Transcript Meta-ethics - Bloomsbury

Meta-ethics
Section 5
Naturalism & Non-naturalism
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Naturalism & Non-naturalism

Theories that aspire to supply the basis
for the moral truths claimed by moral
realism & the moral knowledge claimed to
be possible by moral cognitivism.
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Non-naturalism


Moral truths can be known not by reasoning
from definitions or experience but intuitively.
Hard to see how such truths could be learned.
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Ethical Naturalism

Moral truths result from & are underpinned by
natural facts, & the relevant facts are
necessarily connected to the corresponding
ethical truths & constitute them.
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Distinct From…
Ontological
naturalism:

general
metaphysical
thesis about the
nature of facts.
Methodological
naturalism:

concerns how we
may properly
investigate them.
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Ontological & Methodological Naturalism

Both are consistent with ethical naturalism
where they grant that moral propositions
can be underpinned by natural facts
(supervenience).
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Restrictive Versions

Restrictive versions of both these kinds of
naturalism hold that there are no facts about
desirability, rightness or reasons for action.

Conflict with ethical naturalism.

Moral realists need to reject these versions.
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Can Natural Facts Constitute Ethical Ones?
Non-naturalism:

regards the
supervenience
of ethical truths
on natural ones
as mysterious.
Naturalism:


(certain) natural
truths constitute
ethical ones.
Necessarily related.
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What Kind of Facts are Relevant?


Philippa Foot — facts about causing harm
are necessarily related to ethical conclusions.
Other examples include facts about animal
suffering & welfare.
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Further Examples



John Searle — facts about words spoken can generate
obligations, in the context of human institutions.
Obligations to keep promises.
Implicit benefits to human welfare of (some) institutions
make the related obligations moral ones.
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Think About…

ways of reasoning from empirical
facts to moral conclusions.
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Non-naturalism V Restrictive Forms


Non-naturalism is attractive when
naturalism is interpreted in restrictive forms
(since the latter preclude ethical truths).
But ethical naturalists need not endorse
restrictive interpretations.
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Ethical Naturalism


Coheres with the accounts of ‘oughts’, moral
motivation & moral goodness presented in the
other Sections of this Chapter.
Coheres with the accounts of intrinsic value,
rightness & moral obligation presented
elsewhere in the book.
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