Monsanto Staff Briefing
Download
Report
Transcript Monsanto Staff Briefing
How Green is the Green Box?
US and EU “green” agricultural policies
William H. Meyers
Howard Cowden Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics
and Co-Director, FAPRI
University of Missouri
University of Southern Bohemia, 3 November 2010
Agenda
Historical background
Political economy of agr policy
Origins of the “Green Box” in WTO
Evolution of “green” policies in EU
Evolution of “green” policies in US
Where do we go from here?
Old history on origins of market
protection resurgence
Political Economy of Ag Policy
Why do policies evolve differently in different countries
or in different time periods?
Why do policies differ from what economic analysis
may suggest?
If governments don’t just do what economists say, what
actually determines policy decisions?
Political economy approach views decisions as rational
responses to all pressures from an array of interests in
society
Measures of support 1
The Producer Support Estimate (PSE) is an indicator
of the annual monetary value of gross transfers from
consumers and taxpayers to support agricultural
producers, measured at farm gate level, arising from
policy measures, regardless of their nature, objectives or
impacts on farm production or income.
(see http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2150
for more details and read pages 1-5 of the following
report for basic concepts and read more if you want gory
details
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/5/43411396.pdf )
Comparison of OECD and Emerging Market
countries 2005-07
PSE comparison in OECD countries
Measures of support 2
Two other measures that are also used by OECD and
others when discussing comparisons of support and
protection levels are the
Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC), which is the
ratio between the average price received by producers at
the farm gate (including payments per ton) and the
border price (also calculated at the farm gate), measures
the level of market protection
Nominal Assistance Coefficient (NAC), which is the
ratio of the value of gross farm receipts (including
support) and the gross farm receipts valued at border
prices (also calculated at the farm gate), measures what
share of farm receipts that come from the marketplace.
Comparison of PSE, NAC and NPC changes
Measures of support 3
nominal rates of assistance (NRAs) the percentage
by which government policies have raised gross
returns to farmers above what they would have been
without the government’s intervention (or lowered
them if NRA is negative). Product-specific input
subsidies are included (Anderson et al, 2009).
[Unlike OECD, uses free trade prices not actual
(distorted) prices to aggregate]
See Anderson, Kym; (2009) “Political Economy of
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives: Introduction
and Summary” Agricultural Distortions Working
Paper #91, World Bank
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/handle/50306
Comparison of NRAs for high-income countries
Comparison of NRAs for low-income countries
Some patterns analyzed in the literature
The “development pattern”, which relates to the
pattern that as incomes grow, agricultural
protection also grows and policies shift from taxing
agriculture to protection of it.
The “anti-trade pattern”, which finds that importcompeting sectors or products are supported more
or taxed less than exportables.
Some patterns analyzed in the literature
The “anti-comparative advantage pattern”,
which can be seen when protection is lower or
taxation higher on products that have greater
comparative advantage and that protection
increases or taxation decreases when farm incomes,
especially from that product or sector, fall relative
to the rest of the economy.
Some factors analyzed in the literature
Individual preferences of the citizenry
Differing ability of stakeholder groups to organize
effectively
Collective action by lobby groups
Preferences of politicians or interaction of lobbies
and politicians
Political institutions and ideology (e.g. US Congress
and Administration vs European Commission and
Parliament)
Some conclusions on changes over time
Share of ag & share of farmers declines,
makes subsidies cheaper
makes interest group organization easier
makes food cheaper and less consumer resistance
Trade and trade agreements play a role
External factors, eg regime change, crisis and budget
problems
Often gradual but sometimes radical
Agenda
Historical background
Political economy of agr policy
Origins of the “Green Box” in WTO
Evolution of “green” policies in EU
Evolution of “green” policies in US
Where do we go from here?
Origins of the “Green Box” in WTO
Early in Uruguay Round negotiations, farm groups in
developed countries (high supports) resisted changes
In 1987 US and EU proposed the idea of exempting
“trade-neutral” and “production-neutral” subsidies
So “Green Box” was created for subsidies that “do not
cause more than minimal trade distortion”
By contrast “Amber Box” supports must be cut
according to an agreed schedule and
“Blue Box” required production limits (such as EU and
US land set aside programs) to avoid cuts
Boxes of support
What is in the “green box”
Green box subsidies are supposed to
have “no or at most minimal trade or
production distorting effects”
Cannot be tied to production of
particular commodities or to prices
WTO places no limits on green box
subsidies
EU Green Box expenditures, 03-05
Decoupled income support, ~€14 bil
Investment aids, ~ €7 bil
Environmental programs, ~ €5.5 bil
General services, ~ €5.5 bil
Regional assistance programs , ~ €3 bil
Etc smaller ones
Evolution of CAP Expenditure
CAP Measures: past and current reform process
Changing Shares in the EU agric. budget for different instruments
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1990
1995
2000
Direct payments
Price support instr.
