Transcript Ellen-Marie Forsberg

Justifying moral case solutions
Presentation ASFPG,
Hamburg
Dec 5th 2005
Ellen-Marie
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The ethical matrix in brief
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Created in the 90’s by Ben Mepham in Nottingham
Builds upon Beauchamp and Childress’ principle
based ethics in biomedical ethics
Used in several projects in Nottingham and in Oslo:
for evaluating dairy technology and other
biotechnologies, fisheries technology, radiation
restoration strategies, etc.
Also used in various other contexts
An ethical matrix for food
biotechnology issues
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Filling in the matrix
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Invite the stakeholders to do it themselves
(stakeholder workshop)
The principles and stakeholder categories is the
framework
Indicate if there are any particularly important values
(give weights)
Gives an overview of the most important ethical
concerns to an issue and a (consensual) foundation
for evaluating policy options
A consequence matrix for introducing
production of Roundup Ready rape seed GT73
in Europe
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Questions to ask:
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Who are the winners?
Who are the losers?
Is the distribution of burdens and benefits
fair?
Can the situation be changed by informed
consent and/or compensation?
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Making the judgement
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One might not simply sum up pluses and minuses,
not even adjusted with the weights…
… because the judgement needs to take into
account many variables:
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The current distribution of benefits and burdens  are any
groups currently underprivileged?
How vulnerable are the different groups?
What are the groups relative sizes
Etc.
The result from using a matrix process
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In some versions of the matrix method we come to a
conclusion on an issue
How can we claim that this conclusion is justified, or as justified as possible?
There are different options, for instance using
Beauchamp and Childress’ account (building on
Ross) or using Habermas
But there’s a problem with this principle based
account
Principle based accounts
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It is natural to deal with these particular two
because the matrix method historically relies
on Beauchamp and Childress’ approach and
because the assumptions behind taking a
participatory approach can be given a
discourse ethics grounding
The two approaches are similar in that they
both rely on prima facie principles
The problem with prima facie
principles
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Prima facie means ‘at first glance’, and can be said
to hold ‘other things being equal’. A prima facie
principle holds in general, not taking particular
situational matters into account. It will always supply
an obligation to take it into account, but it might be
overridden in particular situations, provided good
reasons are given.
Thus: they are general and does not indicate how
they should be applied in concrete moral
circumstances when two or more prima facie
principles apply and cannot both be followed.
Some alternatives for solution
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B.
C.
Judgement (intuitive judgement, phronesis)
Substantive decision rules (e.g. lexical
ordering, political decision rules, etc.)
Quasilogical (i.e. not substantial), impartial
rules like
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Coherentism
‘critical thinking’
But…
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B.
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In the public context we don’t like
unexplicated judgements
Within a pluralist ethics context we don’t like
dogmatism
So we want something ‘neutral’ to help us.
Coherentism has been the most popular for
a while.
Coherentism – the solution?
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Both B&C and Habermas realise there is an
application problem and refer to coherentism as its
solution, - however without going into detail on how
this is to be done. B&C ‘outsource’ it to
Rawls/Daniels and Habermas ‘outsources’ it to Klaus
Günther
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(Remember: This is also going to be a problem for the
matrix method, and I want to avoid the demonstrated
problems. So I want to go into this a bit closer.)
Situations where more than one prima facie principle
apply will be solved by picking the principle which
renders the solution most coherent
Coherent with what?
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Daniels: coherence between intuitions about
moral case solutions, established ethical
principles and moral theory (WRE)
Günther: coherence with earlier case
solutions
Coherentism - The question of prima
facie principles
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Prima facie principles are already validated and will not be
adjusted just because of some case solutions (they are ‘above’
specific cases)
The only way principles can have a place in RE is if they are
revisable
Are prima facie principles revisable?
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Øyvind: no
Habermas: not once their validity is established in a justificatory
discourse
Beauchamp and Childress: They are certainly contingent, but
perhaps not revisable in a given culture? Thus, in practice: no
Hare: yes (p. 50 MT). This is in conflict with f.ex Searle’s and Ross’
definition of prima facie principles.
My assumption will be: no. Prima facie principles are contingent,
but once they are there they can not be revised in RE.
Coherentism – more on Daniels’ WRE
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The principles are not prima facie (he does not
discuss this, but it is clear that they are not).
Does his model then apply to approaches that
stresses the prima facie character of the principles?
