Transcript THEODORE ROOSEVELT Carrier Strike Group 2008

The Mafia and the Mullah:
Counternarcotics,
Counterinsurgency, and Realpolitik
in Afghanistan
University of Oxford
Changing Character of Warfare Program
Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict
04 May 2010
Overall Classification is
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Overview
• Thesis / Takeaways
• Opium economy overview
• Counternarcotics myths
• Recommendations
• Conclusion
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Counternarcotics Myths
• Bankrupt the Insurgency
• Taliban Opium Profits
• Taliban / Trafficker Strategic Alliance
• Al Qa’eda Afghan Opium Trafficking
• Eradication
• Interdiction
• Opium Purchasing / Licensing
• Alternative Development
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But first, a story….
• February 2009
• Helmand Province
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• Royal Marine JTAC support
• Opium Lab & IED facility
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United Nations, Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section. Map
No. 3958, Rev 6. July 2009
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Afghan Box Score
• Size of France / Texas – only 12% of land arable.
• 181st of 182 on 2009 UN Human Development Report.
• $800 per capita annual income (219th of 227 countries).
• 20% literacy rate.
• Largest export: opium – accounts for 60% of GDP.
• $23.4B GDP (113th of 227 countries; 150th w/o opium).
• 15 million person labor force (40th of 200 countries).
• 35% unemployment rate (182nd of 200 countries).
• Agriculture utilizes 79% of the labor force.
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Takeaways
• Security is paramount – without it, all else will fail.
• There is not a “one size fits all” approach.
• With security, a blended strategy works best.
• Counternarcotics efforts can both help and hinder
counterinsurgency objectives.
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Myth baseline: Crime / Conflict Nexus
• Commonly held beliefs of nearly all congressional,
military, and public policy professionals regarding
Afghanistan, that:
- Narcotics fund and fuel the Taliban.
- Narcotics undermine the rule of law.
- Narcotics corrupt the government.
- Eliminating the opium economy is a panacea for solving
Afghanistan’s myriad problems.
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Myth baseline: Crime / Conflict Nexus
• These beliefs are simply not true, since:
- Narcotics are a catalyst for, but not the engine of, the
insurgency.
- Crime – notably narcotics, providing the highest return
– thrives in poor regions of weak states, dominated by
labor-intensive economies and insecurity.
- Narcotics are not a cause, but a symptom of, weak
government.
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The Result
• Ineffective policy choices, and inefficient military and
political execution that has protracted the Afghan War.
• Global opium production leader based upon an advantage
of favorable physical, political and economic conditions:
- Cultivation environment that produces opium with the
world’s highest morphine content opium.
- Chronic insecurity and institutional weakness.
- Poor infrastructure and rural poverty that prevents licit,
alternative livelihood development.
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The Plan
• Security.
• No eradication; no interdiction without proper targeting
analysis.
• Counternarcotics (CN), like counterinsurgency (COIN) is
counterintuitive.
• Concurrent, comprehensive approach: aggressive security
and counter-corruption program coupled with laissez-faire,
precise interdiction and alternative development.
• Then – sequential approach: further alternative
development, licensing and targeted eradication.
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Negative Consequences of Opium
Economy
• Chronic insecurity: Taliban, traffickers, warlords.
• Drug profits finance insurgency – but less than you think
 Purchases Taliban military capability (weapons,
manpower, logistics); increases freedom of action.
 Finances warlord militias.
 Purchases warlord political capital by developing
schools, clinics, roads.
• Corrupts law enforcement and justice officials,
undermining their effectiveness and reducing legitimacy.
• Increases bribery and lubrication of market economies.
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Negative Consequences of Opium
Economy
• Subverts the political process by purchasing influential
positions from which officials can control CN efforts.
• Drug-linked political actors can eliminate trafficker
competition, creating vertical integration and increasing
illicit and political power.
• Causes inflation in real estate and consumer goods
(especially in the south and east).
• Undermines currency stability.
• Suppresses production and development of licit crops and
industrial sectors (roads, processing plants,
transportation).
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Negative Consequences of Opium
Economy
• Reduces competent bureaucrats capable of running an
expanding, legitimate government and economy.
