Transcript Deontological Ethics

DEONTOLOGICAL ETHICS
Terminology
Derived from Ancient Greek terms, “deontology” just
means the study of obligations.
However, philosophers often use “deontology” in a
more restricted sense: it is the study of moral
obligations in the form of duties & rights.
Deontological theories
Like consequentialist theories, deontological theories
are ethical theories. They are theories about what
constitutes morally correct/incorrect action, what
makes actions right/wrong.
Unlike consequentialism, a deontological theory
emphasizes the role of duties & rights. Divine
Command Theory is a classic example of a
deontological theory.
Non-consequentialist ethical theory
Deontological theories reject the consequentialist idea
that the moral value of an act is determined solely by
its consequences: deontology is a form of nonconsequentialism.
Constraints & Prerogatives
Non-consequentialists typically acknowledge at least
one of the following.
Constraints: limits on what can be done in pursuing the
good. (not permissible to do x even if x is optimific)
Prerogatives: limits on what has to be done in pursuing
the good. (permissible not to do x even if x is
optimific)
More on constraints
Proponents of deontological theories maintain that
certain kinds of actions are forbidden—even when
they have good consequences. There are two ways to
think about the moral duties/obligations which set
limits on what counts as morally permissible pursuit of
the Good.
Absolutism: some acts are simply forbidden no matter
how great the consequences.
Threshold deontology: if consequences are sufficiently
great, transgression is permissible/required.
Consequentialism vs. deontology
The following example helps to illustrate the
difference between these two broad approaches to
thinking about the moral quality of actions:
Chop. You can maximize overall happiness by
chopping up one person (for his parts) to save five.
If there are in fact cases of this sort, the act utilitarian
is evidently committed to the view that you ought,
morally, to chop up the one to save five.
The deontological alternative
A deontologist can avoid this conclusion by insisting
that there is a moral duty which forbids killing
innocent persons—even if you can get the best
consequences by doing so.
(Deontologists disagree about what, precisely, our
moral duties are, but they generally agree that there
are moral limits on pursuit of the good.)
Two forms of obligation
On one plausible construal of what rights involve
(namely, limits on what counts as permissible pursuit of
goodness), act consequentialists are committed to
denying that there are any such things!
By contrast, deontological theories often classify moral
obligations into two classes: rights and duties. Agents
have moral duties; patients (those affected by the
actions of others) have moral rights.
Agent-centered vs. patient-centered
accounts of obligation
Deontological theories typically take one of two
forms:
1.
agent-centered approaches (duty-based)
2.
patient-centered approaches (rights-based)
We will look at both, beginning with the former.
Rights-talk clarified
It is worth emphasizing at the start that we are
focusing specifically on rights understood as a
component of interpersonal ethics.
Accordingly, our immediate concern is not with
political or civil rights—rights to engage in the
political process (the right to vote, to run for office,
etc.) or rights of citizens qua citizens (rights of
property, marriage, trial by jury, etc.).
Natural/human rights
What we are interested in are sometimes referred to
as natural or human rights (rights to life, liberty,
pursuit of happiness, etc.).
These are rights possessed in virtue of your humanity
or your status as a person. You possess them by your
very nature (qua a human being/person).
Illustration of a patient- or rightsbased approach
Right of Autonomy: We have the right not to be used
as mere means without our consent. One cannot use
another’s labor, body, or talent for some end like total
goodness without that person’s consent.
*How does this principle handle the case of Chop?
For every right, a correlate duty?
Right of Autonomy: We have the right not to be used
as mere means without our consent. One cannot use
another’s labor, body, or talent for some end like total
goodness without that person’s consent.
Kant’s Formula of the End in Itself: Act in such a way
that you always treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other, never simply as
a means, but always at the same time as an end.
“never simply as a means”
A simplified way of understanding Kant’s duty: never
involve someone “in a scheme of action to which they
could not in principle consent.” (Onora O’Neill)
Standard illustration: making a false promise. Success
requires deceit about the character of the scheme of
action, and this deceit rules out the possibility of
consent to the scheme of action.
Digression:
The Trolley Case
Compare the following case with the case of Chop:
Trolley. A runaway trolley is headed towards five
people. You are in a position to switch the tracks and
cause the trolley to swerve towards one innocent
bystander and away from the five innocent people.
*Morally permissible?
The Trolley Problem
Most people have the intuition that it is morally
impermissible to kill the one person in the case of Chop
and morally permissible to kill the one in the case of
Trolley.
*If this is right, what accounts for the moral difference
between the two cases? (the Trolley Problem)
The Right of Autonomy & the Trolley
Problem
*How might the Right of Autonomy serve to elucidate
the difference between Trolley and Chop?
Before we turn to moral duties…
*Do you think the right of autonomy extends naturally
to non-human animals? Why might it be reasonable to
restrict rights to persons?
*Can you think of any other plausible candidates for
rights in addition to the right of autonomy?
Illustration of an agent-centered
approach: W. D. Ross
Contemporary non-consequentialism traces back to the
work of Immanuel Kant and W. D. Ross. Kant’s theory is
rather complicated and better suited to an advanced
course in ethics. Our focus will be on W. D. Ross’s
approach, which departs from Kant’s on two key issues:
 Kant sees our duties as stemming from one ultimate duty
(which he formulated in a variety of ways). Ross posits
a variety of distinct rules.
 Kant thinks of moral duties as exceptionless rules. Ross
has a more commonsensical approach on this front.
