)
- neighbourhood profile: red and
orange
18/25
European regions in the global economy
Functional and sectoral
specializations of regions and
vulnerability
Different types are distinguished :
- Gateway cities
- low vulnerability area specialized
in medium/high functions
- high vulnerability areas specialized
in low functions;
- « In between » areas
- low participation to the global
economy
19/25
2. European cities in the global economy :
advanced services
•A shift to Asia at global
level
•The good and stable
position of European
cities, beside London and
Paris
Rank
Advanced Producer Services
city connected to
London dyad
London
index (APS)
Financial Services
city connected
London dyad
to London
index (FS)
1
New York
100.00
New York
100.00
2
Hong Kong
80.30
Hong Kong
98.72
3
Paris
78.34
Singapore
85.92
4
Singapore
71.29
Tokyo
82.45
5
Tokyo
68.92
Shanghai
77.88
6
Shanghai
65.40
Sydney
77.70
7
Beijing
64.82
Paris
77.51
8
Sydney
62.10
Beijing
70.57
9
Milan
60.83
Madrid
70.02
10
Madrid
58.46
Milan
65.81
11
Brussels
58.06
Seoul
65.63
12
Moscow
56.67
Toronto
65.45
13
Frankfurt
53.21
Taipei
60.51
14
Toronto
52.63
Frankfurt
59.23
15
Seoul
50.66
Mumbai
58.87
16
Chicago
50.26
Zurich
58.32
17
Mumbai
49.22
Brussels
54.48
18
Warsaw
47.26
Dublin
54.30
19
Amsterdam
47.14
Amsterdam
54.11
20
Zurich
46.79
Moscow
54.11
20/25
European cities in the global economy : Cities’ functional
specialization
The
andand
specialization
Theposition
position
and
of
European cities in different
networks
types of functions and networks
- Most global cities have
diversified functions (advanced
services, airports, stock
exchanges, real estate)
- Except port gateways;
- small and medium cities are
more specialized
 A scale rather than
functional specialization of
cities
21/25
European cities in the global economy : Cities’
geographical specialization
Like regions, cities have differentiated
relations with the rest of the world:
- Global cities have the more global
profile (red and brown)
- we distinguish different
neighbourhood profiles (eastwards in
blue, southwards)
22/25
Position of cities in global networks and competitiveness
•Neither in the US nor in the EU, we found a relationship between cities
connectivity and economic performances after 2000
European Union
GDP
per
Growth of Growth of GDP
inhabit
GDP,
per inhabitant
ant
2000-08
2001-08
2008
USA
N
GDP per Growth of
inhabitant
GDP,
2008
2000-08
Growth of
GDP per
inhabitant
2001-08
N
Standardized
Connectivity
2000
-
-0,038
-0,004
167
-
-0.125
-0.001
99
Standardized
Connectivity
2008
0,597*
*
-
-
171
0,565**
-
-
99
Gross
connectivity
2008
0,592*
*
-
-
171
0,596**
-
-
99
23/25
3. Policy implications
1) European territories are unequally open to external
global competitive pressure
2) The position of territories in the international division of
labour and within integrated value chains may explain
unequal vulnerability to global economic competition in
both the service and manufacturing economies.
3) No simple relationship between territorial economic
competitiveness and position in the global economy
24/25
Policy implications
Policy alternatives are:
1. To invest mainly in the global cities, which are the
gateways of globalization, in order to improve Europe’s
position in the world.
“Metropolitan areas play an important role in sustaining the EU’s global
competitiveness” (EC, 2011).
However:
1. The link between economic growth and city connectivity/size cannot be
clearly established by empirical evidence;
2. The idea that the wealth of major European and national cities will
benefit non metropolitan territories is not empirically proven;
3. The impact of public investments toward the most developed areas of
the EU can be questioned since, by definition, it will concentrate in
cities endowed with developed infrastructures ;
25/25
Policy implications
2.
Or, by putting the emphasis on territorial cohesion,
should the EU instead persist in a redistributive regional
policy aiming at providing conditions for better
performance in less developed regions?
 Combining an opened up Europe with a shift toward major cities as a
motor of growth in EU regional policy raises the issue of vulnerability of
different types of regions toward globalization, in particular:
1. The high vulnerable areas specialized in low functions
2. The “in between areas” facing increasing internal and external
competition because of higher labour cost though unable to move up in
the value chains (with no control on value chains)  this is typically
what non metropolitan Mediterranean regions are facing now and
central-Eastern Europe could face in a near future.