• Suppresses import / export industry while creating polar
wealth distribution.
• Increases both regional and worldwide illicit drug use
while undermining Western efforts to curb narcotics
consumption.
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Opium Economy: Physical
• 12% of Afghan land is arable – opium production uses only
2-3%.
• Opium is drought, pest and disease-resistant and thrives in
the hot, arid Afghan climate.
• Unlike licit crops, opium does not require large-scale
irrigation, fertilizers, specialized transportation,
industrialized processing plants or large storage facilities.
• Opium is light, compact, transports easily and possesses a
two year shelf-life. Same for heroin if vacuum packed.
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Opium Economy: Political
• Since 2001, Afghan opium cultivation has averaged a 34%
growth rate annually
• 2002: Karzai outlaws poppy cultivation and opium
trafficking without an implementation strategy
- Farmers and traffickers resume operations
- US military / CIA execute laissez-faire attitude –
stimulates intel gathering
- Opium fetches 17 times more per hectare than wheat
• Balloon-effect: Afghanistan opium supplants the “Golden
Triangle” (Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos)
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Opium Poppy Cultivation 1990 – 2009
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U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2009 Annual Report
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Opium Poppy Production 1990 – 2009
Annual worldwide illicit opium demand: 4000-5000 MT
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U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2009 Annual Report
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Opium Economy: Political
• 2004: Under mounting international pressure, Karzai
declares a “jihad against poppy”
- Zero tolerance cultivation and trafficking law
- Orders governors to eradicate their provinces
• Steps up interdiction in 2005 as insurgency ignites
- Assigns CN responsibilities under MOC and MOI
- Ministry of Counternarcotics: UK lead; policy
- Ministry of Interior: US lead; implementation
- CNPA and ASNF execution; US / UK funded
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Opium Economy: Political
• 2004 – 2005: Under-resourced coalition forces unable to
deliver security.
• Security and alternative development unsynchronized from
eradication and interdiction efforts.
- Taliban insurgency ignites.
- “Accidental Guerilla”: eradication inadvertently recruits
farmers to Taliban.
- Farmers looking for vindication against Karzai
government for destroying their livelihood.
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Farmer’s Responses: Reasons for
Cultivating Opium in 2009
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“Illicit Drug Trends in Afghanistan.” UNODC Country Office for Afghanistan
(June 2009)
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Opium Economy: Political
• Locals refuse to help coalition.
- Dries up intel resources.
- Hinders COIN and CT efforts.
• Intel paucity hampers interdiction efforts by eliminating
small traffickers.
- Increases vertical integration and government
corruption.
- Further paralyzes Afghan government while aiding the
insurgency.
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Opium Seizures 2002 – 2007
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Opium Economy: Political
• Confluence of fertile conditions for both opium cultivation
and Taliban insurgency:
- 75% of poppy cultivation occur in the six
environmentally best provinces.
- These provinces are also areas of strongest Taliban
influence.
- Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Zabul, Uruzgan, Day Kundi.
• Highlighting the precarious link between opium production
and a lack of security and governance, 99% of all opium
cultivation occurs in Taliban controlled areas across
Afghanistan.
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OVAL) SLIDE PHOTO HERE
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“The Afghan War at End 2009: A Crisis and New Realism.” CSIS: Center for
Strategic and International Studies. (January 4, 2010). Pp24.
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Opium Economy: Economic
• While wheat, saffron, and pomegranates can fetch higher
prices than opium, microcredit is solely based on opium.
• Creditors advance money to farmers to buy opium seed,
as well as clothes for the winter, for an agreement to grow
a predetermined amount of opium.
• Traffickers agree to buy the crop and pick it up.
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Opium Economy: Economic
• Labor-intensive opium supports up to 25% of the Afghan
populace with four harvests annually. Afghan daily wages:
- Construction: $3.60.
- Wheat harvesting: $4.40.
- Opium lancing: $9.50 to $15.
• Average poppy farmers cultivate a half-acre, with a gross
income of $2000 and netting $900.
- 53% higher than non-opium growing households.
• This nets the farmer twice as much income than wheat at
current prices.
