Transcript Sir William David Ross: (1877

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Sir William David Ross:
(1877-1971)
The Right and the Good (1930):
An introduction to Intuitionism as a
Model of Ethics:
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1. An Introduction
Ross advocates ethical intuitionism: We now the basic truths of ethics
by a special power called intuition; intuitive recognition is neither
reason nor feelings.
Consider: when you are in the right circumstance, you can see what is
right and what is wrong. It is immediately, directly known and
undeniable; it is self-evident.
Whether this faculty is implanted in us by God or part of our nature
that distinguishes us from other creatures, it is a special power we
have, and if we are receptive to it and honest about it we cannot deny
its existence.
He lists 7 prima facie (conditional duties we know): Fidelity,
reparations, gratitude, non-injury, justice, generosity, and selfimprovement? This list is not exhaustive.
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1. An Introduction
Therefore, when you have a genuine intuition of rightness
or wrongness, you cannot help recognizing that it is an
ethical truth. Having the ethical tuition without recognizing
it as an ethical truth would be like seeing a square without
seeing that it is square And if you don’t get these intuitive
ethical insights, it is because you are deceiving yourself,
lying, or your intuitive power is severely disabled.
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2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model
A..
This deontological approach states that we have a number prima
facie duties:
 A prima facie duty (also called "conditional duty") is a
"characteristic . . . which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain
kind . . . , of being an act which would be a duty proper if it were
not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant."
1. A prima facie duty is more an account of the materials from
which we must make a selection than it is an account of our
actual obligations.
2. In our daily life we are more frequently than not confronted
with conflicting and competing prima facie duties.
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2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model
B. There is an absolute obligation to obey the prima facie duty that is
the most “weightiest” in a given situation. These prima facie duties
will assist in determining the content of the moral ought.
1. These duties are not all-inclusive.
2. They are not in a prearranged harmony of ranked priority nor do
they occur singly.
3. These duties may contract each other in a given situation but
because one of them is most apropos or most weighty, there is an
absolute obligation to obey.
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2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model
4.
There are a few general "rules of thumb" to follow in judging
which prima facie duties are "more incumbent" than others in
various situations--e.g., causing no harm is generally more
incumbent than generosity.
5.
There is no ranking among the prima facie duties that applies to
every situation. Each situation must be judged separately.
6.
We apprehend our prima facie duties in much the same way that we
apprehend the axioms of mathematics or geometry: we do so by
reflecting on "the self-evident prima facie rightness of an individual
act of a particular type."
7.
"The moral order expressed in [the principles of prima facie duties]
is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe . . . as
is the . . . structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or
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arithmetic."
2. Significant Points:
C. Ross is a moral realist: Rightness and goodness are objective
features in the world in the way that shape, size, and masses are.
D. When are attitudes are appropriate it is because something is the
way we think it is: it is really good, bad, right, or wrong.
E. If X is good or right it is because X has a property or quality of
goodness or rightness.
F. It is the existence of our moral properties that make our moral
judgments true. If there were no moral properties, there would be
no truth for the moral properties make our moral judgments true.
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2. Significant Points:
G.
We do not live in an objective valueless world.
Rather, there is no reason to think that the universe is
valueless. Thus, some of our moral judgments are true
and what makes them true is the presence of the relevant
objective value.
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2. Significant Points:
H. Ross was a non-naturalist realist: moral properties cannot be understood in
wholly non-moral terms.
I. If you define “right” as meaning derived from natural moral sentiments, you are
putting forth a non-moral naturalistic definition. If you define good as meaning
“such that it ought to be desired”, you are putting forth a non-naturalistic
explanation.
J. Ross doesn’t deny that certain empirical will be relevant to deciding whether we
ought or ought not act in a certain way. His point is that when all the empirical
facts are in, there is still a further moral judgment to be made-namely that these
empirical facts make a certain act right or good.
K. Ross also believes that these moral properties are simple, meaning they are not
in combination with two or more properties or relations. And if it is simple it
cannot be defined. So, rightness or goodness is indefinable.
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2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model
L.
There are a variety of relations among individuals that are morally
significant--including potential benefactor-potential beneficiary,
promiser-promisee, creditor-debtor, wife-husband, child-parent,
friend-friend, fellow countryman-fellow countryman, and others.
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2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model
M. There is are differences between prima facie duty and an actual,
absolute, duty proper:
1. Actual duty or duty proper is our obligatory
responsibility, no matter the nature of the occasion.
2. Whenever I have to make a moral decision in a situation in which
more than one prima facie duty applies, I must "study the situation
as fully as I can until I form the considered opinion (it is never
more) that in the circumstances one of them is more incumbent than
any other. . . ." The prima facie duty I judge to be "more incumbent
than any other" in the situation is probably my "duty proper" or
actual moral obligation.
