Best Known Methods in Security Events Correlation

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Transcript Best Known Methods in Security Events Correlation

Best Known Methods in
Security Events Correlation
Mohammed Fadzil Haron
GSEC GCIA
April 12, 2005
Agenda
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Correlation overview
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Knowledge requirements
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Methodology
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Data representation
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Reaction
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Correlation defined
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A relation existing between phenomena or
things or between mathematical or
statistical variables which tend to vary, be
associated, or occur together in a way not
expected on the basis of chance alone…[1]
[1]
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http://www.webster.com
Overview
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Correlation is the next security big thing in
importance
An important tool in the security analyst’s toolbox
for monitoring security events
To be most effective, most – if not all – events
should be examined
Defense in depth means more data from different
technologies, vendors, and products
Huge amount of data to analyze; terabytes in size
and growing
Reduce false-positive and false-negative findings
compared to use of a single product/technology
Expensive manned 24x7 monitoring capabilities
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Ultimate goal
Et = Dt + Rt
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Exposure time (Et): The time the resource,
information, or organization is susceptible to attack
or compromise.
Detection time (Dt): The time it takes for the
vulnerability or the threat to be detected.
Reaction time (Rt): The time it takes for the
individual, group, or organization to respond and
eliminate or mediate the vulnerability or risk.
“Time Based Security” by Winn Schwartau
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Security events flow
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Axiom on correlation
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You only see the tip of the iceberg
Know the environment and perimeter of defense
well
Don’t trust the tool; trust your judgment
“Automate whenever possible” [1]
Use the simplest data representation possible
Balance between over-correlated and undercorrelated
Get the big picture
“The truth is in the packet” [1]
[1]
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Toby Kohlenberg, Intel Corp.
Knowledge requirements
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Know your environment
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Know your perimeter of defense
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Automate tasks
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Simplify data representation
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Know your environment
Knowing the ins and outs of your network is a
necessity
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External network, DMZ and internal network architecture
Other networks, such as VPN and dial-up
Logistical and geographical locations of servers and users
Different operation systems, applications and functionality
of servers and client machines
– Network switches and routers in use
– Logistical and geographical locations of critical servers
(DNS, WINS, DHCP) as well as high-valued servers (web
servers, servers containing intellectual properties)
– You cannot know everything yourself, so know the
individual experts on each piece of the network puzzle
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Example of environment knowledge
usage
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Can isolate IP addresses of Internet, DMZ and
internal network for different categorization
– Potential detection of external attack versus inside job
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VPN and dial-up services introduce other threats
and need to be given separate consideration
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Allows assignment of customized severity levels
for different services, such as DNS and servers
housing intellectual property, for upgraded security
needs
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Source of events
Host level – Syslog, HIDS/HIPS, eventlog,
log files, apps logs, anti-virus signature
level
 Network level – NIDS/NIPS, NBAD, firewall,
network routers and switch logs, active
directory logs, VPN logs, third-party
authentication logs
 Audit – Vulnerability scanning, OS and
patch level
 Knowledgebase – Software vulnerabilities
and exploits
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Know your perimeter of defense
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Firewall
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IDS
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IPS
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Audit capabilities
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Host level defenses
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PENS
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Vulnerability scanning data
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And so on.
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Know your firewalls
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Location – Outer-facing, inner-facing, DMZ,
internal, internal isolated network
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Type – Packet filter, stateful, application
firewall/proxy
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What’s allowed versus denied
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Capabilities versus shortcomings
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Know your IDS/IPS
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Which product deployed? NIDS, HIDS/HIPS,
NIPS
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Where were they deployed? What kind of
traffic is being monitored?
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What product/vendor deployed?
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Capabilities versus shortcomings
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Know your audit capabilities
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Where are logs being kept? Syslog server
or logs on host?
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How long have logs being kept? Rotated?
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Know your syslog servers
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Host level defenses
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Anti-virus logs
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Minimum security specification compliance
enforcement software logs
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OS, service packs, patches-level
information
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Automate tasks as much as possible
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Daunting tasks to detect intrusion due to:
– Amount of data involved reaching terabyte range
– Complexity of network environment architecture
with Internet presence, DMZ, WAN, MAN, PAN,
LAN, VOIP, VPN, Dial-up
– Complexity of perimeter of defense
– Large IP address ranges used internally, that is,
using Class A 10.x.x.x
– Multiple internally isolated networks with
different type of policies, and access controls
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What and where to automate
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Data aggregation – at data source and event
manager
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Manual, repetitive tasks – at event manager
and reaction
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Data correlation – event manager
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Simplify data representation – event
manager console
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Incident notification – event manager
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Group your assets
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Break down IP addresses into groups, such
as internal, DMZ and others for Internet
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Determine and group all critical servers,
such as DNS, WINS, and DHCP
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Determine and group all high valued
servers, such as file shares, web servers,
and FTP servers, and encrypted content
servers for intellectual properties
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Types of correlation
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Sets
– String a group of events together to generate a
trigger
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Sequences
– String a group of events together in sequence or
particular order to generate a trigger
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Statistical
– Deviation of normal behavior, such as mean or
normal curve
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Methods of correlation
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Rule
– Manually constructed, easy to create/update. Usually explicit in
nature and can be applied to set, sequence and threshold types.
