Transcript ENGR 107: Engineering Fundamentals

Lectures 7 and 8:
Engineering Ethics
C. Schaefer
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
George Mason University
Administrivia
• Homework:
– Some spreadsheets unreadable. See me for names of
students that need to resubmit their spreadsheet
homework.
• Semester Project:
– Next week: Preliminary Design Reviews
– Student concerns about participation
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Preliminary Design Review Guidelines
• 20 minute presentation with 10 minutes for Q&A for each of the 4
teams
• Present three well thought out design alternatives.
• You must present a detailed, clearly labeled sketch or CAD model
for each of your three design alternatives.
• List the pros and cons for each design and be prepared to discuss in
detail. What specific engineering and project challenges present
themselves for each of the three designs? Include a detailed
discussion of the vehicle designs and egg (payload) protection
schemes.
• Discuss and present any engineering mockups, trade studies, and
testing to substantiate your assessment of the best design
alternative.
• Which of the three design alternatives did you select for detailed
design and why? Discuss your testing approach.
• I want each team to meet at the Engineering building to locate and
assess the railing we’ll use in this project. I want to see photos and
measurements of the railing and surrounding area.
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Impromptu Projects
• Today’s Impromptu Project:
– Ethics Case Studies taken from: CENTER FOR THE
STUDY OF ETHICS IN SOCIETY, WESTERN
MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY
– Cases can be found at this link:
http://ethics.tamu.edu/pritchar/an-intro.htm
• Excellent ethics case studies also at:
– Online Ethics Center for Engineering and Research
– http://www.onlineethics.org/Resources/Cases.aspx
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Reference(s)
• Ethics in Engineering: 2nd Edition, Mike W.
Martin and Roland Schinzinger, McGrawHill, Inc., 1989.
• Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases, 2nd
Edition, C. Harris, M. Pritchard, and M.
Rabins, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning,
2000.
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Engineering Ethics
“Technology can have no legitimacy unless it inflicts
no harm”, Adm H.G. Rickover, father of the US
nuclear navy.
– What does Adm. Rickover mean by this?
– Should engineers avoid technology that has the
potential for [______] inflicting harm on a society or its
members? Possibly? likely?
• Engineers have an ethical and social responsibility
to themselves, their clients, and to society.
• Practically (although there is much debate about
this), engineering ethics is about balancing cost,
schedule, and risk.
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Engineering Ethics
• Engineering ethics is:
– the study of moral issues and decisions
confronting individuals and organizations
involved in engineering,
– the study of related questions about moral
conduct, character, ideals, and relationships
of people and organizations involved in
technological development.
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General Terms
• Ethics – critical reflection on what one does
and why one does it.
• Morality – social conventions about right
and wrong conduct.
• Descriptive ethics (non-normative) –
factual investigation of moral behavior and
beliefs, i.e., the study not of what people
ought to do but how they reason and how
they act.
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General Terms
• Normative ethics – (general) Which “action
guides” are worthy of moral acceptance and for
what reasons? Action guides include theories,
principles, rules, and maxims.
• Normative ethics – (applied) Professional codes
of ethics that specify role norms or obligations
that professions attempt to enforce.
• Tacit ethic – unsaid, unspoken rule of practice.
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Ethics Nomenclature
• Meta-ethics – theories about ethics.
• Normative ethics – recommendations of
standards and guidelines for morally right or good
behavior;
– engineering ethics (and professional ethics, in general)
are normative in nature.
• Ethical relativism – ethics relative to specific
culture or society.
• Ethical absolutism – same ethical standards apply
to all societies and cultures.
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Training in Preventive Ethics
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Stimulating the moral imagination
Recognizing ethical issues
Developing analytical skills
Eliciting a sense of responsibility
Tolerating disagreement and ambiguity
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Questions
• Should we judge what is ethical by a relative
or absolute standard? Why or why not?
• But which (whose) “moral standard” do
we use to judge these things?
– Is the Engineering Code of Ethics relativistic or
absolute?
