Transcript Fisheries management - CFP

Fisheries management;
problems - solutions
Sarah B. M. Kraak
University College Cork
Marine Institute
Ireland
Problems in fisheries management
Fig. from Fulton et al. 2011. Human behaviour: the key source of uncertainty in fisheries management. Fish & Fisheries.
• The regulations are viewed by the fishers as
opposing rather than supporting their
interests and this manifests itself as a reduced
compliance to ‘the letter’ as well as ‘the spirit’
of the regulations.
• sustainability
Solon (Athenian statesman and lawmaker,
c. 638 BC–558 BC).
He was challenged by the problem how
his countrymen’s greed could be kept
within bounds by means of laws.
He resolved that he should frame his
laws in such a way as to make it to
everybody’s advantage to follow them to
the letter and the spirit.
‘perverse’ incentives
• By-catch limits / catch composition rules as
percentage:
– E.g. a lower cod percentage may be achieved by
increasing the catches of other species …
promoting use of smaller mesh gears…
‘perverse’ incentives
• Landings quota rather than catch quota
(discarding is legal):
– discarding of overquota catch in mixed demersal
fisheries.
Species A
Species B
Fishing effort
Species A
Species B
Fishing effort
Species A
Species B
Fishing effort
Fig. modified from Ulrich et al. 2011. Reconciling single-species TACs in the North Sea demersal fisheries
using the Fcube mixed-fisheries advice framework. ICES Journal of Marine Science
Real Time Incentives (RTI)
• Each vessel gets an (annual) quota of RTI
credits;
– RTI-credits or RTIs can be seen as fishing-impact
equivalents
Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach
combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science
Real Time Incentives
The fisher is free to fish where and when he wants,
given the tariffs…
No catch/landings
QUOTA
Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach
combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science
Real Time Incentives
0.1 RTI
0.5 RTI
1 RTI
2 RTIs
5 RTIs
Closed
Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach
combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science
Discards of vulnerable sharks and rays/skates
Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach
combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science
Discards of vulnerable sharks and rays/skates
Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach
combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science
Real Time Incentives
• RTI system does not prescribe and forbid
• allows fishers to fish wherever and whenever they
want
• ‘costs’ internalized and have to be ‘paid’ by the
fishers (in ‘reduced fishing opportunities’)
Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach
combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science
Real Time
Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach
combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science
Advantage
• Costs of ‘overfishing’ and other costs to ecosystem
are internalized: fishers have to take them into
account in their business decisions
– no perverse incentives
Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach
combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science