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2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model:
N. List of prima facie duties (not exhaustive):
FRG-NI-J-B-SI
1. Fidelity (Keep one’s promise);
2. Reparation (make up for wrongs done to others);
3. Gratitude (gratefulness and return the same);
4. Non-Injury (not to harm others);
5. Justice (prevent or correct mismatch between person’s
pleasure or happiness and their merit);
6. Beneficence (generosity)
7. Self-Improvement (improve one’s condition).
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3.
Differences to Consider:
A. Ross agrees with G.E. Moore that defining ethical
predicates in terms of natural predicates commits the
naturalistic fallacy. However, he disagrees with Moore’s
view of consequential ethics, believing that he commits a
fallacy as well, namely, believing that good-maximization is
the only content of the moral “ought.”
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3.
Conscience Theorists:
B. Infallible conscience theorists who subscribe to the view
that we always have immediate or direct knowledge of our
actual duty. Ross responds:
1. They fail to take into account the complexity of the
situational setting and all that is involved therein.
2. They fail to face up to the fact that there are honest
differences of opinion between people of good character
as to what ought to be done in a given context.
3. They simply assume that there is no problem about
selecting one’s actual duty from among the variety of
moral claims simultaneously incumbent upon a
person in a particular situation.
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3.
Utilitarians:
“It is plain, I think, that in our moral thought we consider
that the fact that we have made a promise is in itself
sufficient to create a duty of keeping it, the sense of duty
resting on remembrance of the past promise and not on
thoughts of the future consequences of its fulfillment.
Utilitarianism tries to show that this is not so, that the
sanctity of promises rests on the good consequences of the
fulfillment of them and the bad consequences of their
nonfulfillment. It does so in this way: it points out that
when you break a promise you not only fail to confer a
certain advantage on your promise but you diminish his
confidence, and indirectly the confidence of others, in the
fulfillment of promises….
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3.
Utilitarians:
It may be suspected…that the effect of a single keeping or
breaking of a promise in strengthening or weakening the
fabric of mutual confidence is greatly exaggerated by the
theory we are examining. And if we suppose two men
dying together alone, do we think that the duty of one to
fulfill before he dies a promise he has made to the other
would be extinguished by the fact that neither act would
have any effect on the general confidence? Anyone who
holds that neither act would be suspected of not having
reflected on what a promise is.”
The Right and the Good, 37-39.
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3.
Utilitarians:
C. He rejects the utilitarianism for two reasons:
1. Single Criterion. He Rejects them on the ground that the single
criterion upon which an actual obligation is supposed to restnamely, whatever maximizes good-is both too simple for the
diverse circumstances we face and too restricted in it scope.
2. Violates common sense. Imagine that we could bring about
slightly more good by breaking a promise to benefit someone to
whom we had made no promise. Ought we then to break the
promise? Surely not.
Consider this interesting portion where he defends the fact that his
theory does not reduce to a mere production of good consequences:
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3.
D.
Kant
Ross also rejects Kant on the basis of common sense:
1.
Kant embraced exceptionless duties (e.g., the
duty to keep promises). But common sense
recognizes exceptions to these duties. Imagine a
case where keeping a trivial promise would
cause much harm. Ought we then to keep the
trivial promise? Surely not.
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4. Advantages:
1.
2.
Deontological yet flexible in view of what prima duty will
best fit situation.
Appeals to common sense. We don’t get tangled up in ethical
theory and confused by moral speculation.
3.
Feelings about right and wrong have a distinctive force that
is appealing.
4.
Acknowledges real moral conflicts and says we must choose
the weightier principle in that situational setting.
5.
We naturally tend towards Kantian-type principles.
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5. Potential Objections:
1.
The list of prima facie duties is unsystematic and follows no logical
principle.
Response: The list is not complete.
2.
Provides no principle for determining what our actual moral obligations
are in a particular situation.
Response: There is no reason to assume that they will be the same in any
given situation.
3.
List of prima facie duties is without justification; how can we be sure it is
accurate?
Response: Apprehending what is self-evident; we don’t overturn our moral
convictions just because they conflict with some moral theory.
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5. Potential Objections:
4. Don’t our intuitions change or evolve in view of
interaction with culture.
5. Clearly people can have different intuitions about
moral issues.
6. How can we decide which intuitions we should trust.
Consider the following response…
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Response:
“We have no more direct way of access to the facts about
rightness and goodness and about what things are right or
good, than by thinking about them; the moral convictions of
thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of ethics just
as sense perceptions are the data of natural science. Just as
some of the latter have to be rejected as illusory, so have some
of the former; but as the latter are rejected only when they are
in conflict with other convictions which stand better the test of
reflection. The existing body of moral convictions of the best
people is the cumulative product of the moral reflection of
many generations, which has developed an extremely delicate
power of appreciation of moral distinctions; and this the
theorist cannot afford to treat with anything other than the
greater respect. The verdicts of the moral consciousness of the
best people are the foundation on which he must build….”
~ The Right and the Good, pg. 46-7.
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