Contains three elements: condition, time interval, and response.
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Heuristic
– Similar to anti-virus signature. One signature can detect multiple
variations. More implicit than explicit in nature, thus potential for
higher false positives/negatives.
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Fuzzy Logic / Artificial Intelligence
– Model approach to correlation that can dynamically adapt to
changing environment. Difficult to produce and still immature;
very cutting-edge.
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Hybrid
– No one doing them all yet. Commonly used are heuristic and rule.
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Correlation constraint
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Time
– Time should be considered when creating time
box correlation
– Correct time is critical in correlation
– Time synchronization is crucial
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Context
– Order of events sequence is important
– Context can be necessary in correlation rules
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Sample of correlation flow
INTERNET
External
attacker’s
IP address
NO
Deny
Outer Firewall
NO
Deny
Inner
Firewall
NO
Accept
Deny
YES
DMZ IDS
detection
Deny
Accept
Inner IDS
detection
YES
Outer IDS
detection
YES
Outer Firewall
Accept/Deny
NO
Inner
Firewall
NO
Accept
Deny
Inner IDS
detection
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Inner
Firewall
NO
Accept
DMZ IDS
detection
Accept
Inner IDS
detection
YES
Deny
YES
Inner
Firewall
Accept
NO Inner IDS YES
detection
Graphical representation
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Seeing is believing
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Pros
– Can represent huge data in simple and easy to
understand graphs
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Cons
– Not many tools (commercial/open source) with
this capability
– If exist, limited capabilities
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Effective graphics should…
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Show the data
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Avoid distorting data
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Present a large volume of data in small
space
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Make large data sets coherent
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Show several levels of detail
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Provide clear purpose of data presentation
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Represent the data and not the underlying
technology, methodology, and design
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Forms of data representation
Graphs
 Link graph
 Charts
 Data maps
 Time series
 Narrative graphics (space and time)
 Animation
 Visualization
 Virtual reality
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Scanning graph
(One source to many target relationship)
Mar 14 08:33:20 66.34.244.12:2827 -> xxx.yyy.1.1:18905 SYN ******S*
Mar 14 08:33:20 66.34.244.12:2830 -> xxx.yyy.1.2:18905 SYN ******S*
Mar 14 08:33:20 66.34.244.12:2833 -> xxx.yyy.1.3:18905 SYN ******S*
Mar 14 08:33:22 66.34.244.12:2836 -> xxx.yyy.1.4:18905 SYN ******S*
Mar 14 08:33:22 66.34.244.12:2839 -> xxx.yyy.1.5:18905 SYN ******S*
Mar 14 08:33:22 66.34.244.12:2842 -> xxx.yyy.1.6:18905 SYN ******S*
Mar 14 08:33:22 66.34.244.12:2845 -> xxx.yyy.1.7:18905 SYN ******S*
Mar 14 08:33:20 66.34.244.12:2848 -> xxx.yyy.1.8:18905 SYN ******S*
Harder to internalize
Scan activity easily recognized
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Link graph
Stage 1 of worm
propagation
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Link graph
Stage 2 of worm
propagation
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Link graph
Stage 3 of worm
propagation
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Moving average
(Simple network anomaly detection)
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160
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Example:
Monitoring port 445
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Monitored Events
Moving Average
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0
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Increase in moving
average, showing
an increase in
activities
Animation movie
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Inbound connection attempts to San Diego
State University (SDSU) from external source
(unauthorized)
Representing 332 GB of raw data, 3.4 billion
raw syslog records, and 1 million events
Period of 1996-2002 (6 years)
Available at http://security.sdsc.edu/probesanimations/index.shtml
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Animation movie
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Reaction to correlated data
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Enforcement for malware cleaning
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Blocking to minimize malware propagation
and attack
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Investigation for malicious non-worm
activities
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Learning mode for improving data (reducing
false-positives and false-negatives)
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Conclusion
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Correlation is a must tool for information
security professionals
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Time saved in detection will allow faster
response time
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Faster response time will minimize damages
to your assets
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Questions?
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References
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Event correlation;
http://www.computerworld.com/networkingtopics/networking/
management/story/0,10801,83396,00.html
“Protecting the Enterprise with Scalable Security Event
Management, Part II - Intelligent Event Correlation”; Michael
Mychalczuk;
https://www.sans.org/webcasts/show.php?webcastid=90468
“Thinking about Security Monitoring and Event Correlation“;
http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1231
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