Envrionmental payments
Agr.structural support
2005
2010
Historical entitlements
Axis 2: Environment/Land Management
Measures targeting the sustainable use of agricultural
land: mountain areas, LFA; other areas with handicaps;
Natura 2000 areas; agri-environment and animal welfare;
support for non-productive investments
Measures targeting the sustainable use of forestry
land: first afforestation; first establishment of agro-forestry
systems, Natura 2000 areas; forest-environment; restoring
forestry production potential and introducing prevention
actions; support for non-productive investments
Pillar II PROGRAMME BALANCE - DG Agri guidance
Competitiveness objective: total programme
funding at least 15%
Environment/land management: 25%
Quality of life and diversification: 15%
Implementation of the Leader approach: 7%
25
Importance of Axis 2 in Pillar II
US Green Box expenditures 03-05
Domestic food aid, ~ $45 bil
General services, ~ $10 bil
Decoupled income support, ~$5 bil
Environmental programs, ~ $2 bil
Etc smaller programs
Farm bill spending, 2008-17
Is it really a “farm” bill?
CCC and FCIC net outlays
Sources: USDA’s Farm Service Agency (CCC) and Department of the Treasury’s Monthly Treasury Statement
(FCIC).
Notes: CCC net outlays include commodity programs, the conservation reserve program, and miscellaneous
programs. FCIC net outlays are for the crop insurance program.
“Mandatory” spending in CBO’s
August baseline: selected programs
FY 2011-FY2020 net
outlays
Commodity programs
$63 billion
Crop insurance
$76 billion
Conservation programs
$64 billion
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
$685 billion
Child nutrition programs
$222 billion
Commodity Credit Corporation net outlays include commodity programs, export programs, one
major conservation program (the conservation reserve program) and some other miscellaneous
programs. CBO projects that net CCC outlays will total $102 billion over the FY 2011-FY 2020
period.
Mandatory conservation program spending includes $39 billion in Natural Resources Conservation
Service programs and $25 billion in CCC-funded programs.
Crop insurance spending by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation reflects both subsidies to
agricultural producers and program delivery costs.
Agenda
Historical background
Political economy of agr policy
Origins of the “Green Box” in WTO
Evolution of “green” policies in EU
Evolution of “green” policies in US
Where do we go from here?
Pressures to change EU policy
In early years self sufficiency was driving force –
open ended price support
But, led to surplus, escalating expense, budget
concerns led to supply controls
Supply controls not sufficient, pressure from
WTO/environment groups/budgetary concerns
led to shift to direct payments
Further WTO concerns, and enlargement related
budgetary concerns led to decoupling
What does future hold? Depends on internal and
external pressures.
Main current programs
Decoupled farm support payments
Single farm payment
Single area payment in NMS
Pillar II programs
Investment support – Axis 1
Environmental programs – Axis 2
Rural diversification – Axis 3
other
Agenda
Historical background
Political economy of agr policy
Origins of the “Green Box” in WTO
Evolution of “green” policies in EU
Evolution of “green” policies in US
Where do we go from here?
Pressures to change US policy
WTO pressures and “free trade” ideology of Reagan
Administration led to Uruguay Round concessions
Budget concerns in 1995 led to shift to direct
(decoupled and declining) payments programs in 95
Farm Bill
Congressional farm lobby increased coupled support
and shift to insurance in 2008 Farm Bill
Current budget pressures and interest in more focus
on revenue insurance
What does future hold? Depends on internal and
external pressures.
Some USDA conservation programs
FY 2008 outlays
FY 2012 projection*
Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP)
$1.99 bil.
$2.09 bil.
Environmental Quality Incentive
Program (EQIP)
$0.95 bil.
$1.35 bil.
Conservation Stewardship Program
(CSP)
$0.31 bil.
$1.15 bil.
Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP)
$0.25 bil.
$0.66 bil.
Farmland Protection Program
(FPP)
$0.07 bil.
$0.15 bil.
All other mandatory programs
$0.19 bil.
$0.46 bil.
Total USDA mandatory
conservation programs
$3.76 bil.
$5.86 bil.
*FAPRI projections, Jan. 2009, largely based on CBO estimates
Conservation Reserve Program
Established in 1980s; similar to earlier programs
Pays farmers to take environmentally sensitive land
out of crop production
Usual term: 10 years
Farmers get annual rental payment, tied to value of similar
land in local rental market
Cannot grow crops; can only graze animals when get special
permission
May have other requirements—seed natural grasses, control
noxious weeds, etc.
CRP benefits and costs
Program benefits
Reduce soil erosion
Enhance wildlife habitat
Install buffers to protect streams
Reduce crop supplies to raise crop prices
Income to beneficiaries
Program costs
Program outlays (around $2 bil./year now)
Reduce farming activity in some areas
Raises food prices
CRP enrollment
Compiled by FAPRI-MU from past FSA reports
Some current CRP statistics
Farm Service Agency monthly report, Feb. 2010
31.2 million acres enrolled
Average rental payment: $53/acre/year
Leading states
Texas (3.3 million acres, $35/acre/year)
Montana (3.1, $32)
Kansas (2.8, $40)
N. Dakota (2.7, $35)
For map of enrollment patterns, see
…Iowa (1.6, $119)
page 3 of FY 2008 summary report:
…Missouri (1.4, $70)
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_
File/annualsummary2008.pdf
Some CRP issues
“Right” size for reserve
2008 farm bill sets upper limit of 32 million acres
starting this year
Should other uses be allowed?
