Hawk strategy
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Transcript Hawk strategy
大學部 生態學與保育生物學學程 (必選)
2010 年 秋冬
衝突 (Conflict)
─動物行為學 (Ethology)
鄭先祐(Ayo)
國立 臺南大學 環境與生態學院
生態科學與技術學系 教授
Ayo NUTN Web: http://myweb.nutn.edu.tw/~hycheng/
Part 3. 個體間的互動
生殖行為 (Reproductive Behavior)
親代照顧與交配體系 (Parental Care and Mating
Systems)
溝通:管道與功能 (Communication: Channels and
Functions)
溝通的演化 (The Evolution of Communication)
衝突 (Conflict)
團體生活,利他和合作 (Group Living, Altruism,
and Cooperation)
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16 衝突(conflict)
Aggression and conflict
The economics of holding a
territory
Why do animals fight?
The economics of territory size
As evolutionary view of conflict
The evolution of fighting behavior
Strategies for reducing the cost
of territorial defense
Game theory
A proximate view of conflict
Asymmetries in contests
Aggression and testosterone
Conflict among group members
Stress, aggression, and
How dominance is determined
dominance
The benefits of being dominant
The benefits of being subordinate
Conflict over space
Home ranges, core areas, and
territories
The ideal free distribution and
space use
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Some fights end peaceably, others do not
Male ibex are mountain goats with long, curved horns
They fight for access to females
The confrontation begins with an assessment
They push and shove each other
Sometimes fights end with the loser’s death
Speckled wood butterflies spiral up and up
Until one flies off unharmed
Even when animals have weapons
Contestants often exhibit restraint (克制)
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Aggression and conflict
Aggression: 給予對方有害的刺激或傷害的行為
Includes predation
Behaviors in response to aggression are not included (i.e.
fleeing)
Agonistic behavior: encompass the behavior of both the
aggressor and the animal that is the focus of the
aggression
Includes all conflict between conspecifics
Threats, submissive behavior, chasing, and physical combat
Only includes interactions between conspecifics
Excludes aggressive acts between species (i.e. predation)
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Why do animals fight?
Conflict is potentially dangerous
And metabolically costly (it requires energy)
Enough resources (food, shelter, mates) decreases conflict
But resources are frequently limited
So conflict occurs
Conflict between parents and offspring
The amount of energy and time a parent has available for a
particular offspring
Versus investing in other offspring or its own survival
Conflict is extremely common
But it manifests itself differently in manner and intensity
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Evolution of fighting behavior: game theory
Why don’t animals always fight with maximum effort?
Natural selection favors the individual that passes on
more of its genes
Game theory can help to understand the evolution of
conflict
Game theory: predicts an animal’s optimal behavior
While taking into account the behavior of other animals
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The game-theory model
Players: the combatants
Strategies: Different decisions available to players
Assumed to be heritable
Successful strategies increase in the population
Payoff: measures the costs and benefits for each
strategy
Currency: used to measure the payoff
Relates to fitness (number of offspring produced or
number of calories acquired)
A payoff matrix: organizes the values of the payoffs
of each strategy against the other strategies
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One game theory model: hawk-dove
The simplest game-theory model of aggression
Two players fight over a resource
Each opponent can play one of two strategies: hawk
and dove
Hawk strategy: immediately attack its opponent
Dove strategy: flee immediately if confronted by a
hawk
Display if confronted by another dove
If a hawk meets a hawk or a dove meets a dove
Each opponent has a 50% chance of winning
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The payoff matrix for the hawk-dove
game
Three variables measure a currency that relates to
fitness:
V = the value of the resource being contested
W = the cost of being wounded in a fight
D = the cost of displaying to an opponent
Add some numbers:
V = 30
W = 60
D=5
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Payoff for hawk – hawk interaction
If an animal playing the hawk strategy meets another
hawk
Both attack immediately
One hawk wins the resource: its payoff is V
The other hawk will be wounded: its payoff is –W
The average payoff for a hawk vs. hawk interaction
Payoff for the winning hawk + the payoff for the losing
hawk
Divide by 2 to get the average
V–W
2
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Payoffs for other interactions
Hawk against dove
The hawk immediately attacks
The dove flees
Hawk wins the resource, so its payoff is V
Dove against hawk
The dove immediately flees
The dove does not get injured
Nor does it win anything - its payoff is 0
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The payoff for dove vs. dove
One wins the resource
The other walks away
Both pay the cost of display
The payoff for the winning dove is V-D
The payoff for the losing dove it is just –D
Sum these and divide by 2
V─D─D
2
=
V ─ 2D
2
=
V
─D
2
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Box18.1 How many hawks and doves?