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Organizing Principles to Resolving Ethical
Issues
• Utilitarian thinking – a standard that promotes
those individual actions or rules that produce the
greatest total amount of utility to those affected.
– A code that enjoins engineers to promote the safety,
health, and welfare of the public.
– What is utility, though? Happiness?
– Preference utilitarianism – promote those conditions
that allow each individual to pursue happiness as he or
she conceives it.
– Two conditions necessary for this: freedom and wellbeing.
– Practically, for engineers, this advocates cost/benefit
analyses.
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Problems with Utilitarianism
• Difficult to quantify benefits for ALL those affected.
• “Greatest good” difficult to apply to an all-inclusive
population.
• Someone gets “shafted” – approach justifies perpetrating
injustice on individuals, i.e., someone gets left out.
• Three approaches:
– Cost/benefit – quantifiable approach. Maximize positive utilities
(benefits) against negative utilities (costs).
– Act utilitarian – “will the course of action produce more good than
any alternative course of action that I could take”?
– Rule utilitarian – “would utility be maximized if everyone did the
same thing in the same circumstances”? Adoption of commonly
accepted rules.
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The Ethics of Respect for Persons
• Those actions or rules are right that, if followed, would
accord equal respect to each person as a moral agent.
• One well-known Respect for Persons Approach
– The Golden Rule – “universalizability”:
• “Treat others a you would like them to treat you” (Christian).
• “Hurt not others with that which pains you”, (Buddhist)
• “What is hateful to yourself do not do to your fellow man”,
(Judaism)
• “No man is a true believe unless he desires for his brother
that which he desires for himself”, (Islam)
• Two others not discussed:
– The self-defeating criterion
– Rights
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Impediments to Responsibility
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Self-interest.
Fear.
Self-deception.
Ignorance.
Egocentric tendencies.
Microscopic vision.
Uncritical acceptance of authority.
Groupthink.
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Questionable Engineering Practices
• Trimming – “smoothing of irregularities to make data look
extremely accurate and precise”
• Cooking – “retaining only those results that fit the theory
and discarding others”.
• Forging – “ inventing some or all of the research data…”
• Plagiarism – misappropriating intellectual property.
• Conflicts of interest (such as accepting gifts.)
– actual
– potential
– apparent
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Clearly Wrong Engineering Practices
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Lying
Deliberate deception
Withholding information
Failing to adequately promote the dissemination
of information
• Failure to seek out the truth
• Revealing confidential or proprietary information
• Allowing one’s judgment to be corrupted.
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Code of Ethics of Engineers
Fundamental Canons
1.
Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the
public in the performance of their professional duties,
2. Perform services only in areas of their competence,
3. Issue public statements only in an objective and truthful
manner,
4. Act in professional matters for each employer or client
as faithful agents or trustees,
5. Avoid deceptive acts in the solicitation of professional
employment.
National Society of Professional Engineers
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Code of Ethics of Engineers: Professional Obligations
• Engineers shall be guided in all their professional relations by the
highest standards of integrity,
• Engineers shall at all times strive to serve the public interest,
• Engineers shall avoid all conduct or practice which is likely to discredit
the profession or deceive the public,
• Engineers shall not disclose confidential information concerning the
business affairs or technical processes of any present or former client
or employer without his/her consent,
• Engineers shall not be influenced in their professional duties by
conflicting interests,
• Engineers shall uphold the principle of appropriate and adequate
compensation for those engaged in engineering work,
• Engineers shall not attempt to obtain employment or advancement or
professional engagements by untruthfully criticizing other engineers,
or by other improper or questionable methods.
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Code of Ethics of Engineers: Professional Obligations
• Engineers shall not attempt to injure, maliciously or falsely, directly or
indirectly, the professional reputation, prospects, practice or
employment of other engineers, nor untruthfully criticize other
engineers’ work.
• Engineers shall accept responsibility for their professional activities;
provided, however, that Engineers may seek indemnification for
professional services arising out of their practice for other than gross
negligence, where the Engineer’s interests cannot otherwise be
protected.
