Transcript Alison Rieser

The Changing Climate of High
Seas Fisheries Governance
Alison Rieser
University of Hawai’i at Manoa
The Challenge of Change: Managing for Sustainability of Top
Oceanic Predators Workshop
April 12, 2007
1992
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Failure of Coastal State EEZ management
came to light with the collapse of the No.
cod stock and Canada’s & NAFO moratoria
Coincided with the assertion of larger
community interests in global commons and
proliferation of hard & soft int’l law
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Framework Convention on Climate Change
Convention on Biological Diversity
Rio Declaration, Agenda 21
UN Fish Stocks Agreement –
restoring the role of RFMOs
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Strengthening the RFMOs is key
Fishing States have a duty to join or create
an RFMO if none exists
States with a real interest have a right to
membership
Non-member States must adopt measures
consistent with those of the RFMO
Compatibility with coastal State
management of straddling & migratory
stocks
Questions about the reliance upon
RFMOs in the new law of the sea
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Would high seas fishing states
cooperate more than they did prior to
the advent of EEZs?
Have conditions changed sufficiently to
motivate them to cooperate, to make
them more likely to observe the new
obligations reflected in the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement?
Changes in climate:
greater attention to fisheries from
new quarters
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Scientists from a wider array of
disciplines are now looking at a broad
range of issues connected with
fisheries, including meta- and
retrospective analyses
NGOs have moved beyond whaling to
all marine fisheries, especially high
seas
Changes in climate:
scientific consensus on the need
for an ecosystem approach
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Attention to foodweb
dynamics, habitat
agree on ways to
operationalize it, e.g.:
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FAO Technical
Guidelines on EAF
Pikitch et al. 2004.
“Ecosystem-Based
Fishery Management”
Science, 305:346-347.
Changes in climate: strategies to apply
external pressure on RFMOs through other
multilateral agreements
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Conservation NGOs bringing attention
to fisheries impacts at meetings of
Parties to:
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CITES (int’l trade in endangered species)
Convention on Migratory Species
Convention on Biological Diversity
World Summit on Sustainable Devt
CITES
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Proposals to list by-catch species as
threatened by international trade
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Effort to list Atl bluefin tuna on App. I
proposals for Southern bluefin
Appendix II listing of great white shark,
basking shark, whale shark
Proposals at June ’07 meeting to list
porbeagle and spiny dogfish on App. II
Convention on Migratory
Species of Animals (Bonn)
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commitments among states to protect habitat and
prevent activities that threaten listed species
Species-specific Memoranda of Understanding
e.g., Agreement on Conservation of Albatrosses
and Petrels (ACAP)
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ACAP representatives attend mtgs of all RFMOs that
overlap albatross range as intergovt’l organizations
Results of this attention?
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WCPFC in 2006 is the first RFMO to adopt
measure requiring at least 2 methods to
mitigate seabird bycatch
CMS Parties prepare for meeting on options
for cooperation on migratory sharks (toward
possible agreement)
Australia mentions CMS activities as “good
motivation” for WCPFC to adopt shark
measures; Commission adopts fin-to-body
weight ratio/full utilization/IPOA
Changes in climate: International
Scrutiny of RFMOs
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Consensus that RFMO performance has been poor
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Overfishing of target fish stocks, delays in adopting
rebuilding plans
Few measures to mitigate adverse effects of fishing on
non-target species and habitat
No effective scheme of allocation
Slow to deal with illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing
International attention is now on the reasons for
poor performance
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Review Conference for the UN Fish Stocks Agreement
FAO Committee on Fisheries March 2007
Independent bodies, e.g., High Level Ministerial Task
Force/Chatham House
Different strategies for providing
international oversight
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Publicizing failures (shame-on-you strategy)
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RFMO = “Regularly Failing to Manage Our Oceans”
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Identifying “best practices” among RFMOs (good-on-you strategy)
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Defining a “model” RFMO (inspiration strategy)
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Making specific proposals for items on RFMO agenda (here’s-howyou-do-it strategy)
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e.g., Greenpeace detailed proposal to WCPFC for bigeye TACs and
allocations by gear type, marine reserves in ‘donut holes’ between FFA
States’ EEZs
TRAFFIC’s analysis of conservation impacts of allocation for WCPFC;
trade measures
Impact of outside scrutiny:
identifies costs of the unresolved
allocation issue
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pressure to set TACs high enough to
maintain fishing levels by historical fishing
nations undermining scientific advice
new members insist on shares of TAC or
TAE
reluctance to approve the admission of new
members
non-compliance with quotas
Contributions of outside scrutiny –
how to make progress on
allocations
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RFMOs should view this as priority issue
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specify criteria
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for allocating TAC/TAE; linking it to compliance
for new members in terms of rebuilding target stocks
for distributing any decreases across parties
penalties for exceeding quotas & other CMMs
Monitor the impact of allocation on the distribution of
fishing effort to unallocated species, areas where bycatch
of juveniles or protected species is likely or where
localized depletion
Get outside help early in the process: provide an arbitrated
negotiation process & advisory panel of external experts
Source: Willock and Lack, 2006. Conservation implications of allocation under the WCPFC.
Internal reforms by RFMOs
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Cooperate and coordinate among
RFMOs (circle the wagons strategy?)
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FAO COFI review of RFMOs Mar 2007
Jan 2007 Kobe, Japan meeting of all tuna
RFMOs
Joint Tuna RFMOs Course of Action
Kobe, Japan Jan. 26, 2007
Kobe: RFMO Performance
Review
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Goal - to improve effectiveness and
efficiency in fulfilling mandates
Using a common methodology and criteria
review framework:
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common elements of the RFMOs’ charters
best practices
applicable int’l instruments
Teams selected to ensure objectivity and
credibility; publicize on RFMO’s website
First review asap; then every 3-5 years
What role for inter-RFMO
cooperation?
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If RFMOs meet, will there
be ‘policy transfer’?
e.g., if new RFMOs
(SEAFO & WCPFC) deal
with allocation, will older
RFMOs follow suit (NAFO,
CCSBT)
Does united action on IUU
fishing translate into
internal reforms?
(overcapacity, overfishing)
Does coordination increase
accountability?
Research question: role of
institutional innovations in RFMOs
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Structured and binding decisionmaking
Voting on matters of substance instead of
consensus, with no opt-out allowance
Independent experts panels; arbitrated
negotiation of allocation criteria
New science arrangements (e.g., hybrid
model in WCPFC and CCSBT independent
science advisory panel)
Conflicts or synergies among
policy instruments?
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How might allocation of participatory rights
affect the adoption of EBM tools?
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Depends on the nature of the right;
transferability; spatial dimension
Should place-based management measures be
adopted first to avoid creating resistance by
quota-owners who claim spatial rights?
Are there incentive-based tools for ecosystem
protection?
New RFMOs: preemptive actions
by quota owning companies
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How does the
ownership of fishing
rights change the
behavior of industry?
e.g., Deepwater
Stakeholder Ltd (NZ
trawler companies)
proposed Benthic
Protection Areas for
NZ’s EEZ & the new
So Indian Ocean
RFMO
SIO Closures are those proposed by Southern Indian Ocean Deepwater
Fishers’ Assoc. (NZ quota-owning companies) proposed “Benthic Protection
Areas” for adoption by the new SIO RFMO