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…And Don’t Forget About Cannabis
• Afghanistan now the world’s biggest producer of cannabis
• Net income from harvesting and processing a hectare of
cannabis is 50% higher than opium:
- Cannabis: US$ 3,341; opium: US$2,005.
- Summer crop provides summer employment.
• However, cannabis has a short shelf-life, long vegetation
cycle and fetches only 10-20% of farm-gate (wholesale)
value versus opium.
• Primarily grown in same southern provinces as opium.
• Solution is still the same: security
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Bankrupt the Insurgency Myth
• Myth: Eliminate the opium economy and the Taliban
insurgency will crumble and implode.
• Fact:
- No insurgency has ever been defeated by eliminating
their primary income source (balloon-effect).
- Nearly all insurgencies have been defeated through a
confluence of military, economic and political factors,
but primarily force-on-force military defeat.
- Most insurgencies deal in illicit economies (narcotics)
for both high monetary as well as political capital
return.
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Bankrupt the Insurgency Myth
• Fact:
- An insurgency builds their political capital against the
HN government by protecting the populace dependent
upon an illicit economy for survival.
- Increased political capital legitimizes the insurgency
and undermines the government.
- Destroying the illicit economy to bankrupt the
insurgency often has the unintended consequence of
increasing insecurity by destabilizing livelihoods
without addressing the underlying economic drivers.
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Taliban Opium Profit Myth
• Myth: The Afghan opium economy makes over $4 billion
annually and the Taliban profit in excess of $1 billion.
• Fact:
- The Taliban “only” garner ~$70 million annually from the
opium trade.
- This is captured by running “protection rackets” for
both the farmers and the drug traffickers.
- 10% zakat (tax) is imposed on the farmers and 20% on
traffickers.
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Taliban Opium Profit Myth (Part Deux)
• Myth: Massive opium profits fuel and sustain the Taliban.
• Fact:
- Opium profits account for only 40% of Taliban income.
- The remaining 60% (~$106 million) comes from
smuggling and robust donations from Gulf State donors
(but not donor nations).
- Between 2002 and 2004, the Taliban regrouped
unchecked in Pakistan without access to drug profits.
- GEN McChrystal: “Eliminating insurgent access to
narco-profits – even if possible, and while disruptive –
would not destroy their ability to operate so long as
other funding sources remained intact.”
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Taliban / Trafficker Strategic Alliance Myth
• Myth: Taliban / opium traffickers share a strategic alliance
with shared interests of profit and state destabilization.
• Fact:
- Both covet profit and insecurity – for different reasons.
- Trafficker’s objective is greed: wealth accumulation;
buying political influence to expand their enterprise.
- Traffickers need insecurity to occupy police and
security forces, furthering their moneymaking goals.
- Taliban require money for weapons and operations.
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Taliban / Trafficker Strategic Alliance Myth
• Fact:
- Insecurity undermines the host government; builds
political capital and legitimizes Taliban.
- Relationship is a marriage of convenience and most
often fractious and hostile.
- Fundamental differences are objectives, driven by fiscal
disagreements, between aggressive and violent
elements with competing interests.
- These fissures are ripe for exploitation by government
and coalition forces.
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Al Qa’eda (AQ) Afghan Opium Trafficking
Myth
• Myth: AQ benefits financially from the Afghan opium trade.
• Fact:
- AQ (and the Taliban) benefit indirectly from insecurity,
lack of intel and drain on coalition forces that hinders
CT operations.
- AQ does not protect drug labs / convoys, nor tax these
movements – AQ lacks sufficient numbers for this.
- Taliban have sufficient personnel for protection rackets
willing to make a profit.
- Taxation requires knowledge of territory, language and
security forces, plus freedom of movement – all which
AQ does not possess.
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Al Qa’eda (AQ) Afghan Opium Trafficking
Myth
• Fact:
- Risk from Afghan law enforcement and security forces
highest in narcotics trafficking; AQ will not
unnecessarily highlight themselves.
- AQ instead traffics narcotics upstream in Albania.
 Balkan / Chechen regions supply requisite
insecurity and scarce law enforcement personnel.