No, because the principles would then be taken out
of the equilibrium system
There would only be case comparisons, perhaps
informed by moral theory
Does Günther help?
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The problem is that he does not spell out
how to measure coherence,- so he doesn’t
give an account of how the application will be
done
Possible solution A – strict principles?
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Why can’t we simply follow Daniels and say that the
principles are not prima facie, - that they always
hold? In this case we could use RE, which perhaps
is nice.
The problem is that either we presuppose that moral
conflict is only apparent (which is unlikely) or we
have to suppose a substantive priority rule between
principles and we don’t want that in pluralist ethics.
We also have to presuppose principles with so many
clauses (to account for every possible application of
the principle) that it would not be possible either
formulate or follow.
Possible solution B – only check list
for case descriptions?
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Arguments:
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This is in itself not an unimportant thing
It seems the principles do not have a very clear role in the
justificatory account anyway, so why insist on keeping their
importance (i.e. we don’t need either strict or prima facie
principles)?
I guess we can still call them prima facie, but we
have to make sure they are not going to be confused
with principles in RE
 We need a different account of coherence, RE won’t
do
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General problems … RE
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Coherentism is an approach to justification which is a result of
acknowledgement that final justification cannot be had
In stead it claims that all elements of our morality are justified
by how they fit together in a coherent whole
But it does not (at least not Rawls or Daniels or any other of
those advocating RE) specify how we are supposed to know
what is more coherent
My claim: the method of RE is popular because, and not in
spite of, it is vague. Of course it is important to be coherent, but
coherentism implies a much more developed account than just
being recommending coherence.
Alternative account of coherence
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We have rejected principles (other than as a
checklist) for logical reasons
I would also like to reject moral theory (which
is an element in WRE) because it does not
provide a unified account with which
propositions can be compared. Moral theory
is likely to create more incoherence than
coherence.
I.e., we are left with the cases
Case coherence – does it still provide
justification?
Three options:
 Thagard – provides a specific, concrete
account of how to measure coherence
 Casuistry – can give acceptable conclusions,
if not justified ones
 Particularism – can it give justification at all?
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A defence of another model of
coherence
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I think that if this account is not ‘strong’ enough to
provide justification, then Daniels’ account shouldn’t
be accepted either, - not until he has given an
account of the status of the principles in WRE
Casuistry has been accepted as providing sufficient
justification for judgement in centuries. Casuistry
does not have more resources than my model.
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On the other hand, is this nothing but casuistry? Not
necessarily. Thagard offers a different account which is
more comprehensive than casuistry
Objections 1: Contingent prima facie
principles must be revisable
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Obviously. Perhaps it is appropriate to distinguish
between two levels: case solutions and theory
building. (Note that Rawls’ makes this distinction, but
not Daniels). At the case level they are not revisable;
at the theory building level they are. If this solution
works we might characterise the value matrix as the
theory building stage (compatible with how Rawls
describe theory building), and the rest case solution.
Pretty plausible?
Objections 2: making case solutions
into new principles
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It seems plausible that we can formulate a maxim for
the case solution which can be seen as a
specification of one of the prima facie principles.
Yes, but let me explain. Any case solution, in order to
be moral, must be universal (that is, it must hold
whoever the individuals in the case might be). But it
can still be entirely non-general. A principle must
have a general character. So it can not be seen as a
specified prima facie principle simpliciter. This does
not mean, however, that it might not be related to a
prima facie principle (after the fact), but this prima
facie principle will not have any justificatory effect.
The other impartial option – critical
thinking
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‘What critical thinking has to do is to find a
moral judgement which the thinker is
prepared to make about all other similar
situations. Since these will include situations
in which he occupies, respectively, the
positions of all the other parties in the actual
situation, no judgement will be acceptable to
him which does not do the best, all in all, for
all the parties.’ (Hare, MT, p. 42)
Participation and coherence
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Hare thinks, like Kant, that universalization can be
done by a single moral expert. Habermas is right in
recognising that universalization should be done by
the parties themselves. But Hare is right in
recognising that also moral conflict solution should
be universalised. So what if we compare Hare and
Habermas – and let the affected parties try to
universalise a proposition for a case solution.
This is (coincidentally…;) ) exactly what we do in the
matrix process.
Conclusions
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We end up with two main options for
justification:
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Some kind of case coherentism
Participatory critical thinking (pragmatist
justification a la Peirce’ end of inquiry: this is how
we validate any (empirical or normative)
proposition
Thanks!
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