Neither hawk nor dove is an evolutionarily stable
strategy.
Rather, the stable equilibrium composition of the
population is some combination of hawks and doves
in a mixed ESS.
The stable proportion of hawks and doves occurs
when the average payoff for the hawk strategy equals
the average payoff for the dove strategy.
Assume:
p = the proportion of hawks in a population
1- p = the proportion of doves
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Box18.1 How many hawks and doves?
(V-W)
Payoff for dove strategy = p ----------- + (1 - p) V
2
Payoff for hawk strategy = p (0) + (1 – p) (V/2 – D)
-15p + (1-p)30 = 0 + (1-p) 10
-15p + 30 -30p = 10 – 10p
30 – 45p = 10 – 10p
20 = 35 p
p = 0.57
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Understanding the game
The currency = units of fitness
These strategies are heritable
Successful doves have offspring
That also play the dove strategy
Hawks give rise to hawks
Game-theory models predict whether strategies in a
population
Increase in frequency
Remain stable
Or disappear
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An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
A strategy that, when played by all members of the
population
Cannot be invaded by another strategy
If the dove strategy is an ESS
All members of the population play the dove strategy
If an animal playing hawk entered
All of its opponents would be doves
The hawk strategy will do well
The hawk’s genes increase
The hawk strategy increases in frequency
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Is the hawk strategy an ESS?
Will the population eventually become all hawks?
If the population is comprised of all hawks
The average payoff drastically decreases
If a dove enters the population
It won’t win
But it won’t be wounded during half its battles
The frequency of the dove strategy would increase
Neither a “pure hawk” strategy nor a “pure dove”
strategy is an ESS
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A mixed ESS is stable
A mixed ESS: some combination of hawk and dove
strategies that is stable
The stable proportion of hawks and doves occurs
When the average payoff for the hawk strategy equals
the average payoff for the dove strategy
A certain proportion of animals always plays hawk
And another proportion always plays dove
Or all animals play both hawk and dove
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Can a hawk or dove strategy be stable?
If the value of a resource (V) is greater than the cost of
being wounded (W)
A pure hawk strategy is an ESS
If V < W, a mixed ESS will result
A pure dove strategy is never an ESS
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Game-theory models generate
predictions
One prediction: the ferocity of a contest depends on
the value of the resource
Relative to the cost of injury
In some species, the prize for winning a fight is
incredibly valuable
i.e. a lifetime’s worth of reproductive success
Animals should risk everything, even fighting to the
death
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A valuable resource is worth fighting for
Male elephant seals have brutal(粗暴的) and bloody fights
Duels are so strenuous(費力的) that a male can be harem master
for only a year or two before he dies
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Another reason for hawk-like fighting
Game theory predicts that fights
are more likely to escalate(增加)
Not only because the value of
the resource is high
But if fight costs are low
Toads have no real weapons
against conspecifics
Fights rarely end in serious
injury or death
Toads engage in lively battles
over females
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Some species display
In species that have serious
weapons
Battles are generally
restricted to displays
Game theory reminds us
that it is the cost of battle
relative to the benefit of
winning that drives fight
intensity
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Resource value influences fight intensity
If the value of the resource changes
over time or in different places
Fighting intensity correlates with
resource value
For example, the value of a female to a
male is not always the same
Red deer stags fight most fiercely and
are wounded most frequently during
the period when most calves are
conceived
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As predicted by game theory, male red deer fight
harder when the value of the resource is greater
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Asymmetries in contests
In the basic hawk-dove model
All animals value the contested resource to the same extent
All individuals have the same ability to fight
In real life, rivals are rarely true equals
Contests are usually asymmetric
Inequalities (asymmetries) are grouped into categories
The ability of each contestant to defend the resource
The experiences of each contestant in previous fights
The value of the resource to each contestant
Arbitrary asymmetries unrelated to either resource value
or the ability to defend the resource
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Asymmetry in fighting ability
One combatant may be larger or heavier
Have bigger weapons
Be a more skilled fighter
Resource-holding potential (RHP): characteristics
that bear on an opponent’s ability to defend a resource
Contestants increase their fitness by assessing their
opponent’s RHP
Relative to their own
And adjusting their fighting strategy
Conditional strategy: adjusted according to the
conditions of the particular fight
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A conditional strategy: assessor strategy
Assessor strategy:
if one’s RHP is greater than the opponent’s , Play hawk
If one’s RHP is smaller, Play dove
Assessor strategy is an ESS when the cost of assessing the
opponent’s RHP is less than the cost of losing a fight
How do animals assess RHP?