Grazing
Growing energy crops like switchgrass
How to weigh environmental benefits, fiscal cost,
effects on communities and markets
Wetland Reserve Program (WRP)
In many ways, like CRP
Removes land from crop production
Farmers get paid for environmental benefits
Differences from CRP
Targeted at restoring, enhancing wetlands
Uses permanent and 30-year easements, as well as
restoration cost-share agreements
As a result, up-front per-acre costs are higher
WRP statistics
Compiled from recent NRCS and ERS reports
2.0 million acres enrolled in FY 2008
221,000 in Lousiana
207,000 in Arkansas
97,000 in Missouri
80% in permanent easements as of 3/07
Farm bill limits enrollment to 3.04 mil. acres
Some WRP issues
Which acres to enroll
Mix of permanent and temporary easements
Permanent locks in environmental improvements
But costs more up front and can reduce local tax base
Budget issues
Per-acre cost high relative to CRP and most other
conservation programs
Spending often limited to “pay” for other programs
Environmental Quality Incentive
Program (EQIP)
Established in 1996 farm bill, building on several
previous programs
Pays farmers to address environmental concerns
on their farms
Build terraces to reduce erosion
Put in ponds to control run-off into streams
Improve manure handling facilities
Cost-share program—farmers pay portion
Some EQIP issues
Who/what gets funded
Usually far more applications than dollars
Regional, livestock vs. crop, big vs. small
Help past “bad actors” to clean up?
Budget
Farm bill sets increasing mandatory funding levels
But appropriations bills routinely limit and spend “savings”
on discretionary programs
Senate child nutrition bill limits EQIP spending to boost
school lunch program
Conservation Stewardship Program
(CSP)
2008 farm bill name for program established in
2002 farm bill
Like EQIP in many respects
Pay farmers addressing environmental concerns
A little different philosophy
Reward good stewards
Initially was intended to make payments to everyone
who met certain criteria (open-ended entitlement)
CSP issues
Funding
2002 farm bill vision never met, as subsequent bills
limited spending
As a result, was limited to a few watersheds
Under 2008 bill, goal is to enroll 12.8 mil. acres/yr.
Purpose
To make program more affordable and workable, looks
much more like EQIP than initially envisioned
Farmland Protection Program (FPP)
Latest name for program dating back to 1990s
Provides funding to purchase easements
These limit non-agricultural uses of land
Federal share up to 50% of easement cost
Goal is to limit development, retain farms
FPP issues
Cost per acre can be very high
Near major city, land can be worth much more for
development than its agricultural value
Interest in program much higher precisely where it’s the
most expensive to operate
As a result, funding can’t go very far—how to prioritize?
Should this be a federal program?
Lots of arguments for why it should be local
But proponents argue their areas get little help from
other USDA programs
Some other federal policies related
to conservation & the environment
Conservation compliance provisions for farm program
benefits
Farmers have to agree to conservation plans to get direct
payments, marketing loan benefits, etc.
Minimum standards to limit erosion, such as keeping
some crop residues on surface
Could include biofuel policies, pesticide regulation,
clean water rules and much more
General issues
Who pays to reduce negative externalities
Farmers by way of regulation?
Taxpayers?
Value to the public of USDA spending programs
Conservation programs generally viewed as having
benefits beyond the farm sector
Increasing skepticism about public value of commodity
programs
Changes in spending caused by 2008 farm bill
(FY 2008-17, billion dollars, CBO estimates, relative to continuation of 2002 farm
bill provisions)
Agenda
Historical background
Political economy of agr policy
Origins of the “Green Box” in WTO
Evolution of “green” policies in EU
Evolution of “green” policies in US
Where do we go from here?
Study on Green Box Subsidies
Green Box is not always green, as in “environmental”
Green Box may change
ICTSD (2009). “Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO
Green Box: Ensuring Coherence with Sustainable
Development Goals”, summary note. Geneva
http://ictsd.net/downloads/2009/10/green-box-810.pdf
Vision for future of EU and US Policy
“CAP reform beyond 2013: An idea for a longer view”
by Jean-Christophe Bureau and Louis-Pascal Mahe.
Changing roles and influences
New role of EU Parliament under Lisbon Treaty
Commissioner of Agriculture from Romania
Qualified majority voting in Council of Ministers
2013 debate for new budget period
Loss of budget for CAP and more shift to Pillar II?
Move away from SFP and toward payment leveling?
US Farm bill 2012 debate starting
More gridlock? Less budget?
Thank you!
Lisbon Treaty features
Fewer Commissioners- 27 to 18
Max of 2/3 of total members in future
Change in weighting of votes (QMV)
majority (55%) of states, plus 65% of population
OR fewer than 4 states oppose it
Future changes to Treaty based on QMV not
unanimity