• Engineers shall give credit for engineering work to those to whom
credit is due, and will recognize the proprietary interests of others.
• Engineers shall cooperate in extending the effectiveness of the
profession by interchanging information and experience with other
engineers and students, and will endeavor to provide the opportunity
for the professional development and advancement of engineers
under their supervision.
September 9, 2002
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Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster
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Case Background
• Morton Thiokol developer of Space Shuttle solid rocket
boosters (SRB’s)
• Roger M. Boisjoly senior engineer for SRB and SRB joint
design.
• Inspection of previous flights (STS-51C) indicated hot gas
blow-by in primary seals in two field joints.
• Seal leaks could weaken joint and cause catastrophic
failure of SRB and loss of Shuttle and its crew.
• Seal leaks attributed to cold weather effect on O-ring
resiliency. O-rings lost resiliency below about 50° F.
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Case Background
• If O-rings were cold, they would not flex.
• During hot gas blow-by, seals (O-rings) would
erode (be “eaten” away).
• Earlier launch (STS-51B) also indicated some
blow-by and seal erosion.
• Earlier seal failures prompted Thiokol to conduct
seal tests on resiliency
– First indication of failure mode.
– Test results kept secret from NASA until “Flight
Readiness Review” immediately preceding decision to
launch STS-51L (Challenger).
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Solid Rocket Booster Design
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Solid Rocket Booster Design
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SRB Joint Design
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Events Leading to Flight Readiness Review
• Following seal test results, a memo was circulated
to technical and management personnel at
Thiokol outlining problem.
• Memo indicated potential for catastrophic failure
of SRB joints, loss of shuttle vehicle, and loss of
crew.
• NASA asked Thiokol to present a summary of all
booster seal problems. (NASA later denies this).
• A task team was formed to solve the problem.
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Events Leading to Flight Readiness Review
• Task team denied adequate resources by
Thiokol management – manpower and
materiel.
• NASA and Thiokol significantly pressured to
keep launch schedule.
• Thiokol or NASA management never
acknowledged Boisjoly’s status reports.
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Flight Readiness Review
• Telcon between Thiokol, Marshall Space
Flight Center, and Kennedy Space Center to
discuss whether to launch STS-51L next day.
• Temperature predicted at launch: 18°F.
• Seal erosion problems and concerns
discussed.
• Task force problems presented to NASA –
Thiokol management NOT happy with
Boisjoly.
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Flight Readiness Review
• NASA asked Thiokol middle management
for launch decision. Thiokol does not
recommend launch.
• NASA clearly disappointed.
• Thiokol requests private “caucus”.
• During caucus, Thiokol General Manager
pushes for middle management to launch –
he apparently does not want to disappoint
his client, NASA.
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Flight Readiness Review
• Engineers NOT encouraged to talk during
Thiokol management caucus.
• Thiokol management felt that all facts were
on table.
• Thiokol recommends launch to NASA.
• According to Boisjoly, the launch decision
resulted from “intense customer
intimidation”.
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The Explosion
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Hot Gas Leak from SRB (prior to explosion)
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Post Disaster
• Seven astronauts, including one teacher,
lost their lives in the explosion.
• Cost of disaster is in the billions;
– $1.7 billion to replace Challenger with
Endeavor
– $450 million launch costs
– Payload hardware and development costs
– Congressional hearings
– Process changes and oversight
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Post Disaster
• Space shuttle program put on hold for
several years of investigation and hardware
redesign.
• During Roger’s Commission proceedings,
Thiokol and NASA management begin to
cover up missteps.
• Cover up exposed.
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Post Disaster
• Boisjoly leaves Thiokol following efforts of
management to “punish” him. Some fellow
employees hold grudge against Boisjoly’s
testimony to Congress.
• Thiokol or NASA never really held accountable for
disaster.
• $10 million fine to Thiokol reportedly not paid.
• Chance of another catastrophic Shuttle disaster is
1 in 131 flights – even after redesign!
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The Crew of Flight STS-51L
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Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster
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