Displays convey an impression of size and strength to an
opponent.
Animals assess one another accurately
But bluff convincingly when possible
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Some traits are difficult to bluff
Such traits are used in assessment
A male mountain sheep with small horns defers to a
competitor with larger horns
Male red deer judge each other’s size by interlocking
their antlers and pushing
Size of the male shore crab claw is more important than
its body size
Some species may not be able to judge their opponent’s
RHP
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Asymmetry in experience
Experience of winning or losing influences the outcome of
future encounters
Important in insects, spiders, molluscs, fish, birds, mammals
Winners are more likely to win subsequent fights
Losers become more likely to lose
Spiders fight fiercely for their prey
Spiders experienced as winners beat size-matched opponents
Loser effects can be long-lasting
Larger male copperheads (銅頭蝮) win fights for access to a
female
When rematched: prior losers gave up without even
challenging the competitor
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Asymmetry in the value of a resource
A contested resource may be more valuable to one
contestant
Food is more precious to a starving animal
The hungry contestant fights harder for it
Once northern harriers hawks have eaten
The value of the remaining prey decreases
Harriers are not as aggressive toward intruders
Leaner bluethroat birds were able to chase away larger
birds
Because the food was more important to the lean birds
They were more highly motivated to win
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copperheads (銅頭蝮)
northern harriers
hawks
bluethroat birds
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One animal may value a resource more
An animal that knows about a resource values it more
Than an animal that knows less about it
Territory is more important to a resident than an intruder
A resident knows the location of food, escape routes, refuges
Individuals value a territory more as it becomes familiar
If red-winged blackbird territory owners were removed
New residents fight harder as the territory becomes more
valuable
Knowledge about a resource influences fighting behavior
Hermit crabs (寄居蟹) attempt to steal shells from
conspecifics
Owners of poor shells fight
harder2010)if they are an attacker
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red-winged blackbird
Hermit crabs (寄居蟹)
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Arbitrary asymmetries
Arbitrary (uncorrelated) asymmetries: rules or
conventions used to settle conflicts
i.e. fipping a coin, pulling straws
Rules that are mutually agreed upon
Prior ownership (or residency)
Animals adhere to the principle that “possession is
nine-tenths of the law”
A hamadryas baboon male permitted to associate
with a female was perceived as the “owner” by a
newly introduced male
The second male was deferring ownership
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hamadryas baboon (阿拉伯狒狒)
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The bourgeois(中產階級者) strategy is an ESS
To add the possibility of prior ownership, a variation of
the hawk-dove model includes a third strategy: bourgeois
Sets rules for dealing with prior ownership:
Play hawk if you had possession first; otherwise, play dove
If the bourgeois strategy is added to hawk and dove
strategies in a population, it does better than either
So it is an ESS
If all animals play the bourgeois strategy
The owner always wins the outcome of any dispute
Can be reversed by switching ownership
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An uncorrelated asymmetry
Male speckled wood butterflies defend spots of sunlight
That serve as mating territories
Males fight by flying upward together
At the top of the spiral, one flies away
When a male resident butterfly is removed
The sunspot is instantly claimed by another male
When the original male is released again
It always loses the fight to regain its spot
Wood butterflies follow the rule that the “owner wins”
Butterfly fights may be determined by intrinsic aggression
Or fighting ability, or prior experience
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Dominance hierarchies in groups
Conflict exists among group members
Animals encounter the same individuals repeatedly
The animals don’t usually fight each time they meet
Dominance: the ability of one animal to assert itself over
others in acquiring access to a limited resource
Food, a mate, a display or nesting site
A submissive animal predictably yields to a dominant one
Hierarchies vary among species, conditions and time
Despotism (專制君主統治) : the simplest form of a
dominance hierarchy
One individual rules over all others in the group
Subordinates are equal
in(動物行為學
rank 2010)
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Dominance hierarchies may also be
linear
A is dominant over all
B is dominant over all but A
A ––> B ––> C ––> D ––> E
Often called a pecking order
Dominance hierarchies can be more complicated
A is dominant over B
B is dominant over C
But C is dominant over A
Hierarchies can shift as circumstances change
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Dominance is attained through
associations
Dominance in social groups may also be attained through
an association with a high-ranking individual
When two flocks of dark-eyed juncos merge
All birds of one flock rank above those of the other
Subordinate birds ride the coattails(衣尾) of the highestranking bird