Ross’s provisional list of duties
1. fidelity (duty to fulfill promises, agreements, contracts that
one has entered into)
2. reparation (duty to make up for past wrongs)
3. gratitude (duty to repay others for past benefits conferred)
4. justice (duties of (re)distribution in accord with merit, e.g. the
duty to prevent an unjust distribution of benefits or burdens)
5. beneficence (duty to assist those in need)
6. self-improvement (duty to develop our talents)
7. non-maleficence (duty not to harm others)
*Can you think of any additions/subtractions?
Breaking the rules
Ross is unhappy with the Kantian idea that moral
duties are exceptionless.
Ross thinks that duties sometimes conflict with one
another.
*Examples?
Illustration of a prima facie duty
Suppose that you have made a promise. In that
circumstance, you have a prima facie duty (or
conditional duty) to do as you have promised.
The point of adding “prima facie” here is that the duty
is defeasible. It can be overridden in the face of
more pressing, more significant obligations.
*Example?
Suppose you make a promise…
…and there is no conflicting, overriding duty. Then the
prima facie duty to keep your promise is your actual
duty.
…and there is a conflict with a duty that is “more
incumbent” on you. Then your actual duty is this more
pressing one.
…and there is a conflict with a duty that is equally
incumbent on you. Then flip a coin!
Ranking duties
There is no absolute ranking of prima facie duties—it’s
all relative to circumstances, which can be incredibly
complex.
*With that said, do some duties seem more weighty
than others?
Illustration of Ross’s approach at work
Let’s return to the case of Chop. We have the intuition
that it would be wrong to sacrifice the one for the
many.
*How would Ross account for the prohibition on
chopping here?
Illustration of Ross’s approach at work
*Isn’t the duty not to harm others merely a prima facie
duty? Why doesn’t the duty of beneficence override
the duty of non-maleficence? After all, Ross allows
that we have a duty to help those in need.
Illustration of Ross’s approach at work
Ross’s answer: “But even when we have come to
recognize the duty of beneficence, it appears to me
that the duty of non-maleficence is recognized as a
distinct one, and as prima facie more binding. We
should not in general consider it justifiable to kill one
person in order to keep another alive, or to steal in
order to give alms to another.”
*Do you agree that the duty to treat others well
(beneficence) is distinct from the duty not to treat
others badly (non-maleficence)?
An important question for Ross
You seem to be relying on intuition in claiming that the
duty of non-maleficence is distinct from the duty of
beneficence and overriding. So is that all we have to
go on in such matters—intuition?
Ross’s intuitionism
Ross writes: “In our confidence that these propositions
are true there is involved the same trust in our reason
that is involved in our confidence in mathematics; and
we should have no justification for trusting it in the
latter sphere and distrusting it in the former. In both
cases we are dealing with propositions that cannot be
proved, but that just as certainly need no proof.”
Ross’s intuitionism
Ross’s claim is that the fundamental moral truths are
self-evident and need no proof—we just grasp them.
Knowledge of moral principles is like our grasp of
axioms in arithmetic, geometry, and logic. Just as a
request for proof makes no sense in the case of these
axioms, so it makes no sense in the case of moral
principles.
*Why is this idea different from the idea that moral
duties are true by definition?
Ross’s hyper-realism
Ross writes: “The moral order expressed in these
propositions is just as much part of the fundamental nature
of the universe…as is the spatial or numerical structure
expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic.”
So these duties are really out there, part of the fabric of
the universe, and statements about what we ought to do,
when they are true, are true in virtue of corresponding to
these moral facts. They don’t depend on us in any way.
(Platonism)
Assessing Ross’s agent-based approach
Some questions to ask in assessing moral theories:
 Is it extensionally adequate? (Does it issue plausible
verdicts on actual and hypothetical cases?)
 Does it have a plausible guiding conception? (Does
it offer a plausible view about what morality is,
what it’s all about?)
 Is it appropriately conservative? (Does it cohere
with our knowledge from the sciences?)
A constructivist view of moral duties
Morality is fundamentally about coordinating the
behavior of rational agents whose ends/goals often
conflict with one another.
Moral duties do not exist “out there” in the nature of
things; they are rules for coordinating behavior that
rational agents would agree to under certain
idealized conditions.
Moral duties are not things in the world that we might
discover; they are rules that idealized rational agents
would construct with the aim of coordinating behavior.
Divine command theory
Moral duties are a product of God’s will (not
intellect).
*How does this view of moral duties differ from Ross’s
view?
Moral relativism
Moral duties are nothing more than the set of actual
codes governing behavior.
Very different codes exist in different places and
times because different cultures often have
fundamentally different values. The various codes are
all equally valid. (Cf. matters of etiquette and
fashion.)
Nihilism
You do not have any moral duties!
Statements asserting that we ought morally to act in
certain ways are all systematically false.
Utilitarian alternative (Smart’s version)
Morality is not about conforming to duties; it is about
happiness/misery.
 We are benevolent creatures. That is, we care about
the welfare/happiness of others.
 We are rational creatures. Reason tells us that all
happiness qua happiness is on a par (impartiality and
egalitarianism), and that more happiness is better than
less (maximization).
Upshot: acting morally is a matter of acting rationally in
the pursuit of something we care about; it requires us to
maximize happiness overall.
A table of ethical theories
Objectivism (truth in moral discourse does not depend on the attitudes
subjects take towards moral statements)
more objective
Ross’s intuitionism, divine command
theory
less objective
constructivism
Subjectivism (truth in moral discourse depends on our attitudes,
sentiments)
less subjective
utilitarianism
more subjective
relativism
Nihilism (statements in moral discourse are systematically false)
Which ethical theory do you find
overall most satisfying?
Ross’s intuitionism
 Constructivism
 Divine command theory
 Relativism
 Nihilism
 Utilitarianism
Some questions to ask: Is the theory extensionally
adequate? Does it have a plausible guiding
conception? Is it appropriately conservative?