 Permissive environment for money laundering while
providing numerous sea-based smuggling routes.
 Quickest and easiest cash infusion route to AQ
European theater – where majority of operations
recruited and planned.
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Eradication Myth
• Myth: Eradication will radically reduce the supply of
narcotics to the international market while eliminating
Taliban financial resources.
• Fact:
- Eradication economic failures:
 Farmers will replant (usually more) to replace lost
income.
 Eradication boosts opium prices, making it more
economically attractive to grow opium.
- Eradication political failures:
 Alienates rural population dependent on opium
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Eradication Myth
• Fact:
- Eradication political failures:
 Absent alternative livelihoods, eradication
antagonizes the population against the government,
thus increasing Taliban legitimacy.
- Eradication military failures:
 Decreases intel gathering from populace.
 Runs counter to COIN and CT objectives.
- Eradication only effective once security and alternative
development is established.
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Interdiction Myth
• Myth: Interdiction reduces the opium economy by
targeting traffickers and not alienating farmers, thus aiding
COIN objectives.
• Fact:
- Interdiction aligns better militarily with COIN objectives
by not targeting poor, rural farmers and harming the
local populace.
- Increases intel gathering on Talban and traffickers.
- However, intel can be suppressed by local warlords
when faced with declining opium profits.
- Can significantly reduce Taliban financial resources
and political capital with populace.
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Interdiction Myth
• Fact:
- However, interdiction very susceptible to corruption
and can hinder COIN objectives through incorrect
targeting.
- Results in eliminating competition, consolidating power
and vertical integration of opium economy (usually in
government officials).
- Decrease of Taliban political capital offset by public
frustration with corrupt narco-government.
- Interdiction justice arm subverted by corruption.
- Interdiction requires significant coalition intel and
security forces to execute correctly – both of which are
currently too scarce.
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Opium Purchasing Myth
• Myth: All Afghan opium could be purchased or licensed,
denying the Taliban and traffickers income (Napster myth).
• Fact:
- Licensing can potentially deny the Taliban lucrative
income and political capital, while legitimizing the
government and adding licit income to their GDP.
- However, without security, this plan will also fail.
- The Afghan government cannot enforce legalized
opium production in areas they do not control.
- Further, opium transport routes would have to go
through the same areas currently controlled by the
Taliban.
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Opium Purchasing Myth
• Fact:
- If unable to transport, legalized opium would be
destroyed or priced off the market from air transport.
- Significant political ramifications from drug-linked
officials unless coordinated with purging and
prosecuting of these government officials.
- Requires renegotiating the US “80-20” agreement, but
face a worldwide opiate-based drug shortage.
- Unable to institute as long as there is global heroin
demand.
- Beware the “balloon-effect” into ungoverned areas of
Pakistan.
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Opium Economy: Economic
Opiate trafficking routes
Europe
Russia
China
CARs
Turkey
Afghanistan
Iran
Pakistan
UAE & Africa
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LAB SLIDE PHOTO HERE
• Opportunistic traffickers and Taliban: heroin processing moves
upstream into Afghanistan. Size reduction: 10:1; Value increase: 1:10.
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“Illicit Drug Trends in Afghanistan.” UNODC Country Office for Afghanistan (June 2008). Pp
30.
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Alternative Development Myth
• Myth: “Just have them grow wheat – wheat fetches more
than opium…”
• Fact:
- Until 2008, opium gathered 10 – 17 times more per
hectare than wheat.
- Unusually high price of wheat versus opium in 2008
was driven by opium overproduction and a global
shortage of wheat.
- Wheat production will result in massive unemployment
by employing 88% less labor, and requiring all the
arable land to provide subsistence, while still not
returning sufficient profit to supplant opium on 2 – 3%
of land.
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Alternative Development Myth
• Fact:
- For alternative development to succeed, it must
address the requisite social and economic drivers
creating a lucrative environment for opium:
 Lack of security.
 Lack of physical infrastructure – roads,
transportation, processing facilities, electricity, etc.
 Lack of microcredit.
 Health care and education.
 Assured markets and crops that approach opium’s
labor-intensive employment and profit.