Highest-ranking individuals behave differently towards
familiar birds
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Dominance may be a birthright
Dominance may also be a birthright based on the
status of one’s parents
Adult female rhesus monkeys have a linear dominance
hierarchy
Offspring assume a dominance position just below their
mother
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The benefits of being dominant
Being dominant translates into increased fitness
Two fitness-related benefits: access to food and mates
Dominant individuals get more food than subordinates
In brown hyenas each sex has a linear dominance hierarchy
The male and female at the top have equal rank
Top-ranking animals have more feeding time at carcasses
Subordinates leave without feeding if a dominant animal is
present
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Reproductive benefits go to the best competitor
In some social groups, all or nearly all the reproductive
benefits in a group
Go to a single individual that is the best competitor
In some species, the dominant female (or male)
suppresses reproduction by other members of the group
In eusocial species (social insects, naked mole rats) only a
single female reproduces
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Dominants have a reproductive advantage
More commonly, dominant animals have a clear
reproductive advantage
But they don’t completely suppress reproduction by
subordinates
A pack of African wild dogs has a clear dominance
hierarchy in each sex
More dominant females gave birth than subordinate
females
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The benefits of being subordinate
If subordinates have no other choice but to stay in a
group
Repeatedly challenging other individuals to fights would
lead to a risk of injury in conflicts they would lose
In many groups, both subordinates and dominants suffer
from a shake-up in the hierarchy
When the dominance hierarchy in chickens is stable
Hens fight less and lay more eggs
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Subordinates avoid the costs of
dominance
Dominant great tits or pied flycatchers have a higher
resting metabolic rate
And require more food
In some species, dominant individuals have increased
glucocorticoid levels
A steroid hormone associated with stress
Subordinates may leave and join another group
But this can be risky
Subordinate red foxes usually don’t live long enough to
become dominant in their natal group
But mortality rates of dispersers is also very high
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Staying vs. leaving
The benefits of staying may outweigh the costs of leaving
For a subordinate animal
The situation in the group could get better for a
subordinate
The dominant animal could die or be displaced
Subordinates may gain some fitness through kin selection
By helping to raise siblings
A subordinate can occasionally win a fight to briefly gain
access to a resource
A subordinate Rocky Mountain bighorn sheep may win
and mate with a female
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Subordinates can use subversive (破壞性
的) techniques
Such as alternative reproductive strategies
Sneaky males mimic a female to get past a dominant
male
Male side-blotched lizards, plainfin midshipman fish
Satellite males intercept females who are attracted to a
dominant male
Natterjack toads
The underlying strategy: avoid the costs of achieving
and maintaining dominance
And still enjoy some reproductive success
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Rocky Mountain bighorn sheep
side-blotched lizards,
Natterjack toads
plainfin midshipman fish
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Subordinates may form alliances
Band together to challenge dominant individuals
Lowest-ranking male savanna baboons form alliances
To oppose a single higher-ranking male
Alliances gained reproductive access to the female
But alliances do not always overturn the current hierarchy
Some female Old World monkeys band together
And “gang up” on other lower-ranking monkeys
Alliances occur in other animals besides primates
White-winged trumpeter birds
Subordinate males collaborate to interrupt copulation by the
dominant male
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savanna baboons
White-winged
trumpeter birds
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Conflict over space
Home range of an individual: the area in which it carries
out its normal activities
Space it defends from others
Space that is used by others
Core area: within the home range
An area in which most activities are concentrated
Immediately surrounding the nest site, food or water
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Territory
A defended area
Other definitions downplay(貶低) defense
And emphasize exclusive use of space
It is virtually impossible to state with any certainty
That the exclusive use of an area is maintained by active
defense
Territories have different uses, depending on the
resource being contested
May be used solely for feeding, mating or raising young
Or used for a variety of purposes: multipurpose
territories
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The ideal free distribution and space use
Ideal free distribution: the pattern by which animals
settle into different areas
It’s “ideal” because the animals know the value of each
habitat and can instantly choose the best one
And “free” because every animal is free to choose its
location without interference