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Paradoxes of CN and COIN
• CN, like COIN is counterintuitive and complementary
- “The more you protect..”; “Doing nothing is the best…”
• Intelligence drives operations: misguided CN policies
(eradication, lack of alternative development, lack of
security, etc) recruits for the Taliban and hinders intel.
• In Afghanistan, illicit economies and criminality are so
intertwined that destabilizing the “shadow” economy can
undermine stability operations, hinder COIN objectives and
possibly cause state failure.
• CN policies must generate intel, reduce Taliban political
capital, provide a modicum of political and economic
stability and a zero-sum game for financial resources.
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Recommendations
• NATO’s primary objective is to defeat the Taliban and
provide security in Afghanistan. Without security, both CN
and COIN will fail.
1.Dedicate sufficient resources to winning this war.
2.Oppose all illicit economy, especially CN policies, that
recommend a single-focus strategy to disrupt Taliban
funding flows.
3.Execute a blended, concurrent, comprehensive approach
of laissez-faire and targeted interdiction in the southern
and eastern provinces and other areas under Taliban
control and interdiction, amnesty, targeted eradication and
alternative development in areas under NATO control.
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Recommendations
4. Ensure all interdiction “nexus” targets are vetted and
analyzed for 2nd and 3rd order effects.
5. Militarily, determine which “nexus” targets are prime for
“hard interdiction” (kill or capture) with legitimate
insurgent ties (dual use labs; major trafficker, chemist);
otherwise, leave smaller players to law enforcement.
6. When prioritizing assets (intel; helos) and objectives,
always choose COIN and military objectives over CN
objectives.
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Recommendations
7. With credible evidence, work government officials that
are “soft interdiction” targets (coercion or prosecution).
a. “Name and shame” drug trade players.
b. Offer amnesty; force to renounce drug involvement.
c. Exploit intel; ensure validity and compliance.
d. “Purge and prosecute” those who fail to renounce.
e. Start with top officials and work sequentially to not
cause state failure.
8. If Karzai releases or pardons government officials after
the “purge and prosecute” phase, explore legality of
detaining traffickers in US facilities, and extradite and
prosecute in the US.
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Recommendations
9. After the aggressive counter-corruption program, invest
significant funding to develop competent bureaucrats
and battle the Afghan leadership human capital
deficiency.
10. Follow-up the corruption purge with an aggressive
media campaign to stress the efforts and progress made.
11. After alternative development is established in stable
and secure provinces, attempt a licensing pilot program.
12. Once the Taliban are defeated and security established,
determine if opium licensing can be expanded. Execute
targeted eradication for all unlicensed opium plots.
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Recommendations
13. Once security is established, work with the Pakistani
government to improve border security and prevent
smuggling as well as an opium “balloon-effect” in
Balochistan, NWFP and FATA.
14. Review current US prohibitionist drug policies for
changes that could alleviate Afghan opium economy
influence at home, while diverting US law enforcement
officials away from CT efforts. Encourage Western allies
to do the same.
15. Establish a zero-tolerance drug policy for all ANA and
ANP; pay ANSF twice as much as Taliban soldiers; fund
this pay through international aid until opium licensing
established then pay with state funds.
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Conclusion
•
Thesis focused on
-
1. Can CN sever Taliban financial resources, enabling
defeat; and
-
2. Can CN complement and enable COIN objectives.
•
“NO” – eradication, and other singular-focused
approaches have failed to bankrupt and defeat an
insurgency.
•
Attempting to deny the Taliban opium returns results in
enormous political, security, social and economic costs
that counter COIN objectives without decreasing Taliban
political capital and financial resources.
•
The West’s Afghan opium economy obsession is a myth.
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Conclusion
•
To achieve success, security must be established.
•
Implementing eradication, interdiction or alternative
development without security or individually, is a recipe
for failure.
•
To complement and enable COIN objectives, CN must be
threat-tailored, aligned and blended:
-
In areas under Taliban control (no security),
implement a blended approach of laissez-faire,
targeted interdiction and counter-corruption
programs.
-
In areas under NATO control, interdiction, amnesty,
alternative development and targeted interdiction.
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Discussion
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