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The ideal free distribution and ducks
Two habitats
A = higher quality
As ducks arrive in the area
They should select habitat A
As the number of animals in A increases
The number of resources available declines
The quality of A declines to the point that a new arrival
gets the same benefits
Regardless of which habitat it selects
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The ideal free distribution. Illustrated is a case with two habitats,
with habitat A of higher quality than habitat B. Thus, as animals
arrive , they should select habitat A. As the number of animals in
habitat A increases, the number of resources available to each
animal declines. Finally, the quality of A declines to the point that
a new arrival will get the same benefits regardless of which habitat
it selects.
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Animals are not always ideal or free
An “ideal” animal has perfect knowledge of a site’s
quality
But that’s not always true
Animals need time to gather information
Before they assess the quality of their environment
An animal is not always “free”
Others constrain them from behaving optimally
Some animals may be better competitors and grab more
than their fair share of the food
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The economics of holding a territory
What influences an animal to hold or share a territory?
Benefits of having a territory:
Exclusive access to resources (shelter, food, safety, mates,
site to raise offspring)
Costs of holding a territory:
Energy to patrol territory boundaries and display to or evict
intruders
Boundary fights can be dangerous
A “lost opportunity” cost: acquisition and defense takes
time away from other essential activities
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Costs and benefits of holding a territory:
resource abundance
Territoriality occurs only if
The fitness benefits from enhanced access to a resource
Exceed the fitness costs of defending the resource
Resource abundance: territoriality is favored when
resources are moderately abundant
If resources are scarce: not enough benefits to pay the
defense bill
If there are more than enough resources, it’s unnecessary
to defend a territory
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Resource abundance affects territoriality
Scarce resources don’t provide enough benefits
Golden-winged sunbirds abandon a territory when it no
longer contains enough food to meet the energy costs of
activities and defense
Chickadees in habitats disturbed by logging were less
likely to defend their territories
Territoriality is unnecessary with abundant resources
Female marine iguanas only defend territories with few
nest sites
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Costs and benefits of holding a territory:
resource distribution and intruders
Resource distribution: animals are more likely to be
territorial if resources are moderately clumped
A pile of food is easier to defend
As long as there aren’t too many competitors
Intruder pressure: the number of other individuals
willing to compete for a territory
The more competitors, the greater the cost of defense
Male fruit flies are less likely to hold territories when
there is a higher density of males
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The economics of territory size
Costs and benefits influence not only whether a territory
is held
But also its size
Benefits increase as territory size increases
An animal uses certain resources
More resources are not necessary
Costs of defense also increase with territory size
More borders to patrol
More intruders to drive off
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Optimal territory size: the benefits outweigh the costs by the
greatest amount
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Territory size maximizes energy gains
Rufous hummingbirds stop in California during
migration
To build fat reserves
Each bird defends a group of flowers as a territory
More flowers provide more energy
But requires more energy for defense
Reducing territory size cuts defense costs
And maximizes weight gain
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A bird adjusts the size of its territory to gain weight as
quickly as possible
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Reducing the costs of territorial defense
Animals can band together and share a territory
The faster an intruder is detected, the easier it is to drive away
Good vantage points and high trees
Juvenile Anolis lizards living in habitats without a barrier
Defended compact territories
They did not include barriers in their territories
Some birds pay attention to visibility when choosing territories
Red-capped cardinals defend territories along rivers and lakes
They defend territories on opposite shores
They easily see intruders on the opposite shore
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Anolis lizard
Red-capped cardinals
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Reducing the costs of territorial defense
Some animals use natural boundary markers to mark a
territory
i.e. Cicada killer wasps
Wasps use dowels (wooden sticks) as landmark cues
And shift their territories so the boundaries align with the
dowels
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(a) cicada killer wasp
(b) the original placement of the territories
(c) wooden dowels were laid on the ground
so that none of them aligned with territory
boundaries
(d) the next day, the wasps shifted their
territory boundaries so that they aligned
with the dowels.
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Another way to reduce costs of territorial
defense
Paying attention to the early-warning system provided
by neighboring territory holders
Peruvian red-capped cardinals evict(驅逐) an
intruder
Chasing and calling
This behavior alerts neighbors that there is an intruder
lurking nearby
Territory holders detect and evict an intruder if their
neighbor has just evicted it
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A proximate view of conflict
Aggressive tendencies involve genetics, hormones and
the nervous system
Seasonal changes in testosterone levels are correlated
with the intensity of territorial aggression
In winter, both testosterone levels and territorial defense are
low
Testosterone may increase after there is an aggressive
response to an intruder
A territory holder maintains its high aggression levels
Especially in the face of a persistent intruder
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Hormones may influence behavior
The presence of a hormone does not mean a particular
behavior will follow
An animal primed by testosterone will not fight if a
predator is nearby
Hormones increase the likelihood of a behavior
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Stress, aggression, and dominance
Aggression and stress are linked by the
neurotransmitter serotonin
And hormones called glucocorticoids
Physiological changes accompany conflict and other
stressful situations
The fight-or-flight response: increased heart rate,
rapid breathing, sweating
Digestion, growth and reproduction are shut down
Under the control of short-term bursts of glucocorticoids
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Serotonin and glucocorticoid levels
during aggression
Baseline levels establish an animal’s tendency to be
aggressive
In dominant animals: high glucocorticoids, low serotonin
Serotonin holds aggressive tendencies in check
When a social interaction begins
Glucocorticoids, serotonin, and dopamine (another
neurotransmitter) increase in dominant individuals
As the fight increases
Both dominant and subordinates have increased serotonin
and corticosterone levels
And show stress responses
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Interactions between glucocorticoids,
serotonin, and dopamine
When dominance is established and the fight ends:
Serotonin remains high in subordinates
Which are then less likely to initiate fights
The winner effect: winners are more likely to win
future fights
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A model of the possible interactions between
glucocorticoids, serotonin, and dopamine over the
course of an interaction.
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Being subordinate is not always more
stressful
Subordinate baboons have higher levels of
glucocorticoids
But dominant animals also spike with unstable
dominance hierarchies
The effect of glucorticoids varies by species
Glucocorticoid levels can be positively correlated,
negatively correlated, or uncorrelated with rank
Or even vary in their correlation with rank during the
day
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Stress responses can both help and harm
Cortisol level vary according to the social situation
Subordinates without close social support have higher
levels
Stress responses are adaptive in the short term
But persistent, long-term stress can lead to health
problems
Increased susceptibility to disease, shorter lifespan
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Summary
Conflict occurs when resources are limiting
Aggression: inflict noxious stimulation or destruction on another
Agonistic behavior: behaviors of the aggressor and the object of
aggression
Animals can limit conflict to displays and other low-cost actions
Game theory examines when conflicts escalate and when they
don’t
In the hawk-dove model, hawks escalate and doves flee
A strategy’s payoff depends on the value of the resource, cost of
being wounded, and the cost of display
Contests can be asymmetrical (different sizes, experience, etc.)
Arbitrary asymmetries are conventions that fighters follow
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Summary
Dominance may be determined by fights or as a birthright
Dominant animals get resources and access to mates
Subordinate animals stay: no other options are available
Ideal Free Distribution: how animals should distribute themselves
Territoriality can be energetically costly and even dangerous
Is favored when resources are moderately abundant,
moderately clumped and the number of intruders is moderate
To reduce costs of territoriality: select territories with good
visibility and landmarks, obey warnings of neighbors
In some species, dominant animals exhibit higher stress levels
In others, subordinate animals do
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問題與討論
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Ayo 台南 NUTN 站
http://myweb.nutn.edu.tw